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1. Introduction 
 
Peter Carey is “[w]ithout question the pre-eminent literary voice of post-colonial Australia”, 
writes Nicholas Wroe in the British Guardian.1 Robert McCrum, also writing for the Guardian, 
calls him “the dominant Australian writer of his generation”, who “arrived exuberantly on the 
international literary scene […] with Illywhacker, his second novel, in 1985” – counting Carey’s 
True History of the Kelly Gang amongst the “100 greatest English-language novels of all time” 
(albeit at place 100).2 So, while Australian literature may have the air of something exotic in 
the field of Anglophone literary studies, Peter Carey, with all his high international acclaim, 
does not. He has won the Man Booker Prize twice – Oscar and Lucinda (1988), True History of 
the Kelly Gang (2001)3 – and he is so well established in academia that Andreas Gaile’s 
extensive bibliography on Carey amounts to almost fifty pages, even though it only reaches 
until the year 2003.4 Quite a few doctoral theses have of course also been published by now.5 
In fact, Carey is so popular that there are articles solely devoted to discussing his fame.6 
Considering all this fame and all these academical discussions, one might think that 
there is little left to say about his work and therefore little need for this additional thesis. 
However, when we look at Gaile’s assessment of almost 30 years of scholarship, then there 
is something that should grasp our attention. Gaile writes: “Regardless of disciplinary 
affiliations of Carey’s academic commentators […], the vast majority of Carey scholars 
have approached his writings with the tools provided by late twentieth-century critical 
                                                          
1 Nicholas Wroe, “Fiction’s Great Outlaw,” Guardian, Guardian, 6 Jan. 2001. Web. 15 Oct. 2015. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/jan/06/fiction.petercarey>. 
A British version of punctuation has been used for quotations in this thesis. Full stops and commas remain outside 
inverted commas if the quoted part does not constitute a full sentence and is not introduced by a colon. All direct 
quotations are put in double inverted commas, while all scare quotes and metaphorical uses are put in single 
ones. 
2 Robert McCrum, “The 100 best novels: No 100 – True History of the Kelly Gang by Peter Carey (2000),” Guardian, 
Guardian, 16 Aug. 2015. Web. 15 Oct. 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/aug/16/100-best-
novels-true-history-kelly-gang-peter-carey>. If not indicated otherwise, italics are always in the original 
throughout the entire thesis. 
3 Of course Carey has also won many other prizes, which is often mentioned in academia. See e.g. Paul Kane, 
“Framing Peter Carey,” Preface, Fabulating Beauty: Perspectives on the Fiction of Peter Carey, ed. Andreas 
Gaile, New York: Rodopi, 2005, xi-xiii. 
4 See Gaile 2005. 
5 In his introduction to Fabulating Beauty Andreas Gaile talks of seven doctoral dissertations (including his own), 
but his bibliography only reaches up to the year 2003, excluding, for example the 2009 thesis by Chris Boge 
(Andreas Gaile, Introduction, Gaile 2005, xix-xxxv, xxiv; Chris Boge, Outlaws Fakes and Monsters: Doubleness, 
Transgression and the Limits of Liminality in Peter Carey's Recent Fiction, Heidelberg: Winter 2009). 
6 See Karen Lamb, Peter Carey: The Genesis of Fame, Pymble, NSW: Angus & Robertson, 1992; and Graeme 
Turner, “Nationalising the Author: The Celebrity of Peter Carey,” Australian Literary Studies 16.2 (1993): 131-9. 
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theory.”7 The first point to note is the shortness of Gaile’s statement. In his thesis, it takes him 
no more than two paragraphs to assess almost the entire research on Peter Carey that had 
been produced at the time. The second point to note is the term “late twentieth-century 
critical theory”. What Gaile means by this expression is, as he says, “postist” theories. And by 
this, in turn, he means that scholars usually demonstrate that and how Carey’s works are 
postcolonial and/or postmodern.8 Thus, when the Guardian’s McCrumm appraises Carey’s 
True History of the Kelly Gang as “postmodern historical novel”,9 he moves on very safe 
ground. Which brings us to the main point of this thesis. 
When Gaile in his doctoral thesis is done with the scholarly overview of Peter Carey 
after two paragraphs, when this, moreover, is definitely not due to Gaile’s superficial 
investigation (in fact, hardly a scholar is more thorough than Gaile), when Gaile’s summary 
is therefore actually very accurate, then either Peter Carey, to say it bluntly, has been 
writing the same old novel for nearly thirty years by now, or there are whole worlds in his 
writings that have yet to be uncovered. Since I claim the latter is the case, this thesis sets 
out to chart at least a few areas of these vast forgotten territories, to use a consciously colonial 
metaphor. The theoretical ‘vehicle’ with which the new areas are entered is agency, a concept 
that will be discussed at length in Chapter 4 and that at this stage can be taken to simply mean 
self-determined acting. 
In order to make Gaile’s observation more concrete and to be able to show what new 
impulses this thesis offers, I will proceed with the unusual step of providing an example, 
namely a five-page introduction to Carey’s Parrot and Olivier in America (2009 Penguin 
Australia; 2010 Faber). Parrot and Olivier is a comparatively new novel that as of today has 
not been discussed very often in academia. Thus, by juxtaposing the introduction with 
scholarly statements that seem to fit Parrot and Olivier perfectly but are actually referring to 
entirely different, much older novels, the cul-de-sac in which Carey research seems to be stuck 
should become plainly visible. At the same time, the introduction will help to situate the 
agency approach of this thesis within current discussions in academia and to demonstrate 
what it has to offer. 
 
                                                          
7 Andreas Gaile, Rewriting History: Peter Carey’s Fictional Biography of Australia, New York: Rodopi, 2010, 8. 
8 Ibid. 
9 McCrum, n.pag. 
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Parrot and Olivier in America 
 
Through many interlaced flashbacks the novel Parrot and Olivier in America tells the very 
different life stories of the French aristocrat Olivier and the English orphan Parrot, who meet 
in Paris and embark – not entirely voluntarily – on a joint journey to America; a journey on 
which Parrot is employed by Olivier’s mother to serve and spy on her son. Both these 
characters are typical Carey thefts, even though the references to Virginia Woolf’s The Voyage 
Out are perhaps no more than a quick nod. Woolf’s Perrott is a barrister whose love to an 
upper-class woman is not returned because being the mere son of a grocer who had to go 
through a tough childhood, had to work his way up very hard and is now also supporting his 
invalid sister, he may appear to be a gentleman, but will never ‘quite’ belong to her class. In 
Carry’s hands, Perrott turns into the rough, good-hearted Parrot, who is permanently 
pummelled by cruel fate, struggles his way through continuous hardship and in this way has 
much more in common with the prototype of the Australian battler than Woolf’s character. 
The aristocrat Olivier (Olivier-Jean-Baptiste de Clarel de Barfleur de Garmont), however, is 
Carey’s fictional version of the famous 19th century intellectual and author of Democracy in 
America, Alexis de Tocqueville. And for the plot of the novel, this second theft is the more 
significant one. 
As is typical of Carey, and as Carey indicates in his acknowledgements, many of the 
descriptions and discussions in the novel are directly taken from the historical Tocqueville 
himself. A noteworthy example is the letter from Olivier’s father in which he describes how 
he was received by King Louis XVIII: “we saw enormous mass emerge from the king’s study, 
shuffling and waddling; this mass was topped by a fine and noble head”. Surprisingly, this 
is an actual letter from Hervé de Tocqueville (Alexis de Tocqueville’s father), which is 
quoted – word by word – in Hugh Brogan’s biography of Tocqueville.10 Another example 
would be the “redoubtable Mrs Dougdale”, an American woman who, as she tells Olivier, 
“was perfectly convinced that the Negroes were of the same race as us, just as a black cow 
is of the same race as a white one”. Despite black people enjoying citizens’ rights (that is, 
voting rights) on paper, she criticises her own racist society, “‘[t]he law with us is nothing 
                                                          
10 See Carey, Parrot and Olivier in America, 37-8, and Hugh Brogan, Alexis de Tocqueville: A Biography, London: 
Profile Books, 2006, 39-40. 
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if it is not supported by public opinion’”.11 Also these critical words are quoted in Brogan’s 
biography, though not uttered by a Mrs Dougdale but a Mr John Jay Smith, whom Alexis 
de Tocqueville describes as “‘a very well-informed and capable Quaker’”.12 One should be 
careful, therefore, not to attribute all the progressive attitudes that are expressed and all 
the conservative attitudes that are exposed in the novel to Peter Carey – many are directly 
taken from Tocqueville himself. 
In fact, the whole character of Olivier, his views and inner conflicts, remain very close to 
the historical model – even if Carey takes the freedom to highlight certain aspects and to 
downplay others. For his novel, he particularly utilises Tocqueville’s conflicted attitude 
towards democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville, writes Alan Kahan, “firmly believed in the 
superiority of the new democratic society, yet he was socially uncomfortable with people who 
did not come from his own caste”.13 And he continues: “As he [Tocqueville] wrote in a note to 
himself, ‘I have an intellectual preference for democratic institutions, but I am aristocratic by 
instinct’”.14 
Just like Alexis, then, Olivier is trapped in a third space, a no man’s land between the fading 
world of the old French (European) aristocracy, of which he is a part, and the new world of 
(American) democracy that he learns to admire but cannot wholeheartedly subscribe to. 
“Olivier de Garmont was unhappy with the king, but what I [Parrot] did not understand was 
that he was, so to speak, on the same team. So no matter what a nutter the king was, Olivier 
de Garmont was a noble, duty-bound to protect him from the mob.”15 
This conflict reaches its climax when Olivier falls in love with Amelia Godefroy in America, 
but finds he cannot escape his upbringing. Again, Carrey loots his sources here and 
unscrupulously reuses them for his own purposes. The actual Alexis de Tocqueville “broke 
tradition by marrying a woman who was not only not a French aristocrat, but English, middle 
class and six years his elder [Marie Mottley, the marriage took place on 26 October 1835]. For 
the rest of his life he engaged in a hopeless struggle to make his family accept her”, as Kahan 
informs his readers.16 Olivier, by contrast, desperately tries to convince his Amelia to marry 
                                                          
11 Carey, Parrot and Olivier in America, 248-9. 
12 Brogan, 195; see also George Wilson Pierson, Tocqueville in America, Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1996, 513-
4. 
13 Alan S. Kahan, Alexis de Tocqueville, New York: Continuum, 2010, 3. 
14 Ibid., 11. 
15 Carey, Parrot and Olivier in America, 99. 
16 Kahan, 3. 
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him in America and live there with him. When Amelia, in the middle of an argument, 
declares: “‘you are a de Garmond’”, he thinks: “I did not correct her or admit, even to 
myself, the jarring note. She should not, of course, have used the de.”17 It is this small 
gesture that Carey uses to convey the whole diffuse yet insurmountable trench 
constituted by class: 
 
I [Amelia] would not cut you off from all you are. You are a de Garmont. Would I be the 
knife that severed the cord to the mother of your life?’ 
‘You do not say the de.’ 
‘Dear, do I embarrass you?’ 
‘Don’t be silly.’ 
‘Yes, I embarrass you.’ 
‘No.’ 
‘That is why you will not take me home to France.’ 
Of course the first part was not true, but alas the second was. I could die of love inside 
her sweet white arms, but I could not present her at the rue Saint-Dominique. We would 
be made more miserable than poor Heudreville who drowned himself like a peasant in 
his well. 
‘We will be Americans together.’ 
‘Please do not say that, Olivier. You are not American.’18 
 
One can clearly see, then, that the novel’s relevant themes are the ties of class against 
which Olivier unsuccessfully rebels and, on a metafictional level, Carey’s appropriation and 
rewriting of official Western history. In fact, the text itself almost bullies the reader 
towards these two conclusions. 
At its beginning, when still in France, Olivier describes his inner struggles quite 
explicitly. His friend, Thomas de Blacqueville, says Olivier, “set the example of a noble who 
every day refused to be trapped inside his history. Thus it was history itself that became 
our subject, our enemy, our ambition. […] Would we drown swimming against the tide of 
history?”19 In vain Olivier struggles against the trap of his class background. Because he “is 
trapped inside his [personal] history”, he is in danger of drowning “swimming against the 
tide of [general] history”. He is too young and open-minded to stick to the fading world of 
the old aristocracy of which he is a part. But he is not flexible enough to cut loose from his 
                                                          
17 Carey, Parrot and Olivier in America, 427. 
18 Ibid., 427-8. When the self-made men and women of America are fascinated by Olivier’s nobility and seek his 
approval of their way of life in the novel, then this is an expression of the cultural cringe that they experience 
towards the Old World from which they emerged and to which they compare themselves (see Chapter 10.2. for 
the concept of the cultural cringe). But as soon as the arrogance of class becomes apparent, they drop him like 
a hot potato. 
19 Ibid., 83. 
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upbringing entirely. And so his allegiance to his family, his class, his “team” as Parrot puts it, 
pull him underwater as soon as he tries to swim. He remains miserably stuck between the Old 
and the New World. 
Also the point that the text constitutes a historical refabulation is highlighted by the 
text itself and almost thrown into the face of its readers. At the end of the novel and in 
keeping with postmodern writing techniques, Parrot enters the extradiegetic level by 
directly addressing his audience in his role as narrator, making the following tongue-in-
cheek reference to Olivier’s “own book”: 
 
Indeed, you will read a very different account of the dinner [at Parrot’s newly acquired 
house “on the banks of the Hudson River some three miles south of Harlem Heights”20] 
in his [Olivier’s] own book, for in the so-called appendix there are five pages titled ‘An 
Account of Settlers at Harlem’. (I have taken care not to repeat any of those very original 
observations, they are his alone and shall not be poached by me.)21  
 
Most likely Carey refers to an – actually not quite ‘un-poached’ – anecdote Gustave de 
Beaumont, Alexis de Tocqueville’s travel companion, relates in a letter to his mother, dated 7 
June 1831, and a “[c]onversation with Mr. Livingston at Greenburgh on the Hudson” they had 
on that day, which Tocqueville in turn recorded in his notes.22 While waiting for a steamboat, 
they discussed the “want of intellectual tone” in America, the idea that intellectual activity 
suffers in America because the landed gentry are destroyed by democratic inheritance laws. 
It is the very discussion Olivier has with Parrot at the end of the novel, where Olivier says that 
in a democratic society there are no leisured classes, who alone have got the time, money, 
and education to appreciate and support fine art, and that the common American people like 
their leaders to be as undereducated as they are themselves.23 
Such passages make it very clear that the novel employs metafictional writing techniques 
in order to intervene in a fabled piece of Western scholarship and to rewrite it from an 
Australian perspective. Paul Giles – one of the first scholars to discuss the novel – has already 
drawn this conclusion: 
 
                                                          
20 Ibid., 436. 
21 Ibid., 445. 
22 Cf. Pierson, 116-17. For Tocqueville’s notes, see also Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America, 1831, trans. 
George Alfred Lawrence, ed. Jacob Peter Mayer, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1960, 19-20. Cf also Brogan, 156-7. 
23 Carey, Parrot and Olivier in America 449-50. 
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In effect, then, Carey’s novel is intertextually revising the American myth of Tocqueville 
from an Australian perspective, introducing a transnational dimension to problematize 
the simplistic notions of national narrative that have for too long held sway in every 
cultural environment.24 
 
By replacing Gustave de Beaumont with Parrot, moreover, Carey can contrast Olivier’s 
fictional class sentiments with Parrot’s egalitarianism, mateship and successful, if haphazard 
and makeshift, entrepreneurship. Inevitably, Parrot and his “misshapen” carpentry25 have to 
be read as a type therefore, the prototypical Australian. As opposed to Olivier, he manages 
to intervene in the tide of colonial history. Like Jack Maggs (Jack Maggs), Ned Kelly (True 
History of the Kelly Gang), or Bob McCorkle (My Life as a Fake), Parrot intrudes into and 
disrupts the narrative of the powerful, and is a truly inauthentic authentic voice (his name 
says it all) of the oppressed and downtrodden coloniser of the New World, who with 
honesty and bravery manages to struggle through. In the end, the narrator’s voice is the 
servant’s (Parrot’s), not his master’s (Olivier’s). Thus, coming back to the beginning of this 
chapter, one may justly conclude, Parrot and Olivier is a “postmodern historical novel” – 
to use the words that McCrumm intended for Carey’s True History of the Kelly Gang, a 
novel that was published almost a decade prior to Parrot and Olivier. 
And this is not a mere fluke. What can and presently will be shown with this short 
introduction to Parrot and Olivier is that not only McCrumm’s words but the words of 
many Carey critics seem to apply to almost all of Carey’s works, including Parrot and 
Olivier, a novel that had not even been published at the time they were spoken. The all-
decisive motif that I claim is responsible for this situation already appeared above when 
Olivier reported that Thomas de Blacqueville “set the example of a noble who every day 
refused to be trapped inside his history”. For, it is this being trapped inside one’s history 
through which one can show both, the repetitiveness of Peter Carey research and the 
relevance of agency. It is indeed a motif that recurs throughout Carey’s writing, a motif 
that many scholars have noticed, but only in passing, and that directly points to a struggle 
of many if not most of his characters with their origin, their roots, that seems to be central 
for Carey’s entire oeuvre – up to his latest work, A Long Way from Home (2018). As such 
                                                          
24 Paul Giles, “English Literature and the Antipodean Imaginary,” Arts: The Journal of the Sydney University Arts 
Association 32 (2010): 89-108, 106. 
25 Carey, Parrot and Olivier in America, 444. 
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it is a motif that can be seen as indicator for a (post)colonial condition as well as a struggle for 
and with personal development. 
 
The Motif of Entrapment and Agency 
 
Time and again critics have noted certain kinds of captivity in Peter Carey’s writing – exactly 
the sort of entrapment that has just been described in Parrot and Olivier in America, where it 
was the trap of social structure – class and family history – that Olivier could not escape. M.D. 
Fletcher might serve as a representative commentator, therefore, when he writes – long 
before the publication of Parrot and Olivier: “Throughout Carey’s fiction, both literal and 
figurative entrapment are invoked; […]. His fictions abound with actual prisons and cages.”26 
However, cages and entrapping structures necessarily require something that is entrapped. 
And this is the ‘birth of the character’ if one may call it that. Thus when Graeme Turner notes, 
already in 1986, that “[h]is [Peter Carey’s] fiction’s most basic structural situation is enclosure, 
entrapment, and he is interested in that”,27 he follows up this observation by stating: “Carey’s 
fiction regularly depicts isolated individuals or fragmented communities confronting an 
exploitative system.”28 The theme of entrapment, in other words, fundamentally involves a 
dichotomy between trap (e.g. class and history) and entrapped (e.g. Olivier) – the individual 
and their circumstances. Writing over a decade before the appearance of Parrot and Olivier 
(or, indeed, A Long Way from Home), Anthony Hassall makes this point very clear at the 
beginning of his monograph, Dancing on Hot Macadam: 
 
Such desperate attempts to metamorphose [he refers to various characters in “Crabs”, 
“The Chance”, Bliss, The Tax Inspector, Tristan Smith, and Jack Maggs] are sometimes 
partly successful […] but more often they fail […]. Though they struggle to transform 
themselves, these characters cannot escape from meaningless jobs, predatory 
relationships, corrosive addictions and exploitative social and political structures.29 
 
                                                          
26 M.D. Fletcher, “The Theme of Entrapment in Peter Carey’s Fiction,” Australian Literature Today, ed. R.K. 
Dhawan and David Kerr, New Delhi: Indian Society for Commonwealth Studies, 1993, 74-9, 74. 
27 Graeme Turner, “American Dreaming: The Fictions of Peter Carey,” Australian Literary Studies 12.4 (1986): 
431-41, 435. 
28 Ibid., 436. 
29 Anthony J. Hassall, Dancing on Hot Macadam: Peter Carey’s Fiction, 3rd ed. St Lucia: U of Queensland P, 1998, 
2. 
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The dichotomy between individual and environment also brings into relief the role the 
entrapped plays. For, the notion of the trap does not only make the entrapped necessary, it 
also demands their active participation. A trap is a lure or hidden mechanism, but the victim 
has to follow this lure or step into the mechanism for the trap to work. Those who find 
themselves encaged must actively contribute to their situation. Thus, Helen Daniel observes 
already in 1988 that “Borges’ theme of a man caught in a trap he has himself unwittingly 
constructed […] runs throughout his [Carey’s] work”,30 a point that Bill Ashcroft confirms in 
his discussion of Illywhacker: “The cage of history is one into which the colonized are inevitably 
led, indeed one they often enthusiastically help construct”31 – again it is enlightening to 
keep in mind that these lines were written well before the publication of Parrot and Olivier 
and relating to an entirely different novel. In a similar vein, but referring mainly to The 
Unusual Life of Tristan Smith, Peter Pierce remarks: 
 
His [Carey’s] essential intuition […] is how dependent folk happily collaborate in their 
subjection. The condition of captivity, both literal and metaphorical, may involve some 
clandestine coercion, but is enabled by the captivating allure (however specious, hand-
me-down, two-dimensional) of the dominant culture. […] The resourceful resistance of 
individuals to institutions which attempt to control them is epitomised by the disruption 
that Tristan causes in Efica.32 
 
This last quote is noteworthy, for it shows how the characters on the one hand “happily 
collaborate in their subjection” and thus walk into the trap, but that, on the other hand, 
there is also something of a “resourceful resistance of individuals” that may lead them out 
again – as in the case of Parrot. A point that leads Ralph Pordzik to claim that Peter Carey 
“has developed a taste for new modes of expression that seek to break the spell of the 
tragic ritualized in much dystopian fiction and to put an end to the apocalyptic state of 
siege that prevents humans from getting anywhere in the future”.33 For, also Pordzik 
                                                          
30 Helen Daniel, Liars: Australian New Novelists, Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin, 1988 (Chapter “Lies for Sale: Peter 
Carey” 145-84), 152. 
31 Bill Ashcroft, “Against the Tide of Time: Peter Carey’s Interpolation into History,” Writing the Nation: Self and 
Country in the Post-Colonial Imagination, ed. John Charles Hawley, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1996, 194-213, 201. 
32 Peter Pierce, “Captivity, Captivation: Aspects of Peter Carey’s Fiction,” “And What Books Do You Read?”: New 
Studies in Australian Literature, ed. Irmtraud Petersson and Martin Duwell, St Lucia: U of Queensland P, 1996, 
140-50, 149. 
33 Ralph Pordzik, “Reinventing the Future(s): Peter Carey and the Dystopian Tradition in Australian Fiction,” 
Missions of Interdependence: A Literary Directory, ed. Gerhard Stilz, Cross/Cultures 58, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2002, 285-98, 287. Cf also Bernadette McSherry, “Power and Subjugation: Australian Society in the Fiction of 
David Ireland and Peter Carey,” Melbourne Journal of Politics 15 (1983-84): 82-90. 
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notices how “[t]he future prospects his [Carey’s] fictions offer may at times seem bleak, but 
they always provide some extra space for the celebration of human creativity and 
inventiveness or for the possibility of escape”.34 
Similarly, Graham Huggan states that “if there is a fear, above all others, in Carey’s 
anxiety-ridden fictions, it is the fear of repetition, of entrapment in a self-perpetuating 
structure”; and although he notes that “[t]ransformation, in Carey’s work, often works to 
reinforce entrapment”35 and that “[t]he attempt to break free, however, often leads to 
further confinement”,36 also he comes to the conclusion that “Carey’s work, sceptical 
though it is of millenarian modes of thought and action, retains a fundamental belief in 
the power of change and the possibility of renewal”.37 
But it is this very “concern for transformation at both individual and societal levels”38 that 
Christer Larsson then connects with the trap again. For him reinvention itself is the entrapping 
lure for the characters: 
 
One common kind of entrapment in Carey’s fiction is the belief that one can somehow 
effect fundamental change in one’s life while still remaining oneself, that a life can be 
lost and kept at the same time. The theme of identity transformation is relevant to all of 
Carey’s novels […] [this is until the publication of True History of the Kelly Gang in 
Larsson’s case].39 
 
The “restlessness of his [Carey’s] characters, their constant need for escape and change”40 
is thus highly ambivalent and might as much be the way into the trap as out of it. “[T]he 
celebration of human creativity and inventiveness”, “the possibility of escape”, and the 
“fundamental belief in the power of change and the possibility of renewal” that Pordzik and 
Huggan pointed out may therefore be directly linked to the “dangers of desire, especially the 
desire to remake oneself […]” noted by Paul Kane.41 
                                                          
34 Pordzik, 288. 
35 Graham Huggan, Peter Carey, Melbourne: Oxford UP, 1996, 4. 
36 Ibid., 53. 
37 Ibid., 87. 
38 Ibid., 11. 
39 Christer Larsson, “The Relative Merits of Goodness and Originality”: The Ethics of Storytelling in Peter Carey’s 
Novels, Diss. Uppsala U, 2001, 13. See also ibid. 41-2, 60, 74, 103. 
40 James Bradley, “Bread and Sirkuses: Empire and Culture in Peter Carey’s The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith and 
Jack Maggs,” Meanjin 56.3-4 (1997): 657-65, 664. 
41 Paul Kane, “Postcolonial/Postmodern: Australian Literature and Peter Carey,” World Literature Today 67.3 
(1993): 519-22, 520. 
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The one theme that Carey has been varying but essentially repeating for over 30 years, 
then, is entrapment. Almost always we seem to find an individual character struggling against 
social bonds or repetitive structures such as class or history. But this does not mean that every 
single one of his novels works just like every other. 
Of course, the predicament of the trap as it is described here points towards the 
postcolonial condition – a sense of unbelonging or deracination that leaves some characters 
like Olivier stranded in the no man’s land of a third space, while other characters like Parrot 
use the freedom of such a new and still undefined territory (at least as far as the white 
invaders are concerned) to finally become the masters of their own fate. And of course it is 
also true that Carey’s favourite writing strategy is that of metafictional intervention, rewriting 
or “writing back” – just as we have witnessed in the discussion of Parrot and Olivier. 
But noticing these points always seems to lead away from the particularities of the 
texts and towards the repetitive conclusions we just witnessed: It is a “postmodern 
historical novel”. The ingenuity that the entrapped characters display, their personal 
development and their meticulously drawn individuality all these seem to slip out of focus 
in such a reading. My own discussion of Parrot and Olivier showed how quickly one ends 
up concluding that the text is a historical rewriting of official Western history. It simply was 
not, in other words, focussing on the details of the characters’ development but on the 
postcolonial thrust of a postmodern writing strategy. And here we come to a decisive 
point. What makes Carey criticism so repetitive is that it examines the novels’ political, 
perhaps also artistic, potential so well, while sometimes neglecting the details of their 
actual stories a bit. Carey creates intertextual mosaics, great fabrics from which familiar 
figures look at us with peculiar expressions from unfamiliar contexts. It is fascinating to 
observe this technique, but it is all too easy to overlook that each of these strange mosaics 
looks vastly different. This might be the reason, too, why agency has never entered the 
critics’ vision as a valuable addition to the postcolonial readings. 
Accordingly, the introduction to Parrot and Olivier may have been reasonably accurate, 
but its treatment of Parrot made him exchangeable with Herbert Badgery (Illywhacker), 
Jack Maggs (Jack Maggs), Ned Kelly (True History of the Kelly Gang), Bob McCorkle (My 
Life as a Fake), and many more of Carey’s characters. It passed over the fact that Parrot, 
just like Olivier, has a childhood in the novel and that much of the novel’s content 
describes the two main characters’ struggle for development, their struggle for bildung. 
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Clearly then, in Peter Carey’s case a focus on the texts’ political and artistic potential is 
highly relevant, but it also leaves much to be desired. To put it into a pointed expression: 
Olivier de Garmont is not Kafka’s Josef K. Neither are Oscar Hopkins and Lucinda Leplastrier. 
Or Jack Maggs, Tristan Smith, Herbert Badgery, Gabrielle Baillieux, and all the others. They all 
have got full last names. None of them are ‘men without qualities’. They all have got a 
childhood, a history, a development. They are all unique individuals. In fact, I would go as far 
as claiming that what makes a novel such as Oscar and Lucinda so readable is precisely the 
quirkiness, unlikelihood and likeability of its characters. 
Barbara Schmidt-Haberkamp provides a striking case in point. She maintains that it is 
impossible to summarise and retell Illywhacker, primarily for its close focus on the 
protagonists, “who clearly command the love of the author and whom Carey describes in 
adorable, untiring attention to detail”.42 And yet, despite her insight, what her analysis of this 
highly complex 500-page novel (depending on the edition) comes down to is the following: 
“The novel orchestrates the total dismantling of any claims to authenticity”43. She concludes: 
“Using fashionable terminology, one could call Illywhacker also a self-deconstructing novel.”44 
She is absolutely right, of course. She is spot on in describing what the text does and how its 
artistical creator achieved these effects. But at the same time, this is not a deep investigation 
of the novel’s characters, nor of the particularities of its stories. Illywhacker may deconstruct 
itself or else refabulate Australian history or both, but there might be more to say about 
Herbert Badgery than that he is ostentatiously inauthentic and flauntingly unreliable as the 
narrator of his story. Why would the author and his readers labour through 500 pages of 
childhood anecdotes and witness the emergence of a whole family tree if the only point was 
to convey the narrator’s insincerity and the final destruction of his tale? In how far, for 
example, is Herbert entangling himself ever more hopelessly with every move he makes? Or 
is he? “The question is: how would you take me, sitting there in my chair, neon lit, surrounded 
by these swirling signs? Am I a prisoner in the midst of a sign or am I a spider at its centre?”45 
This is a very interesting question Herbert poses here. Is he indeed an agent? And what is 
more, who is this person who is caught in the web of his own signs and tries to get out again? 
                                                          
42 Barbara Schmidt-Haberkamp, “Wider den Pauschaltourismus der Literatur: Peter Careys australisches 
Panoptikum Illywhacker,” Arbeiten aus Anglistik und Amerikanistik 17.1 (1992): 71-82, 76, trans. S.J. 
43 Ibid., 78. 
44 Ibid., 81. 
45 Peter Carey, Illiwhycker, 515. 
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Might there be a character one can salvage from the deconstruction of his tale? Might 
there be a motive for telling the tale and spinning the yarn of the web? The question an 
agency approach would ask is not only, therefore, if Herbert is a self-determined actor or 
not, but how much and why he is the one more than the other. 
When we think of Parrot and Olivier, we can already see that the question of whether or 
not Olivier and Parrot act self-determinedly does not seem to be very productive. With 
regard to their childhood and their highly individual life stories the question would rather 
be how they make use of their natural gifts to achieve happiness, or fail to do so. As this 
thesis will show, in Carey’s universe what makes Parrot successful as an agent is his 
humbleness and realism – both of which are not so much character traits he is born with 
but qualities for which he has to work hard over the course of his story. By contrast, what 
makes Olivier unsuccessful is that he tries to completely cut loose from his past and invent 
himself anew; that, rather than to engage and struggle with his environment, he tries to 
reconstruct it. 
But this will be much clearer at the end of this thesis. At this point I am more concerned 
with exposing the desiderata the present thesis tries to address. Focusing on agency, this 
thesis will take a new theoretical approach to Carey’s novels that shifts the emphasis from 
postcolonial politics and postmodern strategies to closer readings of the characters’ 
development and their motifs. The next chapter, Chapter 2, sets out to give an overview 
of the research that has been done so far. Afterwards, in Chapter 3, I trace the notion of 
agency in Carey’s oeuvre and show more explicitly where and how agency is relevant to 
his writing. Three ‘Carey themes’ will be established that are directly linked to human 
agency: 1. The contest for voice of and between various characters, 2. Characters trapped 
in alluring dreams, willingly contributing to their own doom, 3. Carey’s political activists 
and revolutionaries who are very often trapped in a destructive form of theatrical self-
staging. In connection with these discussions I will also justify my choice of novels for an 
in-depth analysis. But before these analyses can be carried out, it is first necessary to lay 
the theoretical foundation of agency in Chapter 4. I will combine the ancient philosophical 
tradition of thinking about human acting with the more recent sociological approach to 
agency in order to arrive at a concept of agency with which one can usefully discuss Carey’s 
plot and characters. A major source of influence in this effort were the works from Charles 
Taylor. 
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In Chapter 5, I begin with the actual discussion of Carey’s novels. I will examine My Life as 
a Fake with a particular focus on the contest for voice not only between Christopher Chubb 
and Bob McCorkle. Clearly, Paul Ricœur’s concept of narrative identity is highly relevant in 
such a competition. Chapter 6 will then trace various characters’ paths through Carey’s 
breakthrough novel Illywhacker. Anthony Giddens’ concept of compulsive mastery and Jean 
Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality will be very useful to examine these entrapped dreamers’ 
plight more closely. The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith, finally, has been regarded as Carey’s 
greatest failure in academic circles,46 but hopefully Chapter 7 can redeem this novel. Indeed, 
my personal opinion is that once one engages with the text thoroughly, it reveals itself as one 
of the most interesting, complex, and intellectually rewarding works Peter Carey has ever 
written – lending itself to readings ranging from disability studies to Lacanian psychoanalysis 
to Baudrillardian hyperreality. What makes it so particularly rewarding for an agency 
perspective, however, is that its narrator is not only a political rebel and actor, but also one of 
Carey’s few characters who manages to escape the structures in which he finds himself 
entrapped and fundamentally change his situation. The results of all the work will then be 
summarised and slightly rearranged in the conclusion presented in Chapter 8. 
 
                                                          
46 See Wroe and the beginning of Chapter 7. 
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If one organises Peter Carey’s oeuvre, considering also biographical traces that are evident 
from Bliss to A Long Way from Home, then what emerges are not life periods such as early 
works, middle period, and later writing, but three broad, cultural-political categories. The 
most prominent group is made up of his historical rewritings: Illywacher (1985), Oscar and 
Lucinda (1988), Jack Maggs (1997), True History of the Kelly Gang (2001), Parrot and Olivier in 
America (2010) and A Long Way from Home (2018). These are the novels most often discussed 
in academia; and, with Oscar and Lucinda and True History of the Kelly Gang, there are two 
Booker Prize winners among them. All these novels either refabulate the Australian past and 
in so doing take on a critical, revisionist attitude, or they take a European model such as 
Charles Dickens’ Great Expectations (Jack Maggs) or Tocqueville’s journey to America (Parrot 
and Olivier in America) to rewrite them from a distinctly Australian angle.47 Ambiguously, 
Carey declares his love for his country and at the same time indicts it in these works. 
The second group of novels could be described as ‘1970s novels’. The socio-political 
issues that were prevalent during the 1970s – and this means the overthrow of the 
Whitlam government as much as the rebellion against the bigotry and narrow-mindedness 
of small-town Australia – form the core of the novels Bliss (1981), The Tax Inspector (1991), 
The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith (1994), His Illegal Self (2008), and Amnesia (2014). Some 
of these novels are very dissimilar in mood and content, but there are, I argue, good 
reasons to place them into one group. Bliss and The Tax Inspector are often listed as 
examples of Carey’s anti-capitalist counter-cultural attitude. Woodcock, for instance, 
observers: “The counter-cultural ethic had an ongoing impact on him [Peter Carey] 
through later experiences as a member of an alternative community. It appears in works 
as varied as ‘War Crimes’, Bliss and The Tax Inspector, often ironised or questioned.”48 
Needless to say that these concerns play a role, too, in Tristan Smith, His Illegal Self and 
Amnesia. While these novels have different foci, they all discuss Peter Carey’s Australian 
1970s: the overthrow of the Whitlam government (Tristan Smith, Amnesia), the exposure 
                                                          
47 Even though Parrot ends up in America, his story parallels that of Jack Maggs in many respects. Not least 
because of the wife and children Parrot leaves behind in Australia, the novel can be read as an Australian 
narrative. 
48 Woodcock, 4. In the Guardian Woodcock is quoted saying about “War Crimes”: “These hippie capitalists [the 
narrator and his companion Barto] are sent to sort out a frozen-food depot in the desert. They take their job 
literally, and get their guns out and blow people away for not performing. He foresaw Thatcherism and 
Reaganism” (Qtd. in Wroe). 
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of the dark underside of the “restrictive ‘suburban values’” of capitalist Australia (Bliss, The 
Tax Inspector, Amnesia) and the escape to an alternative community (Bliss, His Illegal Self). 
The third group of novels, the smallest one, is made up mainly of My Life as a Fake 
(2003) and Theft: A Love Story (2005). These two novels are intense reflections on artistic 
practice and originality in Australian art production. They take up a particular aspect of the 
cultural cringe and discuss Australia not as an insecure client state, but as a dislodged 
European culture (see the appendix, Chapter 10.2. for the concept of the cultural cringe). 
When Herbert Badgery in Illywhacker shows his grandson, Hissao, Sydney, he says: “I had him 
do drawings, of buildings that lied about their height, their age, and most particularly their 
location. There was not one that did not pretend itself huddled in some European capital with 
weak sun in summer and ice in winter.”49 The problem that Carey describes here and that is 
the central theme of Theft and My Life as a Fake concerns an Australian voice that is perceived 
as a European echo so that every artistic expression becomes a performance out of place, 
forever caught in imitation. While this “cringe direct”, as Phillips called it above, constitutes 
the main theme of Theft and My Life as a Fake, it appears more or less prominently in many 
of Carey’s novels, not only Illywhacker’s description of Sydney. It features strongly, for 
example, in Carey’s fairly recent Parrot and Olivier in America. Parrot, the talented artist, is 
“made useful”50 by the marquis de Tilbot (Henri de La Rochejaquelein seems to have been 
Carey’s inspiration for this “Hero of the Vendée”). Instead of producing artistic engravings, he 
is forced to serve as scribe, copying – and meddling with – Olivier’s notes, which make up parts 
of the story we are reading: “he [Olivier] set me to making a fair copy of his smudgy notes. It 
was a mistake to trust it to me, for he never had the patience for the proofs.”51 His great asset, 
in the end, is not producing art, but marketing and selling it.52 Thus the novel treats similar 
themes as Theft, but connects art and market values directly with the emergence of 
democracy: 
 
In a democracy [says Olivier to Parrot] there is not that class with the leisure to acquire 
discernment and taste in all the arts. Without that class, art is produced to suit the tastes 
of the market, which is filled with its own doubt and self-importance and ignorance, its 
own ability to be tricked and titillated by every bauble. If you are to make a business 
from catering to these people, the whole of your life will be spent in corrupting whatever 
                                                          
49 Carey, Illywhacker, 517. 
50 Carey, Parrot and Olivier in America, 261. 
51 Ibid., 143. 
52 See ibid., 367, 373, 404-9. 
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public taste might struggle toward the light, tarnishing the virtues and confusing the 
manners of your country.53 
 
On the metanarrational level also Carey’s True History of the Kelly Gang deals centrally 
with the inauthenticity of the Australian voice. The novel is “[b]ased on the idiom, syntax, 
grammar and expressiveness of Kelly’s own account of his actions in the Jerilderie Letter of 
1879”, writes Victoria Reeve, but it also deliberately alters this account and “introduces 
expressions Kelly himself would not have used”. Moreover, “[f]ellow bushranger Joe Byrne 
is understood to have served as Kelly’s amanuensis and his role might be located in what 
would seem to be a scribal slip from first to third person”.54 Thus Carey’s literary account 
is a mimetic refabulation of a letter that is itself an obvious copy of a faux-Irish voice that 
has long since faded; it is a self-conscious, self-reflexive fake and has often been discussed 
as such in academia.55 While this is a recurrent theme, then, in Carey’s writing (for which 
one could find many more examples), so that many of his novels would also fit into this 
third category, it is nowhere more explicit – also on the intradiegetic level – than in My 
Life as a Fake and Theft: A Love Story. 
These three broad categories into which one can divide Carey’s novels may reflect his 
life experience; they may reflect his personal political commitment and his preoccupation 
with the ‘state of the arts’ in Australia – two stable concerns throughout his writing career 
that also his historical refabulations share – as we have seen in the case of the Kelly Gang. 
But when we return to a broader perspective again now, Carey’s writing – personal though 
it may be – still represents an Australian take on international – that is Western – 
intellectual movements. One could try to pin down this intellectual current with the term 
‘structural turn’, a turn towards structuralism and poststructuralism, towards 
constructivism and deconststructivism. It is a general suspicion against grand narratives 
and truths, against an independent, unconditional reality that applies to human concerns 
                                                          
53 Ibid., 449-50. The argument comes up already earlier in the novel: “‘But your argument is just the same as 
Garmont’s [says Parrot to Mathilde]. He says you cannot make art, he is wrong. You say no one [in America] can 
recognise art, and you are also wrong.’” (373). What Parrot argues is that good art also sells well, and to high 
prices. But of course, he is shipping it off to the nobles in France, which proves the others right again. 
54 Victoria Reeve, “Who Cares Who’s Speaking? Cultural Voice in Peter Carey’s True History of the Kelly Gang,” 
Journal of the Association for the Study of Australian Literature, Special Issue: Common Readers and Cultural 
Critics, (2010): 1-9, 1. 
55 See Reeves, but also, e.g. Andreas Gaile, “Re-mythologizing an Australian Legend: Peter Carey’s True History 
of the Kelly Gang,” Antipodes 15.1 (2001): 37-9; or Paul Eggert, “The Bushranger’s Voice: Peter Carey’s True 
History of the Kelly Gang (2000) and Ned Kelly’s Jerilderie Letter (1879),” College Literature 34.3 (2007): 120-39. 
2. Literary Overview of Carey’s Writing 
21 
 
but is beyond their influence, a suspicion that finds expression in debates revolving around 
key concepts such as gender, ethnicity, or history. Inevitably, this broad academic current 
also dominates the literary criticism that has been applied to Peter Carey’s work. 
 
Perhaps one can say that German Andreas Gaile is one of the most eminent Peter Carey 
scholars to date. In 2005 he edited the anthology Fabulating Beauty, for which he got 
academics like Bill Ashcroft and Ansgar Nünning on board, and to which he added an 
impressive bibliography that, within the time span from 1967 to 2003, comes close to 
exhaustiveness. Gaile followed up this work with his doctoral thesis that was finally published 
as Rewriting History: Peter Carey’s Fictional Biography of Australia in 2010. Only few works of 
Peter Carey criticism have been published since then or have escaped Gaile’s attentive gaze; 
notably all the criticism on those novels that appeared in 2003 and later: My Life as a Fake 
(2003), Wrong About Japan (2005), Theft: A Love Story (2006), His Illegal Self (2008), Parrot 
and Olivier (2009), The Chemistry of Tears (2012) Amnesia (2014) and A Long Way from Home 
(2018). The most important, recent critical publications apart from Gaile’s are perhaps Chris 
Boge’s 2009 doctoral thesis Outlaws, Fakes and Monsters: Doubleness, Transgression and the 
Limits of Liminality in Peter Carey’s Recent Fiction, and Mary Ellen Snodgrass’ 2010 reading 
guide: Peter Carey: A Literary Companion. The latter contains the most recent chronology – 
although it, too, is already outdated, reaching as it does only to 14 July 2009 and thus ending 
shortly before the publication of Parrot and Olivier. 
As already the titles of Gaile’s and Boge’s recent publications indicate, scholarship seems 
to concentrate on Carey’s ‘rewriting’ and his ‘liminality’. We can translate this, roughly, into a 
postmodern and a postcolonial approach to his works, whose narrative techniques have been 
variously identified as metafiction, magic realism, and fabulation.56 
In the introduction, we already saw an example of the postcolonial approach. It 
concentrates on how Peter Carey picks up works of the British canon and refabulates them 
from an Australian angle or the perspective of an outsider – as he famously does in Jack Maggs 
(1997), where he rewrites Charles Dickens’ Great Expectation from the perspective of 
                                                          
56 To quote but a few examples of descriptions of Carey’s narrative techniques: a discussion on metafiction can 
be found e.g. in Hermine Krassnitzer, Aspects of Narration in Peter Carey’s Novels: Deconstructing Colonialism, 
Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 1995, 23-6. Bill Ashcroft writes in his “Against the Tide of Time”: “Much of his [Peter 
Carey’s] writing operates in that suspension between reality and fantasy which characterizes what has come to 
be known as ‘magical realism’” (196). Turner notes “Carey’s use of […] black humour, metafiction, or fabulation” 
(431). 
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Magwitch. A second aspect of Carey’s rewriting is his recurrent refabulation of Australian 
history that simultaneously exposes its fictitiousness. Discussing Illywhacker, Bill Ashcroft calls 
this intervention tactic ‘interpolation’.57 As was shown, the most obvious of these 
interpolations is probably Carey’s True History of the Kelly Gang. 
The postmodern strand of criticism focuses mainly on the undecidability of truth, 
particularly the truth of art, the liminality of situations where the protagonists cannot tell 
any longer the difference between fake and original. This is taken to be a deconstruction 
of binary oppositions, the insight that everything is a copy without original, and 
transferred, by critics, to the world outside the novel – so that even the dichotomy 
between narrated world and real world becomes blurred. According to this strand of 
criticism, there might be no outside of narration. A novel that seems to satisfy this critical 
approach perfectly is Carey’s Theft: A Love Story. 
Both these strands of Carey criticism can be found in Bruce Woodcock’s often 
referenced, and therefore representative, monograph Peter Carey. He notes “the self-
consciously fictive tendency of Carey’s work”, claims that “Carey is almost the definitive 
product and critic of postmodern experience”, indicates Carey’s “magic realism”, describes 
the “blurring [of]any clear-cut oppositions”, and concludes that “he might, then, seem ripe 
for a case study by a post-colonial theorist such as Homi Bhabha”.58 
However, the simple observation that scholarship on Peter Carey can roughly be 
separated into postcolonial and postmodern analyses might be somewhat of an 
understatement, or at least it does not adequately convey the situation. It was already 
mentioned in the introduction, but this is the place to thoroughly demonstrate the point. 
Let us quickly march back, therefore, through the chronology of Peter Carey criticism and 
keep in mind that all that is to follow had been written before the publication of Parrot 
and Olivier in America. 
In 2010, Gaile observes in his doctoral thesis (part of this had been quoted earlier): 
 
Regardless of disciplinary affiliations of Carey’s academic commentators […], the vast 
majority of Carey scholars have approached his writings with the tools provided by late 
twentieth-century critical theory. This is, perhaps, not too surprising, for Carey’s period 
of literary eminence […] approximately coincides with the ascendancy of “postist” 
                                                          
57 Bill Ashcroft, “Against the Tide of Time.” 
58 Woodcock, 10-12. 
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theories […]. This is why Carey’s fiction has proved to be particularly approachable 
through postmodern and postcolonial concepts.59 
 
And Gaile’s own thesis is no exception, of course, when he writes that he tries to show “how 
the postmodernist, postcolonialist and poststructuralist writerly strategies and techniques in 
evidence in Carey’s fiction deflate the master narrative of Australian history and help the 
author install a new version in its stead”.60 
Just shortly before Gaile, Chris Boge opts in 2009 for the postmodern branch of criticism 
by observing that “Carey’s fiction derives its energy” from the tension between postmodernist 
ambiguity and a modernist “clear-cut frame of reference” against which all the postmodern 
fuzziness and transgression can be measured61: 
 
“fiction” becomes an uncertain term in Carey’s hands, and while his writing is not 
panfictionalist, he nonetheless succeeds in radically blurring the seemingly stable 
boundaries between fact and fiction as he pleases; without succeeding in rendering 
perimeters as such superfluous; nor does Carey’s writing render delineation an activity 
that is per se meaningless, however futile it may at times come to appear.62 
 
In the same year, coming from the postcolonial angle and talking about inherited “languages 
or identities that are powerful, often arrogant, and usually colonial in either a literal or 
metaphorical sense”,63 David Huddart comes to the similar conclusion that “Carey’s work 
insists on the instability of authenticity, lest it become all too similar to the colonial identities 
against which it rebels”64 and finds in Carey’s writing “a kind of ongoing openness to future 
forms of authenticity”65 achieved by “a repetition in new contexts, as described so vividly in 
Derrida’s deconstruction of J. L. Austin”.66 
When we jump back over a decade into the year 1996, we find that already Raymond 
Aaron Younis and Graham Huggan expressed similar insights. Younis comes to the conclusion: 
“Indeed, works by Patrick White, David Malouf and Peter Carey involve elements which 
                                                          
59 Gaile, Rewriting History, 8. 
60 Ibid., 9. 
61 Boge, 19. 
62 Ibid., 23. Already Graham Huggan noted and described this “ambivalent attitude toward transcendence” in 
Carey’s writing (Peter Carey, 84). 
63 David Huddart, “‘The Opposite of the Cringe’: Peter Carey and the Appropriation of Language,” Literature 
Interpretation Theory 20.4 (2009): 288-306, 288. 
64 Ibid., 304. 
65 Ibid., 288. 
66 Ibid., 301. Derrida’s “deconstruction” of Austin – some would rather say ‘purposeful misunderstanding’ – will 
be touched upon in Chapter 4. 
2. Literary Overview of Carey’s Writing 
24 
 
provide analogues and parallels in relation to the discourses of poststructuralism and/or 
postcolonialism”,67 while Huggan remarks at the beginning of his monograph, Peter Carey: “It 
is one of the marks perhaps of Carey’s versatility as a writer that his work seems both 
postmodern and, at the same time, postcolonial”.68 
However, already three years prior to these two critics, in 1993, Paul Kane wrote in his 
aptly titled article “Postcolonial/Postmodern: Australian Literature and Peter Carey”: “Carey’s 
recent novels69 suggest a sense of the malleability of Australian society” and represent 
“Australia’s attempt to see itself with its own eyes”. So that 
 
[i]n Carey’s work the disjunctiveness of postmodernism coincides with his sense of the 
historical displacement of colonialism; the continuing influence of the past – the 
“postcolonial condition” – is transformed into a vision of the future: Australia as the 
postmodern society.70 
 
In the same year, also Patrick Fuery proposes a very similar argument in his equally aptly titled 
essay: “Prisoners and Spiders Surrounded by Signs: Postmodernism and the Postcolonial Gaze 
in Contemporary Australian Culture”. “The postcolonial gaze in Australia is seductive”, he 
maintains, “because it represents an attempt to engage in the difficulties of a missing – or, at 
the very least, unspoken – cultural identity”.71 According to him, this attempt at grappling with 
a “missing […] cultural identity” results in a postcolonial “obsession with the past”72 that turns 
postmodern when the cultural reinvention process is undertaken self-consciously and the 
gaze becomes self-referential, as is the case in Peter Carey’s novels: “It is precisely this form 
of historical rereading which occurs in Peter Carey’s Illywhacker and Oscar and Lucinda (1988) 
[…] which contains as its narrative structure a metadiscourse about the operation of 
colonialism and history in Australia’s past.”73 
                                                          
67 Raymond Aaron Younis, “Apropos the Last ‘Post-’: Contemporary Literature, Theory and Interpretation,” 
Literature & Theology 10.3 (1996): 280-9, 280. 
68 Huggan, Peter Carey, 3. 
69 This concerns primarily Illywhacker, Oscar and Lucinda, The Tax Inspector, and The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith 
– a work still in progress at the time Kane wrote his article under the provisional title The Dog, the Duck, the 
Mouse. 
70 Kane, “Australian Literature and Peter Carey,” 521-2. 
71 Patrick Fuery, “Prisoners and Spiders Surrounded by Signs: Postmodernism and the Postcolonial Gaze in 
Contemporary Australian Culture,” Recasting the World: Writing After Colonialism, ed. Jonathan White, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993, 190-207, 205. 
72 Ibid., 199. 
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Yet already six years before Kane and Fuery, in 1987, Paul Sharrad goes through the same 
theoretical exercise of demonstrating how Carey self-consciously reinvents Australian history, 
when he writes: “Carey may be issuing a challenge to the institutionalizing of ‘sophisticated’ 
texts in academic Australian Literature courses at the expense of the thirties writers, 
reinventing their Australia and bringing it up to date.”74 
Reading through these statements and arguments, one might get the impression that 
the academic appreciation of Peter Carey’s work is slightly repetitive – and this short 
course is by no means complete, there would be many more examples one could quote.75 
Indeed, even though Kenneth Gelder, discussing Illywhacker, launched already in 1988 a 
polemic against the political emptiness of postmodern literary criticism he found in the 
then recent treatment of Australian fiction,76 Christer Larsson still laments thirteen years 
later, in 2001, that “[a]t present, in accordance with the relativistic climate in literary criticism, 
open time, resisting anything definite, is the most prevalent view [on Peter Carey’s novels]”.77 
Critical voices as theirs, however, remained few and unheard – which makes the following 
statement by Hermine Krassnitzer almost appear ironic: “This analysis examines particularly 
the post-colonial and postmodern features of the novels [Bliss, Illywhacker, Oscar and 
Lucinda], and is of course not the one and only approach to Carey’s complex works.”78 In fact, 
for over a quarter of a century there seems to have been only one broad theoretical approach 
to Peter Carey that could be subdivided into two related sub-branches: the postcolonial 
postmodern analysis which traces how Peter Carey rewrites history and challenges the 
distinction between fact and fiction – without, of course, completely unsettling it. Even the 
Guardian quotes Caryl Phillips in 2001 as saying:  
 
When I first encountered him [Peter Carey] in the 80s, his work was categorised as being 
complex, rather challenging novels from Australia. People were very concerned with the 
formal invention in his work. But to me Peter seemed to be doing a re-mapping of 
Australian history. 
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In that sense he was a quintessential post-colonial writer who was trying to 
contribute to the writing of a national literature of Australia. I saw him as part of a 
group of writers, including Rushdie and Achebe and Walcott; people for whom the act 
of writing literature is also about reclaiming history.79 
 
As has been mentioned, there is some irony in this new nationalism, that is, in the fact that 
mostly white Western intellectuals (Phillips for example while not being white is most 
definitely a Western intellectual), discussing a white male author of a Western society, should 
indulge in postcolonial readings that in their ubiquity approach something of a hegemonic 
status themselves. Indeed, roughly at the same time as Gelder wrote his polemic, a lively 
academic debate about this very point was taking place. In an endnote of a 1989 article, 
we find Huggan “taking issue here with the excessively negative tenor of Hulme’s,80 
Felperin’s81 and Tiffin’s82 recent critiques of the neo-hegemonic assumptions behind 
Franco-American deconstruction”. But still he 
 
would support their general thesis that applications of deconstructionist – and other 
post-structuralist – methodologies should take account of the ambivalent position of 
post-structuralist theory within self-privileging Western cultural institutions, and, in 
particular, of its apparent elevation to the status of a new orthodoxy.83 
 
Almost 20 years later, in 2007, he repeats this claim in his overview of Australian literature – 
with more urgency: 
 
Literary history, notwithstanding, is in a state of productive crisis, its traditional forms 
and concerns undermined by the new orthodoxies of postmodern/poststructuralist 
criticism; its authoritative, sometimes authoritarian syntheses displaced by the populist 
eclecticism of cultural studies.84 
 
Also Bennett observes in 1998 how “a proliferation of literary theories from the 
European (mainly French) and American (often Yale) theorists began to affect Australian 
literary studies in the 1980s” and critically remarks: “Based on the work of Jacques Derrida, 
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deconstructionist theory led some students back to the language of texts rather than social 
contexts, but much tortuous and obfuscatory critical discourse resulted.”85 
In an overview of Peter Carey’s writing, this leaves us in an ambivalent position. It has 
become evident after all these many quotes and examples that – at least in Australian 
literary studies – postmodernism and postcolonial theory are frequently combined to form 
the standard research approach to literary texts. In Peter Carey research, this has even 
been the norm from the very beginning. It has also become evident that this situation has 
been noted by scholars and that some commentators see it very critically. Graham Huggan, 
one of the most pre-eminent postcolonial studies scholars today, publishing for example The 
Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies (2013), even writes of “new orthodoxies”, a 
“productive crisis” and of “authoritarian syntheses”. 
On the other hand, the example of Parrot and Olivier clearly showed that the ‘orthodoxy’ 
of a postcolonial interpretation that notes a postmodern style of writing is very productive – 
it just seems to be so pleasingly adequate. See this last example from Susan Lever and keep in 
mind that Parrot and Olivier had been written before her assessment of the Australian 
literature that emerged from the 1970s onwards. 
 
Arguments about Australian distinctiveness in art will always be inconclusive; 
nevertheless, if there is an identifiably Australian contribution to the international novel, 
it is this extravagant, energetic, learned but untutored approach to storytelling often 
marked by an eccentric narrative voice. […] Where the European and British novels of 
the late 20th century may appear relatively restrained and controlled, these Australian 
works [to which she explicitly counts Peter Carey’s Illywhacker] are digressive and 
extravagant […]. Perhaps led by White, recent Australian literary fiction has less concern 
with narrative, and more interest in the performance of language, often depending for 
its interest on the establishment of an energetic voice (witness the novels of Astley, 
Mathers, Ireland, Foster, Carey).86 
 
Lever has a point, of course. Recounting the plot of almost any of Carey’s novels is exceedingly 
difficult, a situation that is almost always exacerbated by the extravagant, noisy voice of a self-
confessed unreliable narrator. 
But perhaps literary criticism is sometimes too quickly satisfied with stating the obvious. I 
would argue that Carey does also narrate content that is worthy of reflection. He is not too 
postmodern to tell actual stories, too. And he does have genuine ‘themes’ – such as the role 
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of the US in the overthrow of the Whitlam government or indeed the nightmare of 
abortion. There is more to Peter Carey’s novels than the rewriting of white Australian 
history and the deconstruction of hegemonic truth claims. Thus looking into the 
particularities of the development of Peter Carey’s characters and their struggle against 
entrapping structures, three persistent themes emerge that are all connected to the motif 
of entrapment and the question of agency. 
 
3. Agency in Carey’s Writing: Three ‘Carey Themes’ 
 
In this chapter I will not give a definite account of agency in Carey’s works. The purpose is 
rather to argue that agency is a highly relevant topic in Carey’s oeuvre. A full-scale discussion 
of agency in any work by Carey will only be possible after a thorough investigation of the 
concept of agency itself, which will be provided in Chapter 4. In the present chapter, ‘agency’ 
will have to remain an under-theorised term meaning something like ‘self-determined action’. 
But even so it should be possible to delineate three characteristic aspects of Carey’s writing 
that are all very persistent and all linked in different ways to agency. They run through Carey’s 
entire oeuvre and explain the selection of the three novels, My Life as a Fake, Illywhacker, and 
The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith. The Delineation of the three motifs will be quite detailed. 
This is deemed necessary because such an agency-related categorisation has not been 
undertaken before and its validity needs to be demonstrated. 
 
One of Peter Carey’s main interests lies in untold stories, or more precisely: unheared 
voices. “Our heroes are the lost, the drowned, the injured,” says Tristan Smith in the story of 
his unusual life87 – evoking the Australian national symbol of Paterson’s “Waltzing Matilda”. 
This contest for voice has already been touched upon in connection with the True History of 
the Kelly Gang and Parrot and Olivier in America, but it is a feature that is in fact characteristic 
of all his writing. All of Carey’s heroes are lost, injured, downtrodden, and often they are 
explicitly likened to the unsung heroes – or rather losers – of the intellectual cannon. 
Tristan Smith, for example, is introduced to the world by his mother in a theatre play: 
“‘Thou shalt get Kings, though thou be none,’ she said, and thrust me out into the world. 
ENTER TRISTAN SMITH.”88 In Macbeth it is Banquo, who receives this prophecy from the three 
witches.89 But the story of his son, Fleance, remains untold by Shakespeare. It is certainly too 
much to claim that Tristan Smith were a rewriting of Fleance, but the Shakespeare allusion is 
not idle. Tristan finds himself exactly in Fleance’s position. He tells his readers: “My real face 
was snot, tears, drool. I brought it into the lights of the vid camera and screamed at them. I 
did not appear on the vid. Edited out. Not part of the story.”90 
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This theme of an ignored or mistreated character who rebels against the dominant flow of 
narration is probably one of the most prominent ones in postcolonial literary criticism, but in 
more general terms – beyond postcolonial confines, so to say – it is also very interesting for 
an agency perspective. If actions are supposed to be self-determined, actors need the 
interpretive prerogative over their actions – a point that will come into sharp relief in Chapter 
5. 
To continue with the categorisation, the struggle of ignored voices for the right to be heard 
and to tell their own stories is present in Carey’s writing right from the start. In the short story 
“Concerning the Greek Tyrant” (1978) he tells the story of Echion – a character who is not 
mentioned in Homer’s Iliad. But while there is no mention of him in the Iliad, Echion does have 
a very brief moment in the pseudo-Apollodorus Bibliothēke of the first or second century91: 
“and when they [the Greek soldiers hidden inside the Trojan horse] thought that their foes 
were asleep, they opened the horse and came forth with their arms. The first, Echion, son of 
Portheus, was killed by leaping from it; but the rest let themselves down by a rope”.92 Carey, 
demonstrating his learnedness, takes up this “edited out” character from the Bibliothēke and 
fabulates Echion’s helpless struggle against the tyranny of the author. 
In Carey’s story, Homer suffers from a fever and is stuck in a productive crisis. Echion, like 
Harold Crick in Stranger than Fiction,93 realises that something is wrong and starts to question 
the narrative of which he is a part – which is why Homer decides to kill him once and for all. 
When the Greek author appears in person and tells Echion of his destiny, the doomed soldier 
tries in vain to escape his cruel fate (which is in itself an ancient Greek motif). Already dying, 
he attempts to make himself heard, but to no avail: 
 
Echion hadn’t died immediately. He had written some words in the fine clay dust with 
a bleeding finger. The words were as follows: 
‘KILL THE PIG TYRANT HOMER WHO OPPRESSES US ALL.’ 
But the words were erased by the blind feet of his companions as the whole incident 
concerning Echion was later erased by Homer, who no longer found the incident 
interesting enough to tell.94 
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Like Tristan Smith, Echion is “edited out” and “[n]ot part of the story”, but unlike Tristan he 
does not manage to alter this situation. 
In Carey’s writing, the contest for voice does often take on such a form of male rivalry for 
being the one who tells the story – a battle that is really a struggle for independent existence. 
Accordingly, Echion and Homer are only the first couple in a whole line of opponents locked 
in competition for narrative rights. Parrot and Olivier have already been mentioned and will 
therefore not be discussed again here. But there are other pairs. 
In Theft: A Love Story, the two narrators Hugh and Michael Boone complement each other 
and function as each other’s corrective. Nevertheless, Michael’s sensible (in the sense of 
‘making sense’, of being rational or reasonable) if abusive voice constitutes the narrative flow 
against which Hugh’s rambling commentaries are perceived as interruption. Thus, one gets 
the impression that Hugh has to constantly assert his voice against his sane and abled brother 
to defend his independent humanity. “In Butcher’s version I was his cross to bear, God bless 
me, I must be an IDIOT SAVANT, a bloody big disaster.”95 If Hugh did not continuously make 
trouble, he would be turned into the will-less object of Michael’s narration. 
Jack Maggs is one of the few Carey novels told by an auctorial narrator. But still there is a 
battle between Tobias Oates (Carey’s version of Charles Dickens) and Jack Maggs (Carey’s 
adaptation of Mr Jaggers from Dicken’s Great Expectations) over the story of Jack’s life that 
resembles that of Homer and Echion. Hypnotising the returned convict, Tobias revels in his 
power: “‘Do you see what I have now?’”, he asks his bystanders, “‘Do you see what I have 
been given? […] Don’t you see what I now possess? A memory I can enter, and leave. Leave, 
and then return to. My goodness, my gracious. What a treasure house, eh, Buckle?’”96 Utilising 
Jack’s tragic life for a novel project, Oates explicitly poses as the coloniser of Jack’s mind: “‘It’s 
the Criminal Mind,’ said Tobias Oates, ‘awaiting its first cartographer’”97. “He [Oates] blithely 
likened himself to Thackeray. He said he was like an archaeologist inside an ancient tomb.”98 
Jack, however, does not take this ‘break and enter’ lightly: “Maggs did not even have the 
space to be angered by these people [his fellow servants in the kitchen]. It was the man 
upstairs [Oates] who was the focus of his animus. He was burgled, plundered, and he would 
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not tolerate it.”99 When they are on their journey to Gloucester in order to find the famous 
thief-taker, Wilfred Partridge, the conflict over the narrative rights takes its course: 
 
Jack Maggs held him [Tobias Oates] grimly. ‘Your notes are lies, mate. Your notes say 
nothing about me taking off my shirt. The truth is: you have had me reveal secret 
information in my sleep.’ 
‘All your secrets will be returned to you. Please let me go.’ […] 
‘When I read you making fun of that Canary Woman,’ said Jack Maggs with a quietness 
that in no way contradicted the violence of his dark eyes, ‘why, then it was clear as gin 
– you’d do the same with me. You’d tell my frigging secrets to the world. […] How much 
will they pay you for a bit of fun like you have with that poor old biddy? One quid? Two? 
How much does it take to put her secrets in the gutter?’100 
 
Later in the story, Jack even exclaims: “‘You are just a character to me too, Toby.’”101 
But in all this – and here we certainly leave the standard interpretations of the novel – the 
role of Jack Maggs as the one who is oppressed is not as clear-cut as might appear at first sight. 
He has no qualms to cut the throat of Wilfred Partridge102 and later explains: “‘Were he to 
have stolen my gold watch, he would not have suffered so […]. But he were a foolish man to 
steal my son’” – by which he means a portrait of his ‘son’, which is actually a portrait of 
“George IV dressed as a commoner”.103 Jack Maggs certainly suffered in his childhood and is 
exploited by Tobias, but he also holds the power over life and death: “He [Jack] looked Tobias 
Oates threateningly in the eye and thus they stood the two of them, the one with the power 
to take away life, breathing heavily, the other hardly daring to draw breath.”104 
Ned Kelly, to mention yet another famous battler for voice, may not have a direct 
competitor – if we discount Thomas Curnow105 – but the theme is also very dominant in this 
novel – albeit not dominant enough to actually count the entire novel into this first agency 
category (it will reappear in the third one). “I soon learned all the editors had been shown my 
letter by Cameron [a politician in the Victorian Parliament] but NOT ONE WOULD PRINT MY ACTUAL 
WORDS”, Kelly declares. “my words had been stolen from my very throat”.106 What he seeks – 
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right up to his doom – is the justice of having his own version of events acknowledged: “I 
wished only to be a citizen I had tried to speak but the mongrels stole my tongue when I asked 
for justice they give me none.”107 
Echion, Jack Maggs, Ned Kelly, Bob McCorkle, the Boone brothers (especially Hugh), and 
Parrot all share similar characteristics, too. They are all dogged worriers, tall and physically 
intimidating men who tenaciously fight against hardship and try to tell their own versions of 
their lives. They are Carey’s postmodern rendition of the Australian battler, the originally 
inauthentic voice of the antipodes. 
There are also other voices who try to interrupt the narrative and make their independent 
existence known. There is the Aboriginal voice narrating the 100th chapter of Oscar and 
Lucinda. 108 Leah interjects Herbert Badgery in Illywhacker: “Dear Mr Badgery, my name is 
Leah Goldstein”.109 Celine Baillieux complains to Felix Moore that he depicts her in the wrong 
light in Amnesia.110 And Chapter 39 of My Life as a Fake suddenly switches to Tina’s childhood 
perspective.111 
In all these cases the characters struggle to assert their voice, and by extension their 
independent existence. In all these instances, the cage from which the entrapped protagonists 
try to escape is constituted by a threatening, external narrative of their lives. The trap, in other 
words, is a voice or a story against which the protagonists seek to pose their counter 
narratives. While this is thus one of the constants in Carey’s oeuvre, it is nowhere more 
pronounced and more central than in My Life as a Fake. This novel is made up of a whole 
cacophony of Ancient Mariners, or compulsive storytellers. It revolves around the rivalry 
between Chubb and McCorkle, but it is told by Sarah Elizabeth Jane Wode-Douglass and also 
switches to the perspective of Tina – making it the ideal work to investigate this aspect of 
agency in Peter Carey’s writing. Thus, it will be the first of the three novels that will be 
discussed in depth, in Chapter 5. 
The second agency theme in Carey’s writing is the treacherous lure of dreams. Also this 
theme can already be found in his short stories. But other than the always-present contest for 
voice, it pervades especially his early writing. The aptly titled short story “American Dreams” 
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(1974) deals centrally with the entrapping nature of enticing visions and is a good starting 
point to elucidate this motif. It takes place in the fictive small town around Parwan Railway 
Station. This station actually exists. It is a closed station near Bacchus Marsh (the small town 
in which Carey grew up), which is nowadays reduced to a crossing loop that allows trains to 
pass each other. In the story, the population perceive their town “as nothing more than a 
stopping place” for travellers. “[I]t is not where we would rather be”, as the narrator relates. 
The inhabitants do not care for the lives they are leading because they indulge in visions of 
glamour, of other lives somewhere else: “The commercial travellers who buy fish and chips at 
George the Greek’s care for us more than we do, because we all have dreams of the big city, 
of wealth, of modern houses, of big motor cars: American dreams, my father has called 
them.”112 Blindly following this lure, they stumble into the trap. In their dreams, 
 
We saw our big smooth cars cruising through cities with bright lights. We entered 
expensive nightclubs and danced till dawn. We made love to women like Kim Novak and 
men like Rock Hudson. We drank cocktails. We gazed lazily into refrigerators filled with 
food and prepared ourselves lavish midnight snacks which we ate while we watched 
huge television sets on which we would be able to see American movies free of charge 
and for ever.113 
 
In the end, the dreaming townspeople are museified and trapped into performing their own 
small town lives as attraction for American tourists. Just as Pierce observed in Chapter 1, the 
inhabitants are “happily collaborat[ing] in their subjection”. For agency, the issue at hand is 
therefore not the fact of neo-colonisation, but what it is that makes the dreams so irresistible 
to the gullible population. 
This is a decisive question because the motif of a protagonist who is entrapped in his or 
her own vision and actively works towards their own demise even dominates Carey’s early 
novels. We find a clue to answering it in Bliss, Carey’s first published novel and his first 
opportunity to investigate this theme more deeply: 
 
Yet the dreams that shone most brightly in his [David Joy’s] imagination were often 
gathered from his mother who, without really meaning to, taught him about the 
meanness, the insignificance of the town he lived in, the smallness of his life and thus, 
in her own perverse way, showed him the beauty of the world or, at least, the beauty of 
Other Places.114 
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David’s dreams stand in marked and purposeful opposition to his reality: “He dreamed of 
wealth and adventure, and yet he was frightened of almost everything. […] In dark corners he 
rehearsed his triumphal return from South America when he would make presents to his 
family (his enemies too) and tell them stories of his adventures.”115 Thus his dreams express 
as much as establish his perceived inferiority. And he works hard to overcome it. In a 
memorable scene he seduces Honey Barbara, his father’s lover. For months he had prepared 
and practiced the event. 
 
Then she saw […] a look in his [David’s] eyes. It was triumph, a cold hard thing, like a 
spring on the lid of a box. She understood in an instant, that she was a dream he had 
caught in a net. 
Damn you and your dreams. […] 
She had come to this, this seedy betrayal, and she knew it was time to leave these 
people, who had such trunk-loads of dreams, ideas and ambitions but never anything in 
the present, only what would happen one day.116 
 
The problem of living not in the now but an imagined ‘one day’ that seems to incapacitate 
agency to the point of being life threatening is encoded in Bliss by one of Vance Joy’s (Harry 
Joy’s father and David’s grandfather) stories:  
 
‘The story of the butterfly. 
‘I was in Bogotá and waiting for a lady friend. I was in love, a long time ago. I waited 
three days. I was hungry but could not go out for food, lest she come and I not be there 
to greet her. Then, on the third day, I heard a knock. 
‘I hurried along the old passage and there, in the sunlight, there was nothing. 
‘Just,’ Vance Joy said, ‘a butterfly, flying away.’117 
 
Waiting for a possible future, the narrating ‘I’ almost starves to death. In the end, his dream 
proves illusive like a butterfly. But David does not get the massage. 
In a scene that oscillates between slapstick and bitter tragedy he allows himself to be 
executed for smuggling weapons into Columbia. He sacrifices his life for his romantic dreaming 
of adventures in South America – to become the shining character of one of his fanciful stories. 
David plays the role of his life or rather the role of his death. His only concern as he walks, 
with bravado, to his execution, is the state of his white suit. When Major Miguel Fernandes 
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inspects the body after the execution is over, he discovers “the look of ugly surprise […] on 
the dead man’s face”.118 Dying, it appears, was more real than David had anticipated. 
Also David’s mother is caught in the web of her ambitious dreams: “She wanted power 
and success, not vicariously, not through a lover or a husband, but directly, for herself 
alone.”119 She is so determined that she even disowns her father when she courts Harry and 
– with the help of her equally ambitious son – later consigns her husband to a mental asylum 
in order to take over his advertising business.120 Like the Americans themselves, the narrative 
voice explains, she believes “in the benevolence of their [the Americans’] companies, the 
triumph of the astronauts, the law of the market-place and the twin threats of Communism 
and the second-rate, although not necessarily in that order”.121 Above all, she wants to be 
first-rate – a character trait that later reappears, for example, in Phoebe McGrath (Illywhacker) 
and Felicity Smith (The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith). 
However, in the very moment she has finally bullied the men around her into letting her 
be the person of her dreams, she kills herself. Also she has to realise that her dream had been 
a butterfly. She produces an advertising campaign for ‘Mobile’ – an oil company. But then she 
is told that she has an incurable, very specific form of cancer that comes from too long 
exposure to petrol (she grew up on a gas station). “‘Nothing can make you feel better,’ she 
said, ‘when you have been made a fool of.’ Her whole life had been built on bullshit.”122 Like 
her son she wears “a white linen suit with a large white hat” at her final moment.123 Presenting 
her advertising campaign at a board meeting of Mobile, she blows up the room with three 
bottles of petrol: “Only one advertisement survived that inferno (certainly no people did) and 
beneath its bubbled cell overlay one could read the headline […] ‘Petrol killed me,’ it said 
[…].”124 
David reappears, in a much darker arrangement, as The Tax Inspector’s Benny Catchprice. 
On his cellar walls he has written over and over again: “I cannot be what I am”,125 and in a 
poisonous river, “Deep Creek”, he performs a self-actualisation ritual, inspired by the self-
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actualisation cassettes he listens to, which consists in getting rid of his old cloths by 
committing them to the water: 
 
He whispered: ‘When my past is dead, I am as free as air.’ […] 
He said: ‘When my past is cleared, there is only blue sky.’ […] 
He spoke quickly: ‘My past is gone and I am new – born again – my future will be 
wrapped with gold.’ […] 
Death was everywhere, but no way was anyone going to see him doing rituals in his 
underwear. The earth was alive with organisms which wished to make a host of his 
blood. He felt cuts, nicks, toxins, viruses.126 
 
Just as in David’s or Bettina’s case, self-transformation, becoming the imaginary person of his 
dreams, is connected with the death of the flesh and blood person that he is. 
Bettina Joy desired “power and success” in her dreams, just like David and Benny. Overall 
one can therefore justly conclude that “power and success” are an important aspect of 
“American dreams” as such. Especially Benny’s case, however, highlights the darkness of this 
aspect of the dream’s allure. In a porn magazine he sees a woman tied onto a fibreglass 
contraption: “The woman was held at the shoulders and arms. She was held at the top of the 
calves and the ankles. […] The end result was that her arse stuck up in the air and she could 
not move. She could not fucking move. […] Benny thought: this is not nothing.”127 For Benny, 
the fibre glass object symbolises power. He has already rebuilt it in his cellar. Also, he tries to 
turn himself into an angel: He dies his hair blond, has a wing tattooed on his back and gets rid 
of his body hair with depilatory cream. In the most taboo scene of the book he seduces his 
father: “‘I’m an angel,’ Benny said. ‘What does that mean?’ Mort [Benny’s father] put out a 
finger to feel the boy’s smooth thigh. ‘It means I am in control. It means everyone does what 
I say.’”128 This is what Benny seeks with the help of his bizarre and violent dreams. He seeks 
control – control over his life, over his body, over the person that he is. Yet do what he may, 
he cannot get rid of his past and his fragmented, violated self. 
What is noteworthy is that the dreamers’ visions are always linked to a lack of affection. 
When Lucy Joy performs a blowjob on her brother, David, for marihuana, the narrative voice 
comments: “It did not occur to her for a moment that he wanted her affection and love.”129 
In a scene that resembles David’s seduction of Honey Barbara – only with blunter methods – 
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Benny Catchprice tries to force Maria Takis onto his fibre glass contraption with a shotgun, 
but also he “wanted to be friends with her. He wanted her to stroke his hair, maybe, kiss him 
on his eyes, that sort of thing. Not fuck, not unless she made him. Most of all he wanted her 
to smile at him.”130 
Interestingly, even Lucinda in Oscar and Lucinda conceives of her fatal glass palace in a 
moment of rejected love: “She had left [Australia] – although it did not make her comfortable 
to remember this – in a temper with Dennis Hasset who, whilst remaining her close friend and 
confidant, obviously did not think her a suitable candidate for marriage.”131 When she returns 
to Sydney, he has moved away to Boat Harbour:  
 
Her head was burning with dreams of glass, shapes she saw in the very edges of her 
vision, structures whose function she had not even begun to guess. She would build a 
little pyramid of glass. 
A tower. 
An arcade to cover all of George Street. […] There was a peak of anger in her passion, 
a little of the I’ll-show-you-Mr-Hasset-what-it-is-you-could-have-had.132 
 
Like an evil growth, this dream of power and greatness keeps on growing and infests her 
relationship with Oscar: 
 
She kept her glass dreams from him, even whilst she appeared to talk about them. […] 
Her true ambition, the one she would not confess to him, was to build something 
Extraordinary and Fine from glass and cast iron. A Crystal Palace, but not a Crystal Palace. 
A conservatory, but not a conservatory. Glass laced with steel, spun like a spider web – 
the idea danced around the periphery of her vision, never long enough to be clear.133 
 
Still, she manages to plant the seed of her dream into Oscar’s head. And when she makes 
him believe she were still in love with Dennis Hasset, it is Oscar who finally gives her dream a 
concrete shape. His idea “was all born out of habits of mind produced by Christianity: that if 
you sacrificed yourself you would somehow attain the object of your desires. It was a knife of 
an idea, a cruel instrument of sacrifice, but also one of great beauty, silvery, curved, dancing 
with light.”134 The idea to sacrifice one’s life in the knightly service for a lady, not in order to 
marry her – that would be profane and in any case quite impossible due to class barriers or 
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other social conventions – but in order to achieve personal refinement and bliss in the 
hereafter, this idea resembles very closely the medieval concept of ‘hohe minne’. Thus, when 
Oscar takes up Lucinda’s dream and gives it a concrete shape, one can also read his downfall 
as an attempt to become the shining character of a fanciful tale. Also in this case, the 
protagonist gives his life in order to become the shining character of his fancy. 
While this Carey trope of the destructive power of dreams – “the meanness, the 
insignificance of the town he lived in”, the meanness of one’s life, one’s person, that is coupled 
with “the beauty of Other Places”, of imagined other lives and persons that one wants to be 
– is the central motif from “American Dreams” to The Tax Inspector, it is spelled out nowhere 
in greater detail than in Illywhacker. All the aspects that are connected with it – the lack of 
affection, the recurrent feature of inheritance (the dreams are picked up from others and 
passed on), the attempt to gain control over one’s self and other people, the violence and self-
sacrifice or self-destruction to which it leads – all these features can be found there, too. This 
particular trap, in which a character is caught in a destructive dream that leads them to 
collaborate in their own demise, and its implications for agency are therefore the central point 
of discussion in Chapter 6. 
The first agency theme was the contest for voice, the second one was the destructive 
potential of grand dreams, the third one, now, is revolt and rebellion in a more literal sense. 
Also this theme is always present in Carey’s writing, and obviously it is connected to the 
interpolation of deviant, oppressed voices. The difference is that the political rebels fight an 
entrapping structure rather than an individual. While Echion fights Homer, Tristan Smith fights 
the system. This is more, I would argue, than just a matter of scale. Even if we say that Echion, 
Jack Maggs, or McCorkle struggle against the system of the narrative structure represented 
by Homer, Chubb, or Oates, the struggle is still a different one. The political rebels’ struggle 
for voice is always part of an attempt to change the structure to which they are exposed; it is 
an explicitly political campaign. Their fight is thus the one most obviously connected to self-
determined action and to agency in the sociological sense of the term (see Chapter 4). 
There is also a considerable overlap with the second agency theme. Thus, one could 
presume that the entrapped dreamers seek the transmogrification of their selves, while the 
political rebels seek the transformation of their social environment. But this way of putting it 
does not adequately grasp the trap in which most rebels ensnare themselves. Tristan Smith’s 
description of the “radical’s conceit” is more helpful in this respect: “Naturally my maman 
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worried continually about her deformed little boy’s self-esteem, but the truth was, I was being 
privately tutored not only in my schoolwork, but in the radical’s conceit, that I was different, 
but superior.”135 For agency, the most relevant aspect of Carey’s political rebels is that they 
appear to be stricken by vanity, arrogance and hubris. 
Ned Kelly’s megalomania, to use Gaile’s expression,136 is a prime example of the radical’s 
conceit and therefore a good starting point to develop this motif. Towards the end of the 
narration, there are several hints that Ned feels invincible: 
 
What is it he [Joe Byrne] asked and turned it upside down. 
It is the pattern for the ironclad man. 
Who is he asks Joe. 
He is you said I [Ned] he is a warrior he cannot die.137 
 
Mary Hearn, Ned’s lover and Peter Carey’s exclusive addition to the tale,138 implores him at 
one point: “She [Ned’s mother, Ellen] will not die in gaol but you will perish if you remain in 
the colony. […] [W]hen your mother is released she can join us in California […] but I will not 
remain here & wait for them to murder you I cannot do it.” To which Ned simply replies: “But 
they cannot catch me Mary they can’t even find their way along the public highway.”139 
Several times, we read how empowered Ned feels: “We cd. look down from the Warby Ranges 
and see the plumes of dust rising off the plains and know the police was actors in a drama writ 
by me.”140 
 
The Commissioner thought he were the servant of Her Majesty the Queen but he were 
my puppet on a string he ordered the Special Train as I desired he summoned the black 
trackers and called for Hare & Nicolson who thought themselves famous as the 
capturers of Harry Power they never imagined they would be captives in a drama 
devised by me.141 
 
Either Ned Kelly really does feel invincible, or he tries to motivate his comrades. But in either 
case, he engages in a hopeless battle. 
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The aim of this battle, however, does not really appear to free his mother, as he so often 
claims. Twice he is told that this would not even be necessary. Joe Byrn appeals to Ned with 
very similar words as Mary Hearn above: “We’ve spilled their blood the only hope is California 
O Jesus he cried eff you Kelly just let me go. […] Just let your ma serve out her term it aint so 
long. We both done as much time in prison and it hasnt killed us yet.”142 
There is a deeper motivation for Carey’s Kelly to disregard his pregnant wife, to pass up 
the chance to go to California, and to lead his gang into certain death. This motivation comes 
to the fore in the following decisive passage, addressed to his daughter. Ned has just learned 
that no paper wanted to print his letter from the Euroa bank robbery: 
 
Throwing their garbage to the ground I were v. angry to be called a CLEVER ILLITERATE 
PERSON by that rag THE MELBOURNE ARGUS another paper said I were filled with MORBID 
VANITY this were a gross offence against justice the colony being ruled like Beechworth 
Gaol. I kicked the papers apart and would of ripped them with gunshot were it not for 
fear of revealing our location to the traps. 
Mary took my hand & kissed it she held my face and stared deep into my eyes. Dear 
said she it don’t matter no more. 
She led my hands down onto her stomach. Said she Our baby will read your letter dear. 
But I were in a rage she could not comfort me my words had been stolen from my very 
throat. […] [B]ut in truth I were not paying great attention to your mother but stewing 
in my own juice and plotting what revenge I would take upon them higher ups who so 
oppressed us all.143 
 
His motivation is revenge, then, and to show those “higher ups” who – and here he quotes 
Echion – “oppressed us all”. Accordingly, his robbery in Jerilderie is all about his letter: “Now 
the bank were robbed but this were not the main purpose of my visit I come to Jerilderie 
determined to have 500 copies of my letter printed”.144 Indeed, Ned says that his letter will 
be a higher calling for the editor of the Jerilderie Gazette: “Up to that day Gill’s [the editor’s] 
only importance were to make public the price of cows in calf and so called GENERAL SERVANTS I 
come to elevate him to a higher calling. HE WOULD PRINT THE TRUTH THEN MY MOTHER WOULD BE 
RELEASED FROM GAOL.”145 When Ned hears that the Gills gave his letter over to the police, he is 
outraged once more: “He [Mr Gill] were stupid as the government itself if he thought I could 
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be stopped so easy”,146 Ned declares. “I begun again they could not prevent it. I were the 
terror of the government being brung to life in the cauldron of the night.”147 
It is evident that Ned Kelly has very personal reasons – almost like a defiant child – to take 
on the entire government. And this is also what brings him down in the end. His radical’s 
conceit, the conviction of his own superiority, makes him an easy target for the flattery of the 
cunning schoolteacher Thomas Curnow:  
 
Mr Kelly you give the appearance of an author. […] I said THE ARGUS called me a clever 
ignoramus I were sure a schoolteacher would hold the same opinion. […] [H]e said Mr 
Kelly it is no bad thing to be an ignoramus for if Mr Blackmore [the author of Lora Doone, 
from which novel he had just quoted a passage] is an ignoramus then you and I wd. wish 
to be one too. 
 
Thus Curnow persuades Ned to let him read a passage from his writing: 
 
It is most bracing & engaging given the smallest of improvements it could be made 
into something no Professor would ever think to criticise. […] 
There’s 500 adjectival pages. 
I could do it in a night said he if I were in my house with my books about me.148 
 
After a moving recital from Shakespeare’s Henry V, which suggests a comparison of Ned Kelly 
and his gang with the King and his noble knights, Curnow finally convinces Ned to let him go: 
 
[H]e give me the 2 pages from his book [Henry V]. 
He – a souvenir of battle. 
Me – but you will do wt. you promised? 
He – regarding your history? O I couldnt do it here Mr Kelly. I wd. need to take it to my 
house. I wd. need my books about me. 
He waits. No time.149 
 
And this is the end of Ned Kelly’s records. The rest is history and inserted by another narrator: 
 
THOMAS CURNOW had entered the dragon’s lair, the benighted heart of everything rank 
and ignorant. He had danced with the devil himself and he had flattered him and out-
witted him as successfully as the hero of any fairy tale, and now he carried the proof, the 
trophy, the rank untidy nest of paper beneath his arm. These stained “manuscripts” were 
disgusting to his touch and his very skin shrank from their conceit and ignorance and yet 
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he was a man already triumphant. He had ripped out the creature’s bloody heart and he 
would damn him now to hell.150 
 
For Carey’s Ned Kelly the whole fight against the government, the fight against “them 
higher ups”, is an exercise of self-portrayal. He wants his story out there. He wants to have 
command over his story, over his self. One may argue that this zest is born out of the 
experience of powerlessness, of factually never having been in command over his life. There 
is a certain legitimacy to his cause, therefore, which is why he has the support from so many 
people. But what brings him down is that he cannot get over himself, and the sense of his 
moral and intellectual superiority. 
In certain respects the case of Che’s parents in His Illegal Self is very similar. It is highly 
significant that Che sees his parents only on television screens and photographs in magazines. 
The one time he encounters his father in real life, he does not know who he is. In that scene, 
Che enters a hiding place in Seattle with Anna, his involuntary foster mother. He is frightened 
by the aggressive group of radicals in the house and soils his pants. One of them, who later 
turns out to be his father, then hoses him down with cold water. It is Anna who has to come 
to the boy’s rescue.151 
While the boy thus has no live contact with his biological parents, their media presence is 
everywhere around him. Not only did “Dave Rubbo [burn] his draft card on NBC”, Anna also 
remembers seeing Susan posing on a photograph in the Boston Globe. And Che’s grandma 
forbids him to watch television, because his parents appear there so often. What he knows, 
he learns from his sixteen-year-old babysitter, Cameron Fox: “Cameron gave him a full-page 
picture of his father from Life. Cameron read him the caption. Beyond your command. His dad 
was cool looking, with wild fair hair. He held his fingers in a V.”152 These revolutionaries are 
pop stars (like the posthumous Che Guevara himself). So much so that Che is unable to 
reconcile the two personas of his father: “Not the man in Seattle. Not the man with the hose. 
That man had a mustache which lifted and shivered as if disgusted by the life in front of him. 
He bore no resemblance to the photo on the floor.”153 His ‘real’ father has disappeared into a 
staged reality behind a television screen. 
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Just like Ned Kelly, Che’s parents completely disregard their closest relations for the cause. 
But this cause, in the end, seems to be nothing more than a means for their self-staging. In 
True History of the Kelly Gang, Parcel 11 is introduced by the following statement: “In both 
tone and handwriting these latter pages of the parcel attest to the outlaw’s growing anger 
that he should be denied a national audience.”154 While Ned’s spectacle attracts a national 
audience only after his death, Che’s parents enjoy this national audience already during their 
lifetime. But just like Ned, Susan eventually dies for it. 
Gabirelle Baillieux’ case in Amnesia is quite different in so far as she – like Tristan Smith – 
is a successful rebel. The reason for her success is precisely that she does not suffer from the 
radical’s conceit – which is a lot considering that the narration of her life focuses on how she 
turns into a radical activist during her teenage years. In many ways she starts out just like 
Tristan: “Gabrielle Baillieux was born into bohemian comfort in the inner Melbourne suburb 
of Carlton and thereafter grew up around actors and writers and radicals and became 
precocious in the way you might expect.”155 But while her parents ruin their marriage by trying 
to maintain their respective stage personas – her mother pursues an acting career and her 
father a political one, she refuses to stage herself. 
Of course, when the novel starts, Gabrielle has a lot of media and government attention, 
and she sought it, too. Also her first successful activist action as a school girl is planned as a 
media spectacle: 
 
I [Celine, Gabrielle’s mother] told her that our news had become driven by press releases 
and managed events. PR flacks outnumbered journalists at the rate of four to one. She 
[Gabrielle] almost spat at me. You think I don’t know this? What do you think our film [a 
school project] was there to do? She said, I am making history.156 
 
But while this may sound almost like Ned Kelly, there is a decisive difference in the media 
spectacle she produces shortly thereafter – which is that she does not claim to have produced 
it, not alone at least: 
 
There were many people who I represented. I would have given credit if they wanted it, 
not just to Mervyn, but about fifty people we never even spoke to […].This is how it 
would be all my life. I would be the one who everyone could love or hate. But you cannot 
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be a solo artist and release asylum seekers from their corporate jails. I was, always, in 
every single action of my life, spoon-fed by others.157 
 
It is not Gabrielle but her friends who address Felix Moore at the beginning of Book II, and 
they address him with an explicit request for humbleness: 
 
To Mr Felix Moore, posing as a radical, it read […].This woman [Gabrielle] is a human 
being and it will be your honour to celebrate her real life without hysteria. 
Celebrate her real life without hysteria. Celine Baillieux had used these words in 
Moroni’s. 
All you need is to be humble, the note continued. If you can manage this we, her 
friends, have the ability to publish you digitally around the world. We are legion. Ten 
million readers are now within your reach.158 
 
The passage about Gabrielle’s “real life” is disrupted immediately (and duly159), but the 
gesture of humbleness remains – as does the not quite so humble appeal to an international 
audience. 
The novel does offer an explanation for the apparent paradox of advertising humbleness 
to an international audience through spectacularly staged media events: “I was the one”, says 
Gabrielle (as reported by Felix, as edited and published by ‘her friends’), “who would reveal 
her face to the cameras when I removed my hood. I wanted to be responsible. Look at this 
young girl. If she can do it, why can’t we?”160 This seems to be the moral message of Amnesia. 
While the parent generation – represented by Felix, Sando and Celine – was outraged but just 
looked on as the Whitlam government was overthrown, while the parent generation says they 
could not do anything about it (and soon tried to forget the whole event), she takes action. 
When she exclaims: “It was not my fault my father failed. It was not my fault that this was left 
to us to do”,161 then she refers as much to Agrikem’s doings as to the events of 1975. Gabrielle 
wants to wake people up so they realise they can do it, too. As opposed to Ned Kelly, it seems, 
she does not want to take single-handed action against “them higher ups who so oppressed 
us all”, but rather wants to wake the masses to do so together with her. Just like Percy Bysshe 
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Shelley writes in his The Mask of Anarchy: “Rise, like lions after slumber/ In unvanquishable 
number! / Shake your chains to earth like dew / Which in sleep had fallen on you: / Ye are 
many—they are few!”162 From this perspective, Amnesia is a call for agency, the call to take 
responsibility, to make use, in Kantian terms, of one’s powers as a human being and shake off 
one’s ‘self-imposed immaturity’. 
In the digital world, Gabrielle may be Fallen Angel, and she may lend her face to the 
political cause of waking up the slumbering masses, but beneath all this she remains rooted 
in her actual life. She never tries to transform herself completely, never denies her childhood 
and stays in close contact to her parents throughout her story. That is, she does not get lost 
in conceit, in self-images of her own grandiosity. 
This is exactly how already the rebels in “The Chance” (1977) manage to be successful 
revolutionaries. The Fastalogians visit planet Earth and introduce the “Genetic Lottery or The 
Chance”,163 where a player pays money to receive another body while their memory remains 
“more or less intact”. The effect of the Lottery on society is catastrophic:  
 
It proved the last straw. The total embrace of a cancerous philosophy of change. […] 
Institutions that had proved the very basis of our society (the family, the neighbourhood, 
marriage) cracked and split apart in the face of a new shrill current of desperate 
selfishness.164 
 
These few lines already contain very important elements of agency as it occurs in Carey’s 
writing. Personal transmogrification, the philosophy of personal change, is cancerous – think 
of Oscar Hopkins, of David and Bettina Joy, or Benny Catchprice. It facilitates a selfishness that 
destroys the very foundations of human communality: friends and family. It is exactly this that 
Gabrielle never gives up, and it is exactly this that makes the radical’s conceit so bad in Carey’s 
universe. It is based on selfishness and is explicitly linked to anti-family attitudes – if one recalls 
Che’s parents or Ned Kelly’s ignoring his pregnant wife. We will see the same constellation 
with Phoebe McGrath in Illywhacker and Felicity Smith in The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith. 
Consequently, in “The Chance”, Carla, the narrator’s lover, is not the leader but – just like 
Gabrielle – only a member of a social group, the Hups. The Hups are a radical group that will 
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initiate a revolution against the Fastalogians. They were – at least some of them – successful 
people once, shining forth in their beauty, like the famous actress Jane Larange. But they play 
the Lottery in order to lose. They give up beauty, personal success, and selfishness in order to 
install a new form of human community: “‘After the revolution,’ the dwarf said calmly, ‘there 
will be no locks. Children will grow up not understanding what a lock is. To see a lock it will be 
necessary to go to a museum.’”165 It is no coincidence that Amnesia starts on a very similar 
note: “It was a spring evening in Washington DC; a chilly autumn morning in Melbourne; it 
was exactly 22.00 Greenwich Mean Time when a worm entered the computerised control 
systems of countless Australian prisons and released the locks in many other places of 
incarceration.”166 
It seems that from Carla in “The Chance” (1977) to Gabrielle in Amnesia (2014), 
revolutionaries have to stay clear of the radical’s conceit in order to be successful. However, 
Carla and Gabrielle never experience any trouble in this respect; they are never even close to 
consider themselves “different, but superior”. This is different with Tristan Smith. He has to 
actually overcome his conceit, and this is no easy task for him. The novel The Unusual Life of 
Tristan Smith is thus not only representative of a persistent theme in Carey’s writing, it also 
discusses the actual problem of Carey’s revolutionaries in more detail than any other work. It 
will therefore be the final novel that is analysed in more detail in this thesis. 
It could hopefully be shown in this overview that it makes sense to establish these three 
agency-related categories: the contest for voice (“Concerning the Greek Tyrant”, Jack Maggs, 
My Life as a Fake, Theft: A Love Story, Parrot and Olivier), the misleading allure of grand 
dreams (“American Dreams”, Bliss, Illywhacker, Oscar and Lucinda, The Tax Inspector), and 
political rebels and their conceit (“The Chance”, The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith, True History 
of the Kelly Gang, His Illegal Self, Amnesia); and that the three chosen novels are 
representative of their respective group: My Life as a Fake (contest for voice), Illywhacker 
(grand dreams), and The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith (the radical’s conceit). The three novels 
are ideal for another reason. They also each represent one of the three more general 
categories that were established in the last chapter: the novels dealing with art and art 
production (My Life as a Fake), the historical rewritings (Illywhacker) and the 1970 novels (The 
Unusual Life of Tristan Smith). 
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Introducing the three agency-related categories meant to already discuss a good deal of 
Peter Carey’s writing and its link to agency. Yet earlier it was indicated that one could not talk 
about agency using contemporary critical theory. I still maintain that this is the case. The 
presentation of the three agency themes in Carey’s work was rather descriptive – which 
means that all the talk of agency was done without referring to ‘theory’, let alone ‘critical’ 
theory. 
 
 
4. Agency 
 
4.1. Important Terminology 
 
Before we can launch into the discussion of agency, I need to clarify a few technical issues. As 
we shall see in this chapter, metaphysics is unavoidable when conceptualising agency – one 
of the many thorny issues I have to deal with. But when metaphysical aspects of agency are 
being discussed, the term ‘metaphysics’ is used in a specific way, and that needs explanation. 
For the purpose of clarifying how ‘metaphysics’ is used in this chapter, let us consider the 
following statement by Ruth Groff: “However, there is more to be learnt from Aristotle than 
that even he didn’t think it possible to get all the way from ‘is’ to ‘ought’”.167 The sentence is 
taken out of context, and as it stands, one would assume that the “is” refers to physics and 
the “ought” refers to metaphysics. But that is precisely not the case here. For someone not 
trained in philosophy this is odd, if not completely wrong. Surely physics deals with how things 
are, with the measurable, graspable, observable, and predictable; and any statement about 
how things ought to be or should be belongs to the realm of metaphysics. So how come Groff 
has apparently got it the wrong way round? 
The clue for solving this confusion is Aristotle’s concept of phronesis. Phronesis refers to 
practical knowledge. Knowledge, for example, of how things are done, how they used to be 
done; knowledge that belongs to the realm of society and politics. We are dealing here with 
quite observable behaviour. If I know one ought to pay respect to an elder person then this is 
practical knowledge in the realm of the physically observable world. Groff opposes this 
concept of practical knowledge in Aristotle to sophia, “systematic knowledge of the essences 
of things”.168 This is knowledge of the ultimate truth of things, of their true ‘being’. Such 
knowledge is beyond the realm of observable everyday life and the physically measurable. 
Thus it comes to pass that ontology, the science of being, the ‘is’ Groff was referring to, is 
taken to be metaphysics, while practical knowledge about how things should be done, the 
‘ought’ Groff was referring to, is considered knowledge about the physical world. Politics, in 
this view, is taken to be physics because it deals with our this-worldly everyday affairs. 
                                                          
167 Ruth Groff, Ontology Revisited: Metaphysics in Social and Political Philosophy, New York: Routledge, 2013, 
115. 
168 Ibid. 
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And yet, a physicist would strongly disagree. Indeed, knowledge, whether theoretical or 
practical, can be grasped as a metaphysical concept itself. Think of behaviourism and Skinner’s 
black box: behaviour is observable, knowledge is not. From such a viewpoint it is correct to 
claim that one cannot measure or in any way observe knowledge. What one can do is observe 
behaviour, such as answers in a quiz or an IQ-test. But knowledge itself, as the purported 
origin of the answers, is not directly observable. Imagine someone ‘knew’ the correct answer 
but for whatever reason chose to give the wrong answer. As purported origin of observable 
behaviour, ‘knowledge’ must remain speculation or ex post facto deduction and would 
therefore rightly belong into the realm of metaphysics. In this view, therefore, data is not 
knowledge. For data can be exactly measured and thus, as opposed to knowledge, does 
belong to the realm of the physical. 
In this thesis, now, the term metaphysics is not meant to automatically and exclusively 
refer to ontology – nor, indeed, is it confined to mean ‘supernatural’ or ‘God’. The term is used 
much more generally here. Especially concepts of how things ought to be are not taken to be 
physics. That is, value judgements and everything else that deals with claims not of how things 
measurably and predictably are but how things ought to be or should be, is, in this thesis, 
metaphysics. 
This gets us into another thorny issue that should be dealt with at the beginning: namely 
causation. In the philosophical branch of action theory – as opposed to the sociological one 
(more of that in the next chapters) – it became custom to differentiate between two kinds of 
causation: event causation and agent causation. Event causation is a particular kind of 
nomological, that is law-based, determinism in which events trigger further events according 
to the principles of natural laws. Usually this position is accorded to David Hume,169 even 
though he himself proposed no necessary conjunction between two events, and it was only 
subsequent philosophers who added the laws to the picture.170 Proponents of human agency 
                                                          
169 Erasmus Mayr, for example, writes: “On the event-causal view – which has its origin in David Hume’s 
discussion of causation in his Treatise – nature is seen as a flux of events or happenings, wherein substances only 
appear as objects which undergo changes. The events are partly connected amongst each other, it is assumed, 
by natural laws – deterministic or indeterministic – which empirical science must discover” (Understanding 
Human Agency, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011, 9). 
170 See, e.g. Groff, who writes – a little more precise, perhaps, than Mayr – that for Humeans “causality is equated 
with the fact of order”. She points out that according to Hume, “that what can be said to exist are impressions, 
some of which are constantly conjoined in our minds: first one, then another. There is, however, says Hume, no 
basis for the idea that such impressions are connected ontologically. Hume concludes that our concept of causal 
force therefore derives from our own expectations regarding such sequences. […] [E]ven Hume saw that the 
outcome was both unsatisfying and unsettling. Subsequent Humeans, including Kant, have responded by 
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reject this view and try to prove the necessity of substance causation. According to their 
position, agents are substances endowed with specific powers to cause events.171 I do not 
really want to go into the details of these debates but simply state that the position taken on 
here is different from both these views. If we assume human agency – which we do not have 
to do (!) – but if we assume human agency, the notion of causation itself must be separated 
from acting. 
To elucidate this point, we can refer to Donald Davidson’s famous and influential 1963 
essay, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, in which he defends the position that actions are 
caused events.172 Over the course of this essay, Davidson establishes two necessary conditions 
for actions: 
 
C1. R is a primary reason why an agent performed the action A under the description d 
only if R consists of a pro attitude of the agent toward actions with a certain property, 
and a belief of the agent that A, under the description d, has that property. 
 
C2. A primary reason for an action is its cause.173 
 
Now, Davidson talks of a ‘primary reason’ here – and that smacks of a primary cause, thus 
metaphysics. But the decisive point is how this primary reason is defined. It consists of a “pro 
attitude” and a “belief”. Strangely, however, some of the ‘events’ to which Donaldson is 
referring, “bridge failures, plane crashes, or plate breakings”174 do not seem to depend on a 
“pro attitude” or a “belief”, nor would such events as the expansion of our sun, or the 
formation of our planet Earth – God aside. In fact, Davidson himself notices quite clearly that 
“generalizations connecting reasons and actions are not – and cannot be sharpened into – the 
kind of law on the basis of which accurate predictions can reliably be made”. He goes on to 
assume that there are certain classes of events – namely actions – and certain classes of causes 
                                                          
tightening up the order that, from a non-Humean perspective, can be seen as standing in for causation. The 
strategy introduced by J. S. Mill, for example, is to say that because certain sequences do regularly obtain, we 
are entitled to infer that they always will. To cause is to be that which invariably comes first” (6). See also Hugh 
McCann, who writes: “As Hume pointed out, there is no process by which past events confer existence on future 
ones, nor do we observe any form of ‘natural’ necessitation” (Hugh J. McCann, The Works of Agency: On Human 
Action, Will, and Freedom, Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1998, 12).  
171 See Groff, or Mayr. 
172 Donald Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” 1963, The Philosophy of Action, ed. Alfred R. Mele, Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2003, 27-41. 
173 Ibid. 29 and 35 for C1 and C2 respectively. 
174 Ibid. 36. 
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– namely reasons.175 But if he thus has to distinguish ‘events’ in general from ‘actions’ in 
particular and ‘causes’ in general from ‘reasons’ in particular – why talk of ‘causation’ at all in 
the case of human agency? Paul Ricœur’s neat description of the “conceptual network” of 
actions therefore fully applies to Davidson’s reasoning: 
 
Actions imply goals, the anticipation of which is not confused with some foreseen or 
predicted result, but which commit the one on whom the action depends [see also 
Charles Taylor’s “significance feature” further down, Chapter 4.5.]. Actions, moreover, 
refer to motives [Davidson’s ‘reasons’], which explain why someone does or did 
something, in a way that we clearly distinguish from the way one physical event leads to 
another [my emphasis]. Actions also have agents, who do and can do things which are 
taken as their work, or their deed. As a result, these agents can be held responsible for 
certain consequences of their actions [which also relates to the notion of sin that cannot 
be discussed here].176 
 
The problem that human agency seems to involve the metaphysical notion of primary 
causes is also clearly visible in arguments that oppose Davidson by trying to defend substance 
causation against event causation. Thomas Pink, for example, writes: “Freedom does seem, 
by its very nature, to be the power of a substance”.177 However, substances may well have 
‘powers’, qualities, or potentials; but the actualisation of this is still an event, caused – if it is 
caused – by prior events, which makes the notion of substance causation as such indeed 
suspect. Thus, when Pink writes: “It is the agent, and not simply some state or event within 
him […] who determines how he acts”,178 then, despite himself, also he does treat the agent 
not as a substance with a quality “within him”, but as a force in itself – an origin, a primary 
cause. 
Many philosophers shy away from this realisation and try to cover it up, because it leads 
directly into a Cartesian dualism and a metaphysical concept of agents or their will. This 
obvious ‘pitfall’ notwithstanding, Maria Alvarez still dares to develop “a broadly Reidian agent-
causal account of human agency” in which “an action is the causing of an event or change, but 
is not itself an event (for the causing of an event is not itself an event) and, a fortiori, an action 
is not an event caused by the agent”.179 Of course we can ask whether it is permissible to 
                                                          
175 Ibid. 40. 
176 Paul Ricœur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer, vol. 1, Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1984, 55. 
177 Thomas Pink, “Free Will and Determinism,” A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, eds. Timothy O’Connor 
and Constantine Sandis, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, 301-8, 302. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Maria Alvarez, “Thomas Reid,” O’Connor and Sandis 2010, 505-12, 511. 
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separate actions from events – when we say an amoeba floats in the air, is that an action of 
the amoeba or an event that occurs to the amoeba? – and claim that actions are reducible to 
events, but in that case we would deny the existence of human agency. This is a valid position 
(!) But one that one cannot take on when one wants to discuss human agency. 
When we discuss human agency, therefore, and thus presuppose the existence of human 
agency, there is no point in asking for causes. What one can discuss under this rubric is 
whether an action is good or bad, whether it is forced or voluntary – one can even ask for 
reasons for an action, as long as one does not take reasons to be causes. 
With these issues out of the way, we can finally begin with the project itself of finding a 
way of grasping agency that is useful also for the discussion of Peter Carey’s novels. 
 
4.2. Agency: A New Phenomenon? 
 
Agency is a hot term; and quickly gaining currency in social theory. It appears to be a new 
phenomenon, and a little mysterious. It is something that only recently emerged, that is on 
everyone’s lips and that is of nebulous origin. Where did it come from? Almost none of the 
recently published monographs or essays whose title contains ‘agency’ says much about the 
term’s historical background or its position within historical traditions of thought. In this 
respect, the last chapter did already more than most contemporary discussions. Accordingly, 
Ann Mische and Mustafa Emirbayer observe: “The concept of agency has become a source of 
increasing strain and confusion in social thought. […] At the center of the debate, the term 
agency itself has maintained an elusive, albeit resonant, vagueness”. And they refer to “the 
long list of terms with which it has been associated: selfhood, motivation, will, purposiveness, 
intentionality, choice, initiative, freedom, and creativity”.180 Elliot Jurist, who bases his 
analysis on Charles Taylor and engages in a detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s and Hegel’s 
philosophical works, opens up the field of agency between the following four terms181: 
 
                                                          
180 Ann Mische and Mustafa Emirbayer, “What Is Agency?” The American Journal of Sociology 103.4 (1998): 962-
1023, 962. 
181 Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche. Philosophy, Culture, and Agency, Cambridge: MIT P, 2000. Jurist 
himself does not make such a clear cut comparison. Nevertheless, it can be inferred quite confidently from 125-
39. Regarding the horizontal opposition between inwardly and outwardly directed behaviour, we are dealing 
with self-discovery on the one and self-articulation on the other hand. The vertical differentiation emphasises 
that in these endeavours either emotional-irrational aspects may be in the foreground or objective-rational ones. 
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 Inwardly directed 
behaviour 
Outwardly directed 
behaviour 
Dionysus self-exploration self-expression 
Apollo self-objectivation self-control 
 
With this in mind, we can add to Mische and Emirbayer’s list terms like bildung (in the sense 
of German Weimar Classicism), socialisation, individuation, self-discovery, self-experience, 
and self-articulation. 
Indeed, just as Mische and Emirbayer said, this is quite an array of concepts, delineating a 
rather vague area. However, by tracing the sources of the “increasing strain” they detected, it 
should be possible to bring some clarity into matters. First, we need to pay close attention. 
Mische and Emirbayer refer to social thought. In this particular environment terms like will, 
choice, or freedom are addressed in a very specific way. Social scientist Eberhard 
Raithelhuber, for example, says agency grapples with central questions of sociology, 
 
[b]ecause the concept agency is the basis of a fundamental question: How is something 
like individual ‘human’ acting conceivable? And how can ‘individual’ or ‘human agency’ 
be systematically and adequately theorised as something that is interrelated with a 
social environment or social structure?182 
 
For sociologists, then, “individual ‘human’ acting” – and that entails terms like will, choice, or 
freedom – needs to be reconciled with a formative social arena; Raithelhuber calls it “social 
environment” [“soziale Umgebung”] or “social structure” [“soziale Struktur”]. 
However, sociologists are not the only ones who ask how something like human acting 
may be conceivable. Let us therefore contrast Raithelhuber’s description with Jurist’s more 
philosophically inclined account: 
 
‘Agency’ is a technical term used by philosophers and social theorists. […] Traditionally, 
philosophers have been drawn to the word ‘agency’ in connection with the problem of 
free will. Agency is thus predicated on our intentions, particularly the capacity to engage 
in second-order reflections on our own desires and beliefs. The philosophical meaning 
                                                          
182 Eberhard Raithelhuber, “Ein Relationales Verständnis von Agency. Sozialtheoretische Überlegungen und 
Konsequenzen für Empirische Analysen,” Agency. Qualitative Rekonstruktionen und gesellschaftstheoretische 
Bezüge von Handlungsmächtigkeit, eds. Stephanie Bethmann et al., Weinheim: Beltz Juventa, 2012, 122-53, 123, 
trans. S.J. 
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of ‘agent’ is not confined to the realm of action, though action is never alien from the 
concept of agency.183 
 
One particular detail is quite instructive here. While Raithelhuber describes agency in terms 
of an individual’s social environment, Jurist grasps the problem directly in terms of a “free 
will”, an “intention”, “desires and beliefs”. As opposed to an external social structure, these 
are all intrinsic factors. This is a very decisive point that is connected with fundamental 
developments within the humanities as such. 
The first important thing to note, a point that seems to go largely unnoticed or at least 
uncommented and thus contributes a lot to the current confusion that Mische and Emirbayer 
observed above, is a certain split in academic disciplines, where philosophy seems to discuss 
something old under the rubric ‘agency’, while social sciences discuss something new. We 
should therefore clearly differentiate between sociological action theories on the one hand 
and philosophical ones on the other. This should help a great deal to bring order into the vague 
field of ‘agency’ that was outlined above. 
Indeed, the philosophy of action has a long and well-recorded history.184 According to the 
Oxford English Dictionary, the term ‘agency’ itself was first recorded in the English language 
at the beginning of the 17th century, and from its first recordings had already been used in 
connection with the philosophy of action.185 Section V of Jonathan Edwards’ Freedom of the 
Will (1754), which is entitled “Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Moral Agency”, bears 
clear testimony to this fact.186 And, as we can clearly see, too, intrinsic factors, such as 
capability, intention and desire play a prominent role. In philosophical thinking about agency, 
this has not changed until today. The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, for example, 
states in 2008: “An agent can decide to act or not. […] The kind of capacity intrinsic to an agent 
[my emphasis] is called agency. The change caused by an agent is called agent-causation, in 
contrast to event-causation in which one thing is caused externally by another.”187 
                                                          
183 Jurist, 127-8. 
184 The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Action, for example, lists articles on particular thinkers 
contributing to the field, ranging, chronologically, from Plato to Ricœur (Part IV, 419-621). 
185 “Agency,” Entry 2, Def. 4, The Oxford English Dictionary, 3rd ed., 2012. 
186 Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, 1754, Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, n.d. Web. 
08 Feb. 2014, <http://www.ccel.org>. Cf. also the references to earlier texts in the OED’s entry to “agency”.  
187 “Agent,” The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, eds. Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu, Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2008. 
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Social scientists, however, have a completely different approach to the problem. Above, 
Raithelhuber asked two questions: First, “How is something like individual ‘human’ acting 
conceivable?” Second, how can agency “be […] theorised as something that is interrelated 
with a social environment or social structure?” For social scientists, the first question may 
appear to be new, or at least newly problematic, because a certain condition is presupposed 
that provides the second question’s foundation and, for them, also places the first question 
outside the long philosophical tradition. This condition may be called postmodernity. 
Seventeen years prior to Raithelhuber, in 1995, Jaber Gubrius and James Holstein spotted the 
new challenge that comes with “postmodern life” and that might have given rise to agency’s 
current popularity: 
 
The newest challenge to sociological notions of individual agency stems from the 
postmodern assault on the self as a centered presence in experience. […] In postmodern 
life, the notion of individual agency, centered on a self with the capacity to effectively 
act upon the world, ostensibly dissolves and is replaced by floating signifiers, 
transforming agency into a passive cacophony of language games […].188 
 
Taking up this newest challenge, Ermarth sees, ironically, a “cultural evolution” implementing 
itself in 2001. She claims “that postmodernity necessarily, and perhaps opportunely, 
undermines the bases upon which political democracy has rested”.189 Indeed, when we read 
this, agency appears to be a recent problem, and an urgent one at that. Old certainties and 
traditions seem to have vanished suddenly, leaving us in an unprecedented predicament. The 
unified self itself is in a state of disappearance. In this situation, it is absolutely necessary to 
come to grips with what earlier was quite unproblematic: human acting. 
Needless to say, this grand narrative (the word is chosen on purpose) is mostly 
postmodern fiction and rather reveals a certain historical short-sightedness.190 Already at the 
                                                          
188 Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein, “Individual Agency, the Ordinary, and Postmodern Life,” Sociological 
Quarterly 36.3 (1995): 555-70, 555. 
189 Ermarth, “Agency in the Discursive Condition,” 34. 
190 Another good example would be Kenneth J. Gergen’s Das Übersättigte Selbst: Identitätsprobleme im heutigen 
Leben, trans. Frauke May, Heidelberg: Auer, 1996 (the Englisch original is The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity 
in Contemporary Life, New York: Basic Books, 1991). Gergen even seems to spot the obvious objections to his 
claims and in a footnote goes to some length in order to demonstrate that Conrad, Eliot, Joyce, Musil, Proust and 
Woolf do not contradict the prevailing sense of a unified self at their time (footnote 45, 78-9). The point is, 
however, that all his arguments regarding ‘modern’ times equally apply to his own description of a ‘postmodern’ 
condition. Of course a mechanistic worldview and belief in progress could be found during modernist times, but 
so it can be found in our postmodern world – and Gergen’s own hopes for a harmonious, postmodern future – 
free of irrational beliefs in limiting and oppressing ideologies – are the best example of it. At the time of writing, 
well over twenty years after the publication of Gergen’s book, empiricism, scientism, or a positivist worldview 
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beginning of the 20th century, many intellectuals and artists expressed most of these 
postmodern sentiments very accurately and a lot of modernist literature directly precedes and 
sometimes already exceeds postmodern experimentation. However, this would be a 
discussion in its own rights that cannot be undertaken in the current introduction to agency. 
Regarding the split between philosophical and sociological action theory, we may 
understand now the different approaches, but we still cannot really account for them. As a 
sociologist, it may be difficult to understand why philosophy is stuck in medieval, at best pre-
industrial, debates about a ‘free will’, while philosophical action theorists may wonder, on 
their part, why sociology ignores all the relevant history and rather opts for a grand narrative 
of lost certainties and a globalised, postmodern living-condition. In asking how sociology could 
move so far away from the philosophical tradition – remember, in both disciplines scholars 
ask the same question of how something like human acting is conceivable – one can trace a 
certain development that brings to the fore precisely those problems that the talk of lost 
certainties, the talk of naive and finally overcome superstitions of yesteryear (such as a free 
will), tries to put to rest, as if they were, finally, not relevant anymore. 
When we ask why individualising, agent-centred terms like ‘freedom’, ‘volition’, or ‘free 
will’ gave way to the impersonal noun ‘agency’ – leaving the agent itself an implied factor – a 
first point to note is the radicality with which metaphysics is rejected on all fronts in our time, 
and which, ironically, brings postmodernist thinking into very close proximity to radical 
positivism (more on this further down). Around 1920 Robert Musil could use the word ‘soul’ 
without qualms, today the term seems oddly antiquated – especially in social science debates. 
But the further our universe is disenchanted, the more pressing becomes a specific issue 
regarding agency. The fundamental problem arising from the rejection of metaphysics is from 
where else we might take the principles of our actions? If we reject the existence of ‘true’ 
normative values, how do we justify sustained political commitment for or against any cause? 
The issue that is sidestepped, then, by the grand narrative is not that we are romantically 
longing for reliable values, but how to account for those values we find ourselves reliably 
embracing. To make the point quite clear: normative values have never been lost, it is only 
difficult, if not impossible, to account for them in a strictly non-metaphysical way. We will see 
                                                          
with a strong belief in certainties is in no way on the decline, and the simultaneous flowering of deconstructivist 
criticism can well be read as an ongoing reaction to this equally ongoing worldview. 
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Judith Butler struggling with exactly this problem, and Richard Bernstein will trace it in 
Derrida’s writings. 
But connected with this almost complete disenchantment of the universe is another 
development. The radical rejection of metaphysics has sharply exacerbated the nature 
nurture dichotomy and made it one of the great battles of our times.191 On the one hand, 
everything can be traced back to natural causes, which strongly increases the predictability 
and the control we gain over the world and ourselves as parts of it. On the other hand, this 
rationalist worldview puts us in a position of power and makes it very plausible that many 
more things than previously thought are the result of social construction. The idea, for 
example, that gender is socially constructed is the more credible the more one understands 
about the nature of sex and the more it thus becomes possible to interfere with it. So, are we 
governed, like amoebae, by natural causes or do we, God-like, govern the course of nature? 
While some thinkers, especially outside the humanities, tend to side with nature, others, 
especially within social studies, tend to side with nurture. Sociologist Anthony Giddens, for 
example, quite explicitly announces: “This is a society living after the end of nature.”192 
A central point, then, that leads Giddens to postulate the end of nature, while it 
simultaneously leads some neuroscientists to postulate the end of the free will,193 is human 
control. Perhaps one could go as far as claiming that the turning point, where radically 
deterministic natural scientists and radically indeterministic (de)constructivists meet, is 
indeed human agency. The first group, precisely through their deterministic approach, 
increases the predictability and so, too, the possibilities of manipulation of our natural world, 
including ourselves as parts of it; while the second group emphasises that because of all the 
manipulation there is no such thing as a natural world, which also applies to ourselves. While 
                                                          
191 With her essentialist and partly biologist approach and concepts like a pre-social and primary self, Margaret 
Archer’s Being Human: The Problem of Agency is a very good example for the ferocity with which this battle is 
fought within the thematic complex of agency itself (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000). Archer seems to feel 
particularly on the defensive (1-3) – devoting as she does a whole part of her book to the passionate defence of 
her position (“The impoverishment of humanity”, 17-117). In her fierce counter-offensive, especially against 
postmodern views, she does not shy back from subheadings like “Social imperialism and linguistic terrorism” 
(22). She explicates: “The human being, as a causally efficacious subject was exposed to a linguistic terrorism 
which intensified over the stages of thought paving the way to postmodernism – structuralism, post-
structuralism and textualism. Rather than being the source of referential meanings in the real world, humanity 
was increasingly turned into an entity constituted by language – a movement from subject to subjectification 
and subjugation” (25). 
192 Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping our Lives, 1999, London: Profile Books, 
2002, 68. Cf. also 53. 
193 A good discussion of such claims can be found in: Eddy Nahmias “Scientific Challenges to Free Will,” O’Connor 
and Sandis 2010, 345-56. 
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the one group puts us in the driving seat, the other draws our attention to the manmadeness, 
or constructedness of us and our environment. But while this, any way one looks at it, seems 
to underline the unlimited potential of humankind, it somehow passes over the actor itself. In 
the “Anthropocene age”, as Carey calls it in Amnesia,194 we dissolve – either as parts of a 
natural or a social system – as parts, we may say, of a structure. 
This ‘end of the self’, however, poses a second great problem for thinking about human 
action: Who acts? What, if not ‘we’ is the source of our actions? After the end of the self, there 
is no intrinsic quality left within the body of individual agents whose expression society could 
further or hinder. The only enabling and limiting power left is society itself (or nature in the 
natural sciences). Thus social theory has to explain capacities, abilities, potentials as the result 
of formative yet also confining social inculcation. 
And that is where Raithelhuber’s second question is properly situated. It is here that the 
possibility of human causation passes from philosophy to sociology; it is here, too, that a new 
page in the vast volume of human action theory is being written which may be entitled 
‘agency’. Raithelhuber’s phrasing shows how after the linguistic turn “environment or social 
structure” – that is nurture – suddenly commands the focus of attention. Rather than relying 
on nature, on a “universal modern actor”195 who is endowed with universal qualities and to 
whom society remains an external factor, recent social action theories tend to see actors as 
products of their specific historic and social environment who develop context-specific 
qualities through interaction. In so doing, however, we reach an almost complete convergence 
of society and agent in which any intrinsic qualities are denied and the individuality of the 
agent is an effect, is socially produced. The agent vanishes as an implied factor of the system, 
and agency becomes a structural possibility. 
As for the grand narrative of postmodernity and what it conceals: we have never lost our 
sense of subjectivity, our sense of being the authors of our actions, of being the source of 
emotions that are ‘ours’, that ‘we’ experience. It is only difficult, if not impossible, to account 
for this sense, if nature or anything fundamentally intrinsic and non-objectifiable is totally 
rejected. 
                                                          
194 Carey, Amnesia, 366. 
195 Margaret R. Somers and Gloria D. Gibson, “Reclaiming the Epistemological ‘Other’: Narrative and the Social 
Construction of Identity,” Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, ed. Craig Calhoun, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, 
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Especially for the purpose of this thesis the sociological approach to agency bears a serious 
and fundamental problem therefore. For, a theory on agency that is preoccupied with working 
out how human acting might be conceivable without having to take recourse to the notion of 
a sovereign subject cannot yield useful concepts for discussing the theme of entrapment in 
Carey’s writing. One would by necessity come to the same conclusion that literary theorist 
and agency scholar Elizabeth Deeds Ermath reaches about Nabokov. “ [He] develops iterative 
patterns that have nothing at all to do with plot or character, and whose notable recurrences 
throw attention away from plot and character and onto the texture of language”196. Indeed, 
the very discussion about a ‘Parrot’ or an ‘Olivier’ who ‘struggle’ would already contradict a 
theory that – explicitly and repeatedly – denies forms of plot or the notion of characters.197 
The theoretical loss and practical need for a unified, intrinsic self is exactly what drives a 
lot of contemporary fictional writing, I would argue. Which brings us to Peter Carey again. 
Intuitively, he seems to sense in his works a loss of authentic selfhood. While most of his 
novels and stories in some way represent our postmodern condition or employ some 
deconstructivist theory, almost all of his characters struggle against their situation and refuse 
to be deconstructed. That is what the notion of entrapment, which is so central for his 
writings, entails. Therefore, in order to discuss this struggle adequately, one has to take into 
account the philosophical, agent-oriented, and the sociological, agency-oriented, theory of 
action. But it will demand considerable theoretical effort to produce a theory of human action 
with which one can usefully address characters and plots of novels once again. 
First, I will discuss the sociological concept of agency that takes its lead from experiences 
of modernist mass societies at the beginning of the 20th century that strongly questioned the 
possibility of striving for individual happiness. Without having space here to go into detail, it 
has at least to be mentioned that agency is a decidedly Western concept that takes a path  
from early modern times – with a Reformation that individualises faith and emphasises this-
worldly success in a protestant work ethic, with the discovery of a mechanistic, heliocentric 
model for describing the movements of the planets – goes on to trace the increasing sense of 
human control via Enlightenment, the French Revolution and Romanticism, which replaced 
                                                          
196 Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, History in the Discursive Condition: Reconsidering the Tools of Thought, London: 
Routledge, 2011, 67-8. 
197 Cf. Elisabeth Deeds Ermarth, “Beyond ‘The Subject’: Individuality in the Discursive Condition,” New Literary 
History 31.3 (2000): 405-19; Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, “Agency in the Discursive Condition,” History and Theory. 
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the divine, social order with one that is manmade and led to new expressions of individuality 
and individual sentiment, to end up in industrialised modernism from where it was but a small 
step to postmodernism. The result is a deeply entrenched sense in the Western world of the 
uniqueness and dignity of every single human being, of the importance of individual 
happiness, and personal fulfilment that is also the core of all the different concepts of agency 
– also the sociological ones. 
After two world wars and the disappointment of communist regimes, overarching 
ideologies, except liberal ones, had become suspicious and the “universal modern actor” had 
come into disrepute. The task of social studies at the end of the 20th century was therefore to 
theorise agency in an ideologically strictly non-ideological way and without having to take 
recourse to nature. For this, sentiments of fragmentation, impermanence, and alienation that 
were described at the beginning of the 20th century were picked up again and reinterpreted 
as possibility of greater individual freedom. In contemporary sociological action theories 
society is invariably seen as the cumulative, unintended outcome of individual action, while 
the individual in its actions is determined by social inculcation – a neat, circular construct 
where agency drives permanent social development and permanent social development 
enables agency, and both presuppose each other. 
The problem of normativity, of values on which to base our intentions, will then lead to 
the attempt to get back into the picture what Charles Taylor calls “moral frameworks”. This 
will take up considerable argumentative space, because the truth that there is no truth, the 
rejection of anything definite, seems to be a dearly cherished accomplishment of 
contemporary social thought. I will argue however, that this will not do for explaining 
committed action and only serves to veil and leave unreflected the Western liberal values on 
which this recent ‘ideology of no ideology’ is based. 
A very brief discussion on essentialism will then attempt to reconnect agency with inner 
sources in order to arrive at a more complete account. But as has been said, all this effort is 
undertaken not only to rethink the concept of agency for its own sake, but also to make agency 
a fruitful concept for sustained literary analysis. In contemporary writing, and especially in 
Peter Carey’s works, the question of how something like human action is conceivable reigns 
very prominently. Individuality, individual characters, will thus be of key concern in the literary 
analyses. The emergence of Western individuality as the basis of the concept of agency itself will 
therefore be the starting point for the detailed discussion of the sociological concept of agency 
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that is to follow – and also serve as a reminder that one should not deny the philosophical 
tradition that this concept generated. 
 
4.3. The Ancient Sources of Agency 
 
It is important to keep apart different levels of analysis. Agency is clearly a concept of Western 
thinking, but that does not mean one had to adhere to Western, secular, liberal values in order 
to be an agent. What will be described in the following is the basis of a theoretical concept, 
not its practical application. 
Now, as has been said, individuality is crucial for the concept of agency. Even sociological 
action theories, perhaps especially sociological action theories, will invariably find themselves 
committed to concepts of individuality. Judith Butler and Homi Bhabha, for example, premise 
their entire emancipative projects on the idea of the dignity and worth of every human life – 
even emphatically so. But that this amounts to the implicit embracing of Western individuality 
is also a point that many sociological action theories like to overlook in their efforts to do away 
with the sovereign subject (more on this further down). It is important therefore to bring back 
into focus a few fundamental principles that ground the notion of agency as such. What 
follows here is a very rough, very brief sketch of the framework of thinking that lead to the 
concept of agency and in which it is embedded to this day. Charles Taylor has written 
extensively on this subject, and his Sources of Self is an excellent work for a more thorough 
overview. The only purpose of the sketch provided here is to make clear that all the various 
attempts to ‘kill the author’, to ‘dethrone Adam’, to do away with origin and unified 
subjectivity, to emphasise instead processes of signification, the practices of enunciation in 
which we are all embedded, that all these attempts are still rooted in a Western tradition and 
a Western moral framework of humanism that cherishes, centrally, the individual. 
Now, when we talk in this way about ‘individuality’, it is important not to confuse 
‘individuality’ with what Charles Taylor terms the “punctual self” of disengaged reason.198 
“The individualism we identify as so central to the modern experience and modern society 
and culture was shaped by both romantic and rationalist notions”, as also Craig Calhoun 
reminds us.199 And indeed, individuality has always also meant the madness of a Hamlet, the 
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irrational, mad, multiple personalities of an E.T.A Hoffmann (for example Kapellmeister 
Kreisler), the self-referential, postmodern (?), autodiegetic narrator of Lawrence Stern’s 
Tristram Shandy, the play with multiple and exchangeable identities we find in Jean Paul’s 
writings200 and, moreover, a Faust who found himself torn between two souls which, alas, 
dwelled in his breast. Accordingly, Taylor does not only retrace the path from Plato over 
Augustine to Descartes and from there to Bacon, Locke, Hume, Deism and radical 
Enlightenment, but also from Plato over Augustine on to Montaigne and from there via 
Salisbury and Hutcheson to Rousseau and European Romanticism (roughly). The point is that 
not only two interacting but nevertheless roughly distinguishable concepts of individuality 
emerge, but that they emerge because individuality has to be wrought from different 
backgrounds. The individual has to be upheld against external levelling forces – if we are 
matter, we do not matter – while it also must be asserted against the unknowabilty of all 
things – if everything is only perception, maybe life as such is an illusion. When Descartes 
wrote down his “cogito ergo sum”, then this was preceded by a fundamental problem: How 
do we know that we ‘are’?201 Either we take an external perspective, then we might simply be 
an insignificant part, a negligible constituent, of blind, external forces; or we take an internal 
perspective which renders everything human projection, including our own existence. Both 
stances, if thought through to the end, threaten the early modern concept of a dignified 
individual whose singular existence as a human being is valuable. 
But it is this concept that had become and still is the fundamental backbone of Western 
self-perception. Part of the value and dignity we accord to human life derives from the fact 
that today we do not only see ourselves as originators of our actions but also take ourselves, 
our this-worldly happiness and unhappiness, as the ultimate yardstick against which to 
measure these actions. That is what constitutes the core of the concept of agency. And that is 
the reason why it is so inseparably entwined with individuality. As Richard van Dülmen points 
out in the introduction to his monumental historical project: 
 
From the 16th century onwards, reflections upon the own self are increasing 
considerably. […] The emancipation from Christian [“kirchlich-religiös”] tradition and 
                                                          
200 E.g. Dahore/Emanuel in Hesperus oder 45 Hundposttage: Eine Lebensbeschreibung (1795); 
Leibgeber/Siebenkäs in Siebenkäs (1796-1797), who reappear as Schoppe and Siebenkäs in Titan (1800-1803); 
Roquairol/Albano in Titan; and the mothers of Albano and Linda, who exchange their new born children in Titan. 
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culture goes hand in hand with a liberation of the I, which acquires a worth of its own 
for the first time. As the religious-ritual hope for an afterlife decreases, the this-worldly 
significance of human beings increases, and with this also the responsibility and 
possibility to take our fate in our own hands. [Even though we have to add, from an 
agency perspective, that already the early Christian concept of sin makes necessary a 
concept of a will and a genuine capacity for decision making]202 
 
Since the departure of the Early Modern Age with the invention of the printing press, the 
‘discovery’ of America and heliocentricism, the world became more manageable, more 
predictable, more mechanical and thus, above all, more ‘manipulable’ or formable. 
Increasingly, members of the Western world felt they were in power. They could calculate and 
influence things, which meant they mattered. As a human being one literally began to make a 
difference. For, if one could really change things, then perhaps one did not have to remain 
passive towards a cosmic order and could do something else than trying to find the right way 
to admire and salute to it. It meant we were endowed with an internal power to influence 
things. God was less out there and more in us. 
However, this also entails a materialistic stance towards the world and our place in it. For, 
it is a positivist view which enables us to see the world as an arena in which to exercise our 
internal capabilities. Human power is not only the beginning of individuality and agency, 
therefore, but also of the disenchantment of the universe, which threatens, in a rationalistic 
sweep, to make our newly gained capacity for action meaningless in turn. Perhaps no one has 
described the vertigo, the horrifying emptiness, that results from this disenchantment more 
intensely than Jean Paul in his famous “Speech of the Dead Christ from the Universe that There 
is no God” (1796), a daunting, apocalyptic dream in which Jesus Christ appears at the final 
destruction of all existence and calls in vain for his father. The only thing he finds is himself 
and: “Mute, inanimate Nothing! Chill, eternal Necessity! Insane Chance!”203 Foucault 
describes this as “effective history” by referring to Nietzsche, who uses a very similar 
expression as Jean Paul: “the iron hand of necessity shaking the dice-box of chance”.204 This 
                                                          
202 Richard van Dülmen, Einleitung, Entdeckung des Ich: Die Geschichte der Individualisierung vom Mittelalter bis 
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may be “effective” but it is an abyss into which not even Werner Heisenberg is quite ready to 
drop in his memoir-style Physics and Beyond.205 
The increasing sense of control is not only a source of liberation, then, but at the same 
time the source of great despair. It also comes connected with what Taylor calls the 
internalisation of “moral sources”. If one is not simply exposed to godly whims, a godly will, 
or a cosmic order, then in order to be good, one has to do good. But this does precisely not 
mean to be an obedient child, to find out what the almighty father wants and then do it. If we 
really are in charge because we can really change things, then responsibility is transferred 
from the father or the cosmic order to ourselves. We thus do not only initiate actions, we also 
determine to what end we act, what change we actually want to pursue. These are the roots 
of the modern question of morality. Describing modern notions of (a)morality in Baudelaire, 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche but also Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky, Taylor comes to the 
conclusion that, for us moderns, “[o]ur powers must be deployed if these are to empower us. 
And in this sense the moral sources have been at least partly internalized.”206 
But if we are to determine it for ourselves, then what, actually, is ‘good’? “Thinkers in the 
early twentieth century,” Taylor describes the struggle, “were exercised by a problem which 
is still posed today: What is the place of the Good, or the True, or the Beautiful, in a world 
entirely determined mechanistically?” And he goes on to point out what was, according to 
him, one of the most profound sources of solace: “Bergson, with his doctrine of the 
irreducibility of experience to external explanation, of durée to the spatialized time of physical 
explanation, was the great source of liberation”.207 It is the “irreducibility of experience”, this 
almost Cartesian ‘I experience, therefore I am’ – and therefore I matter, I hasten to add – in 
which many modern thinkers sought and still seek refuge from being reduced to insignificant 
dust particles of an unfeeling, unthinking, and unstoppably unfolding external mechanism, a 
                                                          
205 “Do you think that this sort of accident [Zufall] is completely pointless? Does it, so to speak, merely put into 
practice what quantum laws express statistically?” Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker asks and continues: “Your 
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dead, ever faster expanding universe, and in which they seek the certainty of their own 
existence. 
So once we are the masters of the universe, we seem to be quite alone out there, and the 
whole thing seems to turn into a dead mechanism – including ourselves in it. Internalisation is 
an answer to both problems, the uncertainty of our existence (since everything is only the 
product of our fallible human perception) and our utter insignificance (since everything, 
including ourselves, is only matter, is only part of a blindly operating apparatus). 
Internalisation means both, that we have powers that we can deploy (we are not dust 
particles, we make a difference), and that we experience, therefore are. We think, we feel; we 
influence, we control: We live and our life matters. Therefore, too, the deployment of our 
powers makes sense, has an aim: our well-being. To exercise our internal capabilities in order 
to do good means to achieve our own, this-worldly happiness.208 
Here we can close the short detour. According to Slavoj Žižek, the universality of the 
Cartesian subject is the universality of individual freedom: 
 
It is only within this ideological space that one can experience one’s identity as 
something contingent and discursively ‘constructed’. To cut a long story short, 
philosophically, there is no Judith Butler, or her theory of gender identity as 
performatively enacted, without the Cartesian subject.209 
 
It is evident, then, that a Western concept of this-worldly happiness and the firm belief in 
the power of human beings to achieve it is at the basis also of Butler’s and Bhabha’s projects. 
Since our, that is every individual’s, well-being matters, and matters in this world and not 
some afterlife, it is important to overcome oppression, and since this oppression is not God-
given but manmade, since the human condition is of our own making, we have the possibility, 
even the responsibility, to employ our powers to alter our situation. 
 
                                                          
208 Charles Taylor makes clear that even Nietzsche insists on affirming and, yes, loving the world as it is to enable 
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4.4. The Agency Game: The Sociological Concept of Agency 
 
The new brand of sociological action theory takes up the widely perceived deterioration of 
‘old certainties’ and the postmodern disappearance of the individual and individuality and 
reinterprets them as empowerment and the possibility of freer individual self-expression. It is 
a tendency that had been anticipated to a certain extent by Georg Simmel at the beginning of 
the 20th century. However, this vague possibility, suggested in his description of how personal 
freedom and also eccentricity emerge from urban anonymity and counter reactions to it,210 
has by now taken centre stage in the sociological debates on the possibility of individual 
action. With the change of vocabulary that occurred since the 20th or even 18th century, we 
nowadays do not ask anymore What is Enlightenment, but seek the Answer to the Question: 
 
What, then, is human agency? We define it as the temporally constructed engagement 
by actors of different structural environments – the temporal-relational contexts of 
action – which, through the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both 
reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive response to the problems 
posed by changing historical situations.211 
 
Ann Mische and Mustafa Emirbayer write about “actors” who are situated in “different 
structural environments” or “temporal-relational contexts” and who engage in action which 
“both reproduces and transforms those structures.” The change occurs because the actors 
have to respond and adapt to the specific problems of their times. In other words: the 
individual repeats “structures” which it finds in its respective “structural environment”, and 
at the same time changes these structures by applying them to its specific “historical 
situations”. Moreover, these structures are “habitual, unreflected, and mostly unproblematic 
patterns of action by means of which we orient our efforts in the greater part of our daily 
lives”,212 they “constrain and enable action”.213 Although Mische and Emirbayer join the 
common chorus of Bourdieu criticism in that they claim he took agency as “habitual, 
repetitive, and taken for granted”,214 their own definition is not too far away from his. He 
writes: 
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Produced by the practice of the successive generations, in a particular type of conditions 
of existence [“structural environments”], these schemes of perception, appreciation and 
action [“interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment”], which are acquired through 
practice and implemented in the practical state without attaining explicit representation 
[“habitual, unreflected, and mostly unproblematic patterns of action”], function as 
practical operators through which the objective structures of which they are the product 
tend to be reproduced in practices.215 
 
It is true, of course, that Bourdieu focuses in his discussion on how social norms are 
reproduced rather than on how they are subverted, but these may be grasped as two 
simultaneous outcomes of the same process.216 The “schemes of perception” are here as 
much produced by “objective structures” as by “the practice of the successive generations”. 
With ‘objectivity’ Bourdieu therefore does not so much refer to an absolute and unchanging 
truth but rather implies that certain social structures are undeniably and objectively ‘there’ 
and can – yet only to a certain extend – be ‘objectively’ described, that is rationalised, and 
further that these structures tend to be reproduced. But precisely because this reproduction 
takes place through “the practice of the successive generations”, they do not remain self-
identical but change permanently.217 
Since these controversies do not challenge the general principle, then, but are rather 
concerned with how to read and apply it, one could reasonably comprise all these approaches 
and count them among 
 
the number of heroic efforts by sociologists to recast social analysis along the central 
axes of the interaction between agency and structure – that is, to develop a social theory 
                                                          
for the Derridean “break” with context that utterances perform” (Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative, 
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that allows for human action which is nonetheless bounded and constrained by 
structural restraints.218  
 
Or, to put it in Piotr Sztompka’s words: “Social life as a process of structural emergence via 
actions, and the tension between actions and structures as the ultimate moving force of the 
process are the ideas that form the core of recent theories of agency […].”219 
In reference to Wittgenstein, I want to call these by now common sociological descriptions 
of agency220 language game (Sprachspiel) concepts, and it will soon become apparent why. 
So far the description seems plausible, as far as it goes, but it is still very vague. We can see 
that nature has been replaced by ‘structure’ or society, and this – more or less implicitly – 
means urbanised society. The individual, moreover, any form of intrinsic motivation and 
capacity, any kind of what Charles Taylor calls inner sources, has vanished. This is a highly 
problematic situation. But before I can explain why, and why it will be necessary to bring back 
the individual and an independent outside world – our nature within and without one might 
say – we still need a much more detailed account of the agency game in which the individual, 
the player, is not only involved but through which it is manifested. 
When Wittgenstein describes his language game in Philosophical Investigations,221 he 
grasps language as participating in and thus learning by way of social interaction. Language, 
therefore, is not a vehicle for communication, but is communication; it is interacting with 
other social beings. Even playing with a dog could be seen, in this view, as language and 
language use, even though Wittgenstein, of course, never takes his thought that far. Coming 
up with a very basic description of a language in §2, he asks in §10: “Now what do the words 
of this language signify? – How is what they signify supposed to come out other than in the 
kind of use they have?” Accordingly, in §11, he explicitly describes the words of a language as 
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tools in a toolbox. Focussing on “primitive kinds of [language] use”, he states in §5: “A child 
uses such primitive forms of language when he learns to talk. Here the teaching of language 
is not explaining, but training.” One learns language, in other words, in the same way in which 
one gradually learns other skills such as walking, riding a bike, or how to handle certain tools. 
Language is thus grasped as a skill and a tradition that is passed from one generation to the 
next. A helpful comparison might be the notion of procedural knowledge in psychology. Such 
knowledge describes things one knows how to do but which one cannot put in words, or only 
with considerable effort. Procedural knowledge is acquired by permanently repeated practice, 
not by intellectual insight. As Gupta and Cohen put it: 
 
Much of the interest in procedural (implicit) memory arises from the fact that a great 
deal of everyday human learning appears to have just the character of procedural 
memory: It occurs gradually, as a result of practice over many exposures; and the results 
or contents of such memory, learning, or knowledge are typically unavailable to 
introspection or recollection. For example, learning to ride a bicycle appears to have 
these characteristics, as does acquisition of the phonology or syntax of a first 
language.222 
 
Wittgenstein now generalises this thought and describes how a rule (the German term would 
be Regel) is a function of regularity (which in German would be Regelmäßigkeit). In §199 he 
writes: 
 
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which only one 
person followed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion 
on which a report was made, an order given or understood, and so on. – To follow a rule, 
to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, 
institutions). 
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language 
means to have mastered a technique. 
 
What Ferdinand de Saussure famously calls langue, the abstract, rule-based phenomenon we 
call language, is, in this perspective, a perceivable pattern that emerges, and keeps emerging, 
through applied social interaction. It means that we create our language by using it. Or more 
scholarly: langue is a hypothetical abstraction from actual instances of parole and thus created 
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on-line by every single instance of parole. Dietrich Busse expresses this insight in the following 
terms: 
 
Continuity over time is, in the case of linguistic meanings, a fiction like the concept of 
meaning itself. Principally, nothing continues, but a unit of meaning is constituted in 
each communicative act that is tied to this specific situation, this specific context. […] 
The collective consciousness of usages of a word, of the discursive profit one may have 
from this word, is nothing else, in the end, but the extrapolation of the subjective history 
of one’s experiences.223 
 
This is the first aspect of the language game. It means that without participation in the game 
of social interaction there would be no law that one could deduce. Judith Butler, for example, 
applies this point in her description of performativity: 
 
Although Lacan claims that the symbolic law has a semi-autonomous status prior to the 
assumption of sexed positions by a subject, these normative positions […] are only 
known through the approximations that they occasion. The force and necessity of these 
norms […] is thus functionally dependent on the approximation and citation of the law; 
the law without its approximation is no law […].224 
 
The second aspect of the language game has already been described in connection with 
the sociological description of agency and the point that agents, when they repeat the 
structures which they find in their respective “structural environments”, change these 
structures. To elaborate this point a little: The repetition of social interactions can function as 
repetition only when it is recognisable as repetition; it must bear a mark of ‘citationality’. In 
his critique of Austin’s concept of performative speech acts, Derrida emphasises that what 
Wittgenstein has just called “customs” are not something in which certain linguistic acts may 
function, but something constitutional of language itself, thus, of course, repeating 
Wittgenstein: “‘Ritual’ is not a possible occurrence [éventualité], but rather, as iterbility, a 
structural characteristic of every mark”.225 This conception of constant citation then leads to 
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the insight that there cannot said to be an objective or absolute origin or ‘master model’ on 
which the continual repetitions are based, or at least we cannot know it. Further, this means 
that the repetition that brings forth the deducible law is an ongoing process that cannot, at 
any point, be said to be completed. And finally, coming back to sociological description of 
agency, this also implies that no repetition can exactly equal its model: “Because language 
games exist in time only through the repeated activity of playing, they are principally subjected 
to the possibility of change at every point of their application.”226 Or as Derrida puts it: “the 
value of risk or exposure to infelicity […] is always possible, and is in some sense a necessary 
possibility”.227 
This aspect of the language game is very important for agency. It is here that Butler sees 
the potential for “subversive resignification”.228 Also Bhabha, I would argue, has this concept 
of mis-repetition in mind when he joins Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in calling for a 
“catachrestic gesture”229: “the enunciative [as opposed to the epistemological] attempts 
repeatedly to reinscribe and relocate the political claim to cultural priority and hierarchy 
(high/low, ours/theirs) in the social institution of the signifying activity.”230 Since thus “closure 
comes to be effected in the contingent moment of repetition”,231 it is possible to seize that 
moment and make trouble. But these issues will be discussed in more detail further down. 
Another point to note is that despite the perpetual change of the language game, it is 
simultaneously recognisable or stable. A helpful metaphor for this aspect is the game of 
Chinese whisper.232 Suppose the game is staged in a room, and there are always only the two 
acting players admitted into it. Once a player has uttered their phrase, they leave the room 
                                                          
226 Busse, 217, trans., S.J. 
227 Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” 15. This is a somewhat rude quotation, turning a critical comment on 
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228 E.g. Butler, Gender Trouble, xxxi. 
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and a new one comes in into whose ear the phrase is then whispered in turn. Strangely 
independent from the individual player a whisper seems to hover in the air. This whisper 
changes continually without there being any ‘original’ phrase nor a possibility to retrace the 
development of the phrase. Such a concept of reiteration also bears some similarity with the 
concept of cultural memory, “a collective concept for all knowledge that directs behaviour 
and experience in the interactive framework of a society and one that obtains through 
generations in repeated social practice and initiation”.233 Also this reference underlines the 
accumulative super-individual effects of countless individual repetitions that give structure its 
substantiality. Such practices take on a life of their own. They are somehow beyond the control 
of the individual and seem to be strangely manifest or material. In summary, however, one 
can say that the first aspect of the language game is that participating in social interaction 
creates a rule or pattern, and the second aspect is that this pattern is not only produced but 
at the same time already changed by one’s participation. 
The third aspect of the language game was exemplified by Mische and Emirbayer’s use of 
the notion of “enabling constraints”. Here, I think, we leave Wittgenstein or rather elaborate 
his idea of the language game. In Excitable Speech, Judith Butler maintains: 
 
Untethering the speech act from the sovereign subject founds an alternative notion of 
agency and, ultimately, of responsibility, one that more fully acknowledges the way in 
which the subject is constituted in language, how what it creates is also what it derives 
from elsewhere. Whereas some critics mistake the critique of sovereignty for the 
demolition of agency, I propose that agency begins where sovereignty wanes. The one 
who acts (who is not the same as the sovereign subject) acts precisely to the extent that 
he or she is constituted as an actor and, hence, operating within a linguistic field of 
enabling constraints from the outset.234 
 
What Butler describes here is that one can participate in the language game only as part and 
player of the game. So when parents recognise their child as social being they initiate it, in so 
doing, as new player of the game which they are playing. They bring their child into existence 
as participant. This is what is meant by “the subject is constituted in language”. But at the 
same time that the parents impose their game on their child and establish themselves as role 
models, they also open up the “field of enabling constraints” which allows the child to play at 
all. Perhaps this thought is somewhat abstract. But one could make at least the example a bit 
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more concrete. The game is not a kind of board game where the players watch from outside 
and move their pieces, but rather a sports game where the players themselves are the pieces. 
Take a game like rugby, but one with no fixed rules. The moment the parents recognise their 
child and give it a name is as if they would hurl the ball to the child. Prior to that moment, the 
sporting crowd had never recognised it. It literally did not exist for them. Now that it holds the 
ball, however, the eyes of the others are cast upon it and it starts its existence as a player. If 
it wants to or not, the child finds itself holding the cursed object, and the other players are 
rushing towards it now. So play it must. But in playing the game, in repeating its parents’ action 
and throwing the ball onwards, the child continues the game and establishes a pattern. That 
is, it continues a pattern and thus comes into being as part of that pattern. At the same time 
that the child becomes part of the pattern, however, it also changes it in its specific way. It 
imprints its own style onto the game, so to say. So, by passing on the ball that was forced upon 
it, the child continues and thus establishes and changes the very ‘rules’ that bring it into 
existence.235 
At this point all those aspects of the language game that apply to the current sociological 
theories of agency have been introduced: Individuals are born into a structure, and structure 
enables their acting. Moreover, by acting they repeat the structure in which they find 
themselves but at the same time change it. As far as it goes, this conception is convincing. 
For example, it captures very accurately what has been said about entrapment in Peter 
Carey’s novels. That, as Pierce said, “dependent folk happily collaborate in their subjection” 
turns out to be a central feature of the “interaction between agency and structure”, to quote 
Somers and Gibson again. When individuals repeat and change the structure into which they 
are born then this process of repetition may easily result in the self-imposed continuation of 
entrapping structures – while simultaneously providing opportunities for procuring change. 
However, as has been said previously, there are also some serious problems with this 
sociological model of agency. As it stands, nature has been replaced by structure, an implicitly 
urban society – which is only natural for a sociological model. The problem with this is, 
however, that we have lost an independent opposition. ‘Structure’ is made up of its individual 
members and its individual members make up the ‘structure’. This is a circular construct. 
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Neither is it clear what the subjects could bring into the game ‘of themselves’ nor does there 
seem to be any ‘outside’ of the game. The ‘nature within and without’, as it was called earlier, 
is missing. This causes considerable difficulties when one tries to establish where exactly 
agency should come from. It more or less simply ‘occurs’ or ‘takes place’, but no one is actually 
doing things. Accordingly, in the discussion of novels, one does not get down to the level of 
individual characters with this concept. One can describe what it is that defines, that provides 
and at the same time limits, the space for actions – in Olivier’s  case (from Parrot and Olivier 
in America) this was class, if we remember. But that there is a possibility for agency, a field 
that enables and constrains it, does not clarify who it is that finally does things, and for what 
reasons. As soon as agency itself becomes the focus of attention, the individual reappears as 
the author of its actions – bringing all its intrinsic factors along with it, such as a will and an 
intention. 
We come here to a quandary that Appiah describes already in 1991 as ‘the problem of 
ageny’. Illustrating what we now can call sociological action theory, he observes that much 
current theory “notably discourse theory and poststructuralism” is marred “in the 
presuppositions of its account of structure and agency”. Namely, “The ‘problem of agency’ […] 
is conceived of as a problem of its relation to the general structuring of the social world within 
which agency occurs.”236 Appiah continues: “[W]e can recognize in this classic antinomy of 
social theory – the agon of structure and agency – what is also, perhaps, the central issue in 
the high humanist criticism of this century”.237 Effectively Appiah describes what has already 
been observed at the beginning of this chapter: how in contemporary, sociological agency 
concepts, the actor is an implied factor of the system and agency a structural possibility. He 
therefore stresses the importance of differentiating between a “discourse of structure” and a 
“discourse of agency”. According to him, the former is characterised by structuralist and 
poststructurlist accounts of the determining force of society, while the latter is characterised 
by “the language of the romantic ideology of the self, one might say the genius – of the 
individual agent, the author”.238 That is, as we now know, he differentiates between 
sociological and philosophical action theory. For Appiah, the all important insight is not to mix 
up these two discourses: “Everything that a theory of the structure claims to explain belongs 
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to the language, the discourse, of the structure; to insist on autonomous agency within this 
discourse is, if I may say so, simply to change the subject.”239 
So, this, then, is the “problem of agency”: Once one indeed does change the subject and 
puts the focus firmly on an individual’s actions, one is forced to acknowledge the Cartesian 
subject within the agency game. Even if we assume that the player is born and forced into the 
structure and only by repeating it gains meagre space for mis-repetition and thus agency, we 
still grasp them as something external. 
But if the paradoxical nature of a position which simultaneously presupposes an 
autonomous subject and grasps “individuals as puppets on the strings of social conditions” is 
something we simply have to live with,240 then what can we say about this subject’s 
sovereignty? As Appiah said, already posing such a question means to “change the subject”, 
to go beyond the realm of sociological action theory and re-enter philosophical action theory. 
For, the subject’s sovereignty, if we do not want to theorise it away but to investigate it, forces 
us to address the troublesome question of its relationship with social structure and the natural 
environment; that is, the subject’s relationship with an external world. For, that is what the 
‘sovereignty’ of the subject entails: That there is something like an external structure with 
which it interacts in a mutually transformative process. This process of interaction necessarily 
leads to the question of determinism and indeterminism as well as the question of the 
metaphysical sources within and without the subject from which the interaction springs. And 
it is these questions that form the foundation for the conceptualisation of agency that will be 
developed over the next chapters and that will be used to discuss Carey’s work; a 
conceptualisation of agency that tries to place a sovereign subject within structure. 
 
4.5. Agency, Nature, and Metaphysics 
 
To start off the attempt to connect the sociological agency game with the philosophical 
tradition of action theory and its focus on agents (not agency), this section enters, as Appiah 
says “the discourse of agency”. It will be argued that the possibility to act is based on the 
notion of a Cartesian subject that interacts with the world in a mutually transformative 
process – a problem that will reappear also in the next section in the form of the basic truth 
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paradox. Moreover, since decision making is an intentional process, it will be argued that our 
‘nature within and without’ is tied to the metaphysical concepts of inner sources and external 
moral frameworks. 
Let us start, then, with a very basic description of agency from the point of view of 
philosophical action theory. Agency is an individual’s interaction with the world. This world is 
the social and natural arena in which the individual tries to ascertain its own existence; the 
flow of spacetime, as it were, in which the individual tries to intervene. Usually, for example, 
we consider an amoeba to be fully part of the ‘flow of spacetime’, it cannot interfere with it, 
it is no agent. It is our interference itself, then, that constitutes us as Cartesian subjects, as 
agents. 
Accordingly, Scherr, with reference to Niklas Luhmann, describes freedom not as the 
absence of coercion but as the possibility to make a decision which has an influence on one’s 
future. He goes on to describe Ulrich Oevermann’s position, according to which it is in critical 
situations where routines fail and we cannot act by rote that we truly have to decide and 
“individuals constitute themselves as subjects”.241 We might take this as the sociologist’s way 
of saying that agency means to consciously decide in order to cause an effect – of seeing one’s 
will as the basis for one’s decision, therefore installing this will as a primary cause.242 While 
this emphasis on deciding may leave room for a compatibilist view according to which we 
possess a free will but the way we exercise this free will is predetermined, it does not leave 
room for a mechanistic, calculable determinism.243 If the sovereign subject is constituted 
through the act of decision making, agency is opposed to law-based (nomological) 
determinism, whether we take these to be social or natural laws. 
However, if in situations in which we truly have to decide, the consequences of our 
decision are disconnected from our intentions, events appear to occur randomly or at least 
fully unconnected to our decisions, the term ‘decision’ consequently loses its meaning, and 
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we still fail to emerge as subjects. We may in this way influence our own future, but this 
influence could still be completely unintended. Carl Popper is quite right therefore, when he 
refers to quantum mechanics and famously claims that “indeterminism is not enough”.244 The 
power to decide neither means that things happen completely at random, nor that they are 
determined mechanistically and therefore are foreseeable but inevitable. Agency, in other 
words, is as much opposed to determinism as it is to indeterminism. It means to have a 
conscious influence in the now on how the indeterminism of the future connects with the 
determinism of the past. And since “determinism of the past” is such a controversial term, let 
me quickly add that even if we declare that the past is a fiercely negotiated territory, we 
cannot but presuppose in these struggles that something did happen (what we see at work 
here is the truth paradox that will be introduced and explained in the next chapter).245 In fact, 
Bernard Dauenhaur and David Pellauer ascribe to Paul Ricœur a very similar notion of agency 
as the one being described here: 
 
Action, taken in the present, preserves the space of experience [determinism of the 
past] in a dialectical tension with the horizon of expectation [indeterminism of the 
future]. Without them, action would be impossible. But neither singly nor jointly can 
they fully determine action. Undoubtedly we are affected both by a past that is not of 
our own making and by the pictured future that our society presents. Nonetheless, 
through our initiatives we do make history and affect ourselves in the process of doing 
so.246 
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What Dauenhaur and Pellauer point out here is that, for Ricœur, the external frame of past 
and future is not enough to account for agency. In the now, there is “our initiatives”, 
something that is intrinsic to the agent itself. And although it is never mentioned by its name, 
what this intrinsic something seems to be, is a will. However, because a free will is not the 
same as the power to implement it, agency may be connected to the notion of a free will but 
is not the same as a free will. If one is enslaved and forced to do what one does, one has lost 
one’s agency, but one’s will may still freely but powerlessly rebel against the external coercion. 
Thus, in as far as it enjoys independent existence (hence is able to unsuccessfully rebel), a will 
may be called free even though it is completely overpowered by exterior forces.247 Agency, on 
the other hand, means to decide, to have a will and implement it. 
However, from an individual perspective, to implement one’s will cannot mean 
omnipotence either. To understand this, it is crucial to understand that agency is grasped here 
as engagement and thus interaction with an external, social-natural world. But such a concept 
of willed interaction with an external world implies a response from this external world. This 
means further that there must be a causal connection between decision and consequences of 
that decision which is not completely determined. 
Perhaps it is helpful, for a start, to take the interaction process literally – as conversation 
between two people. If one knew beforehand – with absolute precision – what one’s partner 
will answer to a question one asks or a statement one makes, one would not really 
communicate, not really offer opinions and not really ask questions; one would simply trigger 
the predetermined response from the other. And if this could be extended to the whole 
conversation, to any question one asked or statement one made, so that even the 
consequences of not talking at all with the other were fully known beforehand, the whole 
‘communication’ would turn into coercing the other into predetermined states. 
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4. Agency 
80 
 
The question is why this does not constitute agency. At gut-level, it is clear that our world 
simply is not like that and that, if it were, it would be utterly boring. But why? What is it that 
would quickly drain off any motivation to decide in such a world? It is clear, that if one could 
thus completely control another person, the other would become a medium for one’s self-
expression. Whatever state the other is in, it is a state we chose and that therefore reflects 
our own personality. The decisive point is, now, that if we thus determine the other, we 
ourselves remain unchanged. Therefore, from an individual perspective, the action has no 
consequences. 
Communication, interaction – a response to our decisions from an external world – means 
that we ourselves are implied, that we are influenced and changed in turn. Agency, in this 
perspective, must be grasped as interaction with an autonomous and independent system and 
would mean to act as much as to react. In a fully chaotic-indeterministic world, or a fully 
deterministic one, the external system is so independent as to rule out any interaction with 
an agent; in a world where an agent can freely choose definite results, the system is so 
dependent on the agent’s decision as to turn into a reflection of the agent’s self and to rule 
out interaction as well.248 This necessary ‘response from an independent system’ will be very 
relevant for the discussion of Illywhacker and Tristan Smith – in connection with compulsive 
mastery and ‘enabling escapism’ (the latter is my own term and will be developed when 
Tristan Smith is discussed). It is important to keep it in mind therefore. 
But back to the discussion of agency. At this point, the first claim has been presented: For 
agency we need both, a Cartesian subject that is always implied in the agency game, and an 
external, natural-social world with which it interacts in a mutually transformative process. 
What needs to be shown still, is that this interaction necessarily involves moral frameworks 
and metaphysical inner sources. We come here to the central notion of intention. 
A lot of what is to follow has been said or at least implied already. However, for grappling 
with the concept of intention, it will be necessary to make these premises more explicit. The 
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decisive point is the one that has just been made, namely that when we talk of human agency, 
then the agents themselves need to be implied by their decisions. Paul Ricœur noted above in 
Chapter 4.1. that “Actions imply goals […] which commit the one on whom the action 
depends”. And indeed, it is this “significance feature”, as Charles Taylor calls it in his attack on 
cognitive psychology, that brings back metaphysics with a vengeance. In his argument Taylor 
explains: 
 
[H]uman and animal agents [as opposed to computers] are beings for whom the 
question arises of what significance things have for them. […] We define the action by 
the significance it had for the agent [...] So we can only attribute action to beings we see 
as subjects of significance, beings for whom things can have significance in a non-
observer-relative way. […] It is just the principal feature of agents that we can speak 
about the meanings things have for them in this non-relative way, that, in other words, 
things matter for them.249 
 
This means that for human agency, we need to present illustrations in a specific way. Take the 
often-employed assassination of Lincoln.250 Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the 
decision in this case is between triggering the gun or not, and that the consequence of this 
decision is to kill the president or not. As it is, the example sounds ‘technical’, and that is so 
for a reason. It does not, as yet, constitute a case of agency. In order to make this an example 
of human agency, we would have to ask what the decision means for the agent. What does it 
mean for the assassin to kill the president? This concerns the possibility of being caught and 
hanged as well as the reason, the motivation for the decision. Personal gain, a political cause, 
deeply-felt personal hatred – all these subjective – that is: self-implying – motives, and in fact 
the notion of subjective motives as such, point towards the way in which decisions refer back 
to agents themselves. The all-important term, therefore, when we are dealing with human 
agency, is intention. 
Indeed, it is the necessary notion of intention that implies both, the metaphysical concept 
of inner sources and the metaphysical concept of external moral values. A chess computer, 
for example, calculates possibilities and makes a decision based on the intention to win the 
game. But the moral dimension is missing in this example. It is not a meaningful question to 
ask what it means for the computer to win or lose the game. There is no way in which the 
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decision may refer back to the computer itself and in which the consequences of the 
computer’s decision might thus change it in turn. Such a computer in fact never ‘decides’. It is 
fed with an input and generates an output – and in this sense the computer does not really 
have an intention, is no moral agent, and is not accountable for its actions. 
This brings us to inner sources. It is very well known that the idea of a will, of it being ‘us’ 
who make decisions, involves metaphysical concepts. But perhaps it still needs to be clarified 
how deep this point really goes. When agency is described as taking a decision with the idea 
that this decision has an effect, and the idea that a decision has an effect may be called 
intention, and when it is further supposed that this intention is not fully determined by an 
external force such as nature, God, or society – and I accept that we do not need to suppose 
this, but if we do – then, agency depends on something that is thoroughly intrinsic or truly 
subjective, something non-relative that is limited to the subject itself. 
Again, one must assume that this intrinsic source cannot remain unaffected by social 
learning and must have a biological basis. A realist perspective would even go one step further 
and explain that the biological kernel that unfolds in one of infinitely many possible directions 
by being exposed to a natural-social environment contains the seed to develop the power to 
disobey the command of nature. But for agency this is not enough. There is a logic problem 
here, a tautology to be precise. It would have to be a natural principle according to which 
nature developed the seed of a disobeying will. Accordingly, if nature developed the possibility 
to disobey herself, then both possibilities, to obey or disobey, would be natural – or, to put it 
differently, ‘disobeying’ in fact becomes a meaningless expression. In other words, whatever 
one does, whatever abominable or laudable decision one takes, one would always end up 
acting in accordance with some law of nature. ‘Law of nature’ becomes a purely descriptive 
notion without any explanatory or predictive value. Moreover, the otherwise very plausible 
realist position would reduce agency to external forces once again. 
This short excursion into realist arguments should help to outline the central problem of 
the idea of fully intrinsic sources. It is a metaphysical concept. And this I mean principally. We 
might make a decision and still not heed it. In this sense, as purported origin of our decisions 
but not of our observable behaviour – which may be externally enforced, say if we are slaves 
or hypnotised and therefore, precisely, will-less – inner sources are thoroughly metaphysical. 
No realist position can get us out of this bind. At any time one can wonder whether it is really 
one’s will with which one decides, or whether it is an external rule or ruler – such as one’s 
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genes or God or social inculcation – that produces the illusion of a will and predetermines 
what one erroneously calls one’s decision.251 But that is as far as concepts of agency can 
possibly go, no matter to what levels of complexity or obscurity one tries to aspire. 
Through the act of decision making, then, a metaphysical intrinsic source, an intention, a 
will connects the perception of how things are (determinism of the past) with a metaphysical 
idea of how things should be (indeterminism of the future). Now, it may be tempting to claim 
that such a perception of how things are and such an idea of how things should be are aspects 
of the agency game, that they are social constructs. But that would leave the Cartesian subject 
without an independent opposition again. If our moral goods are manmade and perceived as 
such, and if our reality is manmade and perceived as such, then our entire background, our 
environment, turns into human self-expression. Some may even argue that this is in fact the 
case. But such a state of affairs would quickly drain the capacity for human agency. The whole 
point of moral goods is that we believe in them and do not take them to be relative constructs. 
This last observation refers strait back to the problem that human agency has to be 
grasped as interaction with an autonomous and independent system. This is a problem 
because the notion of an independent system opposing an agent actually constitutes a 
paradox. If agency means mutually transformative interaction with an independent, external 
world, then obviously the opposing parties are not independent. In fact, the notion of 
opposition as such suggests contact. So the parts of an opposition are partners, and the fact 
that they form an opposition means that they relate to each other. There is no such thing, 
then, as an independent opposition, but there might be such a thing as opposition. 
The paradox that the world with which an agent interacts has to be independent of this 
agent and at the same time cannot be independent of the agent since she interacts with it and 
is a part of it will reoccur in the next subchapter as the problem of normativity. But underlying 
all these problems is a paradox that is even more basic, so basic in fact that it lurks more or 
less visibly in any argument that is based on (de)constructivist or relativistic reasoning. While 
this alone would be reason enough for treating the paradox, the actual point is to show that 
                                                          
251 One could try to elucidate this point with the help of an example. Suppose I pick up my son from school. 
How should he, or indeed I, ever know whether I truly willed this action or not? Perhaps my wife made me pick 
up our son and I did so unwillingly? Maybe I did not even talk to my wife beforehand, but simply knew how 
angry she would have been, had I not picked up our son. And so on and so forth. It is impossible to prove that I 
truly willed what I did (or vice versa). But if we assume human agency, then this would entail that ‘I’ stand 
behind a ‘decision’ as its origin, that there is a will and an intention that could or could not be carried out. Even 
though we naturally assume these things in our everyday life, they are fully metaphysical concepts. 
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we simply cannot dismiss moral values, that we cannot do without metaphysics, and at the 
same time to show what would be the terms under which moral values could be included 
again into a concept of human agency. The point cannot be, of course, to return to a pre-
postmodern state of discussion, but to show how we might re-introduce moral values and 
metaphysics into the current academic debates of the humanities. 
 
4.6. The Problem of Normativity 
 
There is an ancient paradox that is sometimes overlooked in postmodern theories and that 
also reappears in a lot of Peter Carey research, namely that the rejection of a truth claim 
constitutes in itself a truth claim. Even the intuitively pleasing idea that we leave things 
undecided and say that we do not know whether there is a truth or not is in itself not an 
ambivalent statement and constitutes a truth claim in itself. To engage with all the 
philosophical debates around this paradox – for example to cross out certain words to leave 
them undecided – is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. The basic paradox, however, has 
remained the same for nearly two millennia and it seems, the only way out is not claim 
anything at all – and the rest would be silence.252 Or, to say it with Wittgenstein’s famous 
dictum: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”253 – which he has just 
not done, to make quite sure the paradox of closure and simultaneous transcendence is 
properly understood.254 
For agency, this paradox is important in its moral version, namely the idea that all moral 
truths are equally untrue – a position that Charles Taylor calls ‘neo-Nietzschean’: 
 
If intellectual positions are closely tied up with moral ones, this is because both are to 
be seen as orders which we have imposed on reality, following a line of thinking drawn 
largely from The Gay Science. No position is to be seen as more or less justified than any 
other. All are ultimately based on fiat. Such are the “regimes of truth” of which Foucault 
spoke. Needless to say, I find this view as deeply implausible as its empiricist cousins.255 
                                                          
252 Taking it for granted that doctoral theses are generally not read and definitely not scrutinised, I take the 
liberty to add a random footnote here in which I do not mention Shakespeare, who may never have existed 
anyway and even then perhaps only plagiarised the texts she did not put in writing at any rate. May you enjoy 
it, dear reader. 
253 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus, 1921, trans. D.F. Paers and B.F. McGuinness, intr. 
Bertrand Russell, New York: Routledge, 2014, 89. 
254 Very elucidating in this respect is of course M. A. Numminen’s renown performance. 
255 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 99. His reference is to Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment,” Rabinow 1984, 
32-50; and to Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, “What is Maturity? Habermas and Foucault on ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’,” Foucault: A Critical Reader, ed. David Hoy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, 109-21. 
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The point is that also the rejection of a moral truth claim constitutes in itself a moral position. 
Taylor has put this in slightly less abstract and much more unmistakable terms: 
 
The point of view from which we might constate that all orders are equally arbitrary, in 
particular that all moral views are equally so, is just not available to us humans. It is a 
form of self-delusion to think that we do not speak from a moral orientation which we 
take to be right. This is a condition of being a functioning self, not a metaphysical view 
we can put on or off.256 
 
‘Constructions’ (of identity, gender, nationality) are not ‘only’ constructions, and they are 
definitely not on equal footing. To say it with Talyor again: 
 
When we stand within the moral outlook of universal and equal respect, we don’t 
consider its condemnation of slavery, widow-burning, human sacrifice, or female 
circumcision only as expressions of our way of being, inviting a reciprocal and equally 
valid condemnation of our free labour, widow-remarriage, bloodless sacrifice, and sex 
equality from the societies where these strange practices flourish.257 
 
However, if it is “a form of self-delusion to think that we do not speak from a moral 
orientation”, if the rejection of a moral truth claim already constitutes a moral truth claim, 
then what would be the implicit, unspoken, moral foundation of relativistic agency 
conceptions? This is an important question because moral values or definite norms – though 
often relativised – are crucial for the concept of human agency. 
As we shall see, the merit that lies in critical relativistic agency concpetions is 
simultaneously tied up with a deep underlying problem in their argumentation. Obviously, 
there is a reason why Foucault discusses ‘regimes of truth’ or why Isaiah Berlin develops the 
concept of ‘negative liberty’; there is a reason why the ‘neo-Nietzscheans’ of today 
‘deconstruct’ history, gender, or nationality – and that is a moral one.258 They have a point, of 
course. ‘Truth’, a definite idea of what is the ‘good life’, any such positive notion of what is 
                                                          
256 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 99. 
257 Ibid., 67. 
258 Taylor makes this point, too, when he claims that “defenders of the most antiseptic procedural ethic are 
unavowedly inspired by visions of the good, and neo-Nietzscheans make semi-surreptitious appeal to a universal 
freedom from domination” (Sources of the Self, 504). Cf. also Richard Bernstein, who analyses Derrida’s 
arguments against metaphysics as an ethical-political position against “hierarchies in which there is 
subordination and violence” (97) and against a historical Western “drive toward exclusion and exile” that is 
“evidenced […] in logocentrism and phonocentrism” (101) (“Serious Play: The Ethical-Political Horizon of Jacques 
Derrida,” Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 1.2 (1987): 93-117). 
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right and good, is always prone to turn into dogma, to coerce other people ‘for their own 
good’, and brutally exclude all those who are no part of the ideal or fail to live up to the ideal. 
To know what virtue is, one needs the non-virtuous. And so Berlin explains: “For it is this – the 
‘positive’ conception of liberty: not freedom from, but freedom to – which the adherents of 
the ‘negative’ notion represent as being, at times, no better than a specious disguise for brutal 
tyranny.”259 Foucault expounds: “The notion of ideology […] always stands in virtual 
opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth”, so that the task, according 
to him, consists in “seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses 
which in themselves are neither true nor false.”260 So, “[e]ach society has its regime of truth, 
its ‘general politics’ of truth”, which leads him to conclude: “It’s not a matter of emancipating 
truth from every system of power […] but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of 
hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the present time.” That 
is, similarly to Isaiah Berlin, Foucault suggests something like a democratisation of truth to 
counteract its hegemonic effects. 
Sure enough, an “unchallengeable [moral] framework [might make] imperious demands 
which we fear being unable to meet. […] The pressure is potentially immense and inescapable, 
and we may crack under it”,261 as also Taylor agrees. “To break with a good to which one 
cannot really subscribe is of course a liberation in anyone’s language. […] [Thus] we can readily 
see how, in a confused way, the possibility of such a liberation could seem to accredit the 
rejection of qualitative distinctions as such.”262 Going back quite far to trace the origins of such 
arguments, he points out further: 
 
Writers in this steam [the position Taylor calls ‘neo-Nietzschean’] have made us 
especially aware how visions of good may be connected to certain forms of domination. 
[…] Neo-Nietzscheans build here on insights which were put forward in the Romantic 
era. Allegiance to certain kinds of hypergoods leads to a suppression of ‘nature’, and this 
introduces relations of domination within us. These relations then become fatally 
                                                          
259 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 31 
October 1958, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1958, 16. 
260 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” Rabinow 1984, 51-75, 60. 
261 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 18. 
262 Ibid., 81. In his conclusion, Charles Taylor once more appreciates the point of the neo-Nietzschean position, 
connecting it at the same time to the stance of the natural sciences: “One of the important themes one can find 
in the work of the late Michel Foucault is the understanding of the way in which high ethical and spiritual ideals 
are often interwoven with exclusions and relations of domination. […] And contemporary feminist critique has 
also contributed greatly to this understanding, […]. The sense that in this and other ways hypergoods can stifle 
or oppress us has been one of the motives for the naturalist revolt against traditional religion and morality” (518-
9). 
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reflected in those between people. Thinkers of the Frankfurt school drew on this source 
as well as on Nietzsche.263 
 
Taylor’s notion of hypergoods will reappear a little further down and become perhaps clearer 
there, here the focus is on the Romanticist roots of contemporary deconstructivist ideas. 
Jurist, too, describes how Hegel and Nietzsche both agree that customs and traditions (and 
these imply “allegiance to certain kinds of hypergoods” or, in Nietzsches terms, the “morality 
of mores”) constitute human community, lead mankind out of nature but at the same time 
thus also suppress an inner nature that is the foundation of one’s individuality.264 Also Isaiah 
Berlin connects “the ‘positive’ conception of freedom as self mastery”265 with the dangerous 
idea of a ‘true’ and rational self and the suppression of one’s ‘irrational’ needs and desires.266 
The resulting neo-Nietzschean position is that one should abstain from any moral truth or a 
too strong commitment to any ideal (say of gender, nation, or religion), because that would 
lead to coercion and self-denial. In passing we note that this of course still implies inner 
sources and a true self that is suppressed, and observe how the truth paradox is at work also 
here (what is it that the idea of a true, coherent, unified self suppresses, and if it does not 
suppress anything, why should it be bad?). 
Now, laudable as such a stance is, not only does it – of course – tacitly rely on and 
perpetuate a specifically Western moral worldview that glorifies individuality, self-expression 
and private prosperity, but, perhaps more importantly, it also simply fails to answer what it is 
that one should do. In this vein Richard Bernstein discusses Derrida and asks: 
 
What are we to do after we realize that all archai tremble? It is almost as if Derrida wants 
to bring us out of the wilderness, wants to überwinden the violent ‘history of the West’ 
without providing us with an orientation for avoiding the abyss of nihilism that he so 
desperately wants to avoid.267 
 
While for Nietzsche “there emerged, out of the uncompromising recognition of the flux, 
something which deserved unconditional affirmation, yea-saying”, the stance of neo-
Nietzscheans, writes Taylor, is more consistent: 
 
                                                          
263 Ibid., 100. Cf. also ibid., 116. 
264 See especially Jurist, 45-9. 
265 Berlin, 19. 
266 Ibid., 16-9. 
267 Bernstein, 112. 
4. Agency 
88 
 
For Derrida there is nothing but deconstruction, which swallows up the old hierarchical 
distinctions […] Nothing emerges from his flux worth affirming, and so what in fact 
comes to be celebrated is the deconstructing power itself, the prodigious power of 
subjectivity to undo all the potential allegiances which might bind it; pure untrammelled 
freedom.268 
 
When Foucault at the end of his life “seems to have dropped the stance of neutrality” and 
“espoused the ideal of the aesthetic construction of the self as a work of art”, then “what is 
striking again is the kind of unrestrained, utterly self-related freedom that this ideal entails”.269 
This makes perhaps also clear why the ‘decentring of the self’, which is unfailingly mentioned 
in contemporary discussions on agency, is highly individualist, even radically so – despite all 
the claims to have done, once and for all, with a unified, autonomous self. In fact, the self 
recedes further back in such reasoning, becomes more metaphysical (that is, beyond the 
realm of the graspable, physically measurable), becomes even more something akin to ‘pure 
will’ than even with Descartes and the radical Enlightenment. Taylor positions himself 
unmistakably in regard to such a stance. For him, postmodernity and its non-commitment – 
except to individual freedom – is “the least impressive side of modernism”.270 
The basic features of contemporary critical theory seem to be, then, the notion of 
permanent change, the constructedness of any ‘facts’, and non-commitment. Agency, on the 
other hand, is not change as such but to influence the direction of change. It is thus always 
based on what a person takes to be facts (even if that is the ‘fact’ that there are no facts) and 
constitutes commitment (even if that is a committed stance against commitment). Thus 
agency precisely points to what neo-Nietzscheans and deconstructivists tend to ignore: 
namely, the positive and enabling side of binding moral frameworks provided by the 
unconditional adherence to moral values. What else than ideas of caste-less, unified nations 
and high moral ideals – forms of nationalism in other words – were the bases for Nelson 
Mandela’s or Mahatma Ghandi’s resistance fights? As Calhoun argues during the time of the 
Yugoslav Wars: 
 
Claims to the priority or dominance of large collective identities, therefore, are not only 
the stuff of manipulations by the Milosevics and Karadzics of the world, but sources of 
heroism and self-sacrifice that are as hard to understand in the conventional terms of 
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social theory as in popular ideologies of purely individual self-fulfillment [sic] [he is 
referring to the protests on and around the Tiananmen Square in 1989].271 
 
Even Albert Einstein, “feeling that scientists […] were not the ones to change the course of 
human affairs”,272 wrote: “The betterment of conditions the world over is not essentially 
dependent on scientific knowledge but on the fulfillment of human traditions and ideals.”273 
As it stands, we simply seem to need normative values in order to account for agency. The 
question would only be how to get them back? It seems we cannot claim anymore that 
objective reason simply compels us to adhere to Human Rights and to do the good thing. 
Reason and unreason compel us to do things, these things can be good as well as bad, and 
whether they are good or bad mostly depends on who we ask. If we thus cannot ‘objectively’ 
determine which moral framework is correct, but also cannot theorise them away by saying 
they were all equally incorrect (which is an objective statement along the lines of the moral 
truth paradox), then what we can do is perhaps at least to describe how they enable agency. 
 
4.7. Getting the Moral Framework Back into the Picture 
 
If contemporary critical theories largely fail to make sense of agency, then how can we 
describe agency differently? What are the implications of connecting the indeterminism of the 
future with the determinism of the past? An important lesson to be learnt from the previous 
discussion is that truth may be a true paradox and ultimately unprovable, but, if they want to 
act, even deconstructivists must take for granted and believe in what Anthony Giddens calls a 
“framework of reality”: 
 
                                                          
271 Craig Calhoun, “Social Theory and the Politics of Identity,” Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, ed. Craig 
Calhoun, Oxford: Blackwell 1994, 9-36, 29. Charles Taylor, too, mentions the crusade against slavery (Henry 
Clarke Wright), the civil rights movement of the 1960s (Martin Luther King), campaigns for nuclear disarmament, 
and states that many crusaders secularised during their campaigns. “But what should also be remarked is the 
recurrence of religious leadership in these causes that call for deep moral commitment” (Sources of the Self, 
401). Also here we see, then, first, that strong moral commitment is not necessarily ‘bad’ according probably 
even to deconstructivists’ standards, and secondly, that such strong moral commitment needs something to hold 
on to – a moral framework in which one actually believes. 
272 Anthony P. French, ed., “Einstein and World Affairs,” Einstein: A Centenary Volume. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
UP, 1979, 185-97, 197. 
273 I take this quote from Alice Calaprice rather than French himself, since she gives a source for it: Letter to John 
Cranston, 16 May 1951, Einstein Archives 60-821 (The Ultimate Quotable Einstein, Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011, 
404. 
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On the other side of what might appear to be quite trivial aspects of day-to-day action 
and discourse, chaos lurks. And this chaos is not just disorganisation, but the loss of a 
sense of the very reality of things and of other persons. […] To answer even the simplest 
everyday query, or respond to the most cursory remark, demands the bracketing of a 
potentially almost infinite range of possibilities open to the individual. What makes a 
given response ‘appropriate’ or ‘acceptable’ necessitates a shared – but unproven and 
unprovable – framework of reality. A sense of the shared reality of people and things is 
simultaneously sturdy and fragile.274 
 
Already before Giddens, Charles Taylor made a very similar, and perhaps more direct, point 
by claiming “that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, 
that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would 
recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood”.275 So, when Taylor and 
Giddens point out that in order to act we need a reality framework that is intact and strongly 
qualifies our horizon, then they touch the sore spot that agency reveals. Agency seems to be 
almost directly opposed to radical relativism. To act means to exert one’s influence on a reality 
which one must simply presuppose. Thus, when we are confronted with basic experiences, 
such as hunger, pain, or acute danger, the “framework of reality” looks rather solid, 
deconstructivist reasoning appears strangely out of place, and agency usually does not even 
arise as a theoretical problem. By threatening it, such experiences tend to confirm our 
existence and therefore do not give reason to put “the very reality of things and other 
persons” into question. 
The framework of reality thus consists of truths or realities that just ‘are’, truths and 
realities, that is, which one does not perceive as constructed or manmade and with which one 
engages in a mutually transformative process of interaction. But for agency, a selective 
framework of reality that tells us how things are is not enough. In order to be able to make 
decisions, we also need a framework that tells us how things should be, what constitutes 
‘good’ and ‘bad’. And also that framework must be perceived as external – that is ‘true’ and 
not manmade. 
Now, this point is much more difficult to accept of course, and as so often, it is more 
delicate than might appear at first glance. A first objection that will quickly be raised is that it 
is simply wrong. Moral values are manmade and manmade laws can and do serve as basis for 
action all the time. The law says you must pay taxes and the tradition of decorum declares you 
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must wear clothes in public, and so we do. This is all well and true, but the point we are dealing 
with here is a different one; it is the question whether it is a good thing to pay taxes or not, or 
whether it is a good thing to wear clothes or not, whether one should change these laws and 
traditions or maintain them. One can try to rationalise such rules and describe how and why 
they came about and why exactly it would be ‘rational’ or ‘good’ to maintain them or to 
change them, but that would be only so many arguments to further establish their foundation 
– the external truth which justifies them. 
This externality of moral values is a decisive point. For, when Charles Taylor criticises that 
“[t]he negative focus on the good as a source of crushing guilt or, alternatively, of a smug 
sense of superiority ends up making us unwilling to admit how a constitutive good can 
interpellate us, move us, empower us”,276 then he is not in disagreement with standard 
descriptions of the agency game. Judith Butler would not differ on the point that the law 
interpellates us and makes agency possible in the first place; she would concur that a moral 
framework is “the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand”.277 If we remember 
what she said in the earlier quotation from Excitable Speech: “The one who acts (who is not 
the same as the sovereign subject) acts precisely to the extent that he or she is constituted as 
an actor and, hence, operating within a linguistic field of enabling constraints from the 
outset.”278 
The bone of contention would be the externality or ‘truth’ of the moral framework. Taylor 
stated above that we “speak from a moral orientation which we take to be right” adding that 
this is “not a metaphysical view we can put on or off”.279 And indeed: 
 
[W]e come here to one of the most basic aspirations of human beings, the need to be 
connected to, or in contact with, what they see as good, or of crucial importance, or of 
fundamental value. […] Not being able to function without orientation in the space of 
the ultimately important means not being able to stop caring where we sit in it.280 
 
Hence, our moral positions “are not construals you could actually make of your life while living 
it”.281 And that is the point; that is why agency and radical relativism do not mix. 
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281 Ibid., 99. Cf. also the following statement by Talyor: “On this picture [the ‘naturalist’ position – but of course 
one could equally talk of the neo-Nietzschean position here], frameworks are things we invent, not answers to 
4. Agency 
92 
 
One can demonstrate this point quite well by tracing the moral truth paradox as it surfaces 
in Butler’s writing, and by trying to work out the Western moral values that she externalises, 
that thus underlie or frame her entire emancipative project. Exactly along the lines of the 
classic neo-Nietzschean argument that any definite moral position excludes others and that 
any notion of positive freedom might turn into oppression and tyranny, she proclaims in 
Bodies that Matter: 
 
it is necessary to learn a double movement: to invoke the category and, hence, 
provisionally to institute an identity and at the same time to open the category as a site 
of permanent political contest. That the term is questionable does not mean that we 
ought not to use it, but neither does the necessity to use it mean that we ought not 
perpetually to interrogate the exclusions by which it proceeds, and to do this precisely 
in order to learn how to live the contingency of the political signifier in a culture of 
democratic contestation.282 
 
But can one be ready to sacrifice one’s life for a ‘provisionally instituted identity’? And if not, 
can it sustain it? The question, in other words, is what provisional identity one should take on 
for what reason? Why should one fight for the freedom to express one’s individuality and 
one’s gender? Why should we – always only provisionally – take on far rightwing political 
positions or do not do so? Why does ‘oppression’ mean what it does for Butler? What is the 
non-provisional, unconditional and quite stable moral gospel Judith Butler herself is 
preaching? 
To be fair, one should perhaps mention that she does ask in Undoing Gender: “which 
action is right to pursue, which innovation has value, and which does not?” And she concedes: 
“The norms that we would consult to answer this question cannot themselves be derived from 
resignification.” And then she goes on to refer to a moral framework that she even quite 
explicitly universalises: 
 
[R]esignification has to be contextualized in that way. One must make substantive 
decisions about what will be a less violent future, what will be a more inclusive 
population, what will help to fulfill, in substantive terms, the claims of universality and 
justice that we seek to understand in their cultural specificity and social meaning. When 
                                                          
questions which inescapably pre-exist for us, independent of our answer or inability to answer. To see 
frameworks as orientations, however, does cast them in this latter light. One orients oneself in a space which 
exists independently of one’s success or failure in finding one’s bearings, which, moreover, makes the task of 
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orientation” (Sources of the Self, 30). 
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we come to deciding right and wrong courses of action in that context, it is crucial to 
ask: what forms of community have been created, and through what violences and 
exclusions have they been created? Hitler sought to intensify the violence of exclusion; 
the anti-apartheid movement sought to counter the violence of racism and exclusion. 
That is the basis on which I would condemn the one, and condone the other. 283 
 
Obviously, she does here for what she, elsewhere, criticises others.284 She simply declares an 
unchanging paternal law, but one in which she happens to believe herself and which she 
therefore – here she is quite correct – cannot derive from resignification. Thus, when Butler 
answers the question why we should ‘make trouble’, resignify, and reappropriate subversively 
(which presupposes that some willed entity has the choice to do the one rather than the 
other), what becomes apparent is that her entire argument, her whole cause for non-
exclusion, is based on the principle dignity and worth of every human being. As was said from 
the outset of this chapter, this is the moral framework, the value system, she presupposes and 
in which her argumentation is embedded (above we saw that the same point could be made 
about Bhabha and the “catachrestic gesture” that is to “provide a process by which objectified 
others may be turned into subjects of their history and experience”). In the end, she is not 
only engaged in an ideological struggle in which she tries to defend her own liberalist position 
and in which she expressly excludes certain ‘other’ positions (extreme right-wing positions) as 
wrong – the struggle itself and the way it is presented, is based on a Western notion of the 
sovereign subject. We can conclude this point with a quotation from Slavoj Žižek: 
 
It is only within this ideological space that one can experience one’s identity as 
something contingent and discursively ‘constructed’. To cut a long story short, 
philosophically, there is no Judith Butler, or her theory of gender identity as 
performatively enacted, without the Cartesian subject.285 
 
Almost twenty years prior to Undoing Gender, Bernstein encounters exactly these same 
problems in the work of Derrida and reaches a very similar conclusion: 
 
[F]ew have written more persuasively and imaginatively than he has about all the snares 
and traps that await us in ‘taking a position’. […] But even if we learn this lesson over 
and over again, we are still left with the unanswered question: how can we ‘warrant’ (in 
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284 Cf. e.g. her critique of Žižek in Bodies that Matter, 139-68 (Chapter “Arguing with the Real”). 
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any sense of the term) the ethical-political ‘positions’ we do take? This is the question 
that Derrida never satisfactorily answers.286 
 
Charles Taylor’s introductory remarks might serve as a conclusion on this point. Moral 
standards “concern […] what makes life worth living. […] they involve discriminations of right 
or wrong or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, 
inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these”.287 
Now, but if we accept the necessity of moral frameworks and also their externality – that 
is non-constructedness – is that not naive to a certain extent and does it not also preclude the 
possibility that we might change our moral convictions? The point cannot be discussed away: 
it seems to be obvious that moral frameworks are constructed, manmade, and it is also 
obvious that they change – over history and during an individual life course. And yes, that 
remains true of course. And yet it also remains true and it also cannot be discussed away that 
we always do presuppose a moral perspective. Judith Butler provides a striking example of 
how even adherents of a relativistic worldview cannot but take certain moral truths for 
granted – the truths with which they justify their relativistic worldview. ‘Non-
constructedness’, therefore, can never mean definitely real in the sense of an 
uncommunicated reality. ‘Non-constructed’ means ‘taken for granted when we act’. The truth 
on which we act might later turn out not to have been true at all, but while we acted it still 
gave our action sense, purpose, an underlying motivation. 
Further, the notion of change: The change of moral conviction, to turn from Saul to Paul, 
is even proverbial. But the important point here is conviction. We do not ‘decide’ the truth of 
a moral good and then, a little later, ‘decide’ the untruth of it – say in a democratic vote. We 
‘discover’ and ‘realise’ the truth of a moral good. The change of moral conviction is not a 
decision but a revelation, an insight. Again: the truth on which one acts might later turn out 
to have not been true at all. In a physical (framework of reality) as well as in a moral sense 
(framework of moral values) one may discover new truths – but one still takes these to be 
true. 
This leads to a first reconceptualization of the agency game. All what has been said about 
structure in the agency game is also fully valid for the framework of reality. Individuals are 
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born into nature, and nature thus provides the space for their acting. Moreover, by acting 
individuals become a part of the natural environment in which they are situated but at the 
same time change it. Only the environment, the structure to which we are exposed, of which 
we are a part, and which we reproduce and change through our existence has to be thought 
of as a complementary, social and natural amalgam. And this is the point, too, where 
positivists and (de)constructivists meet. One can take a natural scientific or sociological 
perspective on the agency game, but both perspectives agree that we are part and parcel of 
permanently evolving forces; natural and/or social forces, that is, which evolve and change 
also through us human beings. For a fully-fledged concept of the agency game, then, structure 
would have to be complemented by nature or else would have to be rethought as a concept 
that also contains a permanently changing framework of reality – depending on how 
‘constructivist’ one’s position is. Moral frameworks, however, have to remain outside this 
mutually transformative process of interaction. They have to be conceptualised as 
metaphysical – external and normative – frameworks, a force that drives the agency game. 
 
4.8. Getting Intrinsic Capacity Back into the Picture 
 
Hopefully it could be demonstrated that agency depends on external frameworks that qualify 
our horizons, limit potentially infinite complexity and provide bases for our decisions; that the 
principle provisionality of moral positions is a theoretical demand that, according to the moral 
truth paradox, is itself based on a non-provisional moral position; and that we simply have to 
accept the externality of moral frameworks – that, practically, we take them for granted and 
believe in them when we decide with intentions. What remains to be shown is how one could 
conceptualise inner sources. Perhaps surprisingly it is deconstructivist arguments themselves 
that will provide a good way to integrate this metaphysical notion into a concept of human 
agency. 
The externality of frameworks, their truth, leads to a very important second implication of 
agency. For, the necessity of external truths does also pertain to ourselves. That is, the ‘I’ is a 
physical and moral truth; it is a really existing, physical and moral entity. And it can be 
discovered. Not only the world may turn out to be a different place from what we thought, 
also ‘we’ can turn out to ‘be’ different persons than we thought we were. On the one hand 
this is a common observation, on the other hand it directly points to the necessity of essence. 
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What is it that is enabled and constrained by Butler’s “linguistic field”, “paternal law” or 
Taylor’s “moral framework”? What is it that is suppressed by “the ‘positive’ conception of 
freedom as self mastery” (Berlin), that is suppressed by the misidentification with a true, 
coherent, unified self? How can we say we discovered through a particular event we ‘are’ 
different than we thought we were, how can we say that certain ideals are not for us (or vice 
versa), how can we say we do not have something in us (or vice versa) – without automatically 
referring to an essence of self? 
Above, Charles Taylor described the neo-Nietzschean and empiricist positions as 
“cousins”. And indeed, he has a point. The idea to do away with an autonomous subject, for 
example, is not a postmodern invention. Positivist determinism has been doing that for a few 
hundred years already – some would claim from Hume onwards.288 Of course, what 
contemporary anti-essentialist theories do, is reveal and subvert the normative claims on 
which supposedly ‘neutral’ sciences and popular wisdom alike base their knowledge. 
Ironically, however, it is precisely the deconstructivist attacks on metaphysics that bring them 
close to exactly such descriptive sciences they purport to critically re-examine. Bernstein notes 
this point when he writes that “the way in which many of his [Derrida’s] followers and critics 
have interpreted him”, which is “that we can once and for all make a total break or rupture 
with the metaphysical tradition”, bears “a curious parallel with the claim made by logical 
positivists when they announced that we are ‘now’ in the enlightened position of being able 
to completely dispense with metaphysics”.289 And Taylor puts it thus: 
 
It [the neo-Nietzschean position] claims a kind of distance from its own value 
commitments, which consists in the fact that it alone is lucid about their status as fruits 
of a constructed order, which lucidity sets it apart from other views and confers the 
advantage on itself of being free from delusion in a way that the others aren’t. This is, 
of course, strikingly similar to the claim made by naturalist theories, those which see 
that values are “merely” projections.290 
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advocating that we abandon all authority, but rather that we never cease questioning it” (ibid. 105). But as we 
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anything to hold on to. It would be nihilistic in its relativity. 
290 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 100. Cf. also: “So the meta-construal of the neo-Nietzschean philosopher – ‘in 
holding my moral position, I am imposing (or collaborating in the imposition of) a regime of truth on the chaos, 
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Indeed, note how similar, for example, the definition of agency by Mische and Emirbayer is to 
the theory of evolution. They wrote: 
 
We define [agency] as the temporally constructed engagement by actors of different 
structural environments – the temporal-relational contexts of action – which, through 
the interplay of habit, imagination, and judgment, both reproduces and transforms those 
structures in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical 
situations. 
 
Actors in “different structural environments – the temporal-relational contexts of action” who 
permanently adapt “in interactive response to the problems posed by changing historical 
situations” – Charles Darwin would not disagree. And this should give us to think. Is the idea 
of a state of permanent emergence really so new and revolutionary? Is it not, perhaps, the 
core principle of positivist thinking? What, in fact, is not in a permanent state of emergence? 
People are born as babies, grow up, grow older; in a process of constant reproduction in which 
no new cell quite equals its model, their biological bodies change all the time – that sounds 
very much like a description of the agency game, only now the reference is not to Derrida, 
Butler, or Bhabha but to biology and the process of growing older. Mis-repetition, then, is not 
only the basis for concepts such as Derrida’s and Bhabha’s notion of mimicry (see the 
discussion of My Life as a Fake and especially Tristan Smith), it is also the key concept in 
positivist, quite deterministic sciences such as genetics. Accordingly, mis-repetition as such, 
does not suffice to enable agency. Our cells do not decide to mis-repeat. 
Similarly, the realisation that today we are completely different people than we were ‘back 
then’ is almost universally applicable – just as much as the realisation that certain salient 
features remained the same. And none of this would be in disagreement with even the most 
rigid notions of genetic determinism. Change is never in contradiction to essence; essence is 
that which causes change – which is also why many of the most pronounced postmodernists 
can be grasped from their essentialist side – despite their sometimes frenetic claims to the 
contrary. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, for example, states: 
 
The clue to a new construction of subjectivity, and thus of agency, lies in Saussure’s 
emphasis on language as a differential, not referential (structural) model. He 
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distinguishes between the language system as potential (langue) and the particular 
specification of that system, or usage (parole). This difference between the potential 
and the practice renders a linguistic system forever incomplete-able.291 
 
Now if we juxtapose this statement with Daniel Chandler’s Semiotics: The Basics we might 
understand the essentialism here: 
 
[T]he distinction [between langue and parole] is one between system and usage, 
structure and event or code and message. […] Saussure’s approach was to study the 
system ‘synchronically’ as if it were frozen in time (like a photograph) – rather than 
‘diachronically’ – in terms of its evolution over time (like a film).292 
 
It does not matter even, whether we take the “differential system” to be “frozen in time” or 
whether we take it “in terms of evolution over time”. The very terms ‘differential’ or 
‘relational’ beg the question: Difference or relation between what? They thus rely on and 
immediately re-establish the singular entities and the binary code that were supposed to be 
overcome. Moreover, it does not take much to replace Chandler’s word “code” with ‘genetic 
code’ and, in so doing, to fully expose that Ermarth’s “potential” is indeed an essence (keep in 
mind that also a gene pool, such as the human gene pool, is taken to be permanently changing, 
adapting, developing and forever recombining until a species becomes extinct).293 
The notion of ‘permanent emergence’, then, is rather descriptive and hence a central 
feature of most empiricist theories. This, however, allows us to turn deconstructivist reasoning 
on its head and employ it for a functioning concept of agency. For such a concept, our essence, 
our inner sources, has to be grasped as potential – a potential that unfolds in (is constrained 
and enabled by) a moral framework. Since such a potential can only be realised by going into 
the future and trying to unfold it, since it thus never really ‘is’ and can only be hypothesised 
after the event, one can describe the process of unfolding potential as essentialisation. 
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The truth paradox is clearly visible: The existence of the potential can only be known when 
it is expressed in some way; but this means it necessarily remains an ex-post deduction. 
Moreover, expressing our potential in any way is a process of interaction with something 
external, thus mutual transformation. Once our potential is known, we have already 
transformed ourselves and the way we can express our potential. I would argue that Charles 
Taylor has something very similar in mind when he claims: 
 
[T]he idea of nature as an intrinsic source goes along with an expressive view of human 
life. Fulfilling my nature means espousing the inner élan, the voice or impulse. […] The 
direction of this élan wasn’t and couldn’t be clear prior to this manifestation. […] A 
human life is seen as manifesting a potential which is also being shaped by this 
manifestation.294 
 
The potential of, say quantum particles, can precisely be calculated and their behaviour 
can precisely be predicted (within the margins of probability). A decision, however, cannot 
even be recorded with certainty – it is possible that one is kept from carrying out one’s 
decision, and it is possible to deceive so that one’s behaviour does not reflect one’s decision 
(if one lies, for example). We have to be careful, therefore, when we say that ‘a potential’ is 
being shaped by its manifestation. As a metaphysical concept, the central potential for making 
free decisions itself would have to remain outside of processes of mutual transformation. 
So, while we are shaped by engaging with our natural-social environment in a process of 
mutual transformation, the significance feature does apply to us in a different, non-relative, 
way. Our position within the moral framework is not – or at least not entirely – the 
manifestation of a calculable, predictable potential, it is also the result of the free deployment 
of our metaphysical will. This will may be informed by social and natural frameworks, but it 
does not generate predictable output as a computer would do. It decides. 
Such concept of essentialisation as the manifestation of a will is intricate, as will become 
apparent in the analysis of Peter Carey’s novels, and it is certainly no ‘solution’. Also, it does 
not do away with deconstructivist reasoning, it only re-uses it in its specific way. Note for 
example that such a position is just as deterministic and essentialist as any deconstructivist 
theory. One’s potential is ‘discovered’ forever only with hindsight so that the difference 
between ‘discovery’ and ‘production’ becomes precarious. A potential is by definition 
something that can be deduced only ex post and that thus must remain suspiciously elusive. 
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Still, the position taken on here is that an essence is not constructed, but that constructions 
always refer back to an essence. The concept of agency makes such a position necessary. 
 
4.9. The Whole Picture 
 
With this last section of the theory part, we are finally ready to return to Peter Cary and start 
applying the resulting concept of agency to his writings. What is proposed, then, in this thesis 
is a description of agency that is based on intrinsic sources and external frameworks that are 
connected via the act of intentional decision making. “Our powers must be deployed if these 
are to empower us” Charles Taylor says.295 We need to actively strive for our this-worldly 
happiness in order to be happy in this world. This is one of the fundamental bases of the 
Western concept of agency. It means we need to interact with this world so that the 
consequences of our decisions work back on us, change us in turn, make us happy. In this 
sense we need to unfold our potential, employ the power within us, to interact with an 
environment that Anthony Giddens calls “shared […] framework of reality”. But just what is 
the good life? What constitutes our happiness? It is here that the metaphysical concept of a 
will comes in and connects with the metaphysical concept of external moral frameworks. We 
do not only strive to satiate our hunger, we want to do so. And it is that which gives us the 
power to also not want to satiate our hunger – to die so a loved one may live, to go on hunger 
strike for a political cause, to rather die of hunger than break a taboo such as eating human 
flesh. The term happiness might cause some confusion therefore. Of course, many actions are 
motivated by seeking happiness in an afterlife, or consist in self-denial, even self-sacrifice, for 
a greater good. 
Peter Carey’s Oscar and Lucinda provides a good example of this issue and, at the same 
time, provides a first opportunity to use the new agency concept in literary analysis. In the 
novel, one can readily see how even Oscar’s father’s strict and fatalist faith is based on 
individual effort: 
 
Theophilus, however, had no doubts about the life hereafter. It was this life he worried 
over. He feared his son would be ‘taken’. He begged God to spare him. No voice came 
back. He would bear it if he must. If his God covered him with boils like Job, he would 
bear it. God took his daughter Sarah, his son Percy, his beloved wife. He had not been 
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able to bear it, but he had borne it. There was nothing unbearable. The teeth of lions, 
the torture of martyrs – these were flea bites in the face of eternity. 
He thought himself a weak man, a sensualist. 
Sometimes he wished only to lie on the bed and embrace his son, to put his nose into 
his clean, washed hair, to make a human cage around him, to protect his bird-frail body 
from harm; and what pride, he thought, what arrogance that would be.296 
 
The readers are confronted, here, with a moral framework according to which the mere 
thought of interference with God’s almighty plan for the sake of something as negligible as 
one’s personal happiness would be utter arrogance – a moral framework that seems to 
prevent human agency by disqualifying this-worldly happiness as a valid goal. However, and 
this is the point, even according to such a fatalist faith, one can do right and wrong. One can 
sin and one can actively contribute to one’s happiness in the hereafter. In fact, this is the whole 
point of Theophilus’ faith. Accordingly, when his son Oscar eats the forbidden Christmas 
pudding, Theophilus does leap into action indeed. One therefore can also interpret happiness 
in an afterlife that is sought through actions in this life as a moral good that enables agency. 
Also in such cases one can talk of decision making that is based on an intention, and that 
intention in turn as based on a concept of personal fulfilment, in this case in the hereafter. 
On the one hand Theophilus’ faith thus seems to be fatalistic, yet on the other hand it is 
premised on an even megalomaniac notion of direct communication with the powers of the 
universe – a notion that will reappear in the discussion of Tristan Smith and be described in 
Freudian terms as “omnipotence of thought” (see Chapter 7.2.3.). And this aspect of 
Theophilus’ faith is exposed by the text. First through the thoughts of his servant Mrs Williams: 
“Her master prayed loudly. He prayed self-importantly. He prayed as if he were the centre of 
the universe, as if the only reason the son had run away was so that God could punish the 
father”;297 and then through the thoughts of his son: “Oscar had just, at the moment, realized 
the extent of his father’s self-absorption. All this, everything that Oscar had done and felt, was 
seen by his papa as something God was doing to his father. Oscar was merely an instrument 
of God’s wrath.” Indeed, Theophilus is a regular Job: Mrs Millar “imagined he was imploring 
his son, but she was wrong. He could not implore. He could only endure.”298 
All that Theophilus would have to do in order to make his son come back home, would be 
to implore him, to command him: “On any less fraught occasion they would have walked out 
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into the garden, or down along a lane, but the father had lost his normal sense of authority 
and the boy was just lost and waiting to be led.”299 However, Theophilus’ inability to lead his 
son has nothing to do with the moral framework of his faith. This fatalistic belief in an almighty 
and inscrutable God is a way of sense making for Theophilus, of integrating the intolerable 
pain he had suffered over the course of his life into a coherent framework: 
 
The boy had skin like his mother. In a surgery in Pimlico, a Dr Hansen had dropped nitric 
acid on this skin from a 15ml pipette. Had the boy in the waiting room heard her cry 
out? She had cancer, and Hansen had removed the growth like this, with drops of acid 
on her tender skin [the narrated present of the novel is, at this point, 1856]. What they 
finally removed was a lump, dark and hard from all this pain. She had died anyway.300 
 
In Chapter 4 it was pointed out that agency is interaction with a world that is external but 
can still be influenced. This, however, is not Theophilus’ experience. He has suffered a lot, and 
however drastic the measures that were undertaken to avert the painful fate, they were in 
vain. He has already lost two children and his wife, and when Oscar runs away and subscribes 
to a different faith, Theophilus is confronted with his worst nightmare, as we saw above: He 
“had no doubts about the life hereafter. It was this life he worried over. He feared his son 
would be ‘taken’”. Theophilus’ moral framework is solid, and it is not his fatalistic belief in the 
hereafter that renders him incapable of leading his son. It is rather the repeated experience 
of helplessness, of utter powerlessness in the face of his wife’s and his children’s deaths. We 
may conclude, then, that Theophilus’ depression is not the result of a mistaken, fanatic creed, 
but a classic example of learned helplessness – a well-researched concept in psychology, 
originally proposed by Martin Seligman: 
 
learned helplessness, in psychology, [is] a mental state in which an organism forced to 
bear aversive stimuli, or stimuli that are painful or otherwise unpleasant, becomes 
unable or unwilling to avoid subsequent encounters with those stimuli, even if they are 
“escapable,” presumably because it has learned that it cannot control the situation. […] 
Learned helplessness has since become a basic principle of behavioral theory, 
demonstrating that prior learning can result in a drastic change in behaviour and seeking 
to explain why individuals may accept and remain passive in negative situations despite 
their clear ability to change them.301 
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No wonder, then, that Theophilus “could only endure” when he earlier had to experience 
that all his actions were inefficacious, and that all the advances of modern medicine only 
served to increase his wife’s pain. 
Oscar, however, is different. In what follows, it is important to keep in mind what was said 
about the externality of metaphysical moral frameworks. They are products of culture, but 
they cannot be perceived as such by actors in the moment that they act. For the outsider, they 
are part of the agency game, for the insider – the one who is situated within a certain moral 
framework – they cannot be part of the agency game. The problem is that we all are always 
insiders (note the inescapable paradox of closure and simultaneous transcendence). If this 
argumentation seems to appear wilful or random, remember how even Judith Butler found 
herself forced to say that “[t]he norms that we would consult to answer this question [‘which 
action is right to pursue, which innovation has value, and which does not?’] cannot themselves 
be derived from resignification”. 
Oscar’s conflict, now, is a direct result of a disagreement between the moral goods he 
inherited from his father and his immediate experiences – one could say a disagreement 
between the moral and the ontological aspects of his existence: “His father said the pudding 
was the fruit of Satan. But Oscar had tasted the pudding. It did not taste like the fruit of 
Satan.”302 Theophilus’ faith is described in the novel as being based on self-denial, as an ascetic 
service to God. The delightful taste of the Christmas pudding therefore produces a severe 
conflict in fifteen-year-old Oscar. The pudding is meant to be bad, but does not feel bad at all. 
Embedded as he is, in the moral framework provided by his father, he must forego the 
ephemeral pleasures of this world for the sake of the eternal ones in the next. He can resolve 
the conflict thus initiated by the Christmas pudding only, when he reinterprets his profane 
desires as obeisance to a higher cause. In other words, he can allow himself any pleasure, such 
as the pudding or gambling, but only when it is at the same time a form of service to God. That 
is why Oscar leaves his father and changes his faith. If the Christmas pudding in fact did not 
feel bad at all, but good, if it did not feel like sin therefore, then maybe there is a way that the 
Christmas pudding actually is not sin but a celebration of God’s glory. So he prays: “‘Dear God,’ 
he said, and the straight edge of his teeth showed, ‘if it be Thy will that Thy people eat pudding, 
smite him!’’303 And God does smite Theophilus, if only a little. 
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This is exactly the reason, too, why Oscar can live out his profane or personal love for 
Lucinda only when he perceives it, at the same time, as the service for the higher ideal of 
sacred love. Hence his idea “that if you sacrificed yourself you would somehow attain the 
object of your desires”. When he quite paradoxically tries to attain his this-worldly desires by 
sacrificing himself, then this is because he cannot bring in alignment the ontological aspect of 
his personal life-experience with his moral goods. 
Despite Oscar’s conflicted way and his eventual failure, one can therefore clearly see how 
his moral framework is the very space, to use Taylor’s metaphor, in which he has to unfold his 
intrinsic potential; or, to appropriate Butler’s terms, how he is bound to the (linguistic) field 
that enables and constrains the unfolding of his essence. Oscar’s and his father’s actions make 
sense, but only within the moral framework in which they are embedded. In the eyes of the 
readers and his fellow characters, who do not share their values and experiences, they may 
appear as complete lunatics. 
Charles Taylor uses a much more drastic example to make a similar point: “Think of the 
horrifying description of the torture and execution of a man who had attempted regicide in 
mid-eighteenth-century France, which opens Michel Foucault’s Surveiller et punir”, he says. 
 
It’s not that comparable horrors don’t occur in the twentieth-century West. But they are 
now seen as shocking aberrations, which have to be hidden. […] It’s with a shudder that 
we learn that parents used to bring small children to witness such events when they 
were offered as public spectacles in earlier times.304 
 
The moral framework has changed. What then was perfectly normal is today a 
traumatising horror of the worst kind. Human actions are always deeply embedded in culture 
and thus perceived as reasonable only within the context of the respective moral values. 
Whether being attacked in the streets, for example, is seen as an attack against one’s honour 
(an inner quality) that must be revenged, or as an infringement of one’s personal liberty (a 
universal right) that must be prevented, depends on the moral framework that is applied and 
its most salient goods. 
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Oscar, likewise, is embedded in an entire framework of different moral goods, but the 
obligation to be the Lord’s humble servant is dominant. All his doings must be sanctioned as 
serving this purpose. In the end, he sacrifices all his earthly happiness and even his life to it. 
Charles Taylor calls such moral values that underlie and inform all our actions and positions 
and thus can override our existential needs “hypergoods”. He explains:  
 
Whereas I naturally want to be well placed in relation to all and any of the goods I 
recognize and to be moving towards rather than away from them, my direction in 
relation to this good [a hypergood] has a crucial importance. Just because my 
orientation to it is essential to my identity, so the recognition that my life is turned away 
from it, or can never approach it, would be devastating and insufferable. It threatens to 
plunge me into a despair at my unworthiness which strikes at the very roots of my being 
as a person.305 
 
Thus also Ned Kelly’s actions become quite comprehensible. The reason why he cannot 
flee to California and why he sacrifices his life for the publication of his story has to do with 
his hypergood – a sense of honour that also informs the mateship that holds the gang 
together. Charles Taylor explains: “For those who espouse the honour ethic, the issue 
concerns their place in the space of fame and infamy. The aspiration is to glory, or at least to 
avoid shame and dishonour, which would make life unbearable and non-existence seem 
preferable.”306 Ned Kelly literally cannot live with the dishonour of being perceived as a 
coward and murderer. Death therefore seems to be preferable to fleeing to California. 
One point needs to be taken into consideration, however. In Ned’s case one can talk of 
agency only if he decides to do the honourable, not if he is forced to do the inevitable. The 
notion of hypergoods must not lead straight back into social determinism and a form of social 
inculcation that is so strong as to leave no option. Craig Calhoun, for example, draws on 
Taylor’s observations and outlines the similarity to what Weber called “value-rational” action, 
when he describes how in spring 1989 Chinese students were ready to risk their lives in 
defence of a sense of honour that had become existential during the course of their protests, 
that is, in defence of their existence: 
 
very risky actions, like standing in front of a tank as it rolls down Chang’an Boulevard (to 
borrow 1989’s most powerful media image of bravery to the point of foolishness), 
depend on a sense of who one is as a person and what it means to go on living with 
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oneself that is inextricably social, as well as personal, and that is sufficiently powerful to 
outweigh what might ordinarily be paramount prudential concerns.307 
 
However, not despite but precisely because Calhoun in his own analysis employs 
deconstructivist arguments and emphasises the social constructedness of identity, he ends in 
a deterministic description in which the Chinese students almost become the pawns of a cause 
and effect chain and the events around the Tiananmen Square take on the feel of inevitability. 
To declare honour a possible hypergood for the students that is deeply rooted in their culture 
and that was triggered by the events in the spring of 1989 should provide an explanation as 
to what might be the intention on which they based their decisions, but it should not provide 
a deterministic cause. To put it in very clear terms: in order to avoid social determinism we 
need inner sources. While the hypergood lends a vitally important point of orientation for an 
intrinsic will, it is this will itself that has to be taken as primary cause. 
One should add, or rather repeat, another consideration regarding hypergoods. They are, 
like all moral values, social constructions. And yet, if they are to provide the basis for one’s 
decisions, one must take them as not manmade but true. That was discussed above in 
connection with the externality of moral frameworks. Again, we are dealing here with an 
almost Romanticist problem: one cannot deliberately make up an intellectually and 
aesthetically pleasing faith and at the same time truly believe in it. The very endeavour is 
based on a belief not in the made-up faith but in the power to make it up – a faith in the power 
of our intellectual and aesthetical judgement. 
The resulting concept of agency that underlies the literary analyses can be summarised as 
follows: Moral frameworks with their hypergoods give the primary cause of a will a direction 
and provide a space for our inner sources to unfold. As potential, our inner sources must be 
deployed to make their existence known. That, in all brevity, is what a connection of 
sociological and philosophical action theory could look like. It looks simple and I tried to 
formulate the concept as simple as possible. But the problem that a will, even as metaphysical 
potential, still needs to be deployed in order to exist and thus can be ascertained only with 
hindsight is delicate enough – as is the problem of it being attached to a moral framework 
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which must be a social construction but cannot be taken as social construction if it is supposed 
to work and enable agency. 
The advantages of such a conception of agency seem to outweigh the problems, however. 
As opposed to a general command to engage in non-engagement, it can explain in positive 
terms what actually makes people – or novel characters – act and at least go a little way in 
explaining the question: “How is something like individual ‘human’ acting conceivable?” It can 
describe political commitment – in morally laudable cases as well as in morally reprehensible 
ones. Calhoun demonstrated as much with his description of the Tienanmen Square protests 
and by pointing out that collective commitment is “not only the stuff of manipulations by the 
Milosevics and Karadzics of the world”, but also pertains to cases that today are celebrated in 
the Western world as heroic. The possibility of agency, perhaps unfortunately, principally 
allows for both possibilities. The power to do good is tied to the power to do evil. Such an 
intrinsic power, and the guilt it brings with it, is therefore tantamount to the expulsion from 
Eden – once one attains the knowledge of good and evil, the paradise of innocence is lost. One 
may keep one’s innocence and remain within the Garden’s boundaries, one may exclude the 
possibility of doing great evil by excluding firm positions and essentialist inner sources, but 
one pays a price for this. As Calhoun contends: “The postmodernist ‘decentering’ of the 
subject poses a challenge for a theory desiring to address agency and moral responsibility. […] 
If a critical theory is to hold meaningful implications for action, it must grant actors and action 
a more significant place”.308 
From an agency perspective, therefore, to reject any truth and to forgo the quest for an 
authentic self is not freedom but simply the loss of agency. “Not the fight, in postmodern 
conditions, for being a self is psychotic, but to refuse and not taking up this fight. It might have 
become more difficult, but it is indispensible in order to counter the danger of dissolution”, 
Wolfgang Kraus declares.309 Indeed, in Western literature and culture in general the question 
of authenticity is by no means in decline. On the contrary, as Eckard Voigts-Virchow points 
out, it is “the search for authenticity [that] fuels the interest in fakes and hoaxes”.310 So, 
paradoxically, the unabated artistic and theoretical interest in inauthenticity, in imitation, 
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mimicry, lies, hoaxes and fakes, may well be grasped as a prevailing concern for authenticity 
– an authenticity perceived as being in crisis.311 Accordingly, as a tool for literary analysis, an 
agency approach asks how authenticity is meaningfully constructed (is forever emerging) and 
not how it is deconstructed and rejected as an essentialist idea. For as we shall see, whenever 
there is a way out of the trap in Carey’s writing, it is always connected to authenticity. Finally, 
when dealing with contemporary Western literature, the question can never be whether 
someone is an agent or not, but how someone is an agent or kept from being an agent. That 
everyone either is or should be an agent is the moral premise of the theoretical concept. 
 
                                                          
311 See, for example Patrick Brantlinger’s “Notes on the Postmodernity of Fake(?) Aboriginal Literature,” 
(Postcolonial Studies 14.4 [2011]: 355-71), where he discusses the impossibility of indigenous Australianness 
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5. My Life as a Fake 
 
The first novel being discussed with a focus on agency is My Life as a Fake. It was already 
pointed out in Chapters 2 and 3 that this comparatively recent novel is one of Carey’s ‘artistic’ 
texts – one of the texts which is preoccupied with Australian art production – and at the same 
time a prototypical example of the contest for voice that features throughout Carey’s work. 
Both aspects will be treated in the present reading. First, I will give a very short plot summary 
and then describe at some length the central conflict between Chubb and McCorkle in 
Nietzschean terms, as epic battle between Apollonian and Dionysian art conceptions (Chapter 
5.2.). This is done for two reasons. Firstly, this method allows me to draw in much of the 
previous scholarship on My Life as a Fake, which is important to understand the similarities 
and differences between earlier approaches and the agency perspective that is developed 
here. Secondly, it is essential to have a firm grasp on the novel’s central conflict before it is 
possible to bring the characters’ struggle for authenticity into focus as the central motif for 
the text (Chapter 5.3.). In so doing, it will be necessary to briefly introduce the concept of 
narrative identity. This is no new theory but rather a useful addition to the agency 
conceptualisation of the last chapter. With the concept of narrative identity, it will be possible 
to grasp the process of essentialisation as a process of narratisation – which is very useful 
when the various characters’ competition for narrative rights is established as the central 
motif of the novel. Chapter 5.4., finally, revisits the central conflict between Chubb and 
McCorkle, only this time with a focus on agency. 
 
5.1. The Story 
 
My Life as a Fake may be a complex novel, but when contrasted with Illywhcker or Tristan 
Smith, a plot summary of it appears to be a comparatively straightforward task. The year is 
1972 and Sarah Elizabeth Jane Wode-Douglass, forty-two-year-old offspring of an 
impoverished English noble family and editor of the small avant-garde poetry magazine The 
Modern Review, accepts the offer by sixty-two-year-old writer and bon vivant John Slater to 
accompany him on a one-week trip to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Slater is an old friend of the 
family whom Sarah suspects of having been a lover of her mother, and whom she thus secretly 
holds responsible for her mother’s suicide by drowning when she was still a little girl. Apart 
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from having her memory rewritten – her mother did not drown but cut her own throat in the 
kitchen, which she, as a small child, witnessed in person – she also gets into the hands of an 
Ancient Mariner. For, once in Kuala Lumpur, she quickly comes under the spell of Christopher 
Chubb, an old Australian expatriate and former poet who shows her a small sample piece of 
brilliant poetry and lures her with it into listening to his life story. This story, transmitted 
through a whole layer of unreliable narrators – it is Chubb’s story, as he claims, told Sarah, as 
she claims, told the reader thirteen years after the meeting in Kuala Lumpur – makes for the 
main content of the novel.  
The basis of Chubb’s account is the Australian Ern Malley hoax, where two Australian 
artists, James McAuley and Harold Stewart, invented the biography of the fictitious, recently 
deceased Ern Malley, and, in the name of his equally fictitious sister Ethel, sent pieces of 
purportedly nonsense poetry to Max Harris, young, successful publisher of the avant-garde 
magazine Angry Penguins.312 Harris fell for the trap and published the poems in the autumn 
issue of 1944. The subsequent revelation of the hoax generated much public attention 
including a bizarre obscenity trial against Harris for publishing poems of indecent content. In 
his novel, Peter Carey replaces McAuley and Stewart with Christopher Chubb, who invents the 
biography of fictitious lay poet Bob McCorkle in order to prove the shallowness of modernist 
art. Chubb sends pieces of McCorkle’s poetry to David Weiss, young, successful publisher of 
the avant-garde magazine Personae. And just like in the real story, Weiss falls for the trap and 
publishes the poems. 
But things take a rather unexpected, quite Frankensteinian, turn when Bob McCorkle 
suddenly and mysteriously comes alive and starts to haunt his creator. In a loose re-fabulation 
of Marry Shelley’s novel, McCorkle accidentally causes the death of David Weiss, holds Chubb 
accountable for his creation and then abducts his baby-daughter. Hunted by his maker, the 
monster now flees to Bali, then on to Java and Yogyakarta, to Lake Toba in Sumatra, then to 
Penang in Malaysia and finally settles down in Kuala Lumpur with Tina (as he named Chubb’s 
daughter) and Mrs Lim (his unlikely Chinese lover). 
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McCorkle does not only lay claim to Chubb’s hoax poems and ingeniously turns them into 
genuine, true art, but during his journeys through the rain forest he also composes a fantastic 
volume of brilliant and highly original poetry. It is this artistic masterpiece around which the 
framing story revolves. Up until the end, the reader does not know whether McCorkle is a 
lunatic who took on the personality of Chubb’s fictitious character, popularised as it was by 
the media-scandal, the schizophrenic alter ego of Chubb himself, or perhaps even an unknown 
poet whom Christopher Chubb plagiarised. Several rational explanations are brought up in the 
novel, and then frustrated. 
Back in the framing story, McCorkle is already dead and Chubb lives with his estranged 
daughter, Tina, and Mrs Lim in the Malayan capital. Both women hate their protector whom 
they regard as an evil demon who killed their beloved master, Bob McCorkle. And while Chubb 
tries to regain his integrity, Sarah Wode-Douglass is only interested in the legendary volume 
of poetry which she tries to procure at any cost in order to publish it – whoever may have 
written it. 
 
As we can see, the plot revolves around the rivalry between Chubb and McCorkle, and not 
surprisingly it is the uncertainty of McCorkle’s character in combination with his postcolonial 
triumph over Chubb that critics celebrate. Echoing so many other Peter Carey critics, Huddart 
attributes McCorkle’s victory over Chubb to McCorkle’s defiant inauthenticity and his unfixed, 
ghostly identity: “in My Life as a Fake, the uncanny McCorkle overpowers Chubb, his supposed 
creator, […]. Yet McCorkle’s voice is fictional or even spectral, and so it is never fully present 
and can never be claimed as a stable form of authenticity”.313 
It is here that agency may help to broaden the perspective. Of course, McCorkle’s 
uncertain reality is fascinating and it is definitely a major part of the artistic achievement that 
the novel constitutes. But there might be more to say about McCorkle than that his noisy 
existence is blatantly impossible and that he demonstrates a masterclass of postcolonial 
mimicry – a case, by the way, that goes a bit overboard towards the end of the novel, but 
more of that later. There might be more to say about the other main characters, too. For, 
McCorkle is not the only person in the novel who seeks to make their voice heard. There is 
Chubb of course, his rival, who seems to be engaged in the same endeavour because he seems 
to be trapped in the same predicament. The plot also centrally features the story of its 
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narrator, Sarah Wode-Douglass. And then there are Tina and Mrs Lim. Not only McCorkle, in 
other words, but all the characters are intent on recording their story and on bringing it to the 
attention of an audience – so much so that it seems to become their only purpose in life. 
So, shifting the focus a little away from McCorkle’s victory of Chubb, his inauthenticity and 
his questionable reality status, there are indeed some important questions that emerge. How 
come everybody is so desperately needing to tell us their story? What is the characters’ 
interest in each other? Why can they not leave each other alone and return to their own 
private lives? Is the ending of the novel a tragedy in the true sense of the word, an inescapable 
fate dooming the struggling characters from the outset? Eventually, these questions will be 
answered with the help of the agency approach. But first we need a much closer look at the 
main characters’ struggle because only when we are familiar with the details of their story is 
it possible to develop the arguments of this approach. 
What is to follow is therefore a thorough investigation of the rivalry between Chubb and 
McCorkle, taking its lead from the critical assessment of the previous readings of My Life as a 
Fake that all – without exception – focus on these two characters. Especially the tendencies 
to ignore the female characters (including the narrator of the novel), to uncritically make 
McCorkle the ‘good’ character, and to leave out the brutal finale show that it might be 
desirable to open Carey criticism to new impulses like agency. 
 
5.2. The Central Conflict: Apollo and Dionysus Caught in a ‘Deathlock’ 
 
In form of an epigraph and a slightly but significantly changed citation of this epigraph in the 
text, Peter Carey includes explicit intertextual references to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein in his 
novel and thus invites critics to trace and discuss parallels between the texts – which makes it 
all the more surprising that no one has done this thoroughly so far (pace Boge, more of this 
further down). In any case, Ross Chambers follows this lead, places McCorkle and Chubb 
alongside other literary pairs of monsters and their creators and talks of a “male-rivalry 
scapegoating plot”. According to Chambers, the monsters of Frankenstein and Dr Moreau are 
strikingly similar in certain respects to their creators, which makes it possible to see them as 
supplements rather than surrogates. And in order to ward off this ‘danger’ of perceiving a 
complementation in the other man, the scapegoating and monstrification occurs. “The 
monstrosity attributed to these false men is thus of a piece with the necessary denial of 
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homosocial desire” so that “the male monster is treated as a phobic object”, where “the 
function of the phobia is to suppress the attraction that exists in the homosocial plot between 
men (the male creator and the male creature) by making the artificial male an object of 
repulsion”. Hence, “Frankenstein, The Island of Dr Moreau and My Life as a Fake are versions 
of this male rivalry plot, with strongly homosocial and covertly homosexual overtones”.314 This 
is an intriguing reading, especially with regard to the scenes where Chubb returns to Kuala 
Lumpur to nurse the dying McCorkle: 
 
I prepared the medicine and poured it into a little china cup as the females attempted 
to sit my genius up. They Bapa’d and Tuan’d and whispered in his ear but could not 
budge him. Finally he made it clear that I was the one he designated to touch his skin, 
to slip my hand beneath his sweating back and raise him so he might sip his tincture like 
a damned lover in my arms, a dying Jesus in a Roman church. (MF 260) 
 
He was, finally, very gentle, touching my face so affectionately he might have been a 
doting uncle. (MF 263) 
 
However, such an approach in a way makes the female characters superfluous. And so, 
Chambers is more or less done with his reading after McCorkle’s demise, which for him is 
Carey’s resolution of the repression conflict. Afterwards, the actual ending of the novel is 
dispatched as something rather accidental: 
 
As for Chubb’s death, it ensues only when the framed story encounters the framing 
story. Misinterpreting his attempt to get the narrator, Sarah, to publish McCorkle’s 
poetry, the uncomprehending women, fiercely devoted like Ethel Malley to something 
they do not understand, murder him and dismember the body.315 
 
Chambers himself notices that the assertion “[t]hat the women who tend the McCorkle shrine 
are simple creatures without an understanding of poetry who nevertheless ‘naturally’ speak 
as language” bears misogynist tendencies – which he however attributes to the novel and not 
his reading of it.316 Such an interpretation must remain unsatisfactory therefore. 
Nevertheless, Chambers’ idea of scapegoating is still interesting. For, the first thing that 
can be noticed about the entangled pair of Bob McCorkle and Christopher Chubb is that their 
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understanding of art is exactly opposite. So indeed, Chubb may be understood to secretly or 
subconsciously adore McCorkle’s art, or rather an artistic style as represented by McCorkle; 
which would turn his hoax into an act of sublimation or exorcism in which he denies and 
expulses his inclinations in order to transfer them onto McCorkle. The Ern Malley hoax itself 
has been interpreted along these lines, as Bill Ashcroft points out: 
 
For Atherton, the work [by Ern Malley] supports the theory of sub-personalities: ‘a semi-
permanent and semiautonomous region of the personality capable of acting as a 
person’, in which case Ern Malley betrays the subconscious desires of his creator. This 
throws the interest back onto McAuley and Stewart: the ‘life’ of Ern Malley is the 
subconscious life of his creators.317 
 
According to such a reading, McCorkle is Chubb’s denied sub-personality, and it is the 
expulsion of this subconscious character that results in two clearly distinguishable artistic 
ideals, whose tension and rivalry can be traced throughout the narration. The point of the 
hoax – both, the historic Ern Malley hoax and Chubb’s McCorkle hoax – was to prove that 
“[t]here had been a complete decay of meaning and craftsmanship in poetry” (MF 40). Chubb 
therefore invented McCorkle to embody everything he felt was wrong with modernist avant-
garde poetry. He fashioned him into the natural poet-genius of pure inspired intuition: 
uneducated, working-class, yet, paradoxically, brimming over with wild intellectual 
allusions.318 
In passing, during the introduction to his thesis, Chris Boge supports this view when he 
notes: “McCorkle resembles the embodiment of the Romantic ideal of the original genius”.319 
Boge then leaves Peter Carey’s novel again and makes an interesting observation about James 
McAuley and Harold Stewart’s original hoax: “At the heart of the invention of fictitious, 
deceased mechanic-salesman Ern Malley lay the contention that truly imaginative and 
creative processes have to take on an intermediate, integrative position between the ideals 
of the Apollonian and Dionysian poles”.320 Much later, in his actual discussion of My Life as a 
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Fake, however, Boge fails to take up these cursory remarks in order to develop a coherent 
argument. He does not, therefore, apply Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy to the novel, even 
though this would have been a comparatively small step. In fact, at the point he finally 
discusses My Life as a Fake, Boge even mentions the parallels between the Orpheus myth and 
Christopher Chubb. But inexplicably, he still misses the opportunity to use this insight in order 
to systematically develop the artistic and aesthetic rivalry between Chubb and McCorkle in a 
coherent line of argument.321 But putting together and combining all these dispersed hints, 
the case becomes strikingly compelling. 
For, as opposed to natural poet-genius Bob McCorkle, Christopher Chubb can very easily 
be interpreted as representing the ideal of Apollonian art. Slater tells Sarah: “I cannot believe 
he has never crossed your desk. Formally very rigorous, a great fellow for the villanelle and 
the double sestina. ... Now that is an extraordinarily rigid form” (MF 18). Indeed, Chubb 
himself explicitly likens his own poetry to “a good table or a chair, nothing there that does not 
do a useful job” (MF 30). 
Of course, this rustic (self)-characterisations bears quite ironic undertones. And the meta-
textual mocking of the Chubb character grows even worse. In a memorable night-scene he sits 
alone in the dark and sober solitude of his Spartan chamber crafting verse:  
 
In daylight he might have looked out to where the jacarandas, although they never 
found a way into his poetry, dropped their loaded petals in a luminous, lilac carpet on 
the avenue. It was dark and he could see no more than his reflection. […] He heard 
rustling in some leaves outside but the poem was one of his beloved double sestinas, a 
form in which the last words of each stanza are repeated though in a new order. It is 
never an easy endeavour, and as he proceeded the difficulty grew exponentially, a 
context in which he was not interested in rustling leaves. (MF 99) 
 
So immersed is the poet in the intricate form and abstract geometry of his rule-bound poetry 
that he has neither eye nor ear for the blooming life and bursting colours of the jacaranda 
trees outside. Only his reflection, his own, self-absorbed mind, is available to him. What is 
more, it was Christopher Chubb, “so grotesque and self-deceiving in his love of ‘truth and 
beauty’” (MF 34), who complained about “the Tyranny of Distance”, namely that Australians 
“[m]ust have whatever [English] fashion comes down the gangway” (MF 30). But it is him, the 
Doric Apollonian, who is blind and deaf to the sublime impression that the Australian nature 
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unsuccessfully struggles to bestow upon him – which renders him even less successful in 
producing original art than the Australian followers of English fashions he so despises. Bill 
Ashcroft calls this the “preference of a conservative rather than a modernist cultural 
cringe”.322 Sarah’s narrative voice seems to agree with Ashcroft. Neatly opposing Apollonian 
frugality to Dionysian eccentricity, she judges that Chubb’s received European formalism “had 
none of the obfuscations that sometimes marred the ‘McCorkle.’ Nor did they have its life, its 
wildness, its nasal passion, the sense that nothing on earth can matter but a poem”. The 
aristocratic publisher of the artistic elite323 concludes: “Frankly, these dry yellow pages were 
priggish, self-serving, snobbish” (MF 88). 
Being a re-fabulation of the Ern Malley hoax, it is no wonder that Carey’s work should be 
steeped in, sometimes quite well worked, intertextual references to modernism. So, before 
going on to illustrate one particular reference in order to expound on the Apollo-Dionysus 
theme, I want to give at least one example of how elaborate the modernist first third of the 
novel really is: When he has to explain the meaning of the poem “Boult to Marina” during the 
obscenity trial, “Weiss mostly explicated the issues very elegantly, laying out the cross-
references to Pericles or The Tempest, the parodies of Eliot and Read” (MF 59). Quite in line 
with modernist writing techniques, this short, unassuming remark is a veritable treasure trove 
for the literary critic. The reference to Pericles is explicitly mentioned in the poem itself (see 
MF 49) and indeed elucidated by Max Harris, the victim of the original hoax, in the 
transcription of the court proceedings.324 However, the connection of “Boult to Marina” with 
The Tempest and the parody of Eliot and Read that is contained in “Boult to Marina” are a bit 
more challenging. 
The reference to The Tempest is indeed Carey’s exclusive, postcolonial addition to the hoax 
and becomes obvious only when taken together with all the references in My Life as a Fake to 
Mary Shelley’s gothic novel. There, the monster is longing for affection, any kind of sympathy, 
a family, a place of belonging: 
 
At this time a slight sleep relieved me from the pain of reflection, which was disturbed 
by the approach of a beautiful child, who came running into the recess I had chosen, 
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with all the sportiveness of infancy. Suddenly, as I gazed on him, an idea seized me that 
this little creature was unprejudiced and had lived too short a time to have imbibed a 
horror of deformity. If, therefore, I could seize him and educate him as my companion 
and friend, I should not be so desolate in this peopled earth.325 
 
What I ask of you [the monster addresses Victor Frankenstein] is reasonable and 
moderate; I demand a creature of another sex, but as hideous as myself; the gratification 
is small. [...] My vices are the children of a forced solitude that I abhor, and my virtues 
will necessarily arise when I live in communion with an equal. I shall feel the affections 
of a sensitive being and become linked to the chain of existence and events from which 
I am now excluded.326 
 
While in Shelley’s novel the monster kills the abhorred child in a fit of rage and never gets his 
female companion, McCorkle is more successful in both respects. He is Carey’s refabulation 
of the monster’s tragic fate. 
Back in the context of the poem “Boult to Marina”, the single addition and reference to 
The Tempest therefore self-reflexively or metafictionally points towards Carey’s own writing. 
Frankenstein’s monster, Caliban, Boult – employing a well-established, postcolonial rewriting 
tactic for which The Tempest is paradigmatic,327 Carey, the Australian, embraces these misfits 
and outcasts of the English canon and, in an appropriative gesture (see also further down), re-
fabulates their case through Bob McCorkle. 
The Read-Eliot-part is yet another of Carey’s, Sarah’s, Chubb’s, or Weiss’ contributions, but 
is even more difficult to trace. Looking into the transcription of the court proceedings, we find 
that Max Harris never makes a direct reference to Eliot or Read in connection with this 
particular poem, nor does Michael Heyward, who wrote the standard account of the hoax. In 
order to understand the remark, one needs to know the last two of the three stanzas, which 
are not reproduced in My Life as a Fake: “What would you have me do? / Go to the wars? / 
There is damned deceit / In these wounds, thrusts, shell-holes, of the cause / […] Sainted and 
schismatic would you be? / Four frowning bedposts / Will be the cliffs of your wind-
thrummelled sea / Lady of the coasts, […]”.328 Whether or not there are, perhaps quite explicit, 
                                                          
325 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein: Or the Modern Prometheus, n.p.: The Floating P, 2008, 211. 
326 Ibid. 218-9. 
327 See e.g. Tobias Döring, who writes: “There are a number of major English classics which have repeatedly and 
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sexual overtones here, I leave to the reader (and the appreciation of all three stanzas), but at 
26 September 1944 Max Harris explained in the obscenity trial: 
 
He [the ‘I’ of the poem] has no desire to go off to the wars, a line taken directly from 
him. He develops a strain of irony in the last stanza, at her conjuring him with her acts 
of bravery, for all she can know abt these matters of wars and violence in the 2nd stanza 
are those which occur within the dream context and the 4 frowning bedposts.329 
 
Why this might be a jab at Herbert Read and T. S. Eliot becomes clear when we consider that 
“the most striking aspect of this relationship [between Eliot and Read] was the almost 
unstated pact that each seems to have had with the other ‘not to mention the War’”330 
because Eliot held “the views of someone who had kept a certain detachment from a conflict 
which had excruciating significance for the millions killed and maimed in it, and their 
families”,331 which, in turn, may have caused “inner turmoil [in] veterans of the Great War, 
such as Read and also Wheen”,332 and thus, too, may have lead to a schism between these 
saints of art (“Sainted and schismatic would you be?”). Perhaps this interpretation gives an 
intimation of the close-knit circle the modernists formed in their time (making it impossible 
for outsiders to understand the in-jokes of the Ern Malley affair333), the seriousness with which 
one fought for the truth of art (not least through the hoax itself), and the work Peter Carey 
put into the composition of his tale. 
However, when we consider the abovementioned glorification of Dionysian genius over 
Apollonian pedantry that runs through the entire novel, one particularly interesting 
intertextual reference is that to Rilke’s Die Sonette an Orpheus.334 Not only does Rilke’s 
ruleless work contain quite some of “the obfuscations that sometimes marred the 
‘McCorkle’”, but the reference to the Greek myth itself is also quite telling. Orpheus, who got 
his lyre from Apollo and sings so beautifully that he even moves stones to tears, is eventually 
                                                          
329 “Court Transcript,” n. pag. 
330 Ian Campbell, “The Editor, his Collaborators and Contributors: Eliot’s Editorship of The Criterion,” Literature 
and Aesthetics 18.1 (2008): 69-83, 79. 
331 Ibid., 75. 
332 Ibid., 79. 
333 Consider, for example, also the opening line of the hoax poem “Petit Testament”: “In the twenty-fifth year of 
my age” (qtd. in Heyward 327). Obviously, or for most readers not so obviously, this is a direct reference to: “He 
passed from men’s memory in l’an trentuniesme / De son eage; [...]” (roughly: ‘in the thirty-first year of his age’, 
‘at the age of thirty-one’) of Ezra Pound’s Hugh Selwyn Mauberley (in the novel, Slater likes to quote it), which in 
turn is a reference to the line “l’an trentiesme de mon eage” which starts off the famous collection of poems, 
“Le Grand Testament”, by medieval French poet François Villon. 
334 Cf. Boge, 184-5. 
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murdered in an orgiastic frenzy by maenads – the enraged female followers of Dionysus. And 
indeed, Chubb’s musical performances seem to be far more bewitching than his wordly 
compositions: 
 
I heard about this bookshelf many times, but more often it was his affection for Jelly Roll 
Morton [an American Jazz musician] that his friends remembered, […] In this context, 
men never failed to mention his attractiveness to women. They came to him, they said, 
without him having to do a bloody thing. He played the piano and they rubbed his 
monkish head. (MF 87) 
 
Later, in The True Parrot bar, Chubb relates: 
 
How I wished to spend my tickets [to dance with one of the “taxi-girls”], yet I could not 
break free of myself. […] So when the band finished their set I seized the piano for myself 
and began ‘In the Mood’ with a few flashy runs, then a low boogie baseline. […] I could 
go on, but no need. […] I made the flowers in the melody and then the band returned 
and later I made quite different flowers on a narrow hospital bed upstairs. In the middle 
of my misery I was blessed. Spent all my tickets. (MF 184-5) 
 
Although Chubb’s artistic endeavours are not quite as divine as those of Orpheus, the 
maenads and followers of Dionysian McCorkle, Mrs Lim and Tina, still murder the unlucky and 
unlikely modern version of the Apollonian bard, hack him into pieces and scatter him over 
their backyard. Sarah, as narrator, even explicitly mentions the Dionysian ritual sparagmos in 
this context (MF 271). 
And that, I would argue, is central for the scapegoating or sublimation theme: if McCorkle 
is crafted as a scapegoat on whom Chubb transfers his suppressed desires in order to exorcise 
them, then the focus still needs to be placed on the contested truth of art. Conservative 
sophistry versus avant-garde genius, Apollonian rules versus Dionysian excess: the desire that 
is repressed and transferred, the rivalry that drives the plot, is clearly an aesthetic one. 
Given the general prioritisation of Dionysian over Apollonian art, the complete change of 
opinion by Sarah at the very end of her tale is quite remarkable. First, the short glimpse of 
McCorkle’s poetry produces the following judgment in her: “It was so far beyond what I had 
promised Antrim, ‘beyond’ in that it was previously unimaginable. This was worth being born 
for, this single giddy glimpse, on this high place, with the sound of my own blood singing in my 
ears” (MF 240). Then, however, after the gruesome murder, we read: “One can assume that 
McCorkle’s manuscript remained in the shrine upstairs, although by then it seemed as foul to 
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me as the disgusting giant orchid with which Mrs Lim had first attracted the poet’s attention” 
(MF 272). This is extraordinary as it turns, in one brief statement at the very end, the value 
judgment of the entire narrative upside down. The art of genius, Dionysian excess and frenzy, 
all of a sudden is judged “foul” and “disgusting”. 
One should perhaps take a closer look, therefore, on what the text tells us about the art 
of poetry. “Whoever he was or had been, Bob McCorkle was indeed a genius. He had ripped 
up history and nailed it back together with its viscera on the outside, all that glistening green 
truth showing in the rip marks” (MF 240). Indeed, his work appears to be fantastically original: 
“outside the law of taste and poesy” (ibid.). He even invents his own language for his poetry. 
“Bob McCorkle had his country stolen, she [Tina] said. He came here, knew no names, nothing. 
Our job has been to gather all the names for him” (MF 237). “‘Not a word was known to him 
and twenty four years gone.’ To say that the poet had attempted to create a country may 
sound simply glib, until you understand that this is exactly what he has done” (MF 240). He is 
‘original’ in the truest sense – he knows nothing and therefore creates it anew all by himself. 
He is the origin of what he produces – the original without a copy, true art as truer it could not 
be. 
This also renders a postcolonial take, as it is openly suggested by the text itself, somewhat 
difficult – even though it is, of course, indispensable for a true understanding of the novel. For 
example, McCorkle, like Frankenstein’s monster, embodies the ideal case of conflicted 
hybridity,335 “patched together from three different men” as he is, with a “great forehead like 
the bust of Shakespeare” and a “chest [that] belonged to the famous Aussie Rules footballer 
Keith Guinnane” (MF 52-3). And considering the central position that the concepts of mimicry, 
appropriation, and abrogation take up in postcolonial studies,336 it is no wonder that Bill 
Ashcroft should regard McCorkle’s recitation of Chubb’s hoax poem – which, appropriation 
upon appropriation, is at the same time probably the most famous of Stewart’s and McAuley’s 
‘original’ hoax poems – as “the key moment in the novel”.337 He has a point, too. McCorkle’s 
                                                          
335 This may not be the place to tackle the concept of hybridity, which would warrant a rather lengthy excursion. 
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336 For a concise description of these concepts see Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffith, and Helen Tiffin, eds., Post-
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resignification of Chubb is at the same time Carey’s resignification of Stewart and McAuley 
which in turn was a parody and resignification of the modernist poetic style of the 1930s. 
The passage in which Sarah relates how Chubb relates McCorkle’s performance reads 
almost like a definition of the postcolonial concept of appropriation – while at the same time, 
it reminds us also of one of T. S. Eliot’s most popular quotes. In 1932, Eliot wrote: 
 
Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good 
poets make it into something better, or at least something different. The good poet 
welds his theft into a whole of feeling which is unique, utterly different from that from 
which it was torn; the bad poet throws it into something which has no cohesion.338 
 
And in 2003, we witness such a good poet’s theft, committed by McCorkle, related by Carry, 
who took it from Stewart and McAuley: 
 
This was and was not the poem Chubb had written. It had been conceived as a parody 
and the first key to the puzzle of the hoax, but this lunatic had somehow recast it without 
altering a word. What had been clever had now become true, the song of the autodidact, 
the colonial, the damaged beast of the antipodes. (MF 84) 
 
Indeed, the “menace of mimicry”339 takes its effect here. For Ashcroft, therefore, McCorkle’s 
poetry 
 
has done something that was only ever a dream to those Australian writers, from 
Lawson to Flanagan, who struggled against the dominance of British literature and 
British history [like Chubb]: it has subsumed and transformed their ‘self-serving, 
snobbish’ discourse of truth with the ‘song of the autodidact, the colonial, the damaged 
beast of the antipodes’. 
 
David Huddart follows Ashcroft’s example but puts a stronger emphasis on the fact that 
McCorkle himself is a fake and that his truth is ‘only’ constructed: “The transformation, for 
which Chubb can find no adequate description, is from the merely ingeniously fraudulent to 
the inventively truthful voice (which Carey borrows, of course) […] In short, it is not the words 
but their delivery that has made the poetry truthful”.340 He claims “that Carey’s work has 
                                                          
338 T. S. Eliot, “Philip Massinger,” Selected Esseys, 1932, ed. T. S. Eliot, London: Faber and Faber, 1972, 205-20, 
206. 
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constant recourse to a principle of imitative originality” and so – as we have already seen at 
the beginning of this chapter – concludes that 
 
in My Life as a Fake, the uncanny McCorkle overpowers Chubb, his supposed creator, 
and throughout Carey’s work his master’s voice is drowned out, turned against itself or 
almost entirely forgotten. Yet McCorkle’s voice is fictional or even spectral, and so it is 
never fully present and can never be claimed as a stable form of authenticity.341 
 
Bill Ashcroft concludes similarly: 
 
McCorkle is the sign of transgression, the hoax come to life, the ‘robber of dead men’s 
dream’ creating a new country out of poetry. It is not important at this point that the 
new country is neither Australia nor Malaysia. It is the newness and the fact that it is 
created out of language. Literary truth is created anew out of old materials – this is the 
story of post-colonial literatures. 342 
 
The Eliot quote made hopefully clear that this “story of post-colonial literatures” is, at least 
partly, a rehash of modernist views and attitudes. But be that as it may, these postcolonial 
readings can shed quite some light on the text’s intention. And just like it was shown at the 
case of Parrot and Olivier in the introduction to this thesis, the text almost bullies its readers 
towards these conclusions. 
However, for the same reason, McCorkle’s extreme originality might proof quite 
problematic. The quoted example of his postcolonial appropriation occurs early on in the 
novel. But his subsequent development threatens to undo all of his early achievements. 
Confronting his creator, Fankenstein’s monster tells Victor how – hiding in a “hovel” in the 
woods near a cottage and secretly listening to the cottagers – “I discovered the names that 
were given to some of the most familiar objects of discourse”.343 But McCorkle goes one step 
further. The “patois” he invents in the seclusion of the jungle with Tina and Mrs Lim is “private” 
(MF 243) and therefore exclusive in all the senses of the word. Ashcroft himself 
enthusiastically points out how McCorkle invented his own country and even his own 
language. Still back in Australia, in the scene where McCorkle kidnaps Tina, the as yet 
unnamed baby, also he, like Frankenstein’s monster, confronts his creator: 
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But where I am, dear Father – and he spoke this last word so hatefully that Chubb felt 
the hairs rise on his neck – where I live I am not a joke at all, not a fake in any way. I am 
a Lord, in fact. You see, being a foreigner, no one thinks it strange that I do not know the 
names of things. Sometimes they themselves do not know. Where I am, if you must 
understand, I sleep with the snakes and the spiders and often I have named them too. 
Syzygium McCorkulus, he said, […] It is a tree he said. (MF 155) 
 
McCorkle – exploring, naming (not least Tina herself), and taking stock of the Malaysian 
wilderness like a coloniser, not a colonised – is so truly original, so truly himself and only 
himself, the origin of his art, that it represents nothing but himself and his own genius. “I have 
been called a genius by some, he said without irony, and perhaps that’s why I have very little 
experience of this world. What I know and what I don’t know are difficult to categorise for 
people like you – who understand so much about the world and so little about me” (MF 82). 
What Ern Malley ‘himself’ wrote about ‘his own’ poetry is therefore true also for 
McCorkle’s poetry – which, in the cases of “Boult to Marina”, “Petit Testament”, and “Durer: 
Innsbruck, 1495”, is the same: “These poems are complete. […] These poems are complete in 
themselves. […] Every poem should be an autarchy.”344 So Sarah would not really ‘loot 
treasures from the East’ (cf. MF 209), but the treasures of McCorkle, an Australian transported 
into the Malaysian rainforests inventing his own nation. 
Moreover, when Ashcroft writes that “this tale of pursuit and expatriation is one headed 
for a resolution that is not the capture of McCorkle but the function of art to create life, a 
world, a country”,345 then also he somehow misses the dark overtones of the McCorkle 
character and the ending of the novel in his analysis. 
Already early on, McCorkle lays claim to “the authority given me as a poet” to justify his 
violent means. He recounts how he went too far and took “a good piece of scalp and hair” 
from detective Vogelsang. “I told him his life was at stake and if he thought to make any 
promises lightly then I would come back while he slept and break his neck.” As excuse, he 
simply explains: “All this I did not just for the sake of David Weiss but of art itself”. And he 
goes on to acquit himself of any wrongdoing: “If what I did sounds cruel it will only be to 
people with no appreciation of art. I would take any amount of skin and hair for the cause of 
poetry” (MF 79-80). We have to read this justification carefully, for it contains a dark promise 
– a promise on which he makes true, as Tina’s scar riddled body bears testimony. For the cause 
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of art, it seems, her skin is but a small sacrifice. Finally, when we also consider how McCorkle 
dies and how Chubb is hacked into pieces in the name of McCorkle’s volume of poetry, then 
we must conclude that the function of art is to crush life rather than to create it. While 
Christopher Chubb’s artistic style may lack life, McCorkle’s self-centred inspiration and his 
ruthless application of ‘art for art’s sake’ threatens to senselessly enslave and destroy it. In 
fact, nothing else has to be expected if one takes into account that, according to Nietzsche, 
“[t]he Dionysiac energies […], when unleashed are dangerous, grotesque, cruel, sexual and 
wild”.346 
In the end, all truth claims, even postcolonial ones, are rendered problematic in the text. 
McCorkle’s antipodean art is shown to be at least as hegemonic as Chubb’s. Robert 
Macfarlane, noting that Carey’s novel is stitched together from intertextual references, like 
Chubb’s hoax inside it and like Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein itself, appears to have a point, 
therefore, when he summarises 
 
[T]he conclusion reached by all of these writers on originality [Peter Ackroyd, A.S. Byatt, 
John Banville, William Boyd, Julian Barnes] is the same as that reached by Carey in My 
Life as a Fake: that under careful scrutiny the apparent opposition between ‘making’ 
and ‘faking’ collapses into near-identity; that fakery of some sort is a normative and 
necessary condition of literary creation; and that repetition is the first making and 
plagiarism the unoriginal sin.347 
 
This “set of relatively facile conclusions: that authenticity is a phenomenon not of authorial 
intention but of readerly belief, and that all good literature involves fakery of some sort”348 
now brings us finally closer to the question of agency. For, if the point of the novel is to show 
that there is no authenticity bar the one we fake – why are the characters willingly dying for 
this artificial construction of truth? Or to rephrase it: That authenticity is what we make it, 
does not explain why we make it and why it should be important to us. 
As has been pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, there are indeed very central 
questions that remain unanswered as yet: How come Chubb and McCorkle cannot leave each 
other alone? How can we make sense of the bloody finale of the novel? Why on earth would 
Tina and Mrs Lim dismember Chub? Why would Chub risk being dismembered by trying to 
steal the manuscript for Sarah (he knows very well that this might be his fate)? Why is Sarah 
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involving herself with an Australian lunatic, and why is she incapable of leaving the events in 
Kuala Lumpur behind? Why does she not return to her former life as editor? As the agency 
perspective will quickly reveal, it is the situation of inauthenticity and undefinedness itself that 
is the problem. It is this very state that the characters seek to escape. 
 
5.3. My Life as a Fake and the Struggle for Authenticity 
 
Given that authenticity is elusive in My Life as a Fake, why is it so important for everyone 
nonetheless? It is precisely this question that a perspective on agency seeks to explore. In fact, 
the question is even more basic. What is authenticity? What is meant by this term in 
connection with the characters’ struggles? At the end of the discussion it will hopefully be 
clear that it is not truth as such that is on disposition in the novel, but the characters’ position 
within their moral framework. The first task, however, will be to explain why authenticity 
matters. For, in the story, we are not confronted with a reader (personified by Sarah Wode-
Douglass for Macfarlane349) who first believes this and then that and who finally settles for 
the insight that truth is what we make it. Sarah is deeply troubled by being confronted with 
contradicting evidence and is desperate to get out of the liminal space into which she is cast 
by Chubb’s story and the events in Malaysia: “I entered that maze from which, thirteen years 
later, I have yet to escape” (MF 7). The by now common reading holds that she simply would 
have to give up seeking truth because there is none. But – and this question points towards 
all the lengthy discussions about the externality and necessity of moral frameworks in Chapter 
4 – what would she do then? Giving up her quest for truth she would be free to do, what 
exactly? What an agency perspective reveals is that Sarah and all the other characters along 
with her are incapable of giving up their truth claims, because what is at stake with truth is 
Sarah’s and the other characters’ very existence. “[T]he need to be connected to, or in contact 
with, what they see as good, or of crucial importance, or of fundamental value”, Charles Taylor 
was quoted in the last chapter, is “one of the most basic aspirations of human beings”. Indeed, 
“[n]ot being able to function without orientation in the space of the ultimately important 
means not being able to stop caring where we sit in it”. And this also applies to Sarah and the 
other characters. 
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But what, one may ask, is “of fundamental value” for Sarah? What is it that gives her 
“orientation in the space of the ultimately important”? And how does she lose it? Approaching 
the text with these questions, one can observe how Sarah wanders a path that is carved out 
by her own walking in the direction of her moral goods, thus deploying her inner sources. 
Throughout her story, she self-identifies as a fully dedicated editor: “I am an editor. It’s all I 
do. I read. I have no other life” (MF 7). She describes in detail how she has attained this 
concept of herself. The mythic place of origin is the garden party at which her mother killed 
herself: 
 
In the last minutes of her life I saw John Slater put his arms around her and finally I 
understood, or thought I did. From that moment I hated everything about him […]. But 
even while I was receiving D’s in English I somehow managed to see that Slater’s 
celebrated verses were nothing so much as bowers constructed by a male in order to 
procure sex. This was far from being my only insight and I was not reluctant to let the 
Great Man know exactly what I thought. (MF 3-4)350 
 
As Sarah’s life unfolds, her potential starts to connect with a truth or a moral good. In a process 
of sense making that is oriented in the direction of this truth, she starts to gain shape as a 
person. The moral truth that guides her is obviously not the suicide of Sarah’s mother. It is the 
insights that Sarah gains thereafter. This becomes much more apparent after Slater tells her 
what ‘actually’ happened at that garden party, and she 
 
went to bed with the disconcerting knowledge that almost everything I had assumed 
about my life was incorrect, that I had been baptised in blood and raised on secrets and 
misconstructions which had, obviously, made me who I was. […] If my life had been 
shaped by my misunderstanding of John Slater, I was not unhappy with the shape itself. 
[…] no matter why I hated Slater or wished to prick the pretensions of his verse, I arrived 
at ‘The Waste Land’ and knew that to be both mysterious and true. (MF 136) 
 
Here one gets a clear description of the truth that sustains her and that even lets her get over 
the rewriting of her memory. For Sarah, the hypergood, this external truth towards which the 
unfolding of her potential has been directed, is the truth of art. It is this, she considers “worth 
being born for” (MF 240) and which gives meaning to her life. She is ‘authentic’ when her path 
and her current position inside the moral framework agree with this hypergood. That is 
precisely why the rewriting of her memory may be unsettling for her but not completely 
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crushing, and why she can settle again. That is also why she is irresistibly drawn to the 
manuscript she believes is in Chubb’s possession, and why the discovery of the foulness of 
McCorkle’s poems has a much more profound effect on her than even the revision of her past. 
As Charles Taylor says: 
 
People may see their identity as defined partly by some moral or spiritual commitment 
[…] What they are saying by this is not just that they are strongly attached to this spiritual 
view or background; rather it is that this provides the frame within which they can 
determine where they stand on questions of what is good, or worthwhile, or admirable, 
or of value. Put counterfactually, they are saying that were they to lose this commitment 
or identification, they would be at sea, as it were; they wouldn’t know anymore, for an 
important range of questions, what the significance of things was for them.351 
 
With the validity of her hypergood Sarah loses the meaning of her life. And in this sense, then, 
her existence is threatened when the truth of art is threatened. 
But Sarah Wode-Douglass is not the only one who comes to rest her entire sense of self 
on McCorkle’s poetry. While his writings represent artistic perfection for Sarah, they are 
connected to the integrity of Tina’s person in a much more direct way: “Tina meanwhile 
gestured to the walls of books. This is our family, she said. […] Bob McCorkle is the tree-ah, 
she said, we are the roots. These poems are the flowers” (MF 237). Later in this scene, to 
demonstrate the importance of the book for her, Tina undresses in front of Sarah to show her 
the scar-riddled body of hers, “as if not only her mind but also her body had been singed by 
the poet’s extraordinary will” (MF 239). For Tina, the book (the book of poetry as opposed to 
the botanical journals making up “the walls of books”) comprises her history, her body, her 
entire life. The book itself and her belief in McCorkle is her hypergood. The religious 
connotations are obvious here, and for the literary scholar it might not be necessary to point 
out the rank of art for many modernists, the almost religious admiration that was expressed 
towards, say, a Stefan George in his Kreis around 1900 – the same George, by the way, whom 
Sarah brings to Malaysia in her Modern Review (see MF 13). Tina and Mrs Lim worship 
McCorkle. His volume of poetry is their holy scripture. The problem is only that this truth of 
theirs has serious consequences for Chubb in turn. For, according to them, Chubb is an 
uncanny monster, a demon. For Chubb, on the other hand, McCorkle and his poetry are part 
of a hoax that he invented and that then eerily went out of control. So, if Chubb would get his 
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life story published together with the poems, it would be McCorkle who would be turned into 
a monstrous aberration, a freak accident, or even a ghost. For McCorkle, meanwhile, his 
poetry and his involvement with Tina and Mrs Lim’s lives confirm his independent reality. Each 
character’s existence, in other words, is dependent on this volume of poetry – but each one’s 
in a different way. And one character’s attempt to legitimate their life undoes another 
character’s legitimacy. 
It appears that different narrations and different truths can get in the way of each other. 
Of course it is tempting, therefore, to interpret the novel as showing that fanatic adherence 
to the truth of art (Sarah, Chubb, McCorkle) or the holy McCorkle (Tina, Mrs Lim), and by 
extension fanatic adherence to any truth at all, is dangerous and leads to violence – an 
argumentative line that was already discussed in the last chapter and runs into familiar 
problems. What would be the basis for even provisional commitment and how can provisional 
commitment lend meaning to one’s life? Obviously, Sarah, after actually loosening the firm 
attachment to her supposed truth, is exactly not free, but imprisoned in a labyrinth. And again, 
it is here that the agency perspective comes into its own. 
The whole setup of the novel, with all the characters competing to tell their story, makes 
it reasonable to grasp the deployment of one’s inner sources within a moral framework as a 
form of narration. Indeed, the unfolding of an essence that is dependent on a moral 
framework, a raison d’être, and whose position and trajectory within this framework is 
declared and struggled over in the social arena comes very close to Paul Ricœur’s concept of 
narrative identity. To make clear what Ricœur has got to do with the agency concept that was 
developed in the last chapter and understand how this may help to make sense of Sarah’s, 
Chubb’s and McCorkle’s competition for voice, let me quickly outline its main points. 
Ricœur developed the notion of narrative identity in the 1980s, and for him this concept 
still meant something like sense making.352 Quoting from Time and Narrative, Bernard 
Dauenhauer and David Pellauer explain how, according to Ricœur, the world is an external 
mechanism that is personalised by self-conscious individuals: “historical time becomes human 
time ‘to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full 
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significance when it becomes a condition of temporal existence.’”353 Human time is thus 
narrated time – and that involves plot and characters. In this sense, then, “personal identity, 
[…], always involves a narrative identity”. And so, our “temporal existence” is meaningfully 
integrated into a greater context: “Taken by itself, an element of a story is of interest only if it 
is surprising. But when it is integrated into a plot it appears as a quasi-necessity.” Thus is 
produced “the narrative unity of a person’s life”. That is, through narrative – through ex-post 
deduction or narratisation (my term, in the sense of turning the external events of random 
necessity into a coherent, motivated story or narration) – historical time becomes human time 
and an individual achieves a sense of unity and, especially, purpose. Through narrative one 
integrates one’s personal experiences meaningfully into a humanised world-context: “We 
make sense of our own personal identities in much the same way as we do of the identity of 
characters in stories.” A main feature of this hermeneutic sense-making process is that “[u]ntil 
the story is finished, the identity of each character or person remains open to revision” – and 
that, I want to add here with an eye on My Life as a Fake, might not be a voluntary revision. 
But before we return to the novel there is an important detail to mention about Ricœur’s 
concept that makes it align perfectly with the concept of agency that is used here. According 
to Ricœur, the identity we construct may remain mobile, but there is a Cartesian element or 
metaphysical surplus still present in his reasoning that is the basis for his “entire 
anthropology”: 
 
For Ricœur, von Wright’s analysis [in Explanation and Understanding] shows, that for 
there to be interference, there must be both an ongoing anterior established order or 
course of things and a human doing that somehow intervenes in and disturbs that order. 
Therefore, to make sense of interference, one needs a concept of causation different 
from Hume’s, one that can allow for genuine initiative. Moreover, interference is always 
purposeful. Hence an interference is not merely ascribable to an agent. It is also 
imputable to the agent as the one whose purpose motivates the interference. […] In 
sum, agents in and through their bodies both are capable of initiating and sustaining 
something new in the world and are subject to other causal sequences that bind them 
to the world. The agen’s [sic] power to act requires a distinctive causal capacity that is 
not reducible to other sorts of causality but that can only be manifest as such in 
conjunction with these other causal processes. 
 
Also Ricœur relies on essence, then. It is this non-Humean, “distinctive causal capacity that 
is not reducible to other sorts of causality” that provides the metaphysical kernel of agency in 
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Ricœur’s reasoning (see also Ricœur’s quotation in Chapter 4.1.). What was already pointed 
out in Chapter 4 thus comes into plain view again: the notion of intention – that also Ricœur 
cannot do without – points to both, the metaphysical concept of an intrinsic will and the 
metaphysical concept of external moral values. For Ricœur, there is more to identity, 
therefore, than construction; there is something more, or something more basic, to one’s 
identity than the narrated part. For him, the narration of one’s identity remains a process of 
sense making. And that means coming to grips with something that is already there, has 
already evinced itself. 
In this sense one can argue, for example, that Sarah Wode-Douglass’ postmodern 
condition, the maze in which she finds herself at the end of the novel, is constituted by events 
that do not add up, events that leave insuppressible contradictions, fissures, and gaps in any 
possible plot and accordingly cannot be coherently narrated. Her “distinctive causal capacity” 
– that is, her inner sources, her intrinsic potential – is incapacitated therefore. 
So, where does this leave us with the rivalling life stories of the characters? How can we 
grasp in terms of agency and narratisation the fact that different truths and different self-
conceptions can interfere with each other in the way they do in My Life as a Fake? What does 
it actually mean that the characters’ existence is dependent on McCorkle’s volume of poetry 
or the right to determine its meaning? 
As Ricœur said, the story emerging in the process of narratisation remains open for 
revision. Accordingly, the characters’ history (their path through their moral framework, the 
shape they gained through narratisation) and the compass that lent their actions meaning 
(their moral goods), are not so much taken away in My Life as a Fake, as replaced or 
reinterpreted. But such a revision of a character’s narration means that his or her actions are 
placed in a different context and acquire a new meaning. 
After the gruesome murder, for example, Sarah all of a sudden finds herself and especially 
her self, to be part of a story that is not hers. That is, she finds herself being a person she did 
not mean to be, that is even alien to her. It is this shift of context and meaning, therefore, that 
constitutes the invalidation, the ‘attack’ on the characters’ sense of self. For, if the meaning 
of their actions is replaced or shifted, then, as purported origin of their actions, also the 
position of the characters themselves is shifted inside the moral framework. Narratisation 
integrates a character’s experiences into a coherent plot it was said above. But at the same 
time, it positions the actor of the plot – Sarah, Chubb, McCorkle, Tina, Mrs Lim – inside a moral 
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framework – makes them villain or hero. This is a central point that shows how agency is 
related to being an agent via a framework of reference. Let me explain. 
What links one’s actions to an external, sense-lending framework is intention. So, what 
happens through the reinterpretation of the characters’ actions and intentions is that they 
suddenly find their position within the moral framework challenged. Or, rather, they all of a 
sudden find themselves, potentially, in a position of a common moral framework they never 
meant to hold or approach. Sarah Wode-Douglass’ expedition and attempt to retrieve the 
ultimate piece of art, for example, is suddenly turned into an unholy quest during which she 
becomes the accomplice in a grisly murder. Being cast into such an alien narration, she does 
not only lose her sense of truth and untruth, but, along with it, the sense of who she is as a 
person. In this situation it is difficult to go on living for her, not because of the moral weight 
of her guilt, but because she simply does not know anymore what to do and for what reason 
– other than trying to re-establish certainty, to achieve once more narrative coherence. It is 
exactly as Taylor declared: she does not “know anymore, for an important range of questions, 
what the significance of things [is] for [her]”. 
Take Tina and Mrs Lim. If Chubb’s version of events were publicly accepted, they would 
turn from the followers of a genius and the disciples of beauty and truth into deluded 
worshippers of a monster, into patricidal maniacs. Being the authors of their actions, they 
would be made responsible for seemingly random effects and thus find themselves – like 
Echion in “Concerning the Greek Tyrant” – being characters of a story that is not their own, 
that is even completely unfamiliar to them – which means, in turn, that the persons that they 
are in this story, are also unfamiliar to them. They would cease being what they are, and be 
made what they reject. This is a very ‘objectifying’ experience. Such a disintegration of their 
human self is nothing the characters could live by. Tina and Mrs Lim would rather commit 
bloody murder than being turned into objects alive. 
Also Chubb willingly risks being dismembered actually rather than being disintegrated 
symbolically. He knows very well what might be his fate and tells Sarah what happened when 
Tina and Mrs Lim found him secretly reading the book: “You never saw such rage. They 
scratched my hands with their fingernails but that was nothing. I must put the volume down 
at once. The little scarface [Mrs Lim] threatened what would happen if I erred again: sharp 
knife in the night. My daughter smirked” (MF 265). And yet Chubb will try to steal the volume 
for Sarah nevertheless. Just like the Chinese students who were ready “to stand in front of a 
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tank” and exhibited “bravery to the point of foolishness”, that Calhoun described in the last 
chapter,354 the characters in My Life as a Fake are ready to murder and die if their continued 
existence would turn them into objects or even ghosts. It is this that Charles Taylor explained 
when he said: 
 
Just because my orientation to it [one’s hypergood] is essential to my identity, so the 
recognition that my life is turned away from it, or can never approach it, would be 
devastating and insufferable. It threatens to plunge me into a despair at my 
unworthiness which strikes at the very roots of my being as a person.355 
 
That is why authenticity, their position relative to their hypergood, matters so much to the 
characters. It becomes clear, from this perspective, what motivates the protagonists of My 
Life as a Fake and drives their fanatic adherence to their respective truths. It is nothing less 
than the defence of the “very roots of [their] being as a person”. The contest for authenticity 
is a contest for staying connected with the moral framework in such a way that the continued 
unfolding of their respective potentials is possible. Without this connection and a valid 
hypergood towards which the characters’ actions are aiming, their lives would be utterly 
pointless. 
Perhaps such a reading can offer something new to the “set of relatively facile conclusions” 
that Macfarlane described. But to fully develop the agency perspective, another aspect has to 
be discussed. It is implied in the contest for authenticity that has just been treated – namely 
the point that validation and invalidation, one’s positioning within the moral framework, is a 
social process. 
 
5.4. Chubb and McCorkle Revisited: Authenticity and the Social Arena 
 
Above, Robert Macfarlane pointed out that “authenticity is […] a phenomenon of readerly 
belief”. This emphasis on “readerly belief” ties in with Calhoun’s observation that the “sense 
of who one is as a person […] is inextricably social, as well as personal” and, if under threat, 
can be “sufficiently powerful to outweigh what might ordinarily be paramount prudential 
concerns”.356 But as has been said, what is at stake in the novel is not so much the moral 
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framework itself as the protagonists’ position within this framework. As opposed to the 
notions of fake and authenticity in Illywhacker that will be discussed in the next chapter, here 
the question is not whether McCorkle, Chubb, Tina, or Mrs Lim are true to themselves but 
what is made of them, what sort of truth is granted them. What is conferred to the characters 
by “readerly belief”, therefore, is the legitimacy and validity of their subject position within a 
common moral framework – the sense of who they are as a person. In My Life as a Fake, then, 
a fake is an illegitimate character whose self-narration is socially invalidated. If we want to 
enrich the postcolonial battle between the Apollonian and Dionysian artists with an agency 
perspective, it is from this angle that we have to grasp Chubb’s and McCorkle’s contest for 
voice, which is really a contest for the audience’s hearing time. 
Chris Boge observes that “[t]he process of ostracizing between McCorkle and Chubb is 
reversible, and the rendition of the appalling, abject, monstrous Other as evil spirit or demon 
becomes a dynamic interplay when both call one another by the name of hantu.”357 One may 
therefore credit him for making the point that both, Chubb and McCorkle, are alternately 
called monster (hantu – “ghost, demon”) and master (Tuan – “lord, master, Sir”). But this is a 
battle for which the social context is decisive, and the crucial difference between the position 
of Tuan and hantu is precisely that one either enjoys the audience’s undivided attention or is 
ignored completely. Chubb and McCorkle yell out, but in the wrong position within the 
common moral framework their yells pass unheard. They are silenced, turned inaudible, and 
thus without effect. Accordingly, when Chubb and McCorkle are turned into ghosts and 
demons respectively, when they are turned inauthentic, the impact that they might have had 
is denied them, and with their subjecthood the possibility to act is taken away from them. 
Wherever they are, they are overlooked or chased away; whatever they say or do is ignored. 
Like Frankenstein’s hapless monster, they cease to exist as participants in the social arena. 
McCorkle finds himself in this position at the beginning of the novel. Violently, he tries to 
make himself heard during David Weiss’ prosecution in court, but “[t]he transcript makes no 
mention of the heckler or his raw, uneducated voice. […] What transpired next seemed even 
more shocking to Chubb: the prosecutor, apparently in complete denial of this interruption, 
simply resumed his questioning” (MF 60-1). Again, it is as Huddart claims: “McCorkle’s voice 
is fictional or even spectral, and so it is never fully present and can never be claimed as a stable 
form of authenticity” – the caveat is only that McCorkle desperately tries to get out of this 
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situation. There can be no question of “the uncanny McCorkle overpower[ing] Chubb” at this 
stage of the narration. But sure enough, the position of McCorkle as unheard hantu, as 
Chubb’s personal demon, will change over the course of the novel. It is important, therefore, 
to notice that by stealing Chubb’s daughter, McCorkle forces him to enter his world where he 
is “not a joke at all, not a fake in any way […] a Lord, in fact” (MF 155). Here he is authentic – 
which means that he assumes a different position within the common moral framework, that 
his voice becomes valid and that therefore he gains authenticity and agency. 
Obviously, McCorkle’s jungle episode in My Life as a Fake is a direct reference to Shelley 
and the monster Frankenstein created. To repeat and extend the quote from above, it, too, 
announces: 
 
I will go to the vast wilds of South America. […] My companion will be of the same nature 
as myself […]. We shall make our bed of dried leaves; the sun will shine on us as on man 
and will ripen our food. […] My vices are the children of a forced solitude that I abhor, 
and my virtues will necessarily arise when I live in communion with an equal. I shall feel 
the affections of a sensitive being and become linked to the chain of existence and 
events from which I am now excluded.358 
 
In this new natural and especially social environment, Frankenstein’s monster could have and 
McCorkle in fact can become an agent. What is more, for McCorkle, the rewritten Caliban, this 
new environment also offers the opportunity to turn the tables. He creates his creator anew 
and turns him into a monster, outside the realm of the real. He has Chubb live exactly the life 
Chubb had invented for him and succeeds in turning him from the “cultured Australian” Sarah 
sees in him (MF 15) into a bloodsucking ghost: 
 
He not your friend. He not a person. […] Very late in night, he come along the centre of 
the road. No legs-lah. […] Not drunk. He come into street in the middle of night. Not 
human, Missus. No legs, see? […] This sort of ghost, so Mr Fatt informed me, was of the 
type that are like leeches: They will drink your blood until you grow week and die. Did I 
understand this? (MF 121-2) 
 
In chapter 39, when the perspective of the narration suddenly switches to Tina’s point of view 
– as related by Sarah – one can read about the ritual, the performative act in the Malaysian 
jungle, that makes Chubb into a ghost. The Orang Kaya Kaya (“not royalty, but almost as good. 
The title means he’s bloody rich”, MF 201) receives two bad omen which “caused the grey-
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haired Kaya Kaya to collapse onto his big teak bed, all his family scattering like frightened 
chickens. […] Soon an old woman entered and this turned out to be the pawang” (MF 205). 
Then the exorcising ritual begins: “What is happening, Bapa,” Tina asks (MF 206). “I reckon 
she is going to get the demon from him. […] And there it was, pulled down the hill by the 
pawang’s insistent song. Large and clumsy, the hantu stumbled and rolled down the steep hill 
behind the house. Shit! it cried out angrily” (MF 206). It is Chubb’s very physicality, the 
materiality of his body, that is performatively rescribed by McCorkle. In a truly Butlerian 
performative speech act, he turns him into an otherworldly being, a demon, a ghost without 
legs. 
This indeed life-threatening positioning as un-dead creature can only be redressed by 
Chubb if he manages to change the terms, like McCorkle before him. And really, after 
McCorkle’s demise, and now in the presence of Sarah, the social context, the common moral 
framework, does change once more: In the presence of the English colonisers Sarah and Slater, 
Chubb metaphorically leaves Malaysia and the jungle to re-enter the Western world – which 
constitutes an opportunity for him to regain his voice: “Great good fortune, he said, that 
someone who can understand this story has finally come my way. He smiled. Good things will 
come of this. Important things” (MF 47). Immediately he sets out to re-make McCorkle into 
his creature again: “The man is not the poems, he said, […] Who can say what sort of being he 
was, Mem? Not me. He was the joke, and the joke cannot love its maker. So when he had me 
in his power he showed no mercy. He persuaded the Kaya Kaya I was a hantu!” (MF 217). 
From such a perspective the alternative seems to be either to tell or to be told. The one 
whose voice is heard turns creator and makes the other their creation, their creature. I would 
argue Carey’s turning around of the Frankenstein scene, which Boge minutely references,359 
tells us as much. Frankenstein, after having given life to his monster, almost flees into his bed 
chamber and tries to sleep. But then he has a rude awakening as he finds his creature standing 
beside his bed. The Epigraph for My Life as a Fake describes this awakening with the following 
quotation from Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein: “‘I beheld the wretch – the miserable monster 
whom I had created. He held up the curtain of the bed; and his eyes, if eyes they may be called, 
were fixed on me.’”360 This is the beginning of the life of Frankenstein’s creature. The life of 
Chubb’s creature draws to its end with almost the exact same words: “I beheld the wretch – 
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the miserable monster whom I had created. He held up the curtain of the bed; and his eyes – 
wah! what eyes – were fixed on me” (MF 259). Yet it is Chubb who stands at McCorkle’s 
bedside in McCorkle’s bedchamber. We see here that at the end of the story creature and 
creator have swapped places. Creature and creator, in other words, have become 
exchangeable, or more precisely, seek to replace each other in the role of creator and to force 
the other into the role of creature. 
In order to supplement a postcolonial reading of the novel with agency, the contest for 
authenticity has thus to be read as a contest for the validity of the characters’ voice, a contest 
for agency – within a postcolonial context of West and East, former empire and colony. In 
order not to be objectified or hantued, in order to be able to be what they are and not to be 
made what they reject, in order not to be turned dead alive, the protagonists have to find and 
manipulate an audience – and this, of course, includes us as readers of the novel. 
That is, too, how we can make sense of Chubb’s compulsive storytelling. His tactic is simple 
but effective. When John Slater at the beginning of the tale offers to lend Chubb fifty pounds, 
he rejects the offer: “I don’t want your money-lah. What do you want? He hesitated. Perhaps 
this lady will write up my story” (MF 46). This is the deal for receiving McCorkle’s poetry. And 
Sarah accepts: “Just the same, I had my notebook out. Although where this cheap spiral-bound 
article would lead us all, no-one could have foretold” (MF 48). So Sarah becomes his chronicler 
– just like Captain Walton in Shelley’s Frankenstein, whose narrative situation Carey copies for 
his novel: “I have resolved every night, when I am not imperatively occupied by my duties, to 
record, as nearly as possible in his [Victor Frankenstein’s] own words, what he has related 
during the day.”361 
And sure enough, the Ancient Mariner’s “strange power of speech”362 quickly starts to 
take effect also in My Life as a Fake: “Chubb leaned forward, as if speaking directly to my 
notebook, which prop I seemed to be using more energetically than was my original intention” 
(MF 61). Chubb knows of course what Sarah wants, and it seems he is using McCorkle’s poetry 
really only as an instrument for getting to tell his tale: “I see through you! He was suddenly, 
inexplicably, delighted. You want to go straight to pudding. Look – you’re blushing. You think 
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I don’t know what you want? Would you be listening to me now if you hadn’t read McCorkle? 
Here, he said, your pen is running dry. Take mine” (MF 166). 
Continually, he uses McCorkle’s poems to get his will: “Perhaps you will reject McCorkle 
too? I would hope, I said, not to miss my chance to judge. Then you write down my story, miss. 
And we will see” (MF 167). He is successful, too: Sarah “began to imagine a whopping big issue 
of The Modern Review, one which would set Chubb’s narrative against McCorkle’s poem” (MF 
209). Her verdict of Chubb, her readerly belief (influencing our readerly belief in turn), changes 
considerably during her account – just as her judgment of the value of McCorkle’s poetry. 
First, she gives the following impression: “At that moment, devouring his sandwich, Chubb 
appeared monstrous – malicious, anti-Semitic, so grotesque and self-deceiving in his love of 
‘truth and beauty’” (MF 34). But after the Ancient Mariner has told his tale and is murdered, 
she exclaims: “And I would have paid any price to have the dear old puritan alive, with his wry 
sweet smile and his sniffy snobbery, his desperation to tell the story of his sad, unlikely life” 
(MF 272). In the end, Chubb offers his life for an audience. Paradoxically he gives his life to 
save his self.363 
Indeed, the position of Tuan, of someone who is listened to and whose words have weight 
is decisive for the characters to save their sense of self. And so Chubb is not alone in this 
“desperation to tell the story of his […] life”, he is not the only Ancient Mariner in the text. 
Negotiating the price for publishing McCorkle’s poetry with Tina and Mrs Lim, Sarah 
comments:  
 
It was with great reluctance that I gave up the volume to its custodians, who wished me 
not only to assess the financial value of the work but to listen to their own versions of 
the history. They were anxious to correct false impressions I may have gained from 
Chubb. […] Not for the first time, I judged it politic to uncap my pen. (MF 240-1) 
 
After all, and perhaps much more decisively, the one compulsively telling us her tale through 
the novel we read is Sarah herself. This, of course, makes us, the readers, into the judges of 
the social arena. It is this social arena where the readerly belief is formed and the position 
within the common moral framework attained, that thus lends authenticity and validity to the 
characters’ actions. When the characters try to influence the verdict of this jury, then the key 
is the audience’s attention. 
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One last observation needs to be made before concluding this chapter. Namely that the 
situation is the same for all of Carey’s battlers who are engaged in a competition for voice. 
Echion, most obviously, finds himself in a story that is not his – just like all the hantued 
characters in My Life as a Fake. Also he desperately tries to make himself heard, to gain 
independent existence through his self-narration. It is perhaps an opportune moment to 
quote Jack Maggs again: “‘You are just a character to me too, Toby’”, he says to Tobias Oates 
thus referring to the same conflict that has just been described for Chubb and McCorkle. In 
this vein also Hugh Boone exclaims in Theft: “In Butcher’s version I was his cross to bear, God 
bless me, I must be an IDIOT SAVANT, a bloody big disaster.” He, too, tries to pose his own 
narration of his self against the positioning of himself in the common moral framework by his 
brother. Time and again we find in Carey’s oeuvre characters who try to assert their own voice 
against the narrative stream. In all these instances we are dealing with characters who try to 
defend their authenticity, their sense of who they are as persons, and struggle against being 
objectified, against being made what they reject, being turned into a character that is alien to 
themselves. 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
 
The attempt to develop an agency perspective on My Life as a Fake started out with the 
question what authenticity means for the characters and why it is so vitally important for 
them. The tempting reading that too strong an adherence to something like authenticity leads 
to violence and death so that life is only possible as a fake, is one that the text does not support 
– despite its quotation of Milton’s Aeropagitica in which the “sad friends of truth” imitate “the 
careful search that Isis made for the mangl’d body of Osiris” (MF 271). Sarah Wode-Douglass, 
the narrator of the novel, would be a prime example for such a life as a fake. She has lost her 
hypergood, the truth of beauty and art. But this does precisely not lead to her being released 
and free to be what she wants. She was what she wanted to be before already. The loss of 
authenticity does thus not enable but prevent the deployment of her inner sources. 
Perhaps the most significant part of the whole novel – not only in this respect – is its brutal 
ending, which leads to Sarah losing her hypergood since it reveals, to her, the foulness of ‘true 
art’. It is this part, too, that is somehow passed over by most commentators. However, if the 
characters show “bravery to the point of foolishness” in their attempts to defend their 
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respective authenticity, then they are almost schoolbook examples of the applicability of 
Charles Taylor’s concept of moral frameworks and hypergoods. The characters essentialise, 
they develop and form themselves by approaching their hypergood. Sarah Wode-Douglass’ 
life course, directed towards the truth of modernist poetry as it is (The Waste Land), is a very 
good example of this. Even when she discovers “that almost everything I had assumed about 
my life was incorrect, that I had been baptised in blood and raised on secrets and 
misconstructions which had, obviously, made me who I was”, she is still not broken: “no 
matter why I hated Slater or wished to prick the pretensions of his verse, I arrived at ‘The 
Waste Land’ and knew that to be both mysterious and true”. 
What authenticity is, then, is the validity of the character’s respective hypergood and their 
position relative to it – the validity of their self-narration, granted as it is by a common moral 
framework. The characters’ hypergood is, in each case, the truth of art. But in each case, this 
means something different. Again, because this is important, the characters are not fighting 
over an ideology, but over the validity of their lives, their existence as persons. What is at stake 
is not a value judgement such as ‘modernist art is right/wrong’, but their personhood which is 
implied in value judgements such as ‘I am a worthy human being’. This sense of personhood, 
however, is inseparably associated with a hypergood and a trajectory within a common moral 
framework that is pointing towards it. When each character’s hypergood is represented by 
McCorkle’s volume of poetry, and when for each character this volume signifies something 
else – one is tempted to make an analogy with Jerusalem and its holy sites for Christians, Jews, 
and Muslims – then the problem is that they cannot get out of each other’s way. Whoever 
gains interpretative power over the volume immediately invalidates another’s hypergood, 
another’s status as a dignified human being. The rewriting of self-narration is thus the 
rewriting of one’s humanity. Full humanity is only possible if one is granted oneself the 
interpretive power over one’s life and one’s deeds. The struggle is thus a struggle for voice, 
and the sphere of influence is constituted by an audience. We as readers are this audience 
that is appealed to by the characters of My Life as a Fake. In short: authenticity matters in My 
Life as a Fake. For the characters, authenticity is of truly existential importance. It decides the 
question of whether to be or not to be.364 
                                                          
364 To also finally answer the point whether or not the ending of the novel amounts to a tragedy or not. This 
question was only thrown in for the sake of drama. 
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As we have seen, too, the struggle for voice in Peter Carey’s writing is usually discussed in 
connection with postcolonial theory. Analysing Parrot and Oliver in America, Peter Mathews 
observes: 
 
Contemporary literary criticism, drawing particularly from the insights of feminist and 
postcolonial critics, has taught readers to regard […] claims to neutrality with suspicion, 
viewing every exercise of voice, without exception as an act of power. Since voice is 
inescapably linked to power, the act of speaking holds a place of inherent privilege and 
authority for which the reader must account.365 
 
That is, contemporary critical theory sees power relations in the dichotomies between 
man and woman, master and slave, coloniser and colonised, oppressor and oppressed, creator 
and creature that should be disrupted – for example when the colonised manage to speak for 
themselves and narrate their own stories. We could see that this way of interpretation goes 
quite some way in making sense of the novel. McCorkle, the oppressed, disrupts the 
dichotomy between creature and creator, disrupts the hierarchy between East and West, 
colony and coloniser by mimicking the voice of the powerful in the name of the powerless. 
But the slightly different view that an agency perspective brings to the phenomenon of 
the narrator’s voice might be a useful addition. Agency is not primarily interested in the 
structural characteristic of a person – is it a woman, colonised, oppressed, slave who speaks – 
but in the fact that self-expression (speaking is but one means), rather than being a marker of 
“privilege and authority”, is simply a necessity for the person to emerge as valid human being. 
So, while contemporary critical theory tends to ask what a person is in terms of structure 
(woman, slave, colonised, oppressed), an agency perspective tends to ask who a character is 
in terms of personhood. 
Hopefully it could be shown that such an agency reading provides a perspective that goes 
at least a little beyond Macfarlane’s “set of relatively facile conclusions”; that agency can 
indeed provide a theoretical framework with which all the aspects of My Life as a Fake, 
including the ‘inconvenient’ finale and the different narrative layers, can be related to each 
other and be arranged in one coherent interpretation. 
                                                          
365 Peter Mathews, “On the Genealogy of Democracy: Reading Peter Carey’s Parrot and Olivier in America,” 
Australian Literary Studies 27.2 (2012): 68-80, 71. 
 
6. Illywhacker 
 
In My Life as a Fake, the characters sought authenticity, and authenticity in turn was withheld 
or bestowed by the social arena. One could observe therefore that agency is enabled and 
constrained by the common moral framework and one’s position therein, as hantu or tuan. In 
Illywhacker, now, we are dealing with a different sort of fakery, one that involves self-
simulation. That is, characters who de-essentialise, who cut loose from their essence in order 
to become something new. It was already said that such a transmogrification of oneself is very 
often self-destructive in Carey’s writing. Examples would be David and Bettina Joy (Bliss), or 
Benny Catchprice (The Tax Inspector). Also other characters – such as the townspeople in 
“American Dreams” or Oscar Hopkins (Oscar and Lucinda) follow their dreams and are lead 
into disaster. 
In Illywhacker such self-destructive dynamics are played out in great detail and with many 
characters. The character of Leah Goldstein even points to a possible way out of this particular 
trap, which links her to Honey Barbara from Bliss and Lucinda from Oscar and Lucinda. But 
before I get the agency analysis of Illywhacker underway, I will contextualise it by briefly 
describing the critical tradition that has emerged so far on this breakthrough novel of Peter 
Carey’s. 
Illywhacker has a remarkable, often-quoted, beginning.366 “My name is Herbert Badgery” 
is the first short sentence of the novel. It goes on: “I am a hundred and thirty-nine years old 
and something of a celebrity. […] I am a terrible liar and I have always been a liar” (IL 3). What 
follows is the autobiographical account of Herbert Badgery’s life which constitutes a brisk 
survey of well over one hundred years of Australian history, from events taking place in the 
19th century to a dystopian future (at the time of writing) in the early 21st.367 
This personalised historical narration of Herbert’s has been interpreted by a host of 
commentators as a “rewriting of history from the perspective of the colonized”,368 a “‘little 
                                                          
366 Helen Daniel goes as far as quoting half of the first chapter as epigraph to her essay (“‘The Liar’s Lump’ or ‘A 
Salesman’s Sense of History’: Peter Carey’s Illywhacker,” Southerly 46.2 [1986]: 157-67, 157). 
367 Quite a few scholars have remarked that the novel’s now-time should be 2025. The narrative sets in in the 
year 1919, a time when Herbert, as he proclaims, is thirty-three years old – which would make his year of birth 
1886. See, for example, Heinz Antor, “Australian Lies and the Mapping of a New World: Peter Carey’s Illywhacker 
(1985) as a Postmodern Postcolonial Novel,” Anglistik: Mitteilungen des Verbandes Deutscher Anglisten 9.1 
(1998): 155-78, 156 note 1; or Hassal, Hot Macadam, 216, footnote 5. 
368 Ian Adam, “Illywhacker and The Prowler: Settler Society Response to Ideas of History,” Australian & New 
Zealand Studies in Canada 12 (1994): 1-10, 2. 
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man’ version of history”369 that constitutes an “attack against the standard (‘imperial’) history 
of Australian development”370 and that Peter Carey “invests […] with a better claim to validity 
than the one he attacks”.371 These critics do not use the postcolonial emphasis on ‘writing 
back’ (see below), but rather see a greater truth in Herbert Badgery’s lies than the lies of 
official history writing. As Susan Ryan’s view illustrates: “Carey’s great lie, Illywhacker sets out 
to express the harsh truth about Australians and their history in the guise of fiction, in an 
attempt to make it palatable and even entertaining.”372 “At the heart of lllywhacker, and of all 
Carey’s work”, Hassall agrees, “lies the paradox that truth is narrated through beautiful lies, 
and that stories shape and misrepresent in order to mime, to (re)present extra-fictional 
reality”.373 
Indeed, the novel and especially the noisy opinions of its narrator, Herbert Badgery, seem 
to strike a chord. M.D. Fletcher, for example, is led to claim: 
 
Herbert is continually confronted by people who cannot believe that an Australian 
automobile could compete with an American one […] Nor will people believe that GM is 
not making ‘Australian’ cars […]. Similarly, those whom Herbert encounters in his efforts 
to start an Australian aeroplane factory assume that British ones are better […]. 
Everything of value is taken over by American interests, including patents on inventions, 
because Australian banks will not support them [probably he is referring to the episode 
with Leslie Chaffey at the beginning of Book III here]. At the end of the novel, Australians 
from all walks of life, including all the main characters, are exhibited in a human ‘pet 
emporium’ financed by the Japanese. We are still colonised, and we let it happen.374 
 
                                                          
369 Ronald Leslie Blaber, and Marvin Gilman, Roguery: The Picaresque Tradition in Australian, Canadian and Indian 
Fiction, Springwood, NSW: Butterfly Books, 1990 (Chapter “Illywhacker” 55-60), 58. 
370 M.D. Fletcher, “Peter Carey’s Post-Colonial Australia I: Illywhacker: Lies, Dependence, and Political History,” 
Australian Political Ideas, ed. Geoffrey Stokes, Kensington, NSW: U of New South Wales P, 1994, 134-41, 135. 
371 Antor, 160-1, note 15; see also ibid., 156. See also Brantlinger, who makes the same claim for white settler 
colonies in general and Australia in particular: “Melville, Edgar Allen Poe, and Mark Twain all understood that in 
America, with its history of slavery, the extinction of Native Americans, and racial hybridization, hoaxing was a 
paradoxically honest way to tell the truth” (362). He goes on to argue that “Chatwin’s travelogue [The Songlines, 
New York: Penguin, 1987] […] is […] similar to Carey’s My Life as a Fake: both achieve a certain ironic authenticity 
by acknowledging the impossibility of ever achieving the nonironic authenticity claimed by hoaxes” (363). 
372 Susan Ryan, “Metafiction in Illywhacker: Peter Carey’s Renovated Picaresque Novel,” Commonwealth 14.1 
(1991): 33-40, 36. 
373 Hassall, Dancing on Hot Macadam, 83. Hassall goes on: “He [Herbert Badgery] does not lie about Australian 
history – indeed he tries to correct what he sees as the lies Australians have told themselves” (84). And in an 
endnote he clarifies: “Illywhacker is ‘fictional’ history not ‘factual’ history but, […] it challenges some of the 
(mis)representations of history, thereby suggesting that there is a potentially recoverable truth. It is also 
pervaded by an almost encyclopaedic fascination with the details of Australian history” (endnote 13, 217). 
374 Fletcher, “Peter Carey’s Post-Colonial Australia I,” 137. 
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A cultural cringe comes to the fore here that is expressed in the novel by Herbert Badgery and 
that is echoed in academia by literary critics. Cliff Lobe goes as far as proclaiming an Australian 
“carceral mentality” that he finds exemplified in Illywhacker.375 
Now, obviously, when this set of critics takes Herbert Badgery to reveal, even through his 
lying, the harsh reality about Australian history, they take a lot of what the narrator claims at 
face value. But, as one would expect in post-realist fiction, we are confronted with an identity 
narrating itself, and the tinge of realism that one may detect especially in the first book is 
immediately taken apart in the novel. A cultural cringe is of course presented therefore – but 
not simply. State-of-the-art postcolonial readings take this into consideration. The difference 
is that they do not claim that Herbert revealed the truth about Australian history but that he 
revealed the untruth, or fictionality, of all history. Even though both claims – in keeping with 
the truth paradox – are not necessarily mutually exclusive (it is the harsh truth about 
Australian history that it is not true), in practice the readings are slightly different, and the 
more informed postcolonial one tries not to repeat the cultural cringe that Herbert represents. 
Brian Edwards, for example, describes Peter Carey as Jazz musician who “renovates 
history” in a “postmodernist pastiche of early twentieth-century Australian history”, with 
“inventive duplicity”, producing a “hindsight with difference” so that his text is a bricolage just 
like Herbert’s and his grandson’s buildings in it. What McCorkle does to poetry in My Life as a 
Fake, then, is what Herbert Badgery does to history in Illywhacker. Again we are dealing with 
the topos of a hybrid, fragmented, and decentred ‘unoriginal originality’: appropriation, 
resignification, différance are all technical terms and concepts to describe such repetition that 
is skewed, oblique, slightly unfaithful to its model and that is still, despite claims to the 
contrary, opposed to “traditional history writing” in a neat binary opposition.376 
Nathanael O’Reilly is another commentator to remark on Illywhacker’s rewriting of 
Australian history. He claims – perhaps a little elitist or hegemonic himself – that with Herbert 
Badgery’s description of Sydney as “never […] quite substantial” (IL 516) and “something 
imagined by men and women” (IL 530). “Carey is clearly not just referring to Sydney, but to 
Australia, arguing that it has been imagined and invented, but can also be revised, rewritten 
                                                          
375 Cliff Lobe, “Reading the ‘remembered world’: Carceral Architecture and Cultural Mnemonics in Peter Carey’s 
Illywhacker,” Mosaic 35.4 (2002): 17-34, 23. 
376 Edwards, “Deceptive Constructions,” 150. 
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and reimagined by those in positions of cultural power, such as historians and novelists, like 
himself [my emphasis].”377 
Bill Ashcroft joins this chorus and identifies Illywhacker’s subversive infiltration and 
rewriting of dominant history as “postcolonial method” of interpolation: 
 
it [the method of interpolation] is one that works through, in the interstices of, in the 
fringes of rather than in simple opposition to history. […] This kind of ‘writing back’ has 
a far more profound effect than ‘setting the story straight’, a rewriting which merely 
succeeds in adding one more contestatory voice to the cacophony. Interpolation 
changes the master narrative itself. […] Thus Illywhacker doesn’t simply refute history 
or the historical process, maintaining the binarism of truth and fiction, but interpolates 
a narrative voice into this history to disrupt it.378 
 
In Butler’s terminology, one may perhaps call such an interpolation a subversive 
resignification. Edwards agrees: “Carey’s representation, in Badgery, of the author as bricoleur 
exemplifies the play in postmodernist construction by featuring positive possibilities that are 
in collusion against totalities.”379 
Roughly, then, one can conclude that Illywhacker is seen as a metafictional380 or magic 
realist381 refabulation of Australian history (or else a small man’s counter history) that 
attributes positive value to ambiguity and that blurs the boundaries between fact and fiction 
by deconstructing truth and authenticity.382 Of course, these readings are plausible and valid. 
They do the text justice. Once again, the text even openly asks to be read this way. Take, for 
example, this ‘quote’ from the historian M.V. Anderson that Herbert Badgery relates: 
 
                                                          
377 Nathanael O’Reilly, “Contemporary Nationalist Revisions of ‘Australia’: Illywhacker and A River Town,” 
Hungarian Journal of English and American Studies 12.1-2 (2006): 115-29, 123. O’Reilly uses a different edition 
of Illywhacker and therefore refers to different page numbers. 
378 Ashcroft, “Against the Tide of Time,” 198-9. “maintaining the binarism of truth and fiction” or not “maintaining 
the binarism of truth and fiction” that would be the dichotomous question Shakespeare did not ask. 
379 Edwards, “Deceptive Constructions,” 156. 
380 Antor, 173-5; Ryan. 
381 O’Reilly, 120; Tanja Schwalm, “‘Relax and Enjoy the Show’: Circensian Animal Spaces in Australian and Latin 
American Magical Realist Fiction,” Journal of Commonwealth Literature 41.3 (2006): 83-102 [Quo vadis, literary 
scholarship?]; Richard Todd, “Narrative Trickery and Performative Historiography: Fictional Representation of 
National Identity in Graham Swift, Peter Carey, and Mordecai Richler,” Magical Realism: Theory, History, 
Community, ed. Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris, Durham: Duke UP, 1995, 305-28; Phil McCluskey, 
“The Handsomest Drowned Man in the Outback: Contextualising a Structural Magic Realism,” Journal of the 
South Pacific Association for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies 36 (1993): 88-94. 
382 See for example also Barbara Schmidt-Haberkamp’s quotes in Chapter 1.2. Ian Adam is probably the only one 
claiming: “A good part of the novels’ [Illywhacker and The Prowler] scepticism has to be seen not as denial of the 
possibility of ontological access but as the recognition that such access is often difficult” (“Illywhacker and The 
Prowler,” 7). 
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However it is their [“Our forefathers”] first lie that is the most impressive for being so 
monumental, i.e., that the continent, at the time of first settlement, was said to be 
occupied but not cultivated and by that simple device they were able to give the legal 
owners short shrift and, when they objected, to use the musket or poison flour, and to 
do so with a clear conscience. (IL 429) 
 
Peter Carey uses the voice of Herbert Badgery here to hijack Australian history writing and set 
it on new tracks. This is an interpolation just as Ashcroft described it. But of course this brings 
also back to mind Macfarlane’s “set of relatively facile conclusions”. And what is disappointing 
– yet underlining the need for this thesis – is that there seems to be not one discussion of 
Illywhacker saying anything else; except perhaps for a few articles arguing whether or not 
Illywhacker can be counted as a picaresque novel or not383 – an entirely taxonomic debate 
where I would side with Ryan, who concludes: “although Illywhacker certainly borrows 
extensively from the picaresque tradition, it can in no way be judged to fit neatly into this 
slot.”384 
Leading over, now, to a new, additional perspective, two points are noteworthy. First, 
Barbara Schmidt-Haberkamp remarked in Chapter 1 that it were impossible to summarise and 
retell Illywhacker, primarily for its close focus on the characters, “who clearly command the 
love of the author and whom Carey describes in adorable, untiring attention to detail”.385 This 
stands in marked contrast to reading the novel exclusively as a reinvention of Australian 
history in literary analyses and thus largely reducing the characters, if they are mentioned at 
all, to representations of Australia as such. 
The second point to note is the confusing role Herbert Badgery plays in this Australian 
refabulation. “Badgery takes charge of the narrative and writes himself into existence, so to 
speak. Through his interpolation into the discourse of history, Badgery gains control over his 
own subjectivity”, writes Ashcroft.386 But he also realises: “It is upon the teleology of imperial 
history that the cage building process of national history proceeds in Illywhacker.”387 So if 
Herbert’s “most substantial homes function as cages or prisons, as structures of confinement 
in which Badgery, his family, and eventually his countrymen and women are willingly 
                                                          
383 See for example Blaber and Gilman; Fletcher, “Peter Carey’s Post-Colonial Australia I,” 139-42; M.D. Fletcher, 
“Australian Political Identity: Aboriginal and Otherwise. Carey/Malouf/Watson,” Proceedings of the 2000 
Conference of the Australasian Political Studies Association 3-6 October 2000, ed. F. Castles and J. Uhr, Canberra: 
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384 Ryan, 38. 
385 Schmidt-Haberkamp, 76, trans. S.J. 
386 Ashcroft, “Against the Tide of Time,” 199. 
387 Ibid., 202. 
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confined” as Lobe claims,388 then his “interpolation into the discourse of history” and his 
“gain[ing] control over his own subjectivity” are in fact highly problematic. 
One might even accept O’Reilly’s positive reading of the novel’s ending: “Carey does not 
explicitly state what events are about to unfold, but it seems consistent with the themes of 
the novel to assume that a revolutionary re-invention of Australia is about to take place.”389 
A reading that is supported by Hassall390 and also Lobe: 
 
the Pet Shop might not be the “bleak” final or “dystopian” image that some critics 
suggest but a more positive (albeit disturbing and heterogeneous) mnemonic structure 
[…] the spectres of penal colonialism, of settlement invasion, might be re-addressed for 
there are a growing number of Australians, Carey insists, who will no longer build on nor 
cover over the lies of the past.391 
 
Even if we accept this interpretation, then, the “revolutionary re-invention of Australia” would 
not be Herbert Badgery’s at all but that of “the enemies” (IL 568), those outside the emporium 
seeking to destroy Herbert’s final prison of Australian history; and in that case the re-invention 
would be postponed and placed outside Herbert’s narrative itself. But it is of course 
problematic to claim that Illywhacker as a novel interpolated into Australian history writing 
while at the same time realising that this interpolation, somehow, does not occur in the novel 
itself but might be deduced as following after the text or outside the text as something that 
Peter Carey (the resurrected author) – and not Herbert Badgery – does. 
There are fundamental problems, then, with the traditional postcolonial readings. The 
biggest one is that the actual intervention and interpolation occurs outside the text. These 
readings therefore do not so much analyse the text’s content as the text’s politics; that is, its 
function in extra-textual reality. What I hope to show is that agency opens up the text itself 
for analysis. Because it is true that Carey describes his characters “in adorable, untiring 
attention to detail”, and Ashcroft is right when he writes that “Badgery gains control over his 
own subjectivity”. Agency, as a tool for literary analysis, was called the ‘birth of the character’ 
earlier. So when Ryan correctly declares: “Illywhacker noisily demands a metafictional 
approach”,392 one might answer: but it is also asking for an agency approach. For, with regards 
                                                          
388 Lobe, “Reading the ‘remembered world’,” 23. 
389 O’Reilly, 124. 
390 “The ending of lllywlracker is not tragic, like that of Poor Fellow My Country, but looks forward to the 
interesting times ahead” (Hassall, Dancing on Hot Macadam, 88). 
391 Lobe, 32. 
392 Ryan, 33. 
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to agency, what we can see here, too, is self-placement at work. The narrator, narrating 
“himself into existence”, intervenes, takes control, seems to take his own self out of the hands 
of nature and into his own to create a new subject position for himself in the common moral 
framework. 
If such a focus is justified, however, it has to come to grips, first of all, with Herbert’s lying. 
At the very beginning of the novel, he advises us: “not to waste your time with your red pen, 
to try to pull apart the strands of lies and truth, but to relax and enjoy the show” (IL 3). Of 
course this beginning invites the studious critic to reflect upon the inseparability of fact and 
fiction and upon the narrator’s unreliability. For the suggested reading, however, the point is 
not the inscrutability of truth, but the taking control by the narrator. The narrator admits he 
is lying, so his purpose cannot be to deceive us. And yet, if we really are taken in and just enjoy 
the show, then obviously the narrator is in command. So what sort of power does lying bestow 
here? In a very general sense, lying means to manipulate others’, or even one’s own, 
perception. And that is the very sort of command a narrator may exercise over enthralled 
listeners, if these, indeed, are just relaxing and enjoying the show. 
Moreover, lies need to be maintained and nurtured. Once one stops believing in them, 
and their reproduction is thus discontinued, they vanish, leaving a possible void. For Herbert’s 
mastery, therefore, we readers and our enjoying his show are decisive. A related question, 
therefore, is why Herbert Badgery seeks control. For in a true Hegelian fashion his control over 
the narration makes him dependent on the narration being sustained and so in turn turns him 
into a slave of the narration. His mastery becomes compulsive (Anthony Giddens’ concept of 
compulsive mastery will be explained further down, after a first treatment of the novel). 
The following discussion will treat these issues much more closely and also take in the 
other characters. For this, a structure of three related focus points suggests itself. The first 
point to be investigated in detail is Herbert’s mastery – the nature of his control, his growing 
expertise in lying. As will be shown, from this perspective Illywhacker turns out to be an 
Entwicklungsroman. The second point will be Herbert’s complementary enslavement, the 
nature of his compulsion. Thirdly, I want to combine these readings to analyse the possibility 
of agency as it is presented in the novel. The results of these discussions will then be applied 
to the other novels that centrally feature the theme of entrapping dreams. A Baudrillardian 
interpretation of Illywhacker, finally, will bolster up the proposed reading and place the entire 
discussion within contemporary discourses in the Western world. At the same time, the 
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presented approach is one of the very few narrow or detailed readings of Illywhacker’s 
narrative content – of its characters. 
 
6.1. Lies and control 
 
In what follows the focus will be on how Herbert gains control through lying. This is not control 
over himself so much as over his listeners. Only later the picture will be completed to show 
that his mastery also implies control over his own self, is thus of a driven and compulsive kind, 
is self-destructive. 
As has been said, the reading will be detailed and keep close to the text. Readers are thus 
presented with a well-supported argument, may even enjoy, therefore, their old acquaintance 
being reflected in a new light, or else know the better what they are up against if they want 
to dismiss the interpretation. Moreover, such a close reading should do justice to Carey’s 
magnum opus and that, in turn, should do justice to the theoretical concept of agency. 
One more very general point about Herbert’s lying needs to be addressed before we start. 
“[A]s I tell you these things I cannot possibly know”, he remarks at one point, “in the full 
passion of a liar’s affection for the creatures of his mirrored mind” (IL 151). This typically 
postmodern, metafictional remark makes very explicit what literary scholars know to be true 
for almost any work of fiction. Peter Carey is very up-front with this aspect of narration. In all 
three novels discussed here, the narrators challenge our willingness to suspend our disbelief 
by bluntly narrating things they “cannot possibly know”. If we scholars took such 
pronouncements of unreliability too seriously, we would lose the object of our study. We 
would invalidate the very work of art we set out to discuss, and thus render any interpretation 
of ours invalid, too. Thus when the extradiegetic Herbert Badgery tells us intimate details of 
his characters or when Tristan Smith in the next novel tells us details about his own birth, we 
have to deal with these first-person quasi-authorial passages in some way. If we want to go 
beyond the facile conclusion that this expresses unreliability and demolishes truth claims, we 
have to take them as they are – while keeping in mind that we are still dealing with fiction. 
But to finally bring the discussion of Illywhacker itself underway: To my knowledge no critic 
has as yet remarked that Peter Carey, by making Illywhacker a three-decker novel, picked up 
and resignified the Victorian tradition of the former coloniser. And yes, in the first book, as we 
shall see, Herbert still does seem to believe in a true Australia, while in the last book he has 
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long accepted that any notion of a true Australia is a lie, but one from which – and here comes 
a contradiction – Australians themselves should profit. However, here we will not focus on 
how, over the course of the three books, Herbert’s nationalist anti-England attitude turns into 
a ‘truly’ postcolonial one. Instead we take advantage of the fact that also Herbert’s way to 
mastery can neatly be arranged along the three books of Carey’s novel – suggesting a further 
subdivision of this chapter. 
 
6.1.1. Book I 
 
The focus of this subsection is on Herbert’s lying. But there is an immediate problem. As Leah 
explains to Charles at a family dinner towards the end of the story: “‘Your father […] uses the 
word “lie” in a slightly eccentric way’” (IL 490). And this is indeed the case. Throughout the 
novel, the narrator’s concept of lying remains confusing. For example, in the second book 
while Herbert is on the road with Leah, the narrator observes: “Lies, dreams, visions – they 
were everywhere. We brushed them aside as carelessly as spider webs across a garden path. 
They clung to us, of course, adhered to our clothes and trailed behind us but we were too busy 
arguing to note their presence” (IL 304). And a little later he exclaims: “Spawned by lies, 
suckled on dreams, infested with dragons, my children could never have been normal, only 
extraordinary” (IL 336). There is a whole battery of terms – lies, dreams, visions, dragons – 
that all seem to be used interchangeably by the narrative voice. What are we to make of this 
confusing tangle of overlapping impressions? How do dragons fit in? Moreover, lies seem to 
gain quite material qualities, they can ‘cling’ to people, ‘adhere to their clothes’, and ‘trail 
behind’. What, then, are ‘lies’ – at least here in Illywhacker? 
By way of introducing this chapter, it was claimed that lying in a very general sense means 
to manipulate the perception of others, including one’s own at times. Now, that would be a 
function. But it does not explain how lies operate, how they manipulate other people’s 
perception. To explain this point, one can borrow Herbert’s own metaphor, that of a magician, 
or think of a torero. The trick is to draw the audience’s or the bull’s attention away from 
oneself (‘It wasn’t me’), towards a diversion (‘it was her’). Thus, by drawing our eyes towards 
a red herring, the liar produces a dream or vision like a red piece of cloth which he waves in 
front of our eyes, and behind which, when he lifts it, is nothing, a void. We shall presently see 
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a former bullock driver running into precisely such a void that was produced by Herbert 
Badgery. 
But first we need to sharpen the concept further. Not every vision is bad. Visions might be 
empowering or enslaving. While an empowered visionary forms the world, an enslaving liar 
forms the will (he is a puppet master) – which will hopefully become much clearer in the 
following discussion. There is nothing as such, then, that makes a vision good or bad, it is the 
way it is intended or approached that makes the difference. As we shall also see, there is no 
easy solution for the problem that emerges here, namely: how does one know what sort of 
vision one is currently following, how does one know whether one is in control and forming 
the world or whether one is controlled and one’s will is being formed? Before we are able to 
tackle these questions more fully, however, it is necessary to tackle the novel first. Hopefully, 
therefore, these brief reflections on lying suffice to provide the ground for the reading and 
help not to get too confused by Herbert’s perplexing array of metaphors – the more eccentric 
one of the dragon will be an essential stepping stone on Herbert’s way to mastery and 
therefore become clear, hopefully, in the discussion of Books II and III. 
Now, to finally start the narration of Herbert Badgery’s way to power: when he crashes 
into his own story, Herbert interrupts a picnic of the McGrath family and immediately senses 
an opportunity: 
 
While a house was always my aim, it wasn’t always possible in the short term. I was an 
expert, however at getting ‘put up’. I was not just an expert. I was an ace. […] I delivered 
value in whatever way it was required. I applied this principle to the McGraths. I was an 
aviator. That was my value to them. I set to work to reinforce this value. […] By the time 
I swung the headlights of the Hispano Suiza on to the McGrath house in Western 
Avenue, Jack McGrath could see the factory I said – it was a pleasant whim – I was going 
to establish, a factory that was going to build Australian-designed aircraft. It was 
splendid. Everyone in the car could see it, shimmering in the moonlight. You call it a lie. 
I call it a gift. (IL 24-5) 
 
We can see here how Herbert manipulates the McGraths’ perception, how he produces and 
waves a piece of cloth, an aircraft factory in this case, in front of their eyes. Indeed, “Jack 
McGrath could see [it]”. But even before the poisonous vision of the aircraft factory is 
produced (the “gift” as Herbert calls it393), a snake has already entered the relationship 
between Herbert Badgery and Jack’s daughter, Phoebe. In fact, one could go as far as to say 
                                                          
393 Derrida readers will be familiar with the interesting etymology of ‘gift’, which in German means poison. See 
Jaques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Derrida 1981, 61-172. 
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that the lie about the reptile establishes this relationship. When Herbert crash lands with his 
Farman in Ernest Vogelnest’s paddock, he ‘chances’ upon this very dangerous and very 
important animal: “The snake was lucky, and I don’t mean that in the sense that snakes are 
said to be symbols of good fortune. I didn’t even know what a symbol was. It was lucky 
because it was worth five bob to Mr Chin” (IL 17). And of course the snake is a symbol, though 
not of good fortune – but we will come to that momentarily. The important point here is how 
this crucial protagonist and symbol gets into the story. Picnicking with her parents near the 
paddock, Phoebe witnesses the crash landing and goes up to the stranded pilot: 
 
‘What’s the snake for?’ Phoebe said. […] ‘It’s a pet,’ I said. I did not wish to admit I 
needed the five bob so badly. In any case, it was no trouble to lie. I always lied about 
snakes. I always lied about women. It was a habit. I did it, in both cases, charmingly. I 
was so enthusiastic that I could convince myself in half a sentence. (IL 18) 
 
In this manner Herbert makes up dreams and visions throughout the first book. He invents 
them as he goes, easily, unthinkingly – for pure pleasure at times. But charming as his little 
fibs may be, they are not quite as inconsequential as the above quotation may make appear. 
After all, we are talking about a very dangerous creature here: “The king brown snake […] can 
kill with a single strike” and is “almost as deadly as a taipan”, as the narrator goes on to tell 
his readers. And yet: “Herbert Badgery will do anything to insist his lie is true – I let the snake 
run down my arm, across my trousers, to the ground. And there it should have ended, with 
the five bob slinking off through the grass.” 
But the problem with Herbert’s lies at this stage of the story is that they indeed cling to 
him, adhere to him, and trail behind: “Phoebe came forward and picked the damn thing up 
herself. She held the writhing, deadly twisting rope out to me. My throat was so dry I could 
not speak. I took it with a shudder and got it into the hessian bag and tied the top with binding 
twine” (IL 19). From now on Herbert is forced to keep this ‘pet’ against his own inclinations: “I 
did not like the Geelong snake, nor did I trust it. But I was stuck with it, this cranky creature in 
the hessian sack beneath my bed” (IL 37). The same happens with the aircraft factory. Quite 
early on Herbert tries to come clean before Jack McGrath: “Before I could stop myself I told 
him that I had lied about the aircraft factory, that I had no experience in the business at all” 
(IL 68). But Jack will not have it: 
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‘So where is the problem?’ he said. ‘I wasn’t going to Ballarat at all. I was broke when I 
met you.’ ‘That’s Ballarat’s loss,’ he said. […] You say you’re a liar, but I’ve seen nothing 
dishonest in you. You paid me back my thirty pounds. You don’t go ogling my daughter. 
I’d be happy to have you for a partner.’ I couldn’t understand why, but he made me feel 
unclean. He gave me no comfort. (IL 68-9) 
 
Like the snake, Herbert throws away the lure after it has fulfilled its purpose and made the 
others look in the desired direction. But it is picked up again by those he infected with his 
enthusiasm and handed back to him. And that is precisely the point when the conjurer loses 
control. He finds himself confronted with visions which he only started but which others have 
taken up in the meantime and constructed further: 
 
I had never been in a situation before where my lies looked so likely to become true. I 
did not achieve this alone. So many people contributed creamy coats of credibility to my 
untruth that the nasty speck of grit was fast becoming a beautiful thing, a lustrous pearl 
it was impossible not to covet. The aircraft factory began to achieve a life of its own. (IL 
50) 
 
Thus it happens that his inconsequential “pleasant whim[s]” get out of control, develop “a 
life of [their] own”, and eventually turn back at their creator. For, occupied with his affair with 
Phoebe, lovesick Herbert soon loses interest in the “lustrous pearl”, on which Jack so 
enthusiastically heaps layer after layer: “I wished to Christ he would leave me alone, because 
I had other things on my mind which had no room for Great Plans, or Vision, which in the end 
have never been worth a tinker’s fart in comparison with a woman” (IL 105). But the lie has 
long since slipped out of his grasp, and it is not in his power any more to contain it and shut it 
up. 
At this point one should also investigate why the McGraths are so susceptible to Herbert’s 
visions. A first clue as to why Herbert’s lies can evoke such fascination is that the three 
McGraths, each for different reasons, are unhappy with their current situation. Because they 
do not like what they are usually seeing, so to say, they are so vulnerable for Herbert’s visions 
or diversions. 
There is Jack McGrath, who unfortunately made his fortune. “[G]uided by a luck that was 
really, if he could have admitted it, no luck at all“ (IL 74), he makes it from simple bullock driver 
to well-off owner of a taxi company. He is lucky indeed, and very unhappy about it: 
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He had never meant to become rich. He had never planned anything. He had trusted his 
life and let it carry him along never expecting it to mislead him. He could not 
acknowledge that it had. And although depression often enfolded him as he sat alone in 
an armchair he could not, would not, admit that he was unhappy. (IL 75) 
 
Then there is Molly, Jack’s wife, who is haunted by the fear of becoming mad. She was 
fourteen when her mother hanged herself and a doctor gave her an electric belt against 
hereditary madness, which, so she was told, would befall her one day, too. Already 
traumatised and insecure, the class-conscious social life of an affluent suburb does the rest 
for her (cf IL 10-12). And so, by the time Herbert meets her for the first time, “Molly was so 
shell-shocked by social life in Geelong that she had lost all confidence in her normal manner” 
(IL 27). 
And then there is Phoebe, the daughter, who a year before had left grammar school and, 
in contrast to her parents, “understood Geelong all too well” (IL 10). In school, Annette 
Davidson, her teacher and lover, uncovers her beauty and fills her head with stories of the 
Bohemian life in Paris. So, Phoebe “began to imagine a place in the world where she might 
not only belong but also be admired, a place where there were other problems than the price 
of wheat or wool, or whether the waterside workers would be engaged in Yarra Street or Corio 
Quay” (IL 6) – just like David and Bettina Joy or Benny Catchprice. 
This is the narrative set-up of the characters that provides the fertile ground upon which 
Herbert’s visions fall. He provides that “nasty speck of grit” on which they can build their own 
fancy dreams. Desperately longing for the places of their dreams and visions, Phoebe and, as 
we shall minutely see, also Jack assume or appropriate his stories, they take them out of his 
hands, make them their own and construct them further. Lying is indeed dangerous business 
therefore – especially for Jack. 
Jack, unhappy with his life of luxury, not admitting to himself what it is that he is longing 
for, eagerly grasps the apparent life belt of the aircraft factory. When they meet at the 
beginning of the story, Herbert compares “that first night to the first night with a new lover. 
There was passion, sympathy, excitement” (IL 28). And when Herbert unsuccessfully tries to 
stop the lie of the aircraft factory, Jack tells him: “‘The point is not whether you’re an engineer 
or whether you’re broke. The point is that you’ve got a grand idea. And you’ve also got 
enthusiasm, which is the only quality that makes a business go. We can buy engineers, 
Badgery, but we can’t buy enthusiasm’” (IL 68). The point is that the enthusiasm is rather Jack’s 
own than Herbert’s, that it is Jack who finally found a vision that provides meaning for him, 
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gives his capacity for agency an aim, furnishes him with an intention, and who now literally 
puts all his life into making it real. 
Reaching the major turning point of the first book, both thematic lies, the brown snake 
and the aircraft factory, come together when a group of potential investors meet at Jack 
McGrath’s dining table. “For a trembling instant”, relates Herbert, “I had them all. I had full 
five seconds in which to say something, anything, to begin a sentence that might, with its 
passion and precision, convert them to my view.” But this is as far as the lie can go, and the 
moment passes. “I did not even get my lips to open” (IL 123). As a lie, the aircraft factory was 
a ploy, a distraction. Herbert cannot say anything substantial, because it was never meant to 
be anything substantial. He had never believed in it himself. And pressed to defend his figment 
by “practical”, that is unimaginative, businessmen, Herbert has simply nothing to say. Jack, 
however, who, like a bull himself, went with all he had for the red rag waving in front of his 
eyes, finds himself running against nothing. And this has a dramatic effect on him. 
Shortly after his bluff is called, Herbert furiously leaves the room to return with his snake: 
 
‘This,’ I said as I walked back into the dining room, ‘is a true Australian.’ […] ‘You cannot 
make this a good little bunny,’ I told the men in the room, ‘no matter what you say to it, 
no matter what you feed it. You cannot buy it or tame it or make it nice.’ […] ‘Bow,’ I 
bellowed, ‘to a true Australian snake.’ (IL 125) 
 
After the storm has subsided and the guests have left, Jack McGrath is shattered. “‘You don’t 
know anything about animals,’ my host said. ‘There isn’t a creature alive who won’t respond 
to kindness. You’re not a kind man, Badgery, and it hurts me to say it. […] If kindness is not the 
point, what point is there?’” (IL 127). 
This reaction of Jack’s is remarkable. When Herbert’s lie ceases to be sustained by listeners 
and thus evaporates into thin air, Jack finds himself in a void. Charles Taylor’s words about 
moral frameworks therefore seem to fit this context, too. In the discussion of My Life as a 
Fake, he was quoted: 
 
People may see their identity as defined partly by some moral or spiritual commitment 
[…] [T]hey are saying that were they to lose this commitment or identification, they 
would be at sea, as it were; they wouldn’t know anymore, for an important range of 
questions, what the significance of things was for them.394 
 
                                                          
394 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 27. 
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That is exactly the situation in which Jack finds himself now. The loss of his vision and Herbert’s 
performance, the void in which he suddenly finds himself, shake his ontological security – just 
like Sarah Wode-Douglass when she had her past rewritten by Slater. Only, as opposed to her, 
he has nothing to fall back on. Her hypergood was the truth of art; Jack’s hypergood is 
kindness, in particular the fundamental kindness inherent in all living creatures. That is why 
he says, “If kindness is not the point, what point is there?” And he means it, too. 
The one thing that gave the bullock driver orientation in life and seemingly lead him from 
one success to the next was his firm trust in this kindness (see IL 21, 75; see also Chapter 
6.2.1.). It is this hypergood itself that Jack now finds attacked by Herbert Badgery, when he 
says “You cannot buy [the snake] or tame it or make it nice.” So the reader might understand 
what the people of Geelong cannot: 
 
Why would a healthy, happy man like Jack McGrath go sneaking into another man’s 
bedroom and remove a hessian bag containing a snake? Why, at two o’clock in the 
morning, would he open this bag in the kitchen? And why, when he was bitten, would 
he walk out on to the front lawn to die in public (in his pyjamas) rather than raise his 
family and ask for help? (IL 128) 
 
For Jack, despairing of the world as he is now, either he is right in that “there isn’t a creature 
alive who won’t respond to kindness”, or else there is no point. Herbert’s brown snake proves 
him wrong. 
But returning to Herbert Badgery and the way his lies escape his command: Jack’s death is 
of course not inconvenient for Herbert. One could even say it is necessary for him to marry 
Phoebe. But that does not mean Herbert were in control. Around the event of Charles’ birth, 
Jack and the snake reappear (IL, Book I, Chapters 78-9). At the very birth-night, the ghost “did 
a jig, a little dance, hop-ho, a shearer’s prance” (IL 179). The narrator comments: “When I saw 
the dance I went quite cold. For I knew that I had been defeated in a battle I did not know the 
rules of, and my tormentor had slipped inside my defence and thrust his weapon home 
without his victim being aware of the nature of the wound.” 
On the surface, the explanation of Jack’s ghost’s joy is simple: “as Charles grew and came 
slowly into focus I saw exactly what had happened: Charles was Jack with bandy legs put on. 
No wonder the jig, the hop, the dance” (IL 180), and in the next two books the reader will learn 
that snakes indeed respond to Charles’ kindness. At first glance, therefore, Jack has had the 
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last word and is proven right after all. But what the ghost also proves here is that Herbert is 
not yet a puppet master, is not yet in control of the narrative and his listeners. 
And so, his self-invention as aviator which he used to manipulate Phoebe comes back at 
him in the form of Phoebe’s infatuation with flying. For, unbeknown to him, the vision of 
aviation had determined the end of their affair before it had even begun. While pregnant with 
Charles she writes to her lover Annette: “I am so bored. The aeroplane sits where I can see it 
from the window. It is the only thing that keeps me sane. […] I did not, even for a moment, 
guess that what he wanted was so ordinary: a fat wife with a dozen children and cabbage and 
stew every night” (IL 174-5). She may marry him, but for Phoebe, Herbert is nothing but an 
episode. She would rather risk her life in an illegal abortion than to be grounded and stuck 
with a family. At the end of the first book, she takes the plane and flies away. The narrator 
dryly reports: “She left me with two children and a savage poem” (IL 188). 
Overall, then, the first book shows the readers Herbert’s still inexpert handling of lies. The 
deadly snake might be taken as a symbol, therefore, of the dangerous, untamed potency of 
his visions. Not knowing what he is doing, he makes up his easy figments as he goes, constantly 
losing control over them. And with hindsight, as narrator of the story, he laments: “I wish I 
had been able to control them [lies] as well as I can now, for half the time I blundered clumsy 
as a coot” (IL 140). In this vein a seemingly insignificant detail of the first book, Herbert’s 
tearing off the finger of fictive Mr. Regan in order to scare a draughtsman and procure drafts 
for ‘his’ plane (IL 105-7), will reappear with a vengeance. “This Regan story was, at least for 
the moment, a lie. Unnecessary, of course, but I enjoyed it” (IL 107). Years later, however, 
Herbert will find himself in the very house he imagined for this “pleasant whim” of the Regan 
story. “Inside, at the head of the table, was a man with one finger missing from his bandaged 
hand. It was not the Mr Regan I had once described, but Mr Goon Tse Ying whose angry eyes 
I could not meet. So it was, at a time when it seemed too late, that I began to have some 
understanding of the power of lies” (IL 351). 
 
6.1.2. Book II 
 
As the last quote indicated, Herbert will gain “some understanding of the power of lies” 
eventually. His apprenticeship starts with the second book. Again, lying in a very general sense 
means to produce a decoy in order to manipulate the perception of others. And in the first 
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book, Herbert’s habitual and easy figments, his “lustrous pearls”, constantly slip snakelike 
through his fingers and stealthily glide behind the scenes to wreak havoc on their curvy paths. 
In the second book now, Herbert’s visions and deceptions lose even the appearance of ease 
and triviality. The visions he produces are now described as dragons. As we shall see, what 
makes them so monstrous is just this characteristic of them to operate in the shadows like 
Jack’s ghost. Over the course of the second book, what Herbert will learn is what it means that 
his figments act in the dark, or how they act in the dark. 
The one who introduces the dragon metaphor in connection with a disappearance act at 
the beginning of the second book and explains its meaning at the end of it is the above-
mentioned Mr Goon Tse Ying, Herbert’s Chinese foster father. This disappearing act, and its 
connection with dragons that Goon points out, is highly significant. It frames the second book 
and remains a major theme in it. It is important, therefore, to come to terms with it, to not 
only make it a stylistic device of magic realism or postmodern interruption of realist narration, 
but to explain what it means on the narrative level. To this end we need to have a closer look 
at the two instances in which Herbert produces dragons by disappearing. 
Goon finds the ten-year-old Herbert, “a self-appointed orphan, [who] was living, thin, half 
wild, cunning as a shithouse rat amidst the crates and spoiled vegetables at the back of the 
Eastern Market” (IL 193), Melbourne, and decides to take him into his care. He gives the boy 
an education and, above all, teaches him to disappear – an act that involves being literally 
scared out of one’s wits: “I disappeared and the world disappeared from me. I did not escape 
from fear, but went to the place where fear lives. I existed like waves from a tuning fork in 
chloroformed air. I could not see Goon Tse Ying. I was nowhere” (IL 203). Soon, young Herbert 
masters the art fully and one morning even disappears just “in order to lie in bed of a winter’s 
morning” (IL 204). This, however, brings the dragon on the scene, as Goon Tse Ying explains 
to the boy: “‘If you make yourself feel the terror when there is no terror to feel, you are making 
a dragon. If you meet a real dragon, that is the way of things. But if you make dragons in your 
head you are not strong enough and you will have great misfortune’” (IL 204). 
But this does not keep the Herbert of the narration, the intradiegetic Herbert, from making 
himself “feel the terror when there is no terror to feel” a second time in his life, this time in 
order to impress Leah Goldstein, who tells him that a disappearing act would not be enough 
for a show. First, Herbert approaches the act the same way as he did as a little boy. He 
envisages Goon’s story of how Goon’s father was killed by anti-Chinese rioters at Lambing Flat: 
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“I summoned up the terrible flag of the English, the pipes and drums of the band, their blue 
shirts and white moleskins, the brains of Goon’s father like the brains of the pig.” But then he 
suddenly switches to his own father: “My father galloped his team, his eyes bright, clear blue, 
dragging his cannon, cracking his whip.” And this, finally, does the trick for the adult Herbert 
Badgery: “I wanted to call out but I could not: The dragon came and it was bigger than the 
dragon I knew before […] Thirty-four years of locked-up terror came spurting at me and I knew 
I would drown in it” (IL 216). 
Two aspects about the art of disappearance are noteworthy. First, in order to disappear 
one has to go “to the place where fear lives”. Second, if one does that for pleasure, that is 
without being ‘really’ scared or, more precisely, if one is willing oneself to be scared rather 
than to be frightened by external causes, one produces a dragon. 
The “place where fear lives”, where literally nameless terrors and lusts reside which we 
cannot put in words, this place that we cannot usually access consciously, is suggestive of the 
unconscious. It seems that it is here where Herbert is taken. The dragon that takes him there 
is described as a surge of “locked-up terror”. It rushes at him and takes him away with it. The 
dragon, it seems then, is a metaphor for unleashed passions or drives. And that might be the 
key to understanding the significance of Herbert’s act. He makes contact with a fear that is 
too great for him to process, a childhood trauma that threatens his very sense of self, were it 
not suppressed and banned into the unconscious. By consciously taking off the lid and setting 
free this horror, he actually disappears, he, his very person, drowns in this unleashed fear. 
But of course this is also a willed manipulation, a performance he goes through in order to 
influence his bystanders’ perception. After all, disappearing is a classic magician’s act. Only 
here the magic is real in a sense, and its consequences are grave. “I tried to talk, but the dragon 
had me and dragged me away into the spaces between the mist of Crab Apple Creek while my 
audience, I must suppose, innocently applauded such a clever trick” (IL 216). The significant 
part is not so much the disappearance itself, but the dragon to which it is tied. The dragon is 
awoken anxiety, desire, kindled imagination in which we might metaphorically, or, in the story, 
literally, lose ourselves once it is fully set ablaze. That is the danger Herbert is alluding to. 
Leah Goldstein, sitting at the camp fire with Herbert’s children, knows that she is being 
manipulated and therefore, to a certain extent, immune to the threat the manipulation poses. 
But that is very different with Sonia: 
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And you, dear reader, will do me the kind favour of emulating my patient daughter and 
neither make sarcastic comments like the ill-informed Goldstein (who thinks me 
engaged in some simple trick) nor snivel like my fearful son who is so easily convinced 
that I am gone for good. Thus you will not waste time staring out into the night but will, 
alone with Sonia, appreciate the thin green tower of flame […]. (IL 228) 
 
Like at the very beginning of the novel, the narrator begs us not to waste our time but just 
enjoy the show and be enthralled like Sonia. That, however, would be very dangerous 
business. His dragon produces offspring in Sonia, her imagination is stirred by her father’s act: 
 
‘If you disappear,’ she asked her […] brother, ‘where do you go?’ […] Goon Tse Ying’s 
dragon was not a great scaly monster that any fool could see. It was a tiny thing, a 
thread, a slippery worm. It had entered my daughter without me even glimpsing it. It 
slunk into her viscera and lodged there. ‘You go to heaven,’ she whispered, ‘and see 
Jesus.’ (IL 271) 
 
That people would disappear is something that is beyond Sonia’s personal experience and 
especially also beyond the truths of the social structure in which she is raised and interpellated 
as social being – it simply does not occur in her framework of reality. Her father’s 
disappearance – a potentially very frightening experience of loss – is thus utterly inexplicable 
and acutely threatens the validity of her notion of reality and the truth of things. As Anthony 
Giddens explained earlier: “On the other side of what might appear to be quite trivial aspects 
of day-to-day action and discourse, chaos lurks. And this chaos is not just disorganisation, but 
the loss of a sense of the very reality of things and of other persons.” That is, as opposed to 
Leah and Charles, Sonia’s ontological security, her very sense of self, is fundamentally shaken: 
 
Both Leah Goldstein and my son seemed to have interpreted my disappearing as a clever 
stunt which might be useful. They did not tremble on the edge of an abyss, or question 
the substantiality of matter. (IL 270) 
 
Unlike Charles, who saw new opportunities for escape, revenge, triumph and – most of 
all – making money, Sonia knew that this was not a trick. Her child’s fingers had silently 
questioned my skin, hugged my heavy thigh, or held the fob watch that had disappeared 
with me, looking inquiringly at its coded face. (IL 271) 
 
Sonia, deeply moved as she is and unable to shrug off Herbert’s performance as a clever 
trick, needs an explanation if she wants to save herself. And her imagination sets in motion in 
order to provide one. Her father went to heaven. While Charles can go on as before after a 
while, Sonia needs ‘heaven’ now: 
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[T]he difference, I guess now, between Charles and Sonia was that Charles, once he 
could see no result from his efforts to disappear, gave up and concentrated on things 
that were of more use, whilst Sonia would not give up and was like someone who has 
survived a cyclone and can never quite believe in the solidity of a house or the 
permanence of a tree. (IL 336-7) 
 
The difference is that Charles’ ontological security is not shaken like Sonia’s. What he took 
to be a trick, is for her an existential threat. She clings to the vision of heaven with all that she 
has because it the only thing that stands between her and the abyss. In a world that she 
perceives no longer as just a given, she has to work actively to maintain order, keep the chaos 
“the loss of a sense of the very reality of things and of other persons” at bay. Seeking control, 
her notion of ‘heaven’ quickly grows to form a full-blown obsessive vision. 
In Ballarat, Sonia attempts to be confirmed for the fifth time, and the concerned clergyman 
shows Herbert 
 
the holy picture he had taken from her: the Assumption of the Virgin. It was a beauty. 
The Virgin rose above a great cloud of smoke while down below the adoring crowd 
raised their heads to what they could not see. Sonia had assured the clergyman that she 
herself intended to do likewise and that her father Herbert Badgery (who art in heaven) 
could do it any time he liked. (IL 314-5) 
 
Finally, in Clunes – which is bored full of mineshafts, as the narrator informs the readers – 
Sonia does indeed as she intended and disappears for good. Herbert Badgery is shattered. 
 
It is alleged I hit my son and caused him lasting damage to the ear. There was a funeral 
with no coffin. At the funeral there was a small upset we need not dwell on. As a result 
of this upset my friend Nathan Schick drove me to Sunbury where he placed me in the 
care of doctors. Perhaps he imagined grief was medical. (IL 338-9) 
 
Just like the ghost in the first book, the dragon “slipped inside my defence and thrust his 
weapon home without his victim being aware of the nature of the wound”. Unprepared as he 
is, Herbert is taken by surprise, and once again is devastated when the dragon finally strikes. 
Now, if the dragon stands for the terror that drives Sonia’s vision and makes it obsessive, 
what exactly has it got to do with lying? It is, again, Goon Tse Ying who reveals this connection. 
At the very end of the second book Herbert returns to his master to complete his 
apprenticeship. The frail old man takes some time to recognise his former pupil, the boy he 
once took in his care: “‘You made up stories, all the time. […] Yes, yes, I remember you. Hing 
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said you were a sorcerer. Mrs Wong was frightened of you. You made her frightened with a 
story about a snake’” (IL 346). And then he goes on to explain to Herbert the nature of dragons: 
 
‘You were a small child,’ he said, stirring three sugars into his dark tea. ‘you 
misunderstood the things I tried to teach you. […] I told you, I suppose, that you should 
not make a dragon. My English was not as good as I thought it was and you 
misunderstood me. A dragon, Little Bottle, was my mother’s name for a frightening 
story. Also it is a name they give to liars in my mother’s village. In Hokein, they say “to 
sew dragon seeds” when they mean gossip. My mother also used to call the castor sugar 
she put on dumplings “dragon eggs” but I wouldn’t have a clue as to why.’ (IL 347) 
 
At the end of the second book the symbols of the dragon and the snake are thus brought 
into direct contact. It was a frightening story of a snake that scared his Chinese care takers 
and caused so much turmoil when Herbert was still a boy. His lie, a slippery dangerous 
monster, again slipped through his fingers, took flight like the rumour in A. Paul Weber’s 
drawing (Das Gerücht – the rumour) and turned against its own creator, causing young 
Herbert’s eviction from the Chinese foster family (Book II, Chapter 4). This means that if one 
makes a dragon, one lies in a specific way. One tells a frightening story, creates “terror when 
there is no terror to feel”. In the case of a dragon, then, the distraction one generates in order 
to manipulate other people’s perception is one that works on their deepest emotions, triggers 
their lust, sets free their looked-up, unspoken fears. 
It is important to be precise at this point. Sonia’s vision is not just one mode of bringing 
(symbolic) order into the chaos of ‘uncommunicated reality’. Sonia is ill. She is infected by a 
dragon. And visions generated by dragons do not explain the world, they shape it. Let me 
explain: Since these visions are signs that are established by way of covering up truths we 
cannot possibly accept –an abyss we dare not look into, fears that are too terrible to be 
confronted – these visions function as powerful diversions, like a red rag drawing our attention 
somewhere else. Sonia’s Assumption is thus not so much an explanation of reality as a means 
to avoid confrontation with it. Such a dragon generated vision does not refer to anything in 
the present (it is “terror when there is no terror to feel”), but is forever deferring the aim of 
action towards a future that needs to be achieved or avoided. It is therefore elusive like a Fata 
Morgana, unquestionable, impenetrable, sucking up agency by being ceaselessly 
implemented. Sonia has her fifth confirmation, but also this one will not bring her any closer 
to Assumption. 
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To generalise this point for Illywhacker. Herbert’s infected listeners pick up his “nasty 
speck of grit” and construct it further in the same way as Phoebe “invented [Herbert] 
according to her needs” (IL 28). Like Sonia, they develop their own visions around it, and, in 
the manner of Jack, heap layer after layer on their “lustrous pearl[s]”. That is the way in which 
gossip may work, too. If successful, it lodges itself into the minds of its victims, stirring 
unnameable terrors, growing in momentum as it is passed on. To make a dragon, then, means 
to manipulate the perception of others by stirring in their deep-seated drives and passions, by 
providing a cover and outlet for what is denied and suppressed. It is a particularly potent form 
of lying. 
This is the lesson Herbert finally takes in after having torn off his old master’s finger in a 
fight for The Book of Dragons. The book he wrestled from his master won’t bring back his 
Sonia, but when he finds himself in the very house of the frightening Regan story he told the 
draughtsman in the first book, he begins “to have some understanding of the power of lies”. 
Only now does he understand that he can do more with lies than just selling t-models or be 
put up temporarily. If skilfully applied, they are powerful instruments working on the 
unspoken fears and desires of their victims to trigger fantasies and visions that may turn into 
obsession. 
One last thing needs to be pointed out before we turn to the third book. The dragon 
Herbert produces, the locked-up terror he unleashes in himself, does something with him, 
too. While the McGraths’ invented him according to their needs, he now invents himself 
according his own. The terror, connected as it was with the daunting image of his father, is 
banned, upon reappearance, into an auto-vision, a vision about his desired own self. After 
having travelled with Leah Goldstein for about three years – the readers learn almost nothing 
about this time – Herbert says: 
 
By November 1934 I was a different man. I could read without moving my lips. I was an 
old python with his opaque skin now shed, his blindness gone, once again splendid and 
supple, seeing the world in all its terrifying colours. I had been drip-fed on Rosa’s letters 
and Leah’s monologues. I read the newspapers with the sensitivity of one liar regarding 
the work of another (315). 
 
When he, just after the quoted passage, confronts a group of mean-spirited railway police 
who try to stop a group of bagmen from jumping on a train to Shepparton, he continues to 
describe himself: “As I walked up that railway track to talk to the bully boys I was my father’s 
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son. I had a vision of myself that sunny morning as I had not had a vision of myself for years: I 
could see Herbert Badgery again” (IL 316). 
He has turned himself into a vision of his own person and thus can see himself like Jack 
could see the aircraft factory. But what is really remarkable is how he says, proudly, he were 
his father’s son. Where is all the locked-up terror gone that was connected with the childhood 
image of that man? The point is that he, as Phoebe says, invented himself. Such self-invention 
implies that he takes control, cuts loose from his past and simulates a new self. The terror is 
left behind together with his childhood that he has shed like an old python sheds its opaque 
skin. 
The application of the snake metaphor to his own person is not idle, therefore. It is 
interesting to note that the seven years of travelling through Victoria with his two children are 
not related at all, nor the years on the road with Leah. We learn about the narrator’s life only 
in as far as it is connected to vision, only in as far as the narrator “could see Herbert Badgery”. 
It is further interesting to note that these are not solely self-produced visions, but co-
productions for which the co-characters are vitally important – Phoebe and Jack McGrath in 
the first book, Leah in the second. 
So, even if he now invents himself according to his own needs, this invention still needs to 
be sustained by listeners or an audience – in the end us readers. In My Life as a Fake, the 
audience was decisive for establishing and confirming the protagonists’ position within a 
common moral framework. Here we see self-placement at work. The narrator invents, 
simulates himself. But also this self-simulation depends on support in the social arena. In this 
sense Herbert is indeed a lie himself. He is a figment like the aircraft factory, like true Australia 
– a distracting vision that is picked up by others, transformed by them and empowered by 
them. At the beginning of the second book, in 1931, the depression is also raging in Australia 
but Herbert takes no notice of it, since he had entered his “own private depression” (IL 206). 
Now, however, he is drip-fed by Leah who teaches him not only to read but most importantly 
helps him into another vision of himself, a distraction that diverts his attention away from, 
and so bans, the horrors of his childhood. 
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6.1.3. Book III 
 
In the first book, Herbert made up his lies as he went. He was very successful at it, but that 
meant, too, that they went out of control and had catastrophic consequences. In the second 
book, the consequences of his disappearance act are still catastrophic, but he now realises 
what it is that makes some distracting visions so particularly potent: they have to get through 
to what is locked up inside other people, to kindle their hidden desires, their longing, their 
angst. A vision that can do that causes people to form obsessive ideas. Sonia, for example, 
when she was captured by the inexplicable experience of Herbert’s disappearance, developed 
visions of Assumption in order to avoid the abyss of the unexplainable. What Herbert will 
manage in the third book, now, is to produce ready-made dream-images for others. He will 
not use verbal language or concrete visions any more, but images that are capable of hooking 
directly into other people’s unconscious; images that without any intervening rationalisation 
or sense making can directly trigger unspoken and unspeakable fear, horror, lust. He does so 
by banning the dragon into a decisive Vegemite jar. 
Herbert is in prison when Sergeant Moth, the man who arrested him for tearing off Goon 
Tse Ying’s finger, comes for a visit at the beginning of the third book. “Moth brought a bottle 
from his pocket, an old Vegemite bottle with something – I took it for a little yabby – floating 
in it” (IL 386). This something is the severed finger. The sergeant then goes on to ‘sell’ the 
bottle to Herbert, for exactly the amount of money he had on him when he was arrested. 
What is significant is what the sergeant tells Herbert at the conclusion of the deal: 
 
I’ll tell you, Badgery. I would have given it to you. I would have paid you money to take 
the nasty thing. Have you ever noticed,’ he said, ‘how in a dream nothing ever stays still? 
Things are always moving, Badgery. Have you noticed? […] Always moving. You look at 
a face and you think you’ve got a fix on it, but it changes. The mouth opens and becomes 
a fish or if it’s pretty it turns ugly and all the white skin is suddenly scars. You have 
noticed it, haven’t you?’ ‘Yes,’ I said. ‘That’s right,’ he nodded in satisfaction. ‘And lovely 
roses turn into lumps of meat. You cannot grasp it, isn’t that right, like mercury between 
your fingers?’ (IL 388) 
 
What the sergeant describes here are dreams, vivid dreams, frightening, diffuse, 
uncontrollable images stemming from “the place where fear lives”. This is precisely the realm 
into which those more potent lies of Herbert’s tap. The next passage is therefore highly 
significant for the further development of the novel: 
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I saw it happened just as Sergeant Moth said it did. The finger changed. It changed all 
the time. It changed like a face in a dream. I will not upset myself by describing the slimy 
monsters that tried to free themselves from that bottle, but rather tell you about the 
morning I woke early and found it filled with bright blue creatures that darted in and out 
of delicate filigree forests, like tropical fish feeding amongst the coral. Is it hard to 
understand why an old man with his dentures in his hand would suddenly show his pink 
gums and grin? There: Herbert Badgery, Apprentice Liar, as delighted as a baby with a 
bright blue rattle (IL 389-90). 
 
It is important to understand the significance of what has happened here. The diffuse forms, 
the “slimy monsters that tried to free themselves from that bottle”, are the stuff of dreams, 
images in which deep-seated affects, all Herbert’s locked-up terror, find their expression. But 
these images change, turn from “slimy monsters” to “lovely roses”, and incite terror as much 
as other emotions. The point is that Herbert found a way to arrest this flow, to focus it on 
particular images, and so to trigger the emotions connected with them. 
Earlier, when he disappeared, he evoked the image of his father to unleash his locked-up 
terror and go “to the place where fear lives”. It is precisely this process that he now fully 
mastered. One can call this lying because it is manipulation and implies control. For, if he now 
fully understands this mechanism, he can apply it to others, too. He can arrest their diffuse 
unconscious images, make the flow stop and focalise around one particular affect, and thus 
“make [them] feel the terror [or other emotions] when there is no terror to feel”. He now 
knows how to make a dragon and what it means to make a dragon. He does not need anymore 
to produce visions in order to kindle anxiety or desire, he can directly, without any sense 
making or rationalisation, interfere with others’ unconscious and trigger terror and lust. And 
this, as will be shown in some detail now, is exactly how Herbert takes control over his fellow 
characters. 
First, there is Emma (née Underhill), Charles future wife who enters the novel being 
mounted by a goanna, a dragon. The passage, in which Emma chooses Charles – and not the 
other way round – is highly significant in this respect, because she appears to act completely 
out of character: 
 
She did carry an umbrella, but she used it energetically, like a walking stick, and she put 
her shoulders back and held up her head and walked with a good stride, strong and 
determined, but not without grace or sensuality either. Whilst walking, Emma Underhill 
showed a part of her character she kept hidden the rest of the time and for an hour and 
a half she did not lower her eyes once. […] She put up her umbrella and realized, for the 
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first time, that she was being bold. […] Emma entered [the cage in which Charles keeps 
the goanna from which he rescued her], clutching her handbag to her chest. She had 
already decided to get married. (IL 409) 
 
Somehow Herbert managed to get into Emma’s unconscious and to manipulate it. From 
this point onwards, she is described as a highly sensual and manipulative person: 
 
He [Charles] called her a slattern and a slut and madwoman and then she would go cold 
as ice […]. Then he would come to her in the night, begging as if she were a queen in 
satin and silk, a queen in a cage, and then she would spurn him. 
 Oh what a game they had, what a sweet lovely perversion it was. You could feel the 
rage. […] 
 It was wrong, of course it was. She did not need to be told. She thought up the most 
disgusting things, God strike her. She took his big bull’s pizzle in her mouth and made 
him weep and moan and once she dreamed she had decorated it with lipstick and rouge 
and smoothed depilatory cream on his hairy sac. (IL 469) 
 
Her Mum and Dad would never have believed that shy Emma would have the nerve to 
ask for such a thing [her ‘brekky’ being brought to her] and yet, precisely because she 
was not used to it, there was a pleasure in the request itself that was quite 
extraordinary. It made her nipples go hard, as if she had taken off all her clothes and 
was standing, brazen, in the middle of a paddock, or up to her knees in swamp water. 
(IL 538) 
 
Emma thrives and feeds on passion and Charles’ relationship to her is characterised mostly 
by extreme passions and bizarre, transgressive behaviour.395 
Through manipulating her unconscious, Herbert turns Emma into his instrument. For him, 
her most important function is to exercise control over his son: “Charles did not have his 
magnificent new shop in spite of Emma. He had it because of Emma. If he had not been so 
bluffed and bamboozled by his wife he would have been, deaf or not, in the army” (IL 452). 
Considering this role she plays for Herbert, it is highly significant how, later in the story, 
the bottle with the finger comes into Emma’s possession. At the very family dinner at which 
Leah tells Charles that his father uses the word ‘lie’ in an eccentric manner, the lie of the 
aircraft factory reappears in the form of the Holden. The roles have swapped, however. It is 
Charles now who insists the Holden is a truly Australian product, while his father Herbert has 
lost his faith in true Australia and insists the car is an American business scheme: “‘It’s a lie. 
And the shame is, it’s not our lie; it’s their lie’” (IL 490). Herbert gets into a passion and just as 
                                                          
395 Accordingly, she provides the joyful opportunity for a psychoanalytic field day and sing the Ode to Freud. 
You will be spared, though, for the moment. 
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he brandished his snake in front of the unimaginative imaginary Englishmen in the first book, 
he now produces his Vegemite jar in front of his family:  
 
[M]ostly it reminded me of the trivial nature of my imagination – for I had no doubt that 
it was this that controlled its contents […]. When I placed the bottle on the table, I was 
pointing out our lack of courage and imagination. It was all so clear to me that I felt no 
need to explain it further. (IL 490) 
 
At the climax of the argument Charles is furious. “Put that thing down,’ he said to Emma, 
but his wife was entranced, by the Vegemite jar and did not even look up when her husband 
left the room and stamped down the stairs into the night” (IL 491). Later, after the turmoil is 
over, the narrator recounts, “[w]e proceeded towards my [!] tower and you will understand 
that at a time like this a Chinaman’s dead finger might easily escape my notice” (IL 492) – 
which means that it, ‘coincidentally’, remains in Emma’s possession. It is noteworthy how 
“entranced” Emma is. The parallels between the deadly snake Herbert wielded in the first 
book (deadly for Jack) and the deadly dragon he wields now (deadly for Charles) are indeed 
striking. 
This time, however, Herbert is fully in control. A little later, as Charles’ suicide draws close, 
the narrator shows the magnitude of his influence quite bluntly. Leah and Hissao, Charles’ 
youngest son, apparently meet by chance in a café in Sydney and discuss an impending 
interview about Charles’ pet shop: “They do not, as they might, embrace as the children of 
magicians, as magicians themselves who could, if they decided to, fill the night sky with brand 
new neon. No, they behave like servants. They giggle like idiots because of a … COINCIDENCE” 
(IL 528). Peter Carey does not use capitalisation often in this novel. A few pages later the 
interview is over. Charles, in a very agitated and fragile state of mind, enveloped by his 
fantasies and fears, completely misreads the situation and so “had no idea the interview had 
been a triumph” (IL 536). However, “[e]ven Emma had understood that the interview had 
been a success. She would not, otherwise, have been so reckless as to choose this moment to 
display the foetus in the bottle and claim to be the creature’s mother” (IL 536) – thus 
confronting Charles with the fruits of her apparent sexual activities with the goanna (see IL 
406, 475, 523). It is this display of the dragon – ‘coincidentally’ in exactly the wrong moment 
of Charles’ greatest vulnerability – that sends him over the edge. 
And this brings us back to the bottle again. It is decisive for the present reading and 
therefore deserves close attention. We could see, first with Sergeant Moth, then Herbert, and 
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now Emma, that the Vegemite jar shows the unconscious fantasies of the ones who possess 
it. In the case of Emma, now, it is clear that ‘somehow’ sexual fantasies about the goanna have 
slipped into her mind. Also in Emma’s case, however, the images in the bottle remain elusive: 
 
She knew her babies were wrong. They were thoughts that could not be born. And, 
besides, they would never stay still, and you could not be sure that you had seen what 
you had seen. It was like looking at clouds drifting across the skylight – one minute you 
had a knobbly white-faced man all covered in warts and urticaria, and next it was a 
Spanish galleon in full sail across the top of the yellow Sydney sky. (IL 536) 
 
The point is that, suddenly, this permanent flow stabilises – like the fish Herbert produced 
while still in prison. We must assume that it is Herbert himself who steadies and thus 
unleashes the dragon. The passage above continues thus: “But this one [the foetus she will 
show Charles and which will drive him into suicide] was different – it stayed the same. It 
moved, and breathed. You could see the heaving of its tiny ribcage and the clutching 
movement, just like a real baby, of its elegant, beautiful black claws” (IL 536). The creature 
thus solidified brings to the forefront what had better stayed hidden. It confronts everyone 
who looks at it with a similar abyss that Sonia was facing – revoking ontological security and 
thus producing existential crises. The text shows how it has indeed dramatic effects on 
everyone who looks at it. It is pure phantasma let loose, “terror when there is no terror to 
feel”. When he beholds it for the first time, 
 
Hissao, quite suddenly, did not know where he was. His head span. He stood up, and 
was dizzy, so sat down again. His mother, momentarily, took on the appearance of a 
total stranger. […] Just the same, he did not realize that he had seen a dragon, only that 
he was ill and frightened. (IL 533) 
 
But back to Charles. As the narrator already told us at the beginning of the third book: “no 
one was to be more upset [by the goanna foetus] than Charles for whom it was to prove quite 
fatal”. Upon seeing the dragon, all his locked-up terror comes spurting at him, just as the 
dragon came spurting at Herbert himself in the second book, and takes him away in a surge 
of emotion: 
 
His neck went red and blotchy. He started to say something, but the words got tangled 
and tripped over themselves [caught by the onslaught from his unconscious, he is 
beyond language – or beneath] and he ran unathletically, heavily, his arms flailing, 
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across the gallery and down the stairs, three at a time, falling on the second landing, 
rising, bleeding, bawling to Van Kraligan to get a hessian bag. (IL 536) 
 
The story leaves no doubt about Herbert’s total control over all these events. When 
Charles is about to leave with his youngest son, Hissao looks up to the window behind which 
Herbert sits immobilised by an earlier stroke. “He felt, later, that the eyes had bullied him, had 
made him hold out his hands for the keys when he had been meaning to shake hands, to say 
goodbye” (IL 540). “[J]ust because a thing must be done do not imagine that one necessarily 
relishes it”, the narrator starts the account of the following drive at whose destination Charles’ 
shoots the goanna and himself dead. And if there was any doubt about Herbert’s role in the 
‘suicide’, the following passage makes it clear beyond doubt: 
 
Leah Goldstein looked up. There was Herbert Badgery, sitting in his chair, listing slightly 
towards the collapsed side of his brain, surrounded by the waltzing neon rosellas. ‘You 
bastard,’ she said. […] The door opened. ‘Kill me,’ she shouted. ‘Kill me.’” (IL 545) “She 
never remembered what she had said that day, but it unnerved me just the same, as if 
all my carefully constructed world was unravelling in my hands. Old men do not need 
sleep. I sat up all that night beside her. I watched the signs. I held everything in place by 
the sheer force of my will. (IL 546) 
 
Charles has to die because he cannot take the necessary steps to save the ailing business. He 
would have to illegally export endangered species, but he could never bring himself to do so. 
It simply was time for Hissao to take over, so Herbert’s dream could enter the next phase. And 
again he brings the dragon in the bottle to bear on his fellow characters to bring this phase 
about: 
 
So when she [Leah] arrived back at the pet shop […], she did not pay very much attention 
to the mumbling grunting conversation being conducted by Emma and Herbert Badgery. 
She saw the widow had regained possession of her Vegemite bottle. […] The matter of 
Hissao’s future had been decided in her absence. (IL 555) 
 
It is also important to note that Hissao, “the young man [who] has a face that no one can 
satisfactorily explain” (IL 528), “is, himself, a lie, that […] is no more substantial than this 
splendid four-storey mirage” (IL 569). He is an image seemingly without origin, whose features 
“suggested, strongly at some times, weakly at others, an oriental parent who did not exist” (IL 
527). He is the Phoenician Phoebe dreamed into Herbert, the product of Emma’s fearful 
imagination. The tell-tale sign is how Herbert says, “I was fascinated by my grandson’s 
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appearance – it seemed to change with the light, or the company” (516). The parent he does 
not have, then, is the imagination of the respective beholder. If Jack’s ghost penetrated his 
daughter so Charles turns out to be “Jack with bandy legs put on”, then Herbert penetrated 
Emma so Hissao becomes his lie: “There is no doubt that some unlikely things have happened 
within the wombs of the women of the family but there is no question that they have been 
able to affect the shape of their offspring as easily as children idly fooling with some Plasticine” 
(IL 406). Accordingly, sitting next to Hissao on a flight, Rosa Carlobene “had the feeling of a 
dream where things and people transmogrify, characters dissolve from one to the other like 
tricks in a film, monsters in a bottle” (IL 559). Herbert is not speaking metaphorically, 
therefore, when he says: “He was my flesh and blood, my creature, my monster” (IL 565). The 
goanna’s two penises may be taken to symbolise Hissao’s two fathers. In this sense, Hissao is 
the unleashed dragon foetus of the Vegemite bottle which Emma begot with the goanna. 
At this point, the novel, and also the description of Herbert’s way to mastery, draw to their 
close. The whole third book can be read as illustrating Herbert’s complete control. He learns 
to ride the dragon, as it were, to trigger and unleash people’s deepest fears and lusts. And 
thus, after having disposed of Charles and spawned his personal flesh-and-blood dragon in 
Hissao, his development reaches its conclusion. As was said at the beginning of this subsection 
on mastery, Herbert turns out to be a puppet master. Instead of forming the world as 
empowered visionary, he forms the will of those he addresses with his lies – and that always 
includes us readers who are begged to lean back and just enjoy his story. His mastery, then, is 
manipulative rather than creative. His son’s Best Petshop in the World “was one of those great 
Australian enterprises that generate wealth while making nothing new” (IL 530). And, to 
conclude by way of tying this reading back to a postcolonial one, Hissao’s pet emporium – the 
return of Gleason’s town model in Carey’s “American Dreams”396 – does not display anything 
new either, this image of true Australia is a decoy, a mechanism to ensure Herbert’s control. 
Were he to lift this veil of original Australianness, or were it forced away, as the ending 
suggests it soon will be, there would be nothing behind it but a void. 
Hopefully, it could thus be shown that Herbert, the “Apprentice Liar” as he calls himself, 
goes through a bildung. Despite this close reading of the text, however, central themes have 
                                                          
396 Cf. Peter Carey, “American Dreams,” Collected Stories, 171-81. See also Nicholas Dunlop, “Cartographic 
Conspiracies: Maps, Misinformation, and Exploitation in Peter Carey’s ‘American Dreams’,” Antipodes 22.1 
(2008): 33-9, 35. 
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still been left out, as experts on Illywhacker will have noticed. After having described Herbert’s 
development and thus having made my case that the novel indeed is about him gaining control 
and achieving mastery, the next step is therefore to describe the compulsive nature of 
Herbert’s self-creation. As was said at the outset, this next step should complement the 
perspective that has just been described. In the end both facets of the novel will be combined 
to investigate the possibilities of agency in Illywhacker. 
 
6.2. Compulsive Visions and Compelled Selves 
 
Turning to the compulsory side of Herbert’s mastery now, we will see a family trauma that 
originates in Herbert and then spans three generations of Badgerys. Also others have noticed 
that there is something driven or obsessive about the character of Herbert Badgery. Thus 
Woodcok writes: “The Badgery family are trapped by their own aspirations and mythologies” 
and adds that this being trapped by one’s own desires embodies “the direction of 
contemporary Australian society”. According to him, 
 
Herbert and Charles’s dreams and visions [are] compromised by their dependency on 
American finance, [while] Hissao represents a new phase of the neo-colonialism of 
Australia in the form of Japanese finance: he is an entrepreneurial whiz-kid of a kind that 
the 1980s became familiar with, ‘decadent’ and ‘tough’ (553).397 
 
Also Hassall observes that “Herbert may have invented his own narrative; but for all his 
spieling, he is also trapped in it, unable to change”.398 According to him, Illywhacker 
 
is a bleak vision of a timid and fearful nation trapped in an untrue version of itself, 
presented by a timid and fearful narrator who is also, and all too appropriately, trapped 
in an untrue version of himself. […]. European Australia began as a gaol, and if 
IIlywhacker is to be believed, it has never escaped from that narrative of 
imprisonment.399 
 
Especially the last sentence brings to mind again the Australian “carceral mentality” that Cliff 
Lobe, too, found illustrated in Illywhacker, and that was mentioned above. However, in this 
                                                          
397 Woodcock, 68. Woodcock uses a different edition of Illywhacker and therefore refers to different page 
numbers. 
398 Hassall, Dancing on Hot Macadam, 86. 
399 Ibid., 87-8. 
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chapter it is Herbert’s and the other characters’ self-entrapment itself, and not his or the 
commentators’ cultural cringe, that moves into the focus of attention. 
Already in the previous section, the question was raised what makes Herbert’s visions so 
alluring for the McGraths. It was said that each of them for their own reason is very unhappy 
with their current life and therefore susceptible to his fanciful diversions. That is, Herbert’s 
lies provided a welcome means of escape. But Herbert’s visions are more than pleasant 
entertainment – that was made abundantly clear by the metaphor of the dragon and the 
deaths of Jack and later Charles. The question would be, then, just what it is that makes these 
visions so compelling. How do they work? If we want to clarify how visions interfere with 
agency, it is not enough to realise that they somehow trigger deep-seated affects in those who 
they befall. We have to establish how visions relate to agency itself. A good starting point to 
investigate these issues is Herbert’s own case. For, as has been said, the first victim of his 
visions is the narrator of Illywhaker himself. 
Herbert Badgery’s childhood is marked by a cold-hearted father and a tough life on the 
road – or at least so the readers are told when the narrator describes his early experiences 
with his father: 
 
He did not like my accent. He did not, I think, like much about me. My brothers were 
older and they got on with him better. They were useful to him in his business and I was 
too young to do any more than feed the animals and jump down to apply the brake on 
hills. […] Always we were in a hurry. (IL 29) 
 
Herbert is not useful, he says. Not valued. But this may be worse than it sounds. In order to 
essentialise, in order to matter in this world and be an agent, one must deploy one’s inner 
sources, change one’s environment and be changed by one’s environment in turn – one must 
experience self-efficacy. In terms of the rugby example from Chapter 4.4., one can describe 
Herbert’s situation as him trying to participate in the game but being ignored by the sporting 
crowd. He is not “constituted in language” – as Butler said, or constituted by affirming social 
interaction as I would say, with a more Wittgensteinian concept of language in mind. The 
malicious treatment from his father and brothers thus constitutes a truly existential crisis for 
the boy. 
In order to overcome this situation, young Herbert dissociates from his present – a 
dissociation that is driven into final escalation by an incident that completely severs his ties to 
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his father and brothers. The incident is triggered by a particularly traumatising event that for 
its traumatising effects cannot be related as such: 
 
I will not describe for you the beating he [his father] gave me on account of this [his 
father not having sold a cannon and thus having wasted the ammunition to demonstrate 
it], but rather paint you the picture of my revenge, for it is this that I count as the day of 
my birth, […]. (IL 31) 
 
This scene completes Herbert’s trauma, and it is here that he finally totally rejects his 
upbringing and locks up the terror of his childhood in his unconscious by making himself anew. 
Indeed, this “birth” of his is constituted by him spectacularly demolishing his origins: 
 
I had not planned to destroy whatever home I had and it only occurred to me in that 
moment, that moment when I had released the brake [on a very steep hill], when the 
screaming wheel suddenly went free and silent, that instant before the other screaming 
began, it only occurred to me then as my father’s eyes, panicked by the sudden silence, 
found mine, it only occurred to me then, as I said, that I now had no home. (IL 32) 
 
These are the very eyes that still send him into the realm of invisibility as a grown man: “My 
father galloped his team, his eyes bright, clear blue, dragging his cannon, cracking his whip.” 
By dissociating from these eyes, and by initiating a second birth, little Herbert tries to save 
his self, then. He takes control and seeks to become a valid human being, to find the 
recognition of the social arena, the love and care of a stable home. The resulting vision of 
‘home’ takes on a double meaning in the process. It stands for home and hearth (‘Heim’) but 
it also stands for homeland (‘Heimat’). And both these aspects of Herbert’s fantasy can be 
traced throughout the entire novel. 
Herbert’s vision of homeland is a direct consequence of rejecting and dissociating from his 
father. For, in his father he sees the prototype of an ‘imaginary Englishman’, as he calls it: 
 
This story concerns my father who I always imagined to be an Englishman, who made 
such a thing, as long as I knew him, of his Englishness, who never missed a chance to 
say, ‘I am an Englishman’ or, ‘as an Englishman’ that I was surprised to find out he was 
born in York Street, Warrnambool, the son of a shopkeeper. Yet for all that, I must carry 
his lie for him. For he made himself into an Englishman and my first memory of him is 
being chastised for the way I spoke. (IL 29) 
 
Against this imaginary Englishness, or – to make the point of contact with the still valid 
postcolonial reading more obvious – against his imagined English father, Herbert pits the ‘true 
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Australianness’ of his imagined ‘real’ home. Throughout the first part of the first book, 
revolving around the aircraft factory and the brown snake as it does, Herbert sees imaginary 
Englishmen virtually everywhere; and against them, as a negative foil or backdrop, he builds 
up the images of his vision. 
Indeed, there is quite some overlap here with a postcolonial reading of Illywhacker. By way 
of rejecting the imaginary European or even English parent culture where the ‘real’ things are 
(the real literature, language, customs, flora, and fauna) and in relation to which they are 
always found wanting, the offspring of the first white colonisers try to build up their own ‘true’ 
home – which triggers the ceaseless and forlorn construction of an imagined ‘real’ place that 
can never be finished. As a result, the later generations are restlessly driven by the plight of 
the white, a sense of ‘unbelonging’.400 As Leah Goldstein declares: “If it is anybody’s place it is 
the blacks’. Does it look like your place? Does it feel like your place? Can’t you see, even the 
trees have nothing to do with you” (IL 286). “It is not a country where you can rest. It is a black 
man’s country: sharp stones, rocks, sticks, bull ants, flies. We can only move around it like 
tourists. The blackfeller can rest but we must keep moving” (IL 302).401 Such a reading of 
Illywhacker, combining postcolonial and psychological reasoning, would be valid. However, 
the focus here is a different one. 
To return, therefore, to Herbert’s vision. The second aspect of it is home as in ‘home and 
hearth’ (Heim), a ‘real’ family in other words. As has been said, being denied social affirmation, 
young Herbert flees from the clutches of his cruel father and begins to seek this imaginary 
place. But of course, for the same reason that Herbert must fail to build his ‘true’ homeland, 
he also must fail to build his ‘real’ home and hearth, and no home he actually constructs will 
ever suffice as the ‘real’ one, the one he never had. 
                                                          
400 See Collingwood-Whittick. Initially, the sense of unbelonging is triggered, of course, not by rejecting but still 
identifying with the European parent-culture and having no adequate means to form a relationship with the new 
environment. Instead of trying to assimilate to the indigenous cultures, white colonisers preferred to wipe out 
these cultures and, paradoxically, demanded and still demand assimilation by them. The nationalist rejection of 
the European father-culture, might thus be seen as a second phase in the pain of unbelonging. The feeling of 
uprootedness, of lack remains the same, however. It should be pointed out again that it is important in these 
discussions to keep in mind the quite different and perhaps much more severe pain of unbelonging suffered by 
indigenous peoples. 
401 See also Germaine Greer in her Preface to The Pain of Unbelonging, who makes the same point: “In all our 
interactions with country we are reminded, not that it is not ours, which could be fixed, but that it belongs to 
other people, which can’t. […] White Australians are tourists in their own birthplace, dashing from funny-shaped 
rock to funny-shaped rock, with only the vaguest idea of what might lie between” (Germaine Greer, Preface, 
Collingwood-Whittick, ix-xi, xi). 
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Quite early on Herbert mentions his habit of cobbling together all sorts of shags and huts 
for him and his female partners: “I always built a place of my own when I could.” Indeed, 
“[y]ou could say I was obsessed with houses, but I was not abnormal. My only abnormality 
was that I did not have one. I had been forced to leave my houses behind me, evicted from 
them, disappointed in them, fleeing them because of various events” (IL 24). Mirroring their 
imaginary source, his dwellings are insubstantial affairs, fleeting like a dream. And every time 
a place of dwelling is about to be finished, every time a “lustrous pearl” is about to receive its 
last, shiny coats, Herbert realises that this place is not quite his true home yet. It is not perfect, 
flawed somehow, something is still amiss – and something is always still amiss. Thus ensnared 
by a building compulsion, he literally becomes the architect of his own demise, relentlessly 
pressing on and putting up forever bigger constructions, a looming Tower of Babel that 
threatens to collapse and burry its constructor underneath its rubble. 
In the novel, the eerie nature of Herbert’s vision is acted out in the symbolic play of cages 
and birds that Phoebe brings into motion. In his true fashion, Herbert puts up a bizarrely 
unlikely house for him and his wife, stealing for instance “a church hall from the Methodists 
at Brighton” (IL 144) for its construction. For Phoebe, this building derives its fascination 
precisely from its dreamlike insubstantiality; she values it as something unstable, an 
impermanent camp. And when Herbert now tries to transform this airy fabric into a solid home 
– wife, children, hearth, and all – this runs fully against Phoebe’s own vision. That is, her 
“lustrous pearl” is quite different from Herbert’s, as her desires focalise on Herbert as provider 
of ‘aviation’ – flight, disengagement, freedom. And it is this conflict she then illustrates in her 
“one true poem”. For, when she has Herbert build huge birdcages for an ever growing array 
of parrots, the narrator comments: 
 
I did not understand poetry in those days. I imagined it involved rhymes, and if not 
rhymes at least words. […] I never knew I was a hired hand in the construction of my 
wife’s one true poem (IL 185). […] She had me rhyme a cage with a room, a bird with a 
person, feathers with skin, my home with a gaol, myself with a warder, herself with the 
splendid guileless creatures who had preened themselves so lovingly on the roof on one 
sad, lost, blue-skied day. (IL 189) 
 
The notion of ‘home’, Herbert’s vision of a place of belonging, is sketched here, by Phoebe, as 
the daunting nightmare of a prison. She draws herself as a suffering bird, imprisoned in 
Herbert’s sprawling house and shackled with the burden of a growing family. She needs to 
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break free from this cage and so uses Herbert’s plane to take flight. Immediately afterwards, 
however, Phoebe’s conceited self-image as one of “the splendid guileless creatures” is taken 
apart again, when the narrator remarks “that she spent the rest of her life putting all her wiles 
and energies into being kept, cared for, loved”, and “that she would reveal herself to be self-
indulgent, selfish, admiring herself like a budgie in a cage” (IL 189; see also IL Book III, Chapter 
8; and IL 483-4). More like a budgie than a free-born ruler of the skies, then, she takes to the 
air only to immediately seek the comfort of another cage – this time, however, one of her own 
making. 
What this early, exposing description of Herbert’s ambition to settle for “a domestic 
hearth” (IL 176) goes to show is that his love for home and family has to be treated with care. 
It is true that Phoebe complains in a letter to Annette Davidson: “He, who introduced himself 
into my life with all his dreams and ambitions seems to have become an old man suddenly, 
weary of trying anything and content to sit in his slippers drinking tea” (IL 181). Much later he 
confirms himself: “All I ever wanted was a fire and slippers. But the women never saw, or if 
they did, they looked the other way” (IL 508). “So I admit it – I spent my ten years in Rankin 
Downs with one real aim, i.e., that I would end up with a place in this rotten lonely world. I 
invested an entire decade so that I would not end my life hiding amongst cabbages in the 
Eastern Markets” (IL 461). But one has to be careful when Herbert Badgery ‘admits’ 
something. The question is why he drives on this vision from one disaster to the next, despite 
clearly realising its incarcerating qualities. 
Also the first aspect of his vision is permanently undermined by Herbert himself. In Chapter 
6.1.1. it was pointed out that the brown snake and the aircraft factory are lies that Herbert 
immediately tries to get rid of again, and that Herbert never intended to really build the 
factory. So just how serious is his longing for a truly Australian and not ‘imaginary English’ 
homeland? Indeed, one may wonder whether or not the theme of ‘true Australia’ – the 
pleasant whim of the aircraft factory he tries to drop as quickly as he makes it up, his 
complicated attitude towards the t-model, his symbolising true Australia with a deadly brown 
snake, his regret that the Holden is an American lie about Australia and not an Australian lie 
about Australia, and the often-quoted, humorous and explicit exposure of the terra nullius 
lie402 – one may wonder whether this amounts to a nationalist utopia or not. And it was 
                                                          
402 This refers to Herbert’s M.V. Anderson ‘quote’: “However it is their [“Our forefathers”] first lie that is the most 
impressive for being so monumental, i.e., that the continent, at the time of first settlement, was said to be 
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already said at the beginning of this chapter that a cultural cringe is presented in the novel – 
but not simply. We must assume, then, that Herbert is not entirely devoted to his vision of a 
homeland. But why, in this case, does he act in bad faith and drives on also this aspect of his 
vision? 
In order to understand his actions, we have to go back again to his ‘original trauma’. Young 
Herbert suffers physical and emotional violence during his childhood that he cannot 
meaningfully explain. Accordingly, his visions are an attempt to regain ontological security 
through an ordered, meaningful self-narration. They are a method of escape in other words, 
are part of a process of suppression and denial. His visions help him to draw away his attention 
from his immediate situation towards a different, future-self he wants to become. Eventually, 
the pressure grows too strong and in a second birth Herbert cuts loose completely from his 
family, locks up the pain and leaves a gap behind in his self-narration. 
Remember how in the last section on his way to mastery Herbert proudly called himself 
his father’s son and was quoted as saying: “As I walked up that railway track to talk to the bully 
boys I was my father’s son. I had a vision of myself that sunny morning as I had not had a vision 
of myself for years: I could see Herbert Badgery again.” So completely does he transport 
himself into his vision that – as long as he remains there – he can even bear the image of his 
father and his connection with him. So when he says he “had a vision of myself” then he is not 
talking about a role he is performing but a future-self he is turning into. He is not play-acting 
therefore but becoming. And he has been doing so ever since he cut loose from the 
unbearable present of his childhood. The subsequent commitment to his visions is so absolute 
that he lives only for and through this forever emerging future-self. 
Accordingly, Herbert’s is not a future-oriented but a future-based form of being. A 
fundamental de-essentialisation takes place, a deracination in which Herbert displaces his self, 
shifts it from the now into an already achieved future. To make clear what this means in terms 
of agency, let us recall Ricœur’s concept of narrative identity as it was laid out in the last 
chapter. Quoting from Time and Narrative, Dauenhauer and Pellauer described a process of 
self-narration in which “historical time becomes human time ‘to the extent that it is articulated 
through a narrative mode’”, which process in turn integrates the emerging self into a greater 
context. When Herbert now shifts his self into an already achieved future, then this means 
                                                          
occupied but not cultivated and by that simple device they were able to give the legal owners short shrift and, 
when they objected, to use the musket or poison flour, and to do so with a clear conscience” (IL 429). 
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that his “narrative mode” switches from the present tense to the future tense, the result being 
that the present, all present impressions, are reinterpreted and regarded from the future 
perspective of his vision. 
The result is that the mutually transformative interaction with an external world is 
incapacitated and the reality of the now becomes but material for the further erection of the 
vision. This is the very mechanism through which the denial and avoidance of his childhood 
trauma works. Consequently, he only acts but does not react anymore. One could also say he 
is trapped in action. That is why he drives on his visions despite his clear knowledge of their 
self-destructive qualities. Every new catastrophe is only a stepping stone towards a future into 
which he forever keeps on projecting himself. This is strikingly exposed in the last scene of the 
novel. 
At the very end of Illywhacker, Herbert relates a conversation with his youngest grandson: 
 
“Die, arsehole,” says Hissao Badgery. 
The poor little fellow. Is he frightened of the enemies who shout his name in the 
street? Can he feel their passions? Their rage? Is that what it is, my little snookums? He 
must feel dreadful – he was such a nice boy – everybody liked him – he has not been 
prepared to be the object of such intelligent and necessary hatred. 
For, you see, the emporium is working, sucking rage and hatred towards itself. Such 
vilifications. Such tempers in the street. Last week we had CS gas drifting through the 
skylight. The parrots had to be replaced but I drew deep on the gas as if it were 
honeysuckle. My old optimism is returning. (IL 568-9) 
 
The last sentence is remarkable. In his sinister irony Herbert fully acknowledges that his 
emporium draws “necessary hatred”, but he still drives on and even remarks: “My old 
optimism is returning.” And he is so optimistic because he still dwells in the future of his vision: 
“Did I hear crashing glass, the sound of the first wave breaking as it enters the ground floor? 
It is this which Hissao fears, this which I wait for, which keeps me alive through all these 
endless days. But it is not time, not yet” (IL 569). 
This is even tragic, for Herbert is desperately longing for the final escalation of his 
destructive vision, for the final catastrophe that would end his need for self-narration, but the 
paradox of closure and transcendence is inescapable. “It is […] this which I wait for”, he says. 
So he waits for something and wants to experience something that, if it really took place and 
destroyed him, he would not experience. Accordingly, also this – forever not final – event is 
already related from a future perspective. The last sentence of the novel, in direct contraction 
of Herbert’s exclamation, “I am, at last, the creature I have so long wished to become – a kind 
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man”, therefore reads: “It [Herbert’s milk] will give him [Hissao] strength for the interesting 
times ahead” (IL 569). Neither is Herbert “kind” nor a “man” at this point. And obviously, he 
is still trapped in the future, the “interesting times ahead”. 
Of course Herbert is not the only one who is trapped in his vision. There is considerable 
collateral damage, if I may call it thus. At the same time, as we have to acknowledge in passing, 
this is a typical postcolonial plot element: The trauma of deracination that is passed on from 
the ‘first’ generation, say of settlers or immigrants, to the next. In this vein also Herbert’s 
original trauma is continued in the successive generations. But here we have to regard it in a 
different light. 
Charles, then, experiences his very own traumatic childhood whose key aspects mirror 
that of his father’s. Also he has to cover up a wound or gap in the past of his self-narration. He 
is the unsuccessfully aborted son of a ghost; a creature of dubious, mysterious origin. And at 
a time he is too young to remember his mother abandons him (both, his ‘real’ mother Phoebe 
and his ‘actual’ foster mother Horace Dunlop), after which he is exposed to a tough life of 
travel, growing up on the road, always on the move – just like Herbert before him. 
So, one could argue, it is no wonder 
 
that Charles mistook Leah Goldstein for his mother. When, on that chilblained afternoon 
in 1931, he grabbed her around the legs, he imagined his seven years of wandering were 
at an end, that the declared goal of our travels had been achieved, that we would return 
to the splendid home he could not remember and abandon the converted 1924 Dodge 
tourer in which we slept each night, curled up together amidst the heavy fug, the warm 
odours of humanity, which so comforted his battered father. (IL 205) 
 
Of course, this scene conveys much more warmth and love than the description of Herbert’s 
own family situation as a child. But this is to change dramatically when Sonia disappears. And 
in the memory of Charles, it is this that sticks. About his relationship to Herbert he tells Leah: 
“‘He hates me.’ […] ‘He blames me for what happened to Sonia.’ […] ‘Sometimes I dream I 
skun her. Skun the skin off her…’ […] ‘And she smiles at me. She don’t know what’s happening 
to her’” (IL 447). Having thus lost his father, Charles’ orphanage is made complete when he 
confronts the ‘real’ mother of his imagination in actual life. Sitting in the train to Sydney in 
order to find her, 
 
[h]e imagined his mother would live in a house similar to the ones he saw by the railway 
line and this did not dismay him at all, quite the contrary. He was expecting warm 
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embraces and hot tears, soft beds, big dinners; the noise of the trains passing his window 
could only increase his happiness. (IL 367) 
 
But when he, a little later, meets her in person, Phoebe, having another ‘gentleman visitor’, is 
flustered to the point of disowning him. “One always gave boys biscuits” (IL 377), is how the 
narrator renders her thoughts. And 
 
[w]hen Phoebe [after having shown Charles out again] returned to her flat she found 
that her guest had drawn a caricature of her son as a wombat which was as marvellously 
executed as it was cruelly accurate. […] She laughed and thanked him and made a great 
fuss about how she must have it framed. (IL 379) 
 
Charles “could not admit to anyone that his mother had not hugged him or asked him to come 
back and live with her. […] He went back to Neutral Bay where Phoebe lived, not once, but 
three times” (IL 379). All in vain as he cannot muster the courage to meet her again. 
However, Charles may be infused with the idea of “the splendid home he could not 
remember”, he may have a conflicted relationship to his parents and for the rest of his life try 
to make them love him, but for all this he still does not break with his past as completely as 
his father. He does not fully de-essentialise. After having bought George Fipps’ motorbike with 
money intended for the fare to Spain (Book III, Chapter 10), where he planned to participate 
in the civil war, and while being stranded, with this motorbike, at Les Chaffey’s, he meets 
Emma. And it is only when he meets her that the idea to settle for a life with wife and children 
enters his head. To repeat the quote: “Charles did not have his magnificent new shop in spite 
of Emma. He had it because of Emma. If he had not been so bluffed and bamboozled by his 
wife he would have been, deaf or not, in the army [this time not to fight in the Spanish Civil 
War but against Germany in WWII].” Only through Emma does Herbert’s influence take its 
effect on him, and only in her presence does he develop his vision of The Best Pet Shop in the 
World (IL 402). 
Driven by this vision, he acquires the emporium and adds the next storey to Herbert’s 
Tower of Babel: “But damn it, I had a weakness for grand buildings and I liked the sound of his 
shop. It was not merely a building with a tower [as was Jack McGrath’s house (IL 25), while 
Herbert’s house for Phoebe explicitly was not (IL 144)]. It was a tower” (IL 461), Herbert notes 
approvingly. 
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In the sense of home as in ‘homeland’, this means that Charles turns Herbert’s aircraft 
factory into the Best Pet Shop of the World and his father’s Australian brown snake into a 
whole host of truly indigenous species: 
 
He was an enthusiast, a fan. […] He did not even think about the extra cost of feed if he 
was going to stock the place in accordance with his dream which was, I must tell you, an 
expression of the purest patriotism – pure Australiana – definitely no bunny rabbits or 
pussy cats no matter how tearfully his little boys begged him. There was no one to tell 
him that Sydney was not big enough to support such poetry. Any real business man 
would have told him that the best pet shop in the world would be a failure. The 
Americans, however, saved his arse. (IL 453) 
 
There is of course some irony involved here when it is Americans who allow Charles to make 
his illusion of pure Australia come true. But this also nicely demonstrates that his nationalist 
attitude is just as conflicted as his father’s, naming his first two sons Henry and George as he 
does, and trying to join the British forces against Germany, while at the same time having been 
“suckled on hatred of all things royal and British” (IL 424), and demonstrating just this when 
he throws a picture of “the King of England” out of the window (IL Book III, Chapter 23). 
In the second sense, in the sense of home as in ‘home and hearth’, the emporium 
constitutes Charles’ own ill-fated attempt at building the ‘real’ family he never had. Phoebe’s 
one true poem of cages and birds receives its second stanza here. After Phoebe, many more 
women are likened to birds in the novel. Already Molly, for instance, is envisaged by Phoebe 
to hold a position she is to take up herself a little later: “She watched her mother as she 
fluttered – a humming-bird – in the cage of the aviator’s oil-stained hand” (IL 27). But the one 
who takes Phoebe’s poem to a whole new level is Charles’ wife, Emma. Like Molly, Emma is 
driven by excessive fear, in her case fear of abandonment: “Whatever the ‘thing’ was took 
place when Emma was thrown from her family home into the teachers’ college. One would 
gather that the strength of her reaction against being thrown out from under the parental 
roof gave rise to fears about her sanity” (IL 413). It is, of course, exactly this deep-seated dread 
that made her the perfect candidate for the dragon, and why she was picked out with the help 
of the goanna. And when Charles wants to leave Australia to go to war against Germany, the 
dragon, unleashed fear of abandonment in her case, starts to take its effect. Emma, learning 
about Charles’ intention, is completely shattered: “She was dizzy like the other time, but 
worse” (IL 437). Trancelike, she walks back to their pet shop “and, finding her place behind 
the desk already taken by the lady with the growth, crawled quietly into the big cage that 
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rightfully belonged to the goanna” (IL 437) – thus turning the metaphoric cage of Phoebe’s 
poem quite literal. 
But when desperate, guilt-ridden Charles tries to make her get out again, she finally 
realises the power she can exert over him: 
 
No matter what words he said, his voice betrayed him and Emma saw that she did not 
have to do anything. […] He squatted in front of the cage and groaned and Emma felt a 
pulse of pure pleasure. It did not last long. There was fear as well, fear mixed up with it, 
but the feeling was lovely. […] She felt trembling weakness and steely power (IL 439). 
 
From now on Emma lives more or less permanently in her cage. And so, paradoxically, by 
showing astonishing determination in exposing her vulnerability and making herself a 
prisoner, she gains the upper hand and takes control over her warden. Even though Charles 
later on owns the whole emporium and assigns to his family a flat on the fourth floor of this 
vast building, 
 
the family’s real home was in and around the cage where its most determined member 
lived, out on the gallery floor itself. […] Emma preferred the chaos of that big rectangular 
doughnut of private territory, the fourth gallery, where she lived amidst old mist nets, 
broken-down refrigerators, children’s toys, mouldering laundry, lost sandwiches and 
those abandoned tricycles (IL 468-9) 
 
This somewhat peculiar state of affairs, then, is Emma’s very own rendering of Phoebe’s 
poem and constitutes her contribution to Charles’ reiteration of the family trauma. When she 
takes on the role of the bird in the cage, she exactly inverts the power-relations used by 
Phoebe: Emma exerts control over her warden from her position of seemingly absolute 
dependency. And Charles, who “got great pleasure from providing” (IL 473), in fact turns out 
to be the slave of his mistress. Thus, via the female partners of the Badgerys, Phoebe and 
Emma, the roles of enslaving keeper and enslaved servant are shown to be very ambiguous, 
easily turning and turning out to be their respective opposites. The second notion of home as 
in ‘home and hearth’, however, is thereby once again – and this time much more drastically – 
revealed to be an uncanny entrapment, the place of perverse power games and domestic 
violence. 
The end of Charles, initiating the third and last stage of the family trauma, is very similar 
to Jack’s in the first book. Preparing his story for this blow, the narrator exposes Charles’ 
hypergood to his readers: “Charles’s opinions about himself had always been a tangled ball of 
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string and while he thought himself stupid, clumsy and ugly, he also thought of himself as a 
Good Man” (IL 534). Through the thoughts of Hissao the nature of Charles’ vision is exposed, 
too. He could “see, very objectively, the damage his father’s business was doing to the fauna 
of the country he loved and that, further – like real estate for instance – it was one of those 
great Australian enterprises that generate wealth while making nothing new” (IL 530). It is 
therefore possible to understand the effect the great interview with Time magazine has on 
Charles: “And although he guessed that the journalist from Time might talk about smuggling, 
he was not really prepared for the effect it might have on him. He could not bear to be accused 
of it” (IL 535). The accusation might be justified or not, Charles dimly realises that the vision 
upon which he had staked his life might not have lead him in the direction of being a Good 
Man at all – which gets him in conflict with his hypergood and thus profoundly unsettles his 
sense of self – just as in the case of his grandfather, Jack McGrath. Add to this the goanna 
foetus and you have got a suicide. 
With Hissao, finally, the reiteration of the Badgery family trauma enters the third 
generation. If anything, his origin is even more mysterious than Charles’. As has been said in 
the previous section, he seems to be the product of a double-parentage, and, as real-life 
version of the Vegemite jar, reflects the fantasies of his beholders. It is no wonder, therefore, 
that Herbert sees Sonia in him: “I looked into Hissao’s eyes and saw my lost daughter, for 
whatever Emma had made of him, there was no mistaking that similarity, that sweet nature, 
that pretty face” (IL 481). Almost needless to say that also Hissao is fuelled by a “fierce 
nationalism” and becomes an “architecture student” (IL 529), thus preparing to add the final 
storey to Herbert’s family tower. The aircraft factory and Phoebe’s bird cages, the Best Pet 
Shop in the World and Emma’s goanna cage – all these can be seen as self-repeating 
reiterations of the same trauma, whose final incarnation in the novel comes in the form of 
Hissao’s museum. When he puts his own family in glass cages to exhibit them as showcase 
pieces of Australia for tourists from all over the world, both aspects of Herbert’s vision, the 
‘true’ home as in ‘homeland’ and the ‘real’ home as in ‘home and hearth’, are tied together 
into one, daunting image – the nightmare of lost origin. 
Perhaps it is worth a remark that this agency-focussed interpretation of the reiterative 
family trauma constitutes the addition to a postcolonial interpretation of this trauma that has 
not even been developed so far in the research on Illywhacker. But be that as it may, we still 
have to settle the question how Illywhaker’s visions relate to agency. It is clear by now that 
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somehow the characters’ visions corrupt their potential for self-determined action, and we 
will see more of this further down. It has been pointed out, too, that through their visions the 
characters’ self-narration switches into the future tense. For young Herbert, this is a strategy 
to avoid the present tense of his dreadful childhood. But at the same time, and through the 
same principle, this avoidance strategy can lead to an inability to engage meaningfully with 
one’s immediate presence. With whatever now Herbert is confronted, for him it is only 
material on his trajectory towards a forever uncatchable future. In this vein – to give yet 
another example of this mechanism – he never arrives at the emporium of his son, but from 
the first moment already wants to change it with his ill-fated “opening out” (IL Book III, 
Chapters 48-51). Accordingly, Herbert’s identity appears thoroughly constructed. His vision 
implies control – he takes his origin into his own hands – while also implying compulsion – he 
will forever have to keep creating himself without any hope of completion, because it is his 
origin he tries to rebuild, that which covers up his rejected past, the abyss of ontological 
insecurity. 
While all the main protagonists of Herbert’s narration have a different history and act out 
of different motivations, the one thing they have in common is such a disconnection from their 
roots that comes about either in their attempt to redo themselves, or, as we shall presently 
see in Jack’s case, by completely ignoring who they are or might be. 
In the following, I will discuss the other main characters apart from the male Badgerys and 
thus investigate the problem of agency in Illywhacker in all its rich diversity. We will start with 
Molly. Her case shows very nicely how visions are connected to a future tense of self-
narration. Then Jack follows, who has no vision at all before he meets Herbert, and whose 
case thus demonstrates that visions are not necessarily evil but might even be necessary to 
develop one’s inner sources. Phoebe and Leah, finally, are also in the thrall of self-reflexive 
visions. But their predicament is much closer to the contemporary postmodern condition, 
which is why Anthony Giddens’ sociological concept of compulsive mastery is much more 
applicable to them as to other characters of the novel. I will therefore briefly introduce this 
concept before bringing the discussion of Herbert’s two long-term partners underway, in 
which especially Leah will show how agency can be upheld in such living conditions – albeit in 
a conflicted and only partly successful way. 
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6.2.1. The McGraths: Molly and Jack 
 
Molly (née Rourke) is one of the many characters “Carey describes in adorable, untiring 
attention to detail”. Her childhood is portrayed as happy: “Her mother had called her ‘my song 
bird’, not because she sang, but because she laughed” (IL 82). But this is to change drastically. 
At the age of fourteen she finds her mother, who has hanged herself: 
 
There was one black shoe on her foot, not properly laced, and the other dropped on the 
broken stool she had climbed on. The smell of her opened bowels and the bulging, black 
eyes fused, in that dreadful moment, into one single thing, not a shape, not a colour, 
not a picture, but a feeling that burned itself into her. (IL 82-3) 
 
An unclear, ungraspable image is formed here that is directly linked to the unspeakable horror 
she experiences, “a feeling that burned itself into her”, a nightmare trying to free itself from 
a Vegemite jar. This must be what Goon Tse Ying had called “a real dragon”. So, just as Herbert 
harbours a daunting image of his father, Molly now harbours a feeling, an image, a smell – the 
impression of her dead mother. But astonishingly, this is not what brings her down. In fact, 
young Molly is the one member or her family – including her father – who can cope with the 
situation and deal with it (e.g. IL 83). In her case, it is therefore not the trauma that establishes 
the vision, but the vision that establishes the trauma. 
Wielding the authority of modern science, her aunt Ester connects the horrific impression 
of Molly’s dead mother with the terrifying vision of an impending dreadful destiny. For, Ester 
“had felt honoured to listen to his [the very modern Dr Grigson] talk of Pasteur and Lister and 
the Power of Electricity, the latter being a proven method for dealing not only with such things 
as constipation but also general debilitation and hereditary madness” (IL 81-2). And since 
already Molly’s grandmother had drowned herself, the case is clear. Which is exactly what 
Ester points out to the shell-shocked girl after the wake is over: 
 
‘I am not having you hanging yourself’, she said, ‘here or elsewhere, now or later.’ […] 
’Oh,’ Molly said, ‘I promise you, I promise, Mrs Ester, I never would.’ 
‘It is not a thing you can promise, poor child,’ said Mrs Ester, suddenly hugging her 
fiercely, and crushing the child’s nose into a brooch. ‘It will come up on you. One minute 
you will be singing and happy and the next... I will take you to Grigson,’ she said. 
Molly had wailed. She had howled, sentenced in the Ladies’ Parlour, and felt the black 
dye of her dress insinuate itself into the pores of her skin. (IL 84) 
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Indeed, Molly is sentenced in this secene. Aunt Ester’s intervention turns out to be a 
performative speech act that makes Molly mad with fear of looming madness. Thus what 
happens here is exactly the opposite of Herbert’s, Charles’, and Sonia’s cases. Her ontological 
security is not saved by the vision, but the vision is the very thing that destabilises her, that 
turns the impression of her dead mother into an existential threat. 
Dr Grigson, however, provides Molly with an electric belt, and this object fulfils a double 
function. It confirms Ester’s sentence and for Molly becomes the symbol of her madness, but 
at the same time it also enables her to look away, to draw her thoughts away from the vision 
of impending madness, to find peace of mind therefore, and thus to re-engage with the now-
time of her self-narration and go on with her life – the benign part of a malicious lie. Only 
without the belt, the dragon is released once again and the locked-up terror threatens to rush 
back at her. 
So when Molly, as a young woman, is really bullied into throwing it away, Ester’s judgment 
turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Everywhere Molly sees signs of her impending doom and 
exactly by trying to do everything in her power to avert it she develops nervous ticks and 
mannerisms that let her seem quite mad. The subsequent change in character from an 
exuberant, mathematically gifted young woman brimming with physical and mental health to 
a nervous wreck secretly living in the constant fear of being taken over by her madness is 
almost overdrawn. 
But now we can understand the impact of Herbert’s and Phoebe’s secret love affair on 
her: 
 
[S]he had a strong sense that something was wrong. This sense overpowered her and 
gave her what she called ‘her symptoms’: a feeling of vertigo, like the panic she felt on 
high bridges, ledges, winding mountain roads. And once this feeling had appeared, like 
an old crow from a childhood nightmare, it stayed there and brought its own fear with 
it and she bitterly regretted the day she had so rashly thrown away the electric belt. (IL 
81) 
 
Without the belt she is defenceless against the unleashed terror rushing at her from her 
childhood. Molly’s obsession with electricity is thus part of her vision of hereditary madness 
just as Sonia’s religious mania is part of her vision of Assumption. We can see the vision taking 
effect when Molly flees Point’s Point together with Jack: “Molly sat rigid in the train seat: her 
future madness hung before her, dangling by a rope in her mind’s eye” (IL 97). The scene 
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clearly shows how she is entrapped in the future of her Damoclestian vision, and how she 
rewrites the now-time of her self-narration from this position. Her perception is completely 
manipulated by this lie. Thus, when she sees her daughter fall off the roof, it is quite obvious 
to her that she ‘sees things’, that her madness has finally set in and is about to take over: 
 
[T]he naked figure of her daughter sailed slowly through the air above her eyes. […] The 
figure landed with a thud on the grass beyond the canna lilies. 
It said: ‘Hoof.’ 
Molly McGrath was beset with hot prickling skin and a thundering heart which she 
tried to still with the pressure of her hand. She saw her daughter stand, and saw her arm 
hang like a broken wing. 
Molly McGrath whimpered and curled her fifty-year old body into a shaking ball 
beneath the sheets. 
When Jack McGrath arrived home […] he had great difficulty in persuading his wife to 
leave her bed. The slightly fixed smile she brought to the table made him feel very 
uneasy indeed. (IL 98-9) 
 
In this scene the blunt physicality of Phoebe’s fall contrasts starkly with the eerie 
interpretation applied to it by Molly. It thus emphasises how Molly ‘reads’ the world, how she 
makes sense of it with the help of her imagined madness. 
However, also Molly’s miraculous recovery when she, as a middle-aged woman and after 
the death of her husband, seeks out Dr Grigson in Ballarat and receives another electric belt 
is quite explainable now. The belt, as an antidote or counter-vision, bottles up the dragon once 
more, sets her childhood terror at rest, and lets her find back to her roots again – even the 
Catholic faith she had denied earlier (see Book I, Chapter 36, esp. 94-5). Thus freed from her 
vision and from Jack’s protection, she slips back into the now-time of her self-narration, re-
enters a mutually transformative interaction with the world, and is spectacularly enabled 
again to use her considerable potential: She teaches herself (and then her daughter) to drive 
the Hispano Suiza (IL 163), acquires and successfully runs a taxi business (“Boomerang Taxi” IL 
163, 174-5, 185-6, 307), owns three electrical utilities (IL 163), and in the end leaves “five coal 
mines to the Catholic Church” (IL 484). 
Especially Molly’s recovery teaches us a very important lesson about visions. If we 
remember what was said about Sonia’s vision of Assumption in Chapter 6.1.2. and about 
Herbert’s vision of himself in this chapter: Visions are a way of not confronting reality, a way 
of shaping reality rather than to face truths that would destroy us (as they indeed did destroy 
Charles and Jack once their visions were dismantled). But when her husband dies, Molly’s 
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vision of madness is suddenly so acute and omnipresent that it becomes part of her now. 
Before, it was forever threatening, now it is there. But once it turns into a real, physical object, 
she can also deal with it and ban it once more with the help of the magical object of the electric 
belt. What saves Molly, then, is the very reality, the external nature (the truth), of her vision 
of madness, which means that she can interact with it, appease it with electricity (in the same 
way that the village people in the Malayan jungle of My Life as a Fake banned hantus with 
their rituals). Molly’s madness is not a lie anymore, nor is it a self-chosen fashion. It is real and 
therefore manageable. Securely re-rooted in the now-time as she is after applying the belt, 
she also has a future again – that is, a newly open future that is partly undetermined again 
and therefore offers possibilities: “Under the influence of a number of shandies, Molly began 
to reminisce about her life. […] Molly, who had glimpsed a future, like a rosella, hardly seen, 
swooping through the high umbrellas of the bush” (IL 136-8). 
 
Jack 
 
Especially the last remark about “Molly, who had glimpsed a future” shows that visions can be 
benign guiding lights, as long as they do not override a character’s now and leave room for a 
process of mutually transformative interaction. To connect this conceptualisation of visions 
with the agency model that is used in this thesis, one can grasp moral frameworks as co-
ordinate systems in which ‘good’ visions are visions that one can use to approach one’s 
hypergood and that can be discarded or adjusted if they turn out to be ineffective for this 
purpose. Jack will teach us the same lesson, only from the other side so to say. Before meeting 
Herbert, Jack has no vision at all, neither good nor bad. And this, as we shall see, is as 
dangerous as being enslaved by a compelling vision in the way Herbert is. 
Indeed, Jack is the only character in the entire novel who “had never planned anything”, 
who “had trusted his life and let it carry him along” (IL 75). And yet, or perhaps rather and 
thus: “he had, somehow, missed the track, taken the wrong turning and ended up in Geelong 
by mistake, guided by a luck that was really, if he could have admitted it, no luck at all” (IL 74). 
His misfortune being his renowned luck, he is just as paradoxical a character as his wife who 
becomes mad with trying to fight her imagined madness, his daughter who enjoys public 
admiration in Geelong and flees it for the vision of being admired, or Emma who gains control 
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over Charles by imprisoning herself. The point is, however, that he still leads a life that is not 
his, that feels wrong somehow. 
Agency, it was said, is making intension-based decisions. But if he “had never planned 
anything”, his only intention is immediate gratification or solving the problem immediately at 
hand. That is, being fully immersed in the now-time of his self-narration, he never lifts his head 
once to assess the road in front of him and whether or not it leads towards the moral goods 
of his moral framework. But these moral goods are there. For, his life can only possibly 
“mislead” him, if there is a goal, something that should be approached but is not in his case. 
In order to be able to monitor the direction of one’s life, one needs the co-ordinate system of 
the moral framework and within this framework some sort of yardstick, or fixed star, against 
which to measure one’s approach. What is it, in other words, that would make Jack happy, 
that would fulfil him, give him a sense of purpose? This is the question he never asks. And 
blindly blundering along as he does, it is no wonder that, when he finally looks up, he finds 
“[h]is soul was a jellyfish stranded on the shell-grit shore of Corio Bay” (IL 79). 
Comically, the narrator describes Jack’s complete inaptitude for machinery: “She [Phoebe] 
knew her father would never master the aeroplane, no matter how many lessons I gave him. 
He had even less feeling for it than he had for the Hispano Suiza” (IL 46). And yet his whole life 
is full of machines. He owns a taxi company, drives a Hispano Suiza, takes flying lessons with 
Herbert, and wants to build an aircraft factory. This is comically absurd because it stands in 
total contradiction to his potential and his hypergood of kindness, the inner sources he cannot 
put to use in this way. About Jack’s past we learn: “His father had been a bullock driver; Jack 
McGrath did the same. He had a talent for it, a sympathy with the beasts that got them moving 
when other drivers whipped and swore and tangled themselves in hot confusion” (IL 75). And 
in Geelong, when he is a rich man already, 
 
he’d put on his hat and walk three miles down to Corio Quay where he could still find, 
in 1919, bullock wagons unloading wool. […] He advised them to move into trucks. He 
spoke enthusiastically about the future of the automobile but he looked with envy on 
their teams: Redman, Tiger, Lofty, Yallarman, he knew the beasts almost as well as he 
knew the men. (IL 21) 
 
Jack is not trapped in the past. He is flexible, adaptable, moves with his time and is very 
successful, too: “He had money in the bank. He owned a Hispanothe  Suiza, a fleet of taxis, a 
racehorse, but none of those things made him happy” (IL 21). And that seems to be the point. 
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He is utterly out of touch with his inner sources, his hypergood of kindness, and so has no 
idea, besides being a bullock driver – a dying trade – what it might be that makes him happy 
or could give him meaning in life. He moves on and on and disconnects always further from 
his roots, from the moral goods that really apply to him – but not because he is driven by a 
vision but because he has no telos at all. It is this non-deployment of his sources, this 
permanent suppression of his self, that makes him depressed and grows into a life-
threatening, in the end lethal, condition. What Jack shows us, then, is that by not intervening 
in one’s life at all, by never monitoring one’s path through the common moral framework, one 
loses one’s origin as surely as by completely self-fashioning oneself. In both cases one ends up 
leading a life that feels wrong, is not one’s own, or, as Leah Goldstein will soon call it: a fake. 
 
6.2.2. The Young Compulsive Mistresses 
 
At the end of Chapter 4, Wolfgang Kraus was quoted as saying “Not the fight, in postmodern 
conditions, for being a self is psychotic, but to refuse and not taking up this fight. It might have 
become more difficult, but it is indispensible in order to counter the danger of dissolution”. 
This reference to the postmodern condition is very useful for the characters of Leah Goldstein 
and Phoebe McGrath. For, despite obvious overlaps, their situation is a different one than that 
of Herbert, Molly, Jack, or even Charles and Sonia. It is a situation for which sociologist 
Anthony Giddens has offered an excellent description with his concept of compulsive mastery. 
He develops this concept in his influential study Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and 
Society in the Late Modern Age by discussing bodily regimes in general and anorexia nervosa 
in particular. What he emphasises in this context is the moderns’ potential for unlimited self-
creation: 
 
The body is less and less an extrinsic ‘given’ […], but becomes itself reflexively mobilized. 
What might appear as a wholesale movement towards the narcissistic cultivation of 
bodily appearance is in fact an expression of a concern lying much deeper actively to 
‘construct’ and control the body. […] In the spheres of biological reproduction, genetic 
engineering and medical interventions of many sorts, the body is becoming a 
phenomenon of choices and options.403 
                                                          
403 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 7-8. Cf. also the following passage: “In the post-traditional environments 
of high modernity, neither appearance nor demeanour can be organised as given; the body participates in a very 
direct way in the principle that the self has to be constructed. Bodily regimes, which also bear directly on patterns 
of sensuality, are the prime means whereby the institutional reflexivity of modern social life is focused on the 
cultivation – almost, one might say, the creation – of the body” (ibid., 100). 
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The very terms “choices” and “options” indicate how one’s own person is subjected to market 
mechanisms and turns into a consumer product, how lifestyles are transcribed into material, 
bodily – ‘flesh and blood’ one is tempted to say – facts. In fact, Giddens himself notes this 
point, even if he does not seem very concerned about it: “The more post-traditional the 
settings in which an individual moves, the more lifestyle concerns the very core of self-identity, 
its making and remaking.”404 Lifestyles, however, do not only concern the “making and 
remaking” of “the very core of self-identity”, but also its unmaking. It is very interesting, 
therefore, how Giddens shows that this act of self-determination can become extreme, move 
beyond what he calls “authentic reflexive monitoring” and turn into compulsion: 
 
‘Being on a diet’ in the narrow meaning of the phrase is only a particular version of a 
much more general phenomenon – the cultivation of bodily regimes as a means of 
reflexively influencing the project of the self.405 
 
The body regimes of anorectic individuals are often extreme. A person may, for example, 
run for several miles, take part in a punishing and lengthy exercise class and then go on 
to work out for a period on exercise machines. Such activities bring about a sense of 
achievement, rather than simply despair, and one can clearly see in them important 
aspects of empowerment. […] Compulsive mastery is quite different from authentic 
reflexive monitoring, however, and it is hardly surprising that the anorectic person 
frequently feels herself ‘taken over’ by the very regime to which she submits her body. 
[…] The individual only feels ‘worthy’ on the basis of a regime of self-regulation so 
complete that the slightest lapse is threatening.406 
 
Giddens relates the case study of one girl in particular who as a teenager developed 
rebellious styles that outraged her mother – very similar to Phoebe, who “was an awkward 
misfit”, and who “was known in the common room as ‘the little horror’” (IL 6). The girl Giddens 
writes about relates: “And it was all a façade: underneath I was scared and lonely but I 
desperately wanted to be myself, to define who I was, to express my very nature.” Just as 
Zygmunt Bauman claims in his diagnosis of late modernity: “The pain which used to be caused 
by unduly limited choice has now been replaced by no less a pain – though this time the pain 
is caused by an obligation to choose without trusting the choices made and without 
confidence that further choices will bring the target any closer”.407 
                                                          
404 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 81. 
405 Ibid., 105. 
406 Ibid., 107. 
407 Bauman, Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity 2007, 106. 
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In order to escape her despair and to express her “very nature”, the girl takes control and 
starts little by little to eat less and less. After a spell in hospital where her appendix is taken 
out, she meets an acquaintance at a party: “He remarked on my weight loss and said that it 
suited me; in fact, he said, I looked much more attractive. I reduced my intake of food, 
considerably, from that moment on.”408 The power of choosing a lifestyle turns into a lifestyle 
exercising power over its subject. The girl is caught in a life-threatening regime, fuelled by 
positive feedback, enforced on herself by herself. 
Probably not entirely coincidentally, many aspects of her story neatly match that of 
Phoebe – as has been hinted already. Like so many other young people of today’s Western 
societies, too, Phoebe is full of unfulfilled promise and is longing to realise her potential. In 
this situation her new teacher, Annette Davidson, steps into her life: 
 
Teaching at the Hermitage she got the worst of it [Geelong]: all those stout-legged 
daughters of squatters who displayed the dull certainties of their type. But it was in that 
mullock heap she found a muddied stone more valuable than any of the fool’s gold the 
staff so proudly presented her with. (IL 5-6) 
 
Phoebe’s transformation at the performative hands of Annette is as drastic as her mother’s 
before her at the hands of aunt Ester: “The boys from College and Grammar not only seemed 
to overcome their distaste for her vulgar background, but gave her presents of school scarves” 
(IL 7). Phoebe, however, blocks out this admiration completely. Instead, to repeat the 
quotation, “[s]he began to imagine a place in the world where she might not only belong but 
also be admired [my emphasis]” (IL 6). 
She enters exactly the condition so celebrated by contemporary literary critics who 
observe that in Carey’s fiction “the reader is offered the view of a new quality in individuals 
aiming to overcome their adherence to fixed notions of identity, solidity and permanence”, 
laud in his writing the “attribution of a positive value to ambiguity and elusiveness”, or cherish 
Carey’s “play in postmodernist construction by featuring positive possibilities that are in 
collusion against totalities”. In this vein Phoebe – freeing herself from “fixed notions of 
identity” and displaying “ambiguity and elusiveness” – expresses her indistinct desire to act in 
order to become: “‘I will do something,’ Phoebe said quietly, running a finger thoughtfully 
                                                          
408 Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, 103. Giddens declares to quote from Joan Jacobs Brumberg, Fasting 
Girls: The Emergence of Anorexia Nervosa as a Modern Disease, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1988. 
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across her lover’s lips. ‘It will just be something unusual. It will not be something I can plan 
for. It won’t be what you expect or what I expect either’” (IL 9). 
If we remember, it was this longing that then led Phoebe to pick up Herbert’s lie and to 
invent him “according to her needs” (IL 28). As she explained to him: “‘You have invented 
yourself, Mr Badgery, and that is why I like you. […] You can be anything you want.’ […] ‘We 
will invent ourselves,’ she said” (IL 80). Feeling obliged to make herself, to win over her past 
and define for herself who she is, she shows absolute determination and makes her plans work 
“by the sheer force of her green-eyed will” (IL 101). In so doing, her extreme will-power is just 
as self-destructive as that of the anorectic girl or David and Bettina Joy’s in Bliss – which is 
aptly demonstrated when, for the sake of her invented self, she is ready to risk and nearly 
does lose her life in an illegal abortion. And although she neither becomes independent nor a 
poet, she is still quite successful. Towards the end of the novel the readers learn that “she had 
become the thing she had imagined and there was not, in either her bearing or her accent, 
very much left that would connect her to Jack and Molly” (IL 485). But obviously this self-
simulation is as ghostly as that of her mother, and the narrator, in direct contradiction to this 
last observation, notes: “She laughed again, and I was reminded of her mother in the days 
when she thought something was wrong with her brain” (IL 487). 
We can clearly see how Phoebe manipulates her perception while performing this vision 
of herself: 
 
There were other habits too that Phoebe was not aware of, the worst being the whole 
system of illusion whereby Horace and Annette propped up Phoebe and made her 
believe herself a poet. […] Annette said nothing, perhaps from fear that Phoebe would, 
at last, turn on her and reject her totally, unconditionally, for ever. […] 
 Thus, Phoebe: surrounded by her menagerie: Annette, Horace, the cats arching their 
backs. She had allowed herself to become ridiculous and did not know it. (IL 378) 
 
She uses her emotionally dependent followers, Annette and Horace, as a mirror in this scene 
to confirm her self-constructed self to her and thus avoid confrontation with the inconvenient 
truths of her now – that is, her dependency on others, her complete lack of diligence and 
talent in poetry, or her ‘free life’ which could also be interpreted as sad and desperate attempt 
to get published by prostituting herself (IL 377-8). Even though the magnitude of her self-
delusion thus easily outdoes that of the narrator, her dedication to her self-reflexive vision 
still parallels Herbert’s when he says: “I had a vision of myself that sunny morning as I had not 
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had a vision of myself for years: I could see Herbert Badgery again”. The one thing, then, that 
Phoebe shares with all the other entrapped visionaries of Illywhacker is the suppression of her 
past and the determined embracing of an enslaving vision. 
But there are also marked differences. Remember how Molly, Sonia, and Herbert are 
trapped in a future mode of self-narration. Particularly Herbert’s immediate reality, it was 
said, is just material for him for the further implementation of his vision. Apparently, this is 
exactly the situation in which also our modern compulsive mistress finds herself. But while 
Herbert and Sonia avoid the terrifying abyss with which reality confronted them, modern 
compulsive masters and mistresses like Phoebe live “after the end of nature”, as Giddens says, 
and therefore have by definition no reality with which to interact in a mutually transformative 
process. Reality is only material for self-expression. The resulting dilemma is a true paradox: 
Which self should such postmodern masters express if the self itself is material for self-
expression? In such a situation, lifestyle choices, visions of selves, are the only thing that is left 
– or so it seems. But not every Westerner is a compulsive mistress, and neither are all the 
postmodern characters of the novel. Let us have a look, therefore, into the character of Leah 
Goldstein, who starts out just like Phoebe, but leads an entirely different life. 
Leah grows up in the secure but eerie silence of her parental home: 
 
[The Goldsteins] are at their most comfortable (I must except the mother from the 
generalization) sitting in armchairs, wordless, bookless, their hands clasped in patient 
laps. Even released from the house (I except the mother, again) they will only talk for a 
purpose and never for amusement or diversion. (IL 217) 
 
When they silently sit after dinner in this manner, “[t]he Goldsteins (père et filles) are merely 
engaging in their own quite separate thoughts in the way that has given them reputations for 
eccentricity in the world outside” (IL 217). It is this silent scene into which Poor Wysbraum 
bursts with his exuberant storytelling. 
 
Later, when she [Leah] came to analyse things, she did not understand so well and she 
forgot that it was not just she but all her family who loved Poor Wysbraum who was like 
food too rich for their ascetic taste […]. Wysbraum brimmed with an excess of emotions, 
angers, fears. He boiled over with stories, his big mouth full of food, while the 
Goldsteins, quite replete and accepting their headaches without complaint, sat with 
their hands on their laps and only Sid, their representative, would say: ‘And then 
Wysbraum, what happened then?’ (IL 220) 
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Other than Leah’s father, whose diligence and persistence pay off eventually, and who 
despite the failure of his Electrical Suction Sweeper becomes a successful business man, his 
old friend Wysbraum, “it was silently considered” in Leah’s family, had taken “the braver 
course, the better, more noble course” and became a doctor after fifteen years of studying. 
It is therefore no wonder that the girl takes Wysbraum as a role model: “[S]ixteen-year-
old Leah announced her intention to be a doctor. There seems no doubt that this serious 
young lady’s decision had something to do with kindness but it is not an easy matter to decide 
exactly what or how” (IL 224). When she keeps her word and enrols for a medical degree at 
Sydney University, her vision is still vague, but it is already installed and ready to take over. 
Asked by Rosa Kaletsky, “‘So, tell me, what is it you really want to do with your life?’”, she 
replies: “‘I would like,’ she said, watching the seagulls fight but not seeing them, ‘to do one 
really fine thing’” (IL 239). 
In other words, she is about to embark on the same journey as Phoebe, who also wanted 
to “do something,[…] something unusual […] something [she] can[not] plan for”. And the 
narrator repeatedly exposes the threat Leah’s vision poses when he calls it “the dangerous 
ambition to do One Fine Thing” (IL 259) and “monstrous charity, this bright-eyed, shining One 
Fine Thing” (IL 264). 
Leah, however, is the one character in the novel who fully realises the danger of her vision 
and clearly feels its impending consequences. At the Kaletsky’s she helps washing a dog and 
has an important intuition: 
 
The dog scratched a bare spot in the lawn and rolled itself in the dirt and Leah watched 
it sadly, thinking herself a dog who has lost its doggy smell. […] She felt herself dull, a 
person without a history, or even a character. She wished she could roll in the dirt like 
the dog, roll and roll, and rub her chin along the sandy soil and get her doggy smell back. 
(IL 236) 
 
A feeling that forcefully erupts to the surface as articulated insight a little later at a picnic with 
Rosa: 
 
Leah wept and wept. ‘I am a fraud,’ she said. ‘I am a fake, a fake, a fake. I cannot be 
anything.’ 
‘You are the sky,’ Rosa said, trying to find medicine in words. She held the girl’s head 
to her breast. ‘You are the sky.’ She meant that big sky, the vast clear cobalt sky without 
history, clean, full of light, free of sombre clouds. (IL 244) 
 
6. Illywhacker 
196 
 
While Rosa tries to emphasise the beauty of not being fixed on a definite character, the 
limitless opportunities that such a de-essentialisation seems to bring with it, Leah feels the 
acute pain of her formless, un-characteristic impersonality. Her realisation thus stands in 
sharp contrast to Phoebe’s enthusiastic self-invention. Leah reveals that Phoebe’s act is an 
empty performance, lacking a “doggy smell”, roots, history, substance. Unlike Herbert, she 
does not want to shed her skin, cut loose from her past and turn herself into a lie. When she 
calls herself a fake, then she realises that complete self-construction might feel empowering 
but also constitutes denial, that the more dedicated she is to visions of herself, the more 
thoroughly she suppresses who she really is as a person. 
This, now, brings us to the theoretical premises of agency as they were discussed in 
Chapter 4.8. Namely, the problematic concept of unfolding one’s potential. Such a potential 
can be ascertained only with hindsight, after having deployed it. An authentic identity is 
therefore never something one can arrive at, except by realising that it had actually already 
been there. Or, to put it differently: an authentic identity is something to arrive at, not to 
wilfully construct. But, of course, this is a catch-22. To use Phoebe’s case as an example: in 
order to become a poet, she needs to have always been one in a sense. Whether she actually 
possesses the potential to be a poet, can only be established by her trying to use it, which 
means she needs a telos, a vision, to find out what she ‘has in herself’. 
Identity, by extension, becomes a task. It is a past (arché) one needs to discover by going 
into the future (telos). Accordingly, and as Jack’s case clearly demonstrated, visions are not 
necessarily bad. Quite the contrary, to have plans, visions, imagination is exactly what makes 
us human and what can enable productive agency. As Leah explains to Charles towards the 
end of the novel: “‘We can imagine all sorts of things, sausage,’ Leah said gently. ‘That’s why 
we’re not living in the trees any more’” (IL 524). Visions thus can enable the visionary dreamers 
to not accept their lot and try and better their situation. Only, to stick with the example of 
Phoebe, one has to realise in time that one is not a poet, if one is not. The decisive point is, in 
other words, to acknowledge certain truths about oneself when they emerge, and to accept 
an external, that is non-constructed, reality, also about oneself. This is where Phoebe’s “sheer 
force of her green-eyed will” (IL 101) becomes a problem, where her mastery is so complete 
as to turn her vision into compulsion. 
To ‘be the sky’, then, finally; to have the possibility to become anything, precisely means 
not to accept such limits. It literally means to de-essentialise, not to go into the future in order 
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to ‘discover’, with hindsight, one’s potential, but to already be in the future and, in Phoebe’s 
case, simply decide what one is: “‘We will invent ourselves,’ she said”. As was pointed out 
earlier, this is not a future-oriented mode of self-narration, but a future-based mode of self-
narration. 
Technically, if Leah was “the vast clear cobalt sky without history, clean, full of light, free 
of sombre clouds” and there drew a vision of herself, she would enter an infinite regress or 
paradox because she would not only be the vision in the sky, but also be the one maintaining 
it. She would forever be caught in the making of herself, trapped in her future like Herbert. 
Maybe this argument is a bit abstract, but practically this is exactly what happens to the 
anorectic girl Giddens described above. She cannot look into the mirror and realise that she is 
finally done and complete. Her whole sense of self-worth depends on the achievement of 
producing herself. She literally is her doing. Once she stopped, what would she be? 
But to return to the novel, Leah never turns into the empty sky and thus always stays in 
touch with an external, non-produced reality. We witness exactly this struggle with an 
inconvenient truth, when she meets Izzie Kaletsky: “She was pleased that in all this awful 
world there was someone who was trying to do something decent and she wondered what 
was wrong with her, that her emotions ran so hot and cold about this man who now, as they 
withdrew into a bus shelter, shyly took her hand” (IL 258). She wants to love him, but simply 
finds she does not. The latter point is important, all-important in fact. She may not consciously 
arrive at this, quite essentialist, realisation, but she intuitively acts according to it. That is, she 
does not quite muster the same “sheer force of her green-eyed will” as Phoebe, and therefore 
just about manages to escape her vision to do One Fine Thing. 
What is remarkable in this respect is that she is not only not enslaved by her vision, but 
even manages to employ it to escape her life with Izzy. Even before she marries him, she has 
already given herself to Mervyn Sullivan and arranged for a life on the road: 
 
Rosa would have liked to say some of the things she felt about Leah’s decision. For 
instance: it suggested an enormous arrogance, to undertake this change of career for 
the benefit of people who had not requested it, people far tougher than she was who 
had—anyway—survived a lifetime of difficulty without such monstrous charity, this 
bright-eyed, shining One Fine Thing. (IL 263-4) 
 
Thus Leah already flees her ideal of herself – her marriage with Izzie and her doctoral degree 
– before she even undertakes the first steps towards achieving it. What happens is that her 
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vision to do One Fine Thing changes. It is not expressed anymore by studying medicine and 
marrying Izzie. To do One Fine Thing now means for her to travel with Mervyn and send money 
to the Kaletskys. Leah may not consciously realise, but she feels that she can only be ‘Leah’ 
and a ‘good’ person if she acknowledges her ‘doggy smell’ and adjusts her vision accordingly. 
She can be ‘kind’ and move towards this hypergood, but only in her way, which means she has 
to constantly adapt her vision. Of course this is a conflicted and self-contradictory approach, 
but such is life, and it enables her to live her life after all. 
 
Leah was enjoying her life. She liked travelling and she enjoyed, even more, the life in 
the letters she wrote to everyone, to her father in particular. […] Here, in the letters, she 
can come dangerously close to admitting why she remained on the road and what she 
got from it. (IL 295) 
 
Since she accepts an external, pre-given, reality and thus can interact with it, she can 
always adjust her ambitions to her current living conditions: “she had woven kindness into a 
philosophy that was as simply practiced as sending money to Rosa, picking up bagmen on the 
road, teaching me to read, sharing her food and being attentive to someone else’s children” 
(IL 302). Leah’s weakness of willpower (compared to Phoebe) is simultaneously a strength in 
accepting emerging truths about herself then. 
Accordingly, when her father compares her estranged husband to Wysbraum, she is finally 
able to recognise her relationship with Izzie and understand that her journey back to him goes 
in the wrong direction, leads away from kindness, the hypergood of her moral framework, is 
actually ‘bad’: 
 
‘No.’ The single word rang like a shot through the troubled corridors of their talk. […] 
She saw a vision of a future she did not want and had not guessed at. Even the […] porter 
lowered his eyes and then turned his back, struck by the pain in the exclamation. […] 
She watched Wysbraum with disgust, seeing only a child, a limpet, a parasite living on 
her father’s emotions and she could see nothing fine in the relationship at all. […] Later, 
boarding the train to Sydney, she knew that what she had decided to do was not fine at 
all. ‘I have not valued,’ she wrote, ‘what I have loved.’ (IL 335-6) 
 
She might continually feel guilty and her urge to do One Fine Thing might repeatedly get 
the better of her, but because she does not invent herself, or at least does not invent herself 
entirely, she remains able to confront and interact with an external, not self-produced, reality, 
and thus to adjust her path towards her hypergood when she finds it swerving away from it: 
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“We are all perverted”, She exclaims in a conversation with Emma, “[e]verything good in us 
gets perverted. I wanted to be good and kind and I made myself a slave instead. I lie awake at 
night planning how I am going to leave him [Izzie], but I can’t […]’” (IL 445). In the end, she 
can. 
Leah is also the only character who manages to gain a voice and constitute herself in the 
narrative stream of the all-powerful Herbert Badgery, who inserts a letter of hers into his 
story: “Dear Mr Badgery, my name is Leah Goldstein” (IL 518). And she notes: “You treated us 
all badly, as if we were your creatures” (IL 520). The point is that all the other characters 
indeed are his creatures. Only Leah simply will not let herself be caught: “[…] her character 
will never stay still and be one thing, refuses to be held down on my dissecting board, pulls 
out a pinned-down leg and shakes it in the air” (IL 213). The remark Herbert lets slip about 
Leah being sent “to gaol for throwing firecrackers at police horses” (IL 566) even suggests that 
she had joined the protests against Hissao’s museum and escaped its cages at least for a while. 
What Leah demonstrates, in the end, is that not losing one’s track as all the other 
characters (except Molly in the end) do, is, for all intents and purposes, a practical question of 
trial and error. It requires the constant reconnection of one’s vision with one’s now and the 
constant assessment of one’s path within the co-ordinate system of the common moral 
framework. 
 
6.3. Peter Carey’s Entrapped Dreamers 
 
A lot of ground has been covered so far in the discussion of Illywhacker and agency. What 
remains to be done is to integrate these discussions into the broader picture. That is, the 
results of the discussion of compulsive visions in Illywhacker can now be used to discuss the 
theme of entrapped dreaming in Carey’s work more generally. 
Bettina Joy “wanted power and success, not vicariously, not through a lover or a husband, 
but directly, for herself alone”. David Joy “dreamed of wealth and adventure” and “rehearsed 
his triumphal return from South America”. Benny Catchprice sells drugs for “Personal 
transformation” like David Joy and says about himself: “I’m an angel […]. It means I am in 
control. It means everyone does what I say.’” Like Phoebe McGrath, Frieda Catchprice “had 
made her life, invented it. When it was not what she wanted, she changed it.”409 All these 
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6. Illywhacker 
200 
 
characters (Bettina Joy, David Joy, Benny Catchprice, Frieda Catchprice) end up in terrible 
nightmares and die violent deaths.410 
For very different reasons Carey’s dreaming characters engage in visions. Often, the visions 
cover up a childhood trauma as in Benny Catchprice’s, Herbert and Chareles Badgery’s cases. 
“I cannot be what I am”, Benny has written on his cellar walls over and over again. Other, more 
postmodern, characters, like Phoebe McGrath, Leah Goldstein, or David Joy, come closer to 
Giddens’ description of compulsive mastery. They are mislead by the ambition, perhaps even 
obligation, to seek self-fulfilment. In all these cases, however, the vision puts the characters 
into a position of power from which they construct themselves anew. They break with their 
past and leave the now-time of their self-narration in order to re-narrate themselves from a 
future perspective. A mutually transformative confrontation with the now is thus deliberately 
avoided. 
Carey’s frustrated women are perhaps a special case and should be considered in a bit 
more detail here. Take Frieda Catchprice, for example: 
 
What she remembered was how much she had wanted to escape that musty 
confinement of one more family [her fiancée’s, Cacka’s, mother and brothers], that sour, 
closed smell like a mouse nest in a bush-hut wall. She gave this prominence in her 
memory, and it was true, of course, but she was wrong to discount the effects of love.411 
 
She is utterly, vigorously self-determined, chooses a man, and for him sacrifices her dream of 
a flower farm: 
 
It must happen, it had to happen, she would not let him fail. It was the beginning of a 
pattern – every time she helped him get something he wanted, a poultry farm, a car 
dealership, she drove him further from her. She was the one who talked him into that 
damn poultry farm when it was the last thing on earth she wanted.412 
 
In fact, Cacka had been dreaming of the poultry farm for a long time,413 but it is Frieda who 
puts this dream into action – also in order to escape his mother. However, this resolve of hers 
also means that she sacrifices her own dream for Cacka’s. Paradoxical as it may appear 
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therefore, this self-sacrifice is an act of willpower. Up to her very end, she never fully abandons 
her dream, which she spent her entire life not fulfilling. When she is about to blow up 
Catchprice Motors, the readers are informed that 
 
To call it a ‘plan’ was to diminish it. Once she would have done that. I’m just a silly 
woman. This was not a plan. It was a vision, the same one, the only one – a flower farm 
on the site of Catchprice Motors. […] In this garden Cacka did not exist. Her children had 
not been born.414 
 
The sheer force of her will is exemplified further in the way she deals with her breast cancer:  
 
Cacka could be weepy and sentimental about her breasts, but Frieda Catchprice was an 
animal caught in a trap, eating through its own limbs. She was poisoned and wanted to 
be free from the parts that would kill her. And sure enough, there was a second 
mastectomy – the one they so confidently told her she didn't need to have – another 
five years later.415 
 
Lucinda’s mother is very similar in many respects: 
 
Elizabeth Leplastrier was Elizabeth Fisher – that Fisher – whose great passion in life was 
factories. […] She had seen industrialization as the great hope for women. The very 
factories which the aesthetes and romantics so abhorred would, one day soon, provide 
her sex with the economic basis of their freedom. […] Her factories were like hubs of 
wheels, radiating spokes of care.416 
 
But when she follows her husband, Abel, to New South Wales, her factory dreams are as 
quickly frustrated as Frieda’s dreams of the flower farm, and she finds herself trapped on a 
farm she never wanted. 
The case of Bettina Joy is of course similar, too. Also she is desperate to escape from her 
humble origins, from her father and his petrol station, and binds herself to her husband. 
Bettina even manages to implement her ambitions – and thus clearly demonstrates that it is 
not the husband that is the problem, but the vision itself. All these women try to escape their 
families, their now, and to remake themselves in visions, to become future selves. In every 
case the actual living situation is interpreted from the perspective of the vision – many aspects 
of the now are therefore devalued, others denied. 
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Frieda Catchprice is the most extreme example. On the one hand she “had invented her 
life” but on the other she is a formidable case of repression and denial. Her entire sense of 
empowerment is based on repressing inconvenient truths. The same goes for Elizabeth and 
Bettina. They are mistresses only by not confronting the social cage in which they are confined. 
They want to escape a restraining situation in which they cannot make use of their 
considerable powers and flee into the cage of a marriage. What they deny is that this flight 
into marriage is not empowered self-construction but the only option. They pretend to live in 
a world that is entirely of their own making, never facing their depressing living conditions, 
always following the vision that one day they will live out their ambition after all. Through this 
future-based existence, all their considerable sacrifices and acts of self-denial are reread as 
self-determined feats of willpower. But sooner or later they all find out, like Bettina Joy, that 
“[h]er whole life had been built on bullshit”.417 
Honey Barbara from Bliss is Carey’s first novel character to find a way out. “Damn you and 
your dreams”, she thinks after David seduced her. 
 
She had come to this, this seedy betrayal, and she knew it was time to leave these 
people, who had such trunk-loads of dreams, ideas and ambitions but never anything in 
the present, only what would happen one day, and it was time to get away from it and 
face whatever might be waiting for her at home and hope that it might be as it had been: 
better and deeper pleasures with smaller, more ordinary things, pleasures so everyday 
that these people would never see anything in them but tiredness, repetition, 
discomfort, and no originality at all.418 
 
It is her resolution to “face whatever might be waiting for her” that is so important for 
agency, that refers her back to the now of her immediate living condition and keeps the 
obligation of self-fulfilment in check. The engagement with the present is indeed vital for 
enabling “authentic reflexive monitoring”, to use Giddens’ term. As we saw, this is also how 
Leah manages to personalise her vision and make it small. Facing her present and accepting 
painful insights – at several times she cries out with the pain of realisation – is what keeps the 
dragon, the “monstrous charity, this bright-eyed, shining One Fine Thing”, on its leash. 
Lucinda Leplastrier repeats Honey Barbara’s and Leah Goldstein’s insights once more in 
Oscar and Lucinda. When Oscar is about to embark on his journey, she finally realises: “All her 
passion, all her intelligence, her discipline, her love had gone to produce nothing but a folly. 
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She had not known this until she saw him in his humiliating suit.”419 There is nothing fine about 
the church: “‘My god, you fool’”, she exclaims,420 meaning herself as much as Oscar. In vain 
she tries to abort his mission. Oscar is already beyond her reach, in the bush. 
In Illywhacker, the narrator compares Leah’s personalised idea of kindness with Izzie’s 
grand vision: “What she had made had little in common with Izzie’s giant dream, was like one 
of her proverbial baby swallows beside his giant canvas of smooth grey forms, that complex 
ants’ nest bathed in golden light” (IL 302). In Oscar and Lucinda, Lucinda repeats the same 
insight in a precise formulation: “She had not cared about the church. The church had been 
conceived in a fever. It was not a celebration of sacred love, but of their own.”421 Thus she 
turns from the capitalised Vision of “sacred love” to vision: the “better and deeper pleasures 
with smaller, more ordinary things” – that is, her and Oscar’s personal love. 
From an agency perspective, Oscar and Lucinda ends on an interesting note. Bereft of all 
her inherited fortune and reduced to destitution Lucinda writes a letter to Miriam Chadwick 
(now Hopkins): 
 
Lucinda was known for more important things than her passion for a nervous clergyman. 
She was famous, or famous at least amongst students of the Australian labour 
movement. One could look at this letter and know that its implicit pain and panic would 
be but a sharp jab in the long and fruitful journey of her life. One could view it as the last 
thing before her real life could begin.422 
 
Once she can neither flee into a vision nor hide behind her inheritance, she is forced to deal 
with her present and “face whatever might be waiting for her”. Thus she is forced, too, to 
deploy her inner sources in a meaningful way. Carey tells the readers nothing about her re-
orientation process, but it seems clear that the moral values she inherited from her mother 
provide a far better orientation for the unfolding of her potential than the safety of her wealth. 
Let us sum up, then, what Carey’s successful women can tell us about agency: When Honey 
Barbara’s, Leah’s, and finally Lucinda’s visions are ‘personalised’, then they are reintegrated 
into a narratisation in the present tense. The future aspect becomes a future aspect again, 
something that is regarded from a position in the now. These women’s painful moments of 
insight thus constitute a confrontation of their vision with their actual living conditions and in 
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this way enforce a critical re-evaluation of their present position within the moral framework 
and their path towards their respective hypergoods. Personalising their visions means, then, 
that they more or less radically redirect their focus from their envisioned future to their 
respective now: they are thrown back again into the world. The small, personalised vision 
therefore once more becomes part of a moral framework, secured by moral goods that are 
perceived as given, not chosen. In other words, the personalisation of the characters’ visions 
depends on a fundamental form of acceptance and results in the grounding of the self in pre-
existing frameworks of reference. One could also say that Honey Barbara, Leah, and Lucinda 
personalise their visions instead of envisioning their person in an imagined future. They 
essentialise and in a sometimes painful process of narratisation unfold their potential within 
a common moral framework. 
 
6.4. From the Aircraft Factory to the Museum: Baudrillard in Australia 
 
Before this chapter on Illywhacker and compulsive mastery in Peter Carey’s early writing can 
finally be concluded there is one last issue that needs to be addressed. I claim that it is no 
coincidence that Herbert’s expertise in lying, the development from the aircraft factory in the 
first book to the Australian Museum in the third one, can be grasped in Baudrillardian terms 
as the materialisation of a vision and the steady progression towards hyperreality – a 
perspective from which the novel appears once more in the light of an Entwicklungsroman. 
What is more, Baudrillard’s writings and Herbert Badgery’s narrative comments combine 
perfectly to show the direct relevance of hyperreality to agency. 
While all this is theory, however, it seems conceivable that Carey reacts in his writing to 
actual discussions and concerns about social developments in the Western world. That is, not 
only does Anthony Giddens’ concept of compulsive mastery apply to the motif of entrapping 
visions (particularly in the cases of Phoebe and Leah), the entire setting of the novel that 
culminates in the Australian Museum also places compulsive mastery in turn into a broader 
social context. In order to open up the novel – and in particular the treatment of agency in the 
novel – to contemporary discourses, in order to thus underscore the novel’s relevance, I will 
therefore also give one example of a contemporary discussion that directly relates to the 
novel’s treatment of agency. 
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6.4.1. The Three-Tiered Advance of Australia Fair 
 
Illywhacker describes the materialisation of Herbert Badgery’s great vision in three 
progressive stages. These stages are the Aircraft Factory, the Best Pet Shop in the World, and 
the Australian Museum. There are also three orders of simulacra in Baudrillard’s Symbolic 
Exchange and Death (1976): 
 
- The counterfeit is the dominant schema in the ‘classical’ period, from the Renaissance 
to the Industrial Revolution. 
- Production is the dominant schema in the industrial era. 
- Simulation [sic] is the dominant schema in the current code-governed phase.423 
 
But as this short introductory statement to Baudrillard’s famous chapter, “The Order of 
Simulacra”, already indicates, the correspondence between the novel’s path to hyperreality 
and Baudrillard’s three orders of simulacra is not exact. I argue, however, that there are good 
reasons to refer to Baudrillard nonetheless. One should be careful, for example, not to treat 
Baudrillard’s conceptualisation above as a serious historical study or a rigorous theoretical 
framework that always applies in the same way in his writings – in Simulacra and Simulation 
(1981) he already suggests a different chronology with the four “successive phases of the 
image”424 – and the most important aspect for him seems to have always been the respective 
now-time of his studies, the respective ‘contemporary’ age of simulation and hyperreality. 
And once one is a little flexible in the application of Baudrillard’s various descriptions of the 
Western world’s progression towards hyperreality, his writings turn out to be a truly 
rewarding source for an analysis of Illywhcker. 
So these are the three stages in Illywhacker and the corresponding concepts from 
Baudrillard: In the first stage, the stage of Aircraft Factory, the idea of a true Australia is meant 
to be born and authenticated through the production of Australian aircraft; in the second 
stage, the one of the Best Pet Shop in the World, this idea of true Australia is turned into a 
product in itself and genetically mass produced; in the third stage, the stage of the Australian 
Museum, the idea of Australia is lived and exhibited. Because the Aircraft Factory is a lie, the 
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first stage can be described as a negative form of the counterfeit. The second stage of the Best 
Pet Shop in the World shares at least some characteristics with the logic of production. And 
the third stage is almost a schoolbook example of Baudrillardian hyperreality. 
 
The Aircraft Factory 
 
The Australian Aircraft Factory is more of a romantic, nationalist idea than a serious business 
scheme – at least for Herbert. When he relates his first night with the McGraths, he describes 
how the talk circles around aviation and says: “Phoebe missed the point: the talk was really a 
celebration of towns as plain (and plainer than) Geelong. They were eyries, the birthplaces of 
the great. Australians, it seemed that night in Western Avenue, were born to rule the skies” 
(IL 28). 
But when Herbert calls the romantic idea of the Aircraft Factory a lie, then he refers to the 
referential function of this image that is not fulfilled, thus delineating it as a negative form of 
the ‘counterfeit’. And when the blunt businessmen Cockey Abbot Senior and Oswald-Smith 
later expose this lie, then they do so by referring to the ‘functionality’ of the image, which they 
reject. 
Both views – Herbert’s lying as a negative form of the ‘counterfeit’ and the ‘functionality’ 
of the image of the Australian Aircraft Factory – deal with Baudrillardian key concepts and will 
make necessary a wider sweep in their explanation. For example, in order to understand why 
one may grasp Herbert’s lie as a negative form of the counterfeit, one needs to understand 
the referential function of the Baudrillardian ‘sign’, and in order to understand that, one needs 
at least a rough understanding of his notion of the reality principle – as it is this that separates 
the ‘sign’ from the ‘symbol’. In fact, this latter distinction will serve as a good starting point 
into the Baudrillardian framework of thinking, and we will take our lead from there now to get 
the discussion underway. 
“In feudal or archaic caste societies”, says Baudrillard in Symbolic Exchange and Death, “in 
cruel societies, signs are limited in number and their circulation is restricted. Each retains its 
full value as a prohibition, and each carries with it a reciprocal obligation between castes, clans 
or persons, so signs are not arbitrary.”425 To ensure conceptual clarity, these ‘obligatory signs’ 
will be called ‘symbols’ in the following as they constitute a ‘symbolic order’ (a term that 
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Baudrillard uses in a strictly and provocatively non-Lacanian fashion). Samuel Strehle explains: 
“Rites, sacrificial offerings, dances, the duel, (not only) erotic seduction – all these are 
phenomena that participate in the order of the symbolic. What they all have in common is the 
dimension of an existential involvement of the subjects, of confrontation, of social 
intensity.”426 So according to Strehle, the symbols of the symbolic order are characterised by 
an “existential involvement of the subjects” and a “social intensity”. This is very helpful. But 
the question remains just what it is that makes these symbols so obligatory. 
I would argue that what makes these symbols so existentially important is that they refer 
to a non-constructed reality, a cosmic or godly order – an external frame of moral values. It 
seems, Baudrillard has a world in mind in which there is no differentiation between fact and 
fiction in the modern sense – a world in which dreams are prophecies sent by the gods and 
ideas are insights that come from the muses, a world in which rituals, rites, and customs 
always also constitute an exchange with an external world that is hidden and present at the 
same time: “The symbolic is neither a concept, an agency, a category, nor a ‘structure’, but an 
act of exchange and a social relation which puts an end to the real, which resolves the real, 
and, at the same time, puts an end to the opposition between the real and the imaginary.”427 
This is a world in which wilfully appropriating symbols means to risk confrontation with higher 
powers: “Counterfeit is not possible in the ceremonial, unless in the form of black magic and 
sacrilege”.428 Obviously, Freud describes a similarly direct connection between a psychical and 
an external reality in Totem and Taboo, albeit from a slightly more condescending perspective: 
 
[In primitive societies] [a] general overvaluation has thus come about of all mental 
processes – an attitude towards the world, that is, which, in view of our knowledge of 
the relation between reality and thought, cannot fail to strike us as an overvaluation of 
the latter [thought]. Things become less important than ideas of things: whatever is 
done to the latter will inevitably also occur to the former. Relations which hold between 
the idea of things are assumed to hold equally between the things themselves.429 
 
The reality principle is only established when the signs emancipate: “The end of the 
obligatory sign”, says Baudrillard, “is succeeded by the reign of the emancipated sign, in which 
                                                          
426 Samuel Strehle, Zur Aktualität von Jean Baudrillard: Einleitung in sein Werk, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2012, 57, 
trans. S.J. 
427 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, 133. It is important to bear in mind that Baudrillard uses the terms 
‘symbolic’, ‘real’, and ‘imaginary’ in a strictly, and perhaps provocatively, non-Lacanian fashion in Symbolic 
Exchange and Death. 
428 Ibid., 50. 
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any and every class will be able to participate.”430 When the symbols thus lose their obligatory 
status, they turn into the ‘signs’ of a relational system – the symbolic order turns into a system 
of signs – and counterfeit becomes possible. Baudrillard uses Renaissance stucco as an 
example: “In the churches and palaces, stucco embraces all forms, imitates all materials: 
velvet curtains, wooden cornices, and fleshy curves of the body. Stucco transfigures all this 
incredible material disorder into a single new substance, a sort of general equivalent for all 
the others […].”431 What we call ‘reality’, in others words, is for Baudrillard an effect of the 
separation between counterfeit (fake, the synthetic) and original (reality, nature): “The 
modern sign then finds its value as the simulacrum of a ‘nature’.”432 A few chapters later, he 
tries to describe the reality principle in a more structuralist fashion – but this need not concern 
us here.433 
The important point for us is that when Herbert Badgery describes the aircraft factory as 
lie, then he can do so only because the reality principle is already firmly in place, signs already 
have, or should have, referents – that is, relate to objects in reality or nature. However, 
obviously Herbert does not mean ‘lie’ in the sense of a counterfeit, a fake or synthetic 
representation of nature. He means lie in the sense of pretence and deception – a sense, 
however, that still makes use of the referential function of the sign. As a business plan, for 
example, the Aircraft Factory refers to a scheme that does not exist – at least not for Herbert. 
But more importantly, Herbert Badgery also refers to an Australia that does not exist, an 
Australia that is “the birthplace[e] of the great” – an idea that the factory is meant to confirm 
and establish at the same time; a vision, then, an imaginary past and already achieved future. 
But the Aircraft Factory is a ‘sign’ also in another sense. For, when the blunt businessmen, 
probing the idea for its practicality, immediately expose its ‘functionality’, then they refer to 
the ‘sign value’ of the Aircraft Factory. Both these concepts, the concepts of functionality and 
sign value, relate to each other and quickly have to be introduced before they can be applied 
to Herbert’s factory. 
                                                          
430 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, 50-1. 
431 Ibid., 52. 
432 Ibid., 51. 
433 “The effect of the real is only ever therefore the structural effect of the disjunction between two terms [life 
and death, man and nature, body and soul are Baudrillard’s examples here], and our famous reality principle, 
with its normative and repressive implications, is only a generalisation of this disjunctive code to all levels. […] 
So, all the disjunctions on which the different structures of the real are based […] have their archetype in the 
fundamental disjunction of life and death” (ibid., 133). 
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In The System of Objects (1968) Baudrillard establishes the following distinction between 
‘functionality’ and ‘function’: 
 
With its reference to ‘function’ it suggests that the object fulfils itself in the precision of 
its relationship to the real world and to human needs. But as our analysis has shown, 
‘functional’ in no way qualifies what is adapted to a goal, merely what is adapted to an 
order or system: functionality is the ability to become integrated into an overall scheme. 
An object’s functionality is the very thing that enables it to transcend its main ‘function’ 
in the direction of a secondary one, to play a part, to become a combining element, an 
adjustable item, within a universal system of signs.434 
 
Baudrillard uses the concept of functionality to describe how furniture loses its use value 
for the benefit of its ‘sign value’, ‘sign value’ being yet another important concept in the 
Baudrillardian universe. In The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures (1970), he explains it 
thus: 
 
Until now the whole analysis of consumption […] has been a theory of needs, objects (in 
the broadest sense) and satisfactions. […] This rationalist mythology of needs and 
satisfactions is […] naïve and helpless. Let us explain this point: outside the field of its 
objective function, where it is irreplaceable, outside the field of its denotation, the 
object becomes substitutable in a more or less unlimited way within the field of 
connotations, where it assumes sign-value. Thus the washing machine serves as an 
appliance and acts as an element of prestige, comfort, etc. It is strictly this latter field 
which is the field of consumption.435 
 
So the Australian Aircraft Factory has to be grasped as object “in the broadest sense”, as 
an idea, a business scheme that nevertheless may have use value and sign value, may belong 
to the order of function (“[fulfil] itself in the precision of its relationship to the real world and 
to human needs”), or the order of functionality (“[be] an element of prestige, comfort, etc.”) 
– as will presently be shown. 
Herbert is an excellent salesman. He is an ace at selling American t-models. But at one 
point he tries to talk a certain Stu O’Hagen into buying a Summit. “Now tell me, tell me truly, 
is this Australian car of yours a better car than the Ford?”, asks practical O’Hagen. To which 
Badgery replies: “It’s not the point about better, […] it’s a question of where the money goes. 
You’d be better off with a worse car if the money stayed here” (IL 62). Herbert tries to sell the 
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car not for its practicality, its use value, but for its sign value, its functionality, in short: for its 
being Australian – and he fails miserably. 
To finally return to the original argument: In this sense, too, the whole point about the 
Aircraft Factory is for Herbert its functionality, its producing Australian aircraft. The 
businessmen however, just like Stu O’hagen, still live in a “naïve and helpless” world of 
function and use value: “‘I would not have risked my life in that machine [the plane with which 
Herbert flew the businessmen to the meeting] for amusement or politics. It was only to make 
a quid’”, says Cockey Abbot Senior. Ditto Oswald-Smith: “‘I must say […] that I had no intention 
of investing my money in a political party’” (IL 123). So these old-fashioned businessmen’s 
idea of capitalism is still based on a product’s use value – which means that the Aircraft Factory 
and the struggle over it is situated at the very turn from the era of function, use value, and 
practicality to the era of functionality, sign-value, and prestige. 
Indeed, as opposed to their bygone era, consumers of today’s “Ikea-age”436 buy an 
attitude, an image, a fashion with the items they purchase – exactly as Baudrillard describes 
it in the System of Objects. Cockey Abbot’s and Oswald-Smith’s concerns were not well-
founded therefore. One need not be afraid that trading in the signs of true Australia were 
tantamount to political commitment. Effigies of Che Guevara, for example, are as 
inconsequential as any other lifestyle product – and they are good business, too. And this 
brings us to the second stage, the one of the Best Pet Shop in the World. 
 
The Best Pet Shop in the World 
 
Quite in line with the last argument, Charles’ Best Pet Shop in the World is no catalyst for a 
nationalist movement at all. The Pet Shop is Herbert’s lie come true. It is “an expression of the 
purest patriotism – pure Australiana – definitely no bunny rabbits or pussy cats […]. There was 
no one to tell him [Charles] that Sydney was not big enough to support such poetry”. But when 
Charles teaches “his celebrated cockatoo” to say “Hello, Digger” so it can be a mascot for the 
American General MacArthur – thus sparking “the cockatoo’s brief blaze of glory in the 
newsreels and newspapers” (IL 455) – then he produces of course Australiana for foreign 
consumers. Australianness is a product for sale, exchangeable – not a committed political 
cause. So the irony is only consistent: “The Americans, however, saved his arse” (IL 453). 
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What is more, as opposed to the era of Australian Aircraft Factory, Charles’ Best Pet Shop 
in the World does not have to go the circumstantial route anymore of indirectly establishing 
the idea of a true Australia via a product. The idea of true Australia is itself the product. 
Charles’ enterprise, in other words, is not a lie anymore, could not possibly be a lie anymore, 
and is indeed, and quite significantly, never called one in the novel. His business is the 
materialisation and commoditisation of the idea of Australianness. 
But also as far as the reality principle is concerned, we have left the first stage of the 
Aircraft Factory and entered another phase. The second order simulacrum, says Baudrillard in 
Symbolic Exchange and Death, 
 
erects a reality without images, without echo, without mirrors, without appearances: 
such indeed is labour, such is the machine, such is the entire industrial system of 
production in that it is radically opposed to the principle of theatrical illusion. No more 
semblance or dissemblance, no more God or Man, only an immanent logic of the 
principle of operativity.437 
 
The Best Pet Shop in the World may not seem to directly correspond to Baudrillard’s more 
Marxist illustration of the concept, but at a closer look it shares all the key aspects with the 
second order simulacrum. Charles does not produce models of Australian fauna. He produces 
Australian fauna. Therefore, his products are not signs that refer to an external reality, they 
constitute that reality. In this sense he does indeed erect or produce “a reality without images, 
without echo, without mirrors, without appearances”. However, even this genetic serial-
production is still based on a physical (or biological) product. When Baudrillard calls this “a 
reality without images” then the reality principle is nevertheless still in place and even 
radicalised. This is only to change with Hissao. 
 
The Australian Museum 
 
Precisely when Hissao causes “the death of the last-recorded gold-shouldered parrot” (IL 555), 
he completes the destruction of reality and ushers in the last order of simulacra – it could not 
have been more Baudrillardian. His Museum is not a business anymore in which 
Australianness is produced as a material product. Matter has gone, and with it the product. 
After the death of nature, vision is the only thing left – it stands alone and absolute without 
                                                          
437 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, 54. 
6. Illywhacker 
212 
 
any allusion to referents. Accordingly, in the era of the Museum, the difference between fact 
and fiction is finally fully dissolved again. The reality principle that was established when 
modern societies emerged from archaic cultures is lost once more. This hyperreal situation is 
very often illustrated with the help of Baudrillard’s famous Disneyland example from 
Simulacra and Simulation: 
 
Disneyland exists in order to hide that it is the “real” country, all of “real” America that 
is Disneyland (a bit like prisons are there to hide that it is the social in its entirety, in its 
banal omnipresence, that is carceral). Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to 
make us believe that the rest is real, whereas all of Los Angeles and the America that 
surrounds it are no longer real, but belong to the hyperreal order and to the order of 
simulation.438 
 
In this quote, it appears that Disneyland is an exaggerated spectacle in order to pretend, 
to dissimulate, that there were a non-manmade reality outside the gates, which there is 
not.439 But this would mean that the principle of reality is still in operation – only the thing 
itself is ‘really’ gone (we see a famous paradox striking once more). 
But be that as it may, Hissao’s Australian Museum is an astonishingly exact rendering of 
Baudrillard’s hyperreal Disneyland. Inside the Museum everyone lives in glass cages “a bit like 
prisons are there to hide that it is the social in its entirety, in its banal omnipresence, that is 
carceral”: 
 
There is a spirit in this place. It is this that excites the visitors. The shearers, for instance 
exhibit that dry, laconic anti-authoritarian wit that is the very basis of the Australian 
sense of humour. They are proud people, these lifesavers, inventors, manufacturers, 
bushmen, aboriginals. They do not act like caged people. The very success of the exhibit 
is in their ability to move and talk naturally within the confines of space. They go about 
their business, their sand paintings, their circumcision ceremonies, their strikes, 
settlements, discussions about national anthems, arguments about ‘Waltzing Matilda’ 
and ‘Advance Australia Fair’. (IL 567) 
 
                                                          
438 Baudrillard, “The Precession of Simulacra,” 1981, 12. The wording in the translation of the 1983 version of the 
text in Simulations differs slightly: “Disneyland is there to conceal the fact that it is the ‘real’ country, all of ‘real’ 
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the rest is real, when in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order 
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Directly before the Disneyland passage in Simulacra and Simulation, Baudrillard refers to 
the preservation of the Tasaday Indians, the open museum at Cruesot, and the caves in 
Lascaux in order to denote the notion of “museumification”, which culminates in another 
often-quoted passage: “The museum, instead of being circumscribed in a geometrical 
location, is everywhere now, like a dimension of life.”440 According to Baudrillard, we are all 
Tasaday Indians and inhabitants of the ‘open’ museum, dissimulating and corroborating our 
own confinement by the very invention of these museums. 
Herbert never refers to any confining qualities of Sydney, but he does indeed suggest that 
there is no ‘outside’ of Hissao’s Australian Museum and that materiality itself has gone, when 
he describes the city as “never […] quite substantial” (IL 516) and “something imagined by 
men and women” (IL 530). This was the very lesson he taught young Hissao before he built 
the Museum: “I showed him, most important of all, the sort of city it was – full of trickery and 
deception. If you push against it too hard you will find yourself leaning against empty air” (IL 
516). We can therefore repeat Baudrillard’s famous description of Disneyland and produce a 
collage: “[The Australian Museum] exists in order to hide that it is the ‘real’ country, all of 
‘real’ [Australia] that is [the Museum] (a bit like prisons are there to hide that it is the social in 
its entirety, in its banal omnipresence, that is carceral)”. 
Just like Baudrillard’s Disneyland, Hissao’s Museum is a grotesque exaggeration 
established in order to pretend that there were a different, a ‘real’ world, outside. The puppet 
master Herbert Badgery, however, has even lost the reality principle. He knows that the whole 
thing is a mirage. He does not believe in it: 
 
It would be of no benefit for him [Hissao] to know that he is, himself, a lie, that he is no 
more substantial than this splendid four-storey mirage, teetering above Pitt Street, no 
more concrete than all those alien flowers, those neon signs, those twisted coloured 
forms in gas and glass that their inventors, dull men, think will last forever. (IL569) 
 
And so Herbert lies passively in his bed and waits for the return of the ‘event’ that will sweep 
the entire semiocracy away: “Did I hear crashing glass, the sound of the first wave breaking as 
it enters the ground floor? It is this which Hissao fears, this which I wait for, which keeps me 
alive through all these endless days. But it is not time, not yet.” 
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Baudrillard proposed several counterstrategies that should lead out of hyperreality. Most 
notoriously in The Symbolic Exchange and Death he repeatedly claims that only sacrifice and 
death itself can reinstall the symbolic exchange.441 Later, for example in Simulacra and 
Simulation (1981), or in The Shadow of the Silent Majorities (1982), he proposes the cynical 
idea of “hypersimulation” – a kind of mass apathy so complete that it defies the system 
itself.442 But in The Consumer Society (1970) he still believes, like Herbert, in the ‘event’ and 
exclaims: “We shall await the violent irruptions and sudden disintegrations which will come, 
just as unforeseeably and as certainly as May 1968, to wreck this white Mass.”443 
Whether this event finally occurs or not is left open in the novel and Baudrillard’s work 
alike. This is where the description of the developments ends in both cases. What one can say, 
then, in order to sum up Illywhacker’s procession through the three orders of simulacra, is 
that Herbert’s vision gains shape and materialises from the Australian Aircraft Factory, over 
the Best Pet Shop in the World, to the Australian Museum. In the process, all differences 
between reality and figment are eventually eradicated so that the ‘materialisation’ of 
Herbert’s vision finally leads to the fictionalisation of matter in the era of the Australian 
Museum. Peter Carey’s increasingly magic realist writing style neatly matches this advance. 
 
6.4.2. Agency in the Hyperreal Condition 
 
It is clear that this advance of hyperreality and decline of external, non-manmade reality has 
serious and necessary consequences for agency, too. In The System of Objects, not yet 
referring to hyperreality, Baudrillard already describes what Anthony Giddens has called “the 
end of nature” above: 
 
As directly experienced, the project of a technological society implies putting the very 
idea of genesis into question and omitting all the origins, received meanings and 
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‘essences’ […]; it implies practical computation and conceptualization on the basis of a 
total abstraction, the notion of a world no longer given but instead produced – 
mastered, manipulated, inventoried, controlled: a world, in short, that has to be 
constructed.444 
 
However, if agency is defined as mutually transformative interaction of an agent with an 
independent system, then the constructedness of the world has consequences. For, when the 
system is constructed and not independent anymore, then action is always self-expression: 
one constructs the world but is not changed by it in turn. Accordingly, what Charles Taylor 
called “significance feature” in Chapter 4.5., vanishes in such a world. Things start to lose their 
significance for people if they do not feel “existentially involved” anymore and everything is 
just a non-committing, reversible lifestyle choice. As Baudrillard explains: “Consumer man 
never comes face to face with his own needs, any more than with the specific product of his 
labour; nor is he ever confronted with his own image: he is immanent in the signs he 
arranges.” 
Again Baudrillard describes the postmodern condition in terms of vanishing use value. 
What he means is that consumer men and women ceased producing goods in order to satisfy 
their (and others’) existential needs. They produce, and essentially are, signs – they are 
greeting from a mirror in front of which stands no one. They are pure images. What once was 
their intrinsic core, their self, has dissolved. “Thus, [also] Phoebe: surrounded by her 
menagerie: Annette, Horace, the cats arching their backs. She had allowed herself to become 
ridiculous and did not know it.” Phoebe lives for her vision, is, finally, a vision herself. She lives 
so completely in her self-construction that there is no now left with which her vision could be 
confronted. She is therefore “immanent in the signs [she] arranges”, “nor is [she] ever 
confronted with [her] own image”. Needless to say, the same is true, of course, also for the 
narrator of the novel itself. To repeat, once more, the quote: “I had a vision of myself that 
sunny morning as I had not had a vision of myself for years: I could see Herbert Badgery again.” 
In The Consumer Society, Baudrillard himself expressly explains how in a world that is 
entirely manmade, the subject de-essentialises – he actually uses the word “essence” – and 
becomes part of a relational, non-referential sign system; in other words, how the 
differentiation between subject and society – nature and artefact, reality and fiction – is 
dissolved: 
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[The subject] is absorbed into the order of signifiers of social status, etc. He is not 
reflected in that order, but absorbed and abolished. The subject of consumption is the 
order of signs. […], the involvement of the subject is no longer, at any event, that of an 
‘alienated’ essence in the philosophical, Marxist sense of the term. It is not that of an 
essence which is dispossessed, taken over by some alienating agency and become 
foreign to itself. For there is no longer, properly speaking, any ‘selfsame’, any ‘subject 
itself’, or, therefore, any ‘alterity of the selfsame’, and therefore no alienation in the 
strict sense. The situation is rather like that of the child kissing his image in the mirror 
before going to bed: he doesn’t entirely mistake the image for himself, since he has 
already ‘recognized’ it. Nor is it an alien double in which he is reflected: he plays with it, 
somewhere between sameness and otherness. 445 
 
As if she were exactly the child Baudrillard writes about, Phoebe can be seen “admiring 
herself like a budgie in a cage” (IL 189). The consumer woman became one with the order of 
signs. She can be described entirely in terms of the social roles and the lifestyles she wears – 
there is no core to these shells, alienation is impossible. What sometimes is called the 
decentring of a subject that negotiates multiple constructed identities in theoretical texts, is 
exposed here by Baudrillard and Illywhacker as de-essentialised, smell-less consumer 
behaviour caught in a fatal obsession with self-control and -presentation. 
In hyperreality, then, the difference between now and vision disappears completely. The 
now is the vision and the vision is the now. One cannot ‘personalise’ one’s vision because 
there is no person left, or rather ‘person’ and ‘vision’ are identical. In hyperreality, moreover, 
one is not flung into the world any longer, but in control of it.446 Since moral values, too, are 
not external but manmade and something chosen, one is barred from any existentially 
involving experience. Confrontation is impossible. The only thing left is the sign itself – a 
semiocraty, the rule of the relational, non-referential order. Thus Herbert Badgery: 
 
I could look out at the signs in the sky. They put up a big blue one a block or two away. 
ALCOA AUSTRALIA it said. It did not go on or off but it was both beautiful and enigmatic 
hanging there in the sky, not bothering to explain how it could be both Alcoa and 
Australia at the same time. It was the first of many. I pretended to myself that they 
amused me, these visions as fantastic as flying saucers. (IL 514) 
 
It is in fact Herbert Badgery in Illywhacker who asks what this means for agency: “The 
question is: how would you take me, sitting there in my chair, neon lit, surrounded by these 
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swirling signs? Am I a prisoner in the midst of a sign or am I a spider at its centre?” (IL 515) 
This is the question indeed. With regard to the preceding analysis of compulsive visions, one 
could perhaps slightly rephrase it and render the question of agency thus: Are you using the 
sign to unfold your true potential, or is the sign already enslaving you to unleash its potential 
truth? 
 
6.4.3. Illywhacker and the Western World: Anti-Depressants 
 
As was said at the outset of this Baudrillardian reading, this treatment should open up the 
novel to debates in contemporary Western societies and underscore the fact that it can be 
seen as a contribution to them. In other words, what I try to answer in the following brief 
excursion, is in how far Illywhacker may be relevant. Is it just a magic realist spectacle for easy 
entertainment – as some critics of postmodern literature may claim – or does it contain a 
critical impetus? Are Westerners, to bring in Baudrillard, turning into subjects of 
consumption? Are they, like Phoebe, “admiring [themselves] like a budgie in a cage”? Are 
Westerners, like Herbert Badgery, hyperreal human beings endowed with the power to call 
forth themselves – “My name is Herbert Badgery” is the first sentence of the novel – endowed 
with the power to turn themselves into the vision of themselves? 
A brief excursion into discussions around anti-depressants will reveal that some actual 
social developments are not lacking far behind the novel. A striking example is provided by 
Laurence Kirmayer – indeed some of his quotes should make immediately clear the direct 
connection to the preceding discussion of Illywhacker. He emphasises “the extent to which 
individuals are able to fashion their own self-narratives or have them imposed by local or 
global systems of status and power”,447 and thus, by pointing out the performative quality of 
concepts such as depression, hits on a tension between god-like self-production and 
deterministic social laws.448 According to Kirmayer’s argument, when pain and mental 
upheaval are classed as disorder, dysfunction, or syndrome, the personal and social reasons 
that lead to psychological distress and especially the significance of suffering for processing 
and morally evaluating social and personal episodes are completely neglected – that is, one 
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engages in visions rather than confront the now, the ontological and moral aspect of 
narratisation in which one’s potential gains shape: 
 
There is a global monoculture of happiness in which we are all enjoined to work to 
achieve the good life, which is understood to reside in being pain free, completely 
comfortable, and ready and able to acquire and consume the greatest quantity and 
variety of the newest goods and fashions.449 
 
Not explicitly referring to Baudrillard and his subject of consumption, Zygmunt Bauman 
calls this “the obligation to seek pleasure and happiness”.450 One could argue that initially 
both, Leah and Phoebe, fall victim to this obligation. For even the wish “to do One Fine Thing” 
is in the end nothing but Leah’s way of seeking self-fulfilment and self-determination. The self-
made woman and all such modern, liberal myths are – when one thinks about it – the 
radicalisation of a humanist ideal of deploying of one’s inner sources, of having the courage 
to use one’s faculties, in short: of agency. 
Indeed, there are arguments in favour of cosmetic pharmacology (a term introduced by 
Peter Kramer’s influential bestseller451) that exactly draw upon a self-creating agent and 
celebrate as emancipated act of self-determination the use of certain psychopharmaca 
without medical indication in order to improve one’s self: “At the very least, transformation 
via cosmetic psychopharmacology can be a perfectly authentic piece of self-creation, in that 
the resulting personality and life are very much one’s own.”452 In this vein Martin, Sugarman 
and Thompson note 
 
the extent to which professional psychology, especially in North America but 
increasingly worldwide, has both fueled [sic] and traded on the seemingly unfettered 
fetish of contemporary individuals for self-enhancing commodities and services. In many 
ways, this addiction may be considered one of the primary exports of what sometimes 
is deridingly referred to as American cultural imperialism.453 
                                                          
449 Laurence J. Kirmayer, “Psychopharmacology in a Globalizing World: The Use of Antidepressants in Japan,” 
Transcultural Psychiatry 39.3 (2002): 295-322, 316.  
450 Zygmunt Bauman, Consuming Life, Cambridge: Polity, 2007, 75. 
451 Peter Kramer, Listening to Prozac, New York: Viking, 1993. 
452 David DeGrazia, “Prozac, Enhancement, and Self-Creation,” Hasting Center Report 30.2 (2000): 34-40, 39. The 
argument in the same article that “I agree that our society overvalues competitiveness and other yuppie 
qualities”, but that “responsibility for this problem too should be located in our broader culture, not placed in 
the laps of Marina and her psychiatrist [the case example he gives to portray his discussion]”, and that “[i]f there 
is a responsibility to change the culture, it is everyone’s, and it should not be arbitrarily imposed on particular 
individuals in ways that interfere with their self-regarding projects” (ibid.), can only be called cynical. 
453 Martin, Sugarman, and Thompson, 34. For the point how the self-creating agent imposes a Westernised, 
consumer-oriented notion of selfhood on other cultures through the influence of the apparently ‘neutral’ science 
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They observe further that “Self studies have become a major scholarly, therapeutic, 
publishing, and commercial enterprise, even as some postmodernists declare and celebrate 
the alleged death of the self to a growing market of the self-absorbed”454 – “admiring 
[themselves] like a budgie in a cage”, just as Phoebe does. 
What justifies this brief excursion into the arguments around antidepressants and 
psychopharmaca in general, then, is that it demonstrates, nicely, how the empowerment of 
producing one’s self and the enslavement through visions of success, happiness, and self-
improvement go hand in hand. Thus the general argument, as indicated by Kirmayer and 
others, is much broader than the question of whether we use steroids or labour through a 
tough and long workout routine, whether we change our bad habits and unhealthy lifestyles 
or rather undergo facelifts and liposuctions, or whether we seek psychotherapy or just 
swallow certain psychopharmaca to enhance ourselves and our selves. The problem is 
precisely the posing of these alternatives, which implies to already have uncritically accepted 
the obligation to choose from what Bauman provocatively calls “market-supplied identity 
kits”.455 Stefan Eck concludes his essay on “Pharmaceutical Citizenship” thus: “The global 
spread of antidepressant medication changes not only the definitions of mental health and 
illness, but also changes the parameters of what ‘true happiness’ means.”456 
It seems, then, that in contemporary, Western societies, the ‘construction’ of identity 
actually means to put it under the rule of the market. Zygmunt Bauman writes extensively and 
eloquently about this marketization of identity.457 The very terms ‘deregulation’ and ‘de-
essentialisation’ seem to suggest a similarity that Takis Fotopoulos spells out by saying “that 
                                                          
of psychiatry see also Laurence J. Kirmayer, “Psychotherapy and the Cultural Concept of the Person,” 
Transcultural Psychiatry 44.2 (2007): 232-57. 
454 Martin, Sugarman, and Thompson, 34. 
455 Bauman, Consuming Life, 49. 
456 Stefan Ecks, “Pharmaceutical Citizenship: Antidepressant Marketing and the Promise of Demarginalization in 
India,” Anthropology & Medicine 12.3 (2005): 239-54, 251. See also Kirmayer, “Psychotherapy and the Cultural 
Concept of the Person”. 
457 Cf. e.g. the following statement in his The Individualized Society: “In other words, the quandary tormenting 
men and women at the turn of the century is not so much how to obtain the identities of their choice and how 
to have them recognized by people around – but which identity to choose and how to keep alert and vigilant so 
that another choice can be made in case the previously chosen identity is withdrawn from the market or 
stripped of its seductive powers” (147). See also his Identity: Conversations with Benedetto Vecchi, Cambridge: 
Polity, 2004: “We are today […] consumers in a consumers’ society. Consumer society is market society; we are 
all in and on the market, simultaneously customers and commodities. No wonder that the use/consumption of 
human relations and so, by proxy, also our identities (we identify ourselves by reference to people to whom we 
are related) catches up, and fast, with the pattern of car use /consumption, imitating the cycle that starts form 
purchase and ends with waste disposal” (91). 
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advanced market economies, […] have in fact entered a new form of modernity that we may 
call neoliberal modernity, rather than a postmodernity”.458 Whether one agrees with such 
statements or not, the link between self-empowerment and the commoditisation not only of 
identity but also of moral values is undeniable. Even van Dülmen – being far from engaging in 
left-wing political argumentation in his historical project – cannot help but notice an explosion 
of possibilities for self-determination and a simultaneous commoditisation of moral values 
that seems to undermine this self-determination again: 
 
Additionally, under the power and the pressure of media society the individual’s 
possibilities of choice and expression are exponentiated, but simultaneously reduced, 
too. The individual is subjected to new, market-driven values which challenge the 
process of individualisation in the sense of Enlightenment self-determination.459 
 
It is the observation that values are “market-driven” that is so interesting for agency. The 
point is the same in Illywhacker, Baudrillard’s hyperreality, or Chapter 4 on agency theory: A 
moral framework cannot fulfil its function when it is perceived as manmade, non-external. 
This is perhaps an intricate point. It does not really matter how restrictive moral values are 
and how violently one enforces them. In order to fulfil their function of providing a grid for 
orientation and guidance, they must be perceived as external, not freely chosen but accepted 
as true, not constructed but pre-given. 
But to answer the initial question: it seems indeed to be the case that Westerners are 
increasingly like Herbert Badgery, that they are increasingly hyperreal human beings endowed 
with the power to turn themselves into their visions. When “transformation via cosmetic 
psychopharmacology can be a perfectly authentic piece of self-creation”, then one’s fantasies 
of oneself materialise and one’s very personality turns into a commodity. In this sense one is 
a hyperhuman. 
Indeed, hyperhuman is a quite fitting term for another reason. I did not go into the obvious 
connection to Nietzsche until now – there is quite enough theory involved in the reading of 
Illywhacker as it is – but Nietzsche might be seen as the key philosopher for compulsive 
masters. If we – according to one standard interpretation – link Nietzsche’s elusive will to 
power to his notion of the superman and grasp it as gaining control over one’s drives and 
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instincts,460 then Herbert is indeed the perfect example of a Nietzschean Übermensch. His 
journey starts when he, as a small boy, stops to accept his fate and takes his life into his own 
hands, when he leaves the heard of his family in order to establish his own. The considerable 
power he gains over himself and others is established precisely by harnessing his and others’ 
basic drives and instincts. With reference to Baudrillard and the previous discussions on 
compulsive mastery, however, we are justified in calling this superman a hyperhuman. Phoebe 
and especially Herbert clearly expose the problematic, even paradoxic and destructive, 
potential of this sort of mastery. In this they are anything but passive consumers, by the way. 
This is the one difference between Baudrillard’s “consumer man” sitting in front of a TV screen 
or a shop window: the will to power, the will to dominate, the obsession to control. Also for 
this reason it is more appropriate to refer to Phoebe or Herbert as hyperhumans rather than 
consumer woman and man. 
 
6.5. Final Remarks on Illywhacker 
 
Perhaps after such a long chapter it is advisable to sum up a few key points of the discussion 
and make some more general remarks on the novel and its implications. The discussion started 
out by describing Herbert’s way to power, clearly a development. This psychological reading 
was then complemented by a detailed analysis of the main characters’ compulsive visions – in 
all their rich diversity. The main factors for the visions’ compulsiveness – the suppression or 
denial of the characters’ current living conditions that resulted in a life in and for the future 
tense of a self-reflexive vision – were then traced also in the descriptions of all the other 
entrapped dreamers in Peter Carey’s oeuvre. Lastly, a Baudrillardian reading was applied to 
the novel in order to show how the plot advances in three stages towards a ‘hyperreal 
condition’, while the novel itself was applied to contemporary Western discourses in order to 
demonstrate the relevance of the problems it addresses. 
Overall, the discussion of the major metaphors and themes of Illywhacker reveals a certain 
structure. The third book is very much a reiteration and drastic exacerbation of the metaphors, 
themes, and traumatic events of the first one: Charles and Hissao reiterate Herbert’s quest for 
a home, Emma writes the second stanza to Phoebe’s poem, and eventually the Badgery family 
is exhibited in the Australian Museum – combining Heim and Heimat into one Babylonian 
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image of human presumption. The second book, containing Herbert’s Lehr- und Wanderjahre, 
his years of apprenticeship and travelling before he fully masters the art of lying, constitutes 
an interlude. Even though the “dragon” is quite omnipresent there, the notions of ‘home and 
hearth’ and ‘true Australia’ recede very far into the background. Herbert is on the move with 
Leah and his children and precisely for this reason, as close to a ‘home’, a content way of living, 
a positive expression of his identity, as he will ever get. Australia is experienced rather than 
constructed, as is their intimate relationship. Contrary to his own claims, there is actually no 
vision of Herbert, at least not for the readers, only his travelling life. And perhaps this is 
precisely why the readers learn so little about this unimaginative phase so rich in experience. 
A phase Herbert rather spends with the detailed narration of Leah Goldstein’s and Izzie 
Kaletsky’s history than his own. 
But more generally, I think the novel and its central theme of compulsive visions tackles a 
central issue of contemporary Western society. In the absence of overt coercion or violence, 
when there is no dire struggle for sheer, basic survival, in a society liberally granting great 
personal freedom, identity becomes a task. But in Illywhacker and Carey’s early novels more 
generally, the characters fail in carrying out this task more often than not. Indeed, at the “end 
of nature”, as Giddens calls it, when people increasingly take the world into their own hands, 
compulsive mastery may become a phenomenon of social proportions. 
Illywhacker’s Tower of Babel metaphor is a very fitting one therefore. Leah reminds 
Charles that “we can imagine all sorts of things” and that “[t]hats why we’re not living in the 
trees anymore”. But in liberal Western societies, this ability of self-determination that makes 
us human also threatens to make us hyperhuman, hyperreal commodities, simulations of 
ourselves. As Giddens observed: “The more post-traditional the settings in which an individual 
moves, the more lifestyle concerns the very core of self-identity, its making and remaking.”461 
And this is what Illywhacker seems to sense intuitively. Nature’s end apparently promises 
absolute freedom, but what it actually brings is absolute control, control by human beings; 
and control is exactly the ambiguous term – always entailing control over something and 
therefore oscillating between enslavement and power – that points to compulsive mastery. 
When Leah refuses to be “the sky”, “without history”, then she refuses exactly this 
absolute freedom that would result in the absolute control over herself. She accepts her own 
limits, keeps her doggy smell, and thus remains human – does not turn hyperhuman. Thus, 
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when she weaves her grand vision of kindness “into something new and personal”, then this 
move is based not on mastery but on acceptance, the acceptance of a self that cannot be 
formed into everything she wants. Moreover, by personalising kindness she does not choose 
it, like a consumer in a shop, but discovers it, and discovers the way in which it applies to her, 
personally. And that is how kindness can give her orientation as a moral good without 
enslaving her or turning her into a neutral, odourless mannequin wearing lifestyles and putting 
them on display for others. 
Acceptance and a clear idea about where he ‘sits’ – to use Charles Taylor’s metaphor – 
within the moral framework will also be key elements for the narrator and main character of 
the next novel The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith. 
 
7. Tristan Smith 
 
In his 2001 article for the Guardian about Peter Carey, Nicholas Wroe writes: “Carey’s 1994 
novel, The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith, was […] his biggest failure, albeit an ambitious and 
interesting one.” And he goes on to bolster up his statement by referring to Woodcock: 
 
Bruce Woodcock admits that although he discussed Tristan Smith in his study of Carey, 
“I really didn’t know what to make of it. I suspect it’s a better novel than people gave it 
credit for, but I still haven’t found a way of really talking about it, which I think is most 
people’s problem. All the issues are there – it is a critique of Americanisation – but I’m 
not as happy with total fantasy as a form. He doesn’t handle it as well as the historical 
novels with fantasy, like Jack Maggs or Oscar and Lucinda.462 
 
The question would be, whether the ‘failure’ might not be in the eye of the beholder that fails 
to recognise some blind spots when it all too hastily concludes: “all the issues are there” but 
they do not come into focus well enough. The novel is against American neo-colonisation. So 
much appears to be clear. But somehow this finding does not seem to do justice to the 
sprawling, dense 500-page extravaganza of Tristan Smith. There might be stosomething else 
to it. There has to be. Woodcock senses that. But whatever that may be, literary criticism 
cannot talk about it. As Woodcock correctly states: he is not alone. Even though there are in 
fact some highly eloquent and well-founded postcolonial readings of Tristan Smith out 
there,463 there remains a desideratum therefore – a desideratum the following chapter on 
Tristan Smith sets out to address. 
In Illywhacker, we just saw how Leah successfully deployed her potential, because she 
accepted that she was not the sky, that she could not transform herself into anything she 
wanted without losing her doggy smell. In Tristan Smith, we will reach a similar conclusion, 
albeit on a very different route. Herbert’s Tower of Babel will reappear in the guise of the 
fictive city of Saarlim. But it will be confronted with a ‘real’ trouble maker who sets out to 
bring the signs of hyperreal simulation tumbling down. The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith is 
indeed the one novel, of those that are being discussed here, that is most obviously about 
agency. But just as obviously it is a wild, futuristic refabulation of Australia’s troubled 1970s. 
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In Amnesia, Peter Carey picks up the Gough Whitlam coup and Pine Gap much more directly, 
but also in Tristan Smith these incidents of British-American domination over Australian affairs 
are difficult to overlook. Already the following plot summary will make clear, therefore, why 
the many postcolonial readings of the novel are fully valid. 
The story is set in a fictitious near-future world and plays out the cultural conflict between 
the two former colonies of Efica and Voorstand. Voorstand, characterised by a Dutch patois, 
is a dominant neo-coloniser; Efica, characterised by a contrasting French patois, is a small 
dependent island nation. Voorstand maintains its one-sided partnership to Efica (and other 
nations) with the help of a ruthless secret service, the Voorstand Intelligence Agency (VIA), 
and, especially, the cultural exportation of the Sirkus show. The Sirkus is a mixture of 
Hollywood and Disneyland in which human actors perform the characters of the Mouse and 
the Duck in sometimes lethal artistic stunts that are broadcast as laser shows all over the 
world, making the Sirkus actors global super stars. The whole show has religious origins as 
Voorstand started out as a settler colony of religious dissidents who believed that killing or 
imprisoning animals was wrong and that having real animals act in circus shows was a grave 
sin – which is why people have to perform instead. The characters of the Sirkus, evil characters 
such as the Hairy Man or Spookganger Drool and good and funny characters such as the Mouse 
or the Duck, are directly taken from the dissident faith of the forefathers and first settlers of 
Voorstand. Among the once religious and now profaned Sirkus characters, the Mouse is the 
most prominent one and serves as a sort of clownish messiah. Accordingly, the Sirkus might 
be seen as a commercialised and profaned religious service. Since Voorstand is the dominant 
nation of the novel’s fictive world, everyone on the planet knows the Mouse and the Sirkus 
and knows them to be symbols of Voorstand. The similarities between Voorstand and the USA 
and Efica and Australia are very obvious and pointed out by almost every commentator – 
including Peter Carey himself.464 
Into this world, and on the Efican side of the dichotomy, is born “Unhappy Tristram! child 
of wrath! child of decrepitude! interruption! mistake! and discontent!” Of course, this is 
Walter Shandy’s exclamation, but Tristram Shandy, this unfortunate “homunculus” (see also 
TS 45) in whose begetting an infamous clock caused interruption at a very decisive moment, 
whose nose suffered from a clumsy midwife, the tragedy of whose name was caused by a 
forgetful servant, and whose primary sexual organ was injured by a window-sash, this 
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“unhappy Tristram” might well have been Carey’s inspiration for Tristan. “What one 
misfortune or disaster in the book of embryotic evils, that could unmechanize thy frame, or 
entangle thy filaments! which has not fallen upon thy head, or ever thou camest into the 
world”.465 As if Walter Shandy’s interjection turned into a performative speech act through 
the mediation of Peter Carey, Tristan Smith, as opposed to Tristram Shandy, is a baby so 
deformed and malfunctioning that the doctors want to kill him immediately after his birth. He 
is so ugly that the mere sight of him causes people to throw up and faint. Indeed, the only 
things that function well and fulfil all normative expectations are his brain and – as is explicitly 
remarked several times in the novel (and with relief) – his penis (e.g. TS 43). 
Tristan is the son of Felicity Smith, who herself once came from Voorstand but now lives 
in Efica and has become a self-declared Efican nationalist. In order to invent their ‘true’ culture 
for the Eficans, she produces the avant-garde and anti-Voorstand theatre group Feu Follet. 
Against all odds, Tristan survives his early infancy and as youth travels Efica with this 
subversive group of radical resistance artists. 
During the course of the novel, which is divided into two books, Tristan wants to become 
an actor, and, at the end of the first book, has to witness how his mother is hanged by secret 
agents from Voorstand. In the second book, we learn how he travels, as young adult, with his 
foster father, Wally, and his nurse, Jacques – who will turn out to be Jacqui – to Voorstand’s 
capital, Saarlim, and there creates a lasting impact when he convinces the biggest Sirkus 
producer, Peggy Kram, to turn the capital of Voorstand into a Ghostdorp. A Ghostdorp is a 
village in which people have to live according to extremely rigid and orthodox rules as set out 
by the old Voorstand faith (perhaps an analogy would be if one turned the whole of New York 
City into an Amish community and forced every inhabitant to live according to their rules – or 
else leave). Tristan manages to pull off this stunt when he dresses up as Bruder Mouse and in 
this make up seduces Peggy Kram, who, after having been raped and abused as a young 
woman, is not in the healthiest states of mind. She feels sexually attracted to the Mouse and 
has the financial power to buy large parts of her own capital – since most of the ground and 
all the streets had been sold out by the city council to private companies. At the climax of the 
novel, Tristan, almost suffocating in his own vomit inside the head of the Mouse costume, is 
freed from the costume in front of Voorstand’s utterly dismayed high society – including his 
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devastated lover Peggy Kram. In the last moment Tristan and his friends manage to flee, 
leaving his dead foster father Wally behind. 
Now, obviously, such a plot relates the story of a neo-colonised country. And Chapter 7.3., 
“Tristan’s Subversiveness”, begins with a few excellent discussions of Tristan Smith that focus 
on exactly this aspect. As obviously, Tristan, when he takes on the role of the Hairy Man for 
himself during his narration, is, like McCorkle, yet another re-writing of Frankenstein’s or 
Shakespeare’s monster: “I was Caliban, of course”, Tristan remarks (TS 377). As refuse of the 
Empire, he is yet another antipodean beast raising its voice. However, this chapter tries to 
show that a perspective on agency is also valid. It does not contradict the postcolonial 
approaches, but rather adds a few more dimensions to them; it makes the reading richer. 
The following discussion is separated into four parts. First, we will shortly deal with the 
narrative voice, because already the extradiegetic Tristan and the narrative situation give us 
some indications about the eponymous hero’s position within a moral framework and thus his 
agency. Then, in the much longer Chapter 7.2., Tristan’s bildung will be traced. It will be shown 
that his development constitutes a move through two mirror stages that eventually enables 
him to deploy his inner sources. In a third chapter, this development will be placed within a 
broader conflict that runs through the whole novel, in which all the main characters seem to 
be engaged in one way or another, and which seems to be suspiciously similar to the central 
conflict discussed in the last chapter; namely the struggle between reality, or the ontological 
aspect of one’s self-narration, and visions, schemes, or plans. But at a closer look the 
opposition is not exactly the same. While Herbert Badgery completely dominates his narration 
in Illywhacker, here, in Tristan Smith, the very existence of a conflict between reality and 
human imagination (in the broadest sense of the term) already indicates that in this novel 
hyperreality has a hard time – if I may put it thus. In Tristan Smith, Promethean control and 
empowerment are permanently frustrated by the stubbornly persistent forces of ‘the world’, 
‘nature’, or ‘reality’. Chapter 7.4., finally, traces the theme of conceited radicals throughout 
Carey’s writings. Whether this constitutes a “conventional moral and political vision”, as 
literary critic Susan Lever claims in 1998,466 or not is up to the reader. The result is in any case 
that Carey’s rebels are successfully changing their world only if they get over themselves, show 
a certain modesty or humbleness and accept their physical and social limitations – one could 
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also say they have to accommodate their ontological status, the reality of the social and 
physical world to which they are exposed and of which they are a part. 
 
7.1. Tristan as Narrative Voice and as Character inside his Story 
 
Now, let us consider the following claim by Ralpf Pordzik’s that Tristan Smith 
 
in its attribution of a positive value to ambiguity and elusiveness […] lends weight to the 
concept of a postcolonial or cross-cultural future precluding permanent solutions and 
therefore ruling out a condition of being that claims an autonomous (national and/or 
cultural) identity for itself as if it were a timeless and coherent truth recovered from the 
forgetful waters of history.467 
 
What will be argued here is that Tristan Smith, as narrator, far from being an illusive, 
ambiguous, impermanent non-identity, speaks from a clearly discernible subject position 
within a common moral framework. In order to arrive at this position, he has to undergo a 
development on the character level that eventually leads him to accept his own 
fragmentation. 
As is so often the case with Peter Carey, the narrative situation is characterised by an 
unreliable narrator. Tristan tells us his story from hindsight. What is more, he addresses his 
readers as Voorstanders and seems to give us his own account of the events – seemingly in 
order to set things ‘straight’, to justify his actions, and correct a wrong narrative tradition of 
his activities in Voorstand. While doing so, he constantly mocks his readers and throws ironic 
comments at us. This is how he relates the event of finding his dead mother: 
 
The maman loved Efica but she was born in Voorstand. The Voorstanders did not hate 
her personally. They stole her life – Manzini, the VIA [Voorstand Intelligence Agency], 
someone. It was not personal. They took her life from Tristan [he speaks of himself in 
the third person here], not personal. They did not think through the consequences. They 
did not even think that when the boy found his maman, at two a.m., they were 
presenting him with a horror he would carry all his life, the picture of his mother dead 
and ugly, hanging from a bright green rope. (TS 222) 
 
“They did not think through the consequences” sounds very much like a threat. But this is how 
he begins the subsequent narration of his travels to Voorstand: 
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I know you are not responsible for my mother’s death. Indeed, I write this assuming your 
individual innocence, […] 
If I will believe that of you, then please believe the following of me: that when, a whole 
twelve years after Voorstand agents murdered my maman, I made the dangerous 
voyage to your fatherland, it was not – as Mrs Kram would still have you believe – to do 
your nation harm. (TS 231) 
 
We have to be aware of the underlying irony here. Throughout this short chapter the narrative 
voice teases us with the fact that his journey to Voorstand is oddly poorly motivated and 
mockingly asks: 
 
[…] you still suspect that a great political cause had me drag my blinking share-trader’s 
face out into the bright sun. You still want to know why, why really, did I abandon my 
safe house and trundle down the No. 25 wharf in my wheelchair. What is the real story? 
(TS 233) 
 
Later in the narrative – he is already in Saarlim, the capital of Voorstand – he continues to 
construct his own harmlessness: 
 
I came with nothing, not even courage. When we got to the Grand Concourse where we 
would have to stand in line to get our POW cards, I did not even want to leave the air-
kooled Blikk [a make of car]. 
That’s the sort of threat I was. I was too ashamed to face the public gaze. (TS 294) 
 
But towards the end of the novel he sounds very different: 
 
Yes, I came into your country with my secret rage. Yes, I lied to you and said I felt no 
rage. Yes, I acted as if my mother’s murder were not a personal matter between me and 
you. But is that not, in normal circumstances, polite? (TS 401) 
 
Even though he insists, of course: 
 
Your own agent was the one who ran down the Simi [the robot that Tristan later uses as 
his Mouse costume], the so-called theft of which is the subject of charge three.* I could 
not have planned this. (TS 401) […] She [Peggy Kram] told me about the Saarlim 
Ghostdorp. It was not my idea. How could it be? Could it be anyone’s but hers? (TS 402. 
The footnote referred to by the asterisk is not reproduced here.) 
 
Now, of course these examples show an unreliable narrator who contradicts himself and 
who uses sarcasm and irony and openly derides his readers. But I would argue that for the 
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same reasons what is developed here is not an ambiguous, elusive character without a unified 
identity. If one looks at the whole picture, then the narrative voice and the character inside 
the narration present us with a motivated, committed, political, and clearly discernible subject 
position. And for agency, that is what is decisive. Not, of course, in the sense that one needed 
a definitive political cause in order to be able to act, but in the sense that one needs a common 
moral framework, pinned down, as it were, by the linchpin of a hypergood – some notion of 
what is valuable and worth pursuing. Moreover, one’s position within this moral framework 
must allow one to pursue this hypergood and pursuing this hypergood must allow one to 
unfold one’s potential. We saw in the discussion of My Life as a Fake what it means to be 
assigned a position within a common moral framework that points away from and thus makes 
it impossible to approach one’s moral goods – not to be allowed to be what one is, but to be 
made what one rejects. Thus, in as far as the narrator appears to be securely situated within 
a moral framework and from this place speaks to his readers, he does approach his moral 
goods and is a recognisable subject. To quote, once more, Charles Taylor: “Our powers must 
be deployed if these are to empower us” – and the narrator is clearly in a position to do so. 
But, and that was also pointed out in My Life as a Fake, a position within a common moral 
framework that allows such deployment of one’s inner sources, must be a ‘valid’ position, one 
in which one is heard, recognised. That was exactly the problem McCorkle was facing at the 
beginning, when he tried to interrupt David Weiss’ court hearing: “The transcript makes no 
mention of the heckler or his raw, uneducated voice. […] What transpired next seemed even 
more shocking to Chubb: the prosecutor, apparently in complete denial of this interruption, 
simply resumed his questioning” (MF 60-1). Tristan Smith, the character, will find himself in 
the exact same position at the very end of the first book: “My real face was snot, tears, drool. 
I brought it into the lights of the vid camera and screamed at them. I did not appear on the 
vid. Edited out. Not part of the story” (TS 223). 
And that, of course, stands in stark contrast to Tristan Smith, the narrative voice that 
addresses his readers. In the following, I will therefore outline the development that Tristan 
has to go through, on the intradiegetic level, in order to arrive at the position which he holds 
on the extradiegetic level – which is no easy undertaking at all in his case. In fact, the novel 
plays out his struggle in minute detail, and one can agree with Sue Ryan-Fazilleau: in this 
respect, “The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith is a Bildungsroman (and also Künstlerroman) 
describing the trials Tristan must undergo before he can overcome his identity crisis in order 
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to become a cultural warrior capable of safeguarding Australian sovereignty”468 – even though 
the substitution of Efica with Australia is a bit too simplistic here469 and it is probably a bit too 
much to claim Tristan safeguarded Efican sovereignty. 
 
7.2. Tristan’s Bildung: A Study in two Mirror Phases 
 
The development towards a recognised position within a common moral framework is of 
course central for an agency perspective. It will therefore be traced in great detail now. Again, 
what is to follow may appear as a simple re-narration of the novel, but it is a reading from a 
very specific angle, one whose validity, similarly to Illywhacker, has to be established first. 
What had been said there is also valid here therefore: The close attention to the text serves a 
purpose. 
The approach suggested here will follow Tristan’s path from initial, perhaps lifesaving 
conceit at the beginning of the first book – lifesaving because it enables him to develop a 
notion of his subjecthood, his worthiness as a human being – to the brutal confrontation with 
his monstrosity, which, however devastating it may be for him, finally dismantles his conceit 
and enables self-recognition in a mirror phase at the end of it. For the survival of his integrity 
as a person, it is important that this self-recognition is no identification with monstrosity, 
however. Instead, his self-recognition entails the rejection of his monstrous fragmentation 
and the simultaneous identification with an imaginary, enabled and whole self “in an-other 
place”.470 Over the course of the second book he will then approach a second and final mirror 
phase in which he will learn to accept his own fragmentation, which in his case is vital as it 
saves him from drowning in narcissist fantasies of empowerment. The second mirror phase 
will therefore be called acceptance phase. 
 
                                                          
468 Sue Ryan-Fazilleau, “The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith and the ‘Pain of Unbelonging’,” The Pain of 
Unbelonging, 119-42, 121. 
469 Cf. e.g. the following view by Hassall: “The imaginary countries of Efica and Voorstand in Tristan Smith 
determinedly resist any simple allegorical identification” (Anthony J. Hassall, “Power Play: The Sirkus in Peter 
Carey’s The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith,” From a Distance: Australian Writers and Cultural Displacement, ed. 
Wenche Ommundsen and Hazel Rowely, Geelong, Victoria: Deakin UP, 1996, 141-7, 142); or the following by 
James Bradley: “Efica differs from the real Australia as much if not more than it resembles it. The differences 
allow these lands [Efica and Voorstand] to stand for empire and colony everywhere, and by frustrating easy 
identification Carey universalizes the relationships within the novel” (Bradley, 658). 
470 Homer, 26. 
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7.2.1. Initial Conceit 
 
Throughout the narration, Tristan has to struggle hard for sheer survival in the extremely harsh 
conditions into which he is born. As has been said, his bodily make-up is so ‘unusual’ that 
denial and conceit may even be necessary at the beginning of his path. It is a strategy that 
allows him to establish a sense of his own humanness – something that is not granted him by 
everyone, as one can see right at the beginning of his story. 
Tristan’s account starts ab ovo – with his birth. Just after the labour is over, “two doctors 
were nervously trying to persuade Felicity that it would be better, although they did not use 
so blunt a word, for them to kill me.” But the mother insists she first wants to see her son. 
The subsequent encounter is so shocking for her that after a first glance – “she did not 
look at him directly” – she tries to flee into a protecting self-simulation: “She was aware of 
removing herself from herself, of becoming a character whom she could watch.” But the 
routine fails: “She had no distance from herself, or not sufficient. When she saw the baby’s 
face again, she put her hand across her mouth. A noise came out, a noise so painful that Marc 
Laroche’s [the obstetrician] anxious face contorted in sympathy. ‘God damn,’ he said” (TS 16-
7). And then Tristan makes his first, life-saving move: 
 
She held her finger out and touched my hand. I grasped the finger and held it with an 
intensity that surprised her. I was barely human. I was like some dream she might expect 
to stay forever hidden in the entrails of her consciousness. She tried to jerk her hand 
away. I would not let go. (TS 17) 
 
Whatever else literary critics have seen in him – and rightly so, as we will see further down – 
for the current perspective on agency, Tristan is a character in his own rights, and the point is 
that he “would not let go”. He forces himself into the recognition of his mother, who is 
reminded of a worm by the experience of his touch: 
 
it was when you held the worm in your fingers before you baited your hook, the way the 
life shrank from the hook, the way you responded to it, that strong demand within your 
fingers. It was not your personality or your character. It was something more basic than 
character. (TS 17) 
 
Although she might not yet accept Tristan as a subject, she does respond to “that strong 
demand within her fingers”. Afterwards she decides that he will not be killed and flees with 
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him from the hospital, back to her theatre building in Gazette Street 34, the Feu Follet (the 
city is Chemin Rouge, capital of Efica). “When my maman arrived on the second floor she was 
already beyond exhaustion. She had no plan.” Weeping, she locks herself into her room and 
“would not let them [the members of her company] in or even whisper through the door.” 
Yet, “[a]fterwards she pretended that this had all been part of her plan – her dramatic 
announcement later in the evening of that day. This was how she liked history told, but the 
truth was, she lost her nerve” (TS 20). 
And that is how what might be called a great, concerted effort in denial and pretence is 
launched. That very night, in a spectacular theatre performance, Felicity officially introduces 
Tristan to the world. They do the Scottish play and “[i]n normal circumstances Felicity would 
have played Lady Macbeth, but she had taken the part of First Witch in respect of her 
condition [tongue-in-cheek]” (TS 19). On stage, Felicity steals the line from the Third Witch: 
 
‘Thou shalt get Kings,’ she said, and then revealed Tristan Smith in his hiding place, inside 
the cloak against her sweating breast. […] ‘Thou shalt get Kings, though thou be none,’ 
she said, and thrust me out into the world. ENTER TRISTAN SMITH – a gruesome little 
thing, slippery and sweating from his long enclosure in that rubber cloak, so truly 
horrible to look at that the audience can see the Witches must struggle to control their 
feelings of revulsion. (TS 31) 
 
Tristan’s story, then, is the one Shakespeare never told, the one he “edited out”. It fills the 
gap that Shakespeare left open by relegating Fleance, Banquo’s (the receiver of the prophecy 
in Shakespeare) son, to the margins – the periphery shouting at the centre (three years later, 
in Jack Maggs, Peter Carey carries out a very similar manoeuvre with Charles Dickens’ Great 
Expectations). 
However, in respect to Tristan’s development, one also has to pay regard for the fact that 
he is introduced to the world in a performance. Everyone around him plays a role, and it will 
remain this way throughout his early childhood. Right after the stage performance, the 
readers witness another one, this time on the stage that is the world. As is tradition, “all the 
cast and half the audience pushed up the noisy staircase to the tower” to discuss the opening 
night – and on this occasion also “to see exactly who I was” (TS 35). Vincent Theroux, one of 
Felicity’s lovers and a possible father of Tristan, peers through the crowd that has gathered in 
her room: “and there she was, totally alone, exhausted, with the spooky white-eyed baby on 
her crumpled bed” (TS 36). But then the performance takes its course: 
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Someone had, at last, taken pity on Felicity – Claire Chen. […] she was the one who sat 
on the bed and laid her ringed hand on the baby’s foot. When she did this, the room 
quietened. […] Felicity asked Claire, ‘Would you like to hold him?’ […] ‘Sure,’ Claire said, 
‘I’ll hold him.’ […] He [Vincent] could see by the way she pulled her chin into her neck – 
everything in her wanted to thrust the child away. Claire did the thing Vincent knew he 
was expected to do himself – touched the lipless little tragedy, stroked its gaunt little 
praying mantis head. It was very quiet in the square, high-ceilinged little room. […] ‘Feel,’ 
Claire invited, her little brown eyes flicking about the room – she had done the brave 
thing, but she did not want to do it a second longer. ‘It’s so amazing.’ […] When he 
[Vincent] had me held aloft, all he could think was that he was going to faint. No one 
spoke, no one made a sound. (TS 37-8) 
 
Another participant in this scene is Bill Millefleur, another of Felicity’s lovers, and the one the 
narrator takes to be his biological father. On him, the performance leaves quite a disturbing 
impression: “What Bill could not stand was: why must they deny there had been a tragedy?” 
(TS 39) “It was an orgy of denial. It disgusted him” (TS 43). 
This “orgy of denial” is highly ambiguous. While it protects Tristan and allows him to have 
a happy childhood, it also seriously misleads him. Every year, “[i]n the dry season the company 
hired a little one-ring tent and went out into the countryside with the Haflinger bus, a horse 
float, a rented truck, and an ever-changing show my mother named The Sad Sack Sirkus” (TS 
64). Tristan loves these tours, and although he sees the world, he always remains within his 
protected sphere: 
 
Of course I often repulsed strangers in those isolated estuary towns, but when I say this 
did not affect me you have to see the crowd that I was travelling with: men with tattooed 
fingers, women with tinted leg hair, crushed velvet, aromatic oils, ornamental face scars. 
[…] Thus I remained as swaddled and protected under the bright southern skies as I was 
inside the rank dusty womb of the Feu Follet. […] but the truth was, I was being privately 
tutored not only in my schoolwork, but in the radical’s conceit, that I was different, but 
superior. (TS 66-7) 
 
Here we have it, then, the radical’s conceit of being different but superior. It is immediately 
evident that we are dealing with a form of narcissism, but also a form of denial, avoidance or 
flight. To be “different, but superior” means one does recognise one’s marginalised position 
within the common moral framework (to be different), but to reinterpret it (to be superior), 
which means that one’s own narratisation of oneself differs radically from that of most others. 
The radical’s conceit, in its most basic form, is thus a flight from and refusal to engage with 
the common moral framework in a mutually transformative process. 
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Already at this point, then, one may try to put the radical’s conceit into a formulaic 
expression: In Carey’s universe, in order to change society, one first has to be a part of it. But 
this is of course easier said than done if it is society itself that puts one into a marginalised 
position. It is a feat that is ultimately based on self-acceptance. Self-acceptance is the 
acceptance of the shape of one’s self within the common moral framework, or the position 
within the common moral framework in which the gaze of the other puts you – but to 
dissociate from this gaze itself (this should become clearer once we engage with the two 
mirror phases). Simply: to bear and confront marginalisation without fleeing into self-
constructed superiority. 
Back in the novel, Tristan is of course far from self-acceptance. In fact, he is not even aware 
that there might be anything to accept – happily shielded from the outside world as he is 
“inside the rank dusty womb of the Feu Follet” (note how close this formulation, “womb”, is 
to descriptions of primary narcissism, see further down). Over time, however, the situation 
steadily grows tenser, and it becomes clear that at some point the protective bubble must 
burst: “I had become a furtive, even sneaky child, one given to wild and dangerously unrealistic 
dreams. […] At ten years old I believed books would be written about me” (TS 70). Not 
surprisingly Tristan wants to become an actor. And when his wish to act for the Feu Follet is 
denied him, he stubbornly tries to prove his ability in a life-threatening stunt. Performing the 
role of the Hairy Man, an evil Sirkus character, he climbs a very high tree. This is a significant 
scene for several reasons and it will reappear in Chapter 7.3., in connection with Tristan’s 
subversiveness. Here, the important point is that it clearly brings to the fore the destructive 
potential of Tristan’s conceit. Even without his drastic impairment, this climb would be a life-
threatening act. While his action thus brings him into acute danger, he still elicits positive 
reactions from his family – although no one except Bill can read his intention: 
 
My audience was all spellbound – Wally pale, my father smiling, but my maman was so 
still, so intensely still. She held her windblown curls back from her eyes, squinting up at 
me. My arms were an agony. My legs hung like tails. But there was nothing I would not 
have done to maintain the private look of admiration that I found in her face. So 
although I dared not hang as I had planned, I turned and climbed (TS 74). 
 
The bubble in which Tristan lives is not quite as protective as it may appear, then. Perhaps, 
one may rather liken it to an egg that impedes Tristan’s further development and against 
whose shell he pushes as he grows. At some point the shell is bound to break. Potentially, the 
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finally push will set Tristan free, but it will also confront him with a world outside that is quite 
dangerous and that he did not know exists. 
 
7.2.2. The Gaze of the Other 
 
The point of crisis is finally reached when his mother, a little later, suddenly abandons her 
theatre project and moves in with Vincent in order to enter a political career. Tristan rebels. 
He is eleven years old. After a fight in which Felicity slaps his hand, he runs away and, for the 
first time in his life, confronts the world alone. The events that now unfold are decisive for his 
further development. The narrator begins by once more bringing up young Tristan’s conceit: 
 
My mother was right – it was how she brought me up: I had no idea of how I looked. I 
had no real conception of my effect on others. […] And although no one ever spelled it 
out to me, I was really led to believe that it was only BAD PEOPLE who found me 
repulsive – supporters of the Voorstand Alliance, racists, fascists, not ordinary decent 
folk. (TS 131-2) 
 
It is night and Tristan has left Vincent’s house in order to make for the Feu Follet. Since his legs 
are seriously impaired, just like the rest of his body, he walks on his knees, but that cannot 
stop his high spirits: “The resistance of my body, the immediate and early declaration of its 
limitations, was nothing – the stretch of my abbreviated hamstrings was, not quite pleasure, 
but certainly not pain” (TS 130-1). Pretty soon, however, harsh reality catches up with him. He 
“knee-walks” next to a road and waves at a car. It stops – and then the driver tries to run him 
over (TS 132). 
 
An hour later […] I would have gone back to my bed if I could, but I no longer had that 
option. I just lay there in my pee-wet trousers, shivering, lost in space until the cold 
became worse than the fear and I edged my way slowly out of the overpass shadow and 
into the bright stage-light of the freeway. (TS 133) 
 
The next driver who stops has to throw up upon seeing Tristan, but he eventually takes him 
on board and, not being able to understand his impaired speech, takes him to the hospital. 
“Wendell, with all his considerable, ill-informed good will, delivered me into the safe hands of 
the orderlies at the Mater Hospital and convinced them, no matter how I wept or hollered, 
that it was their duty to detain me for treatment” (TS 136). And that is where Tristan’s bildung 
really begins. 
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Entering the hospital, being strapped to a wheelchair, “I was in the habit of thinking of 
myself as – I have said this already – the avant garde, the elite. I associated with anarchists, 
populists, nationalists, but whatever position we had, we imagined ourselves better informed 
than anyone who walked outside the big door on Gazette Street” (TS 138). Waking up, the 
next morning, in the burns unit, he is confronted by a group of sympathetic visitors: 
 
They all wore hospital gowns and they all had missing faces, cleft palates, conditions 
where teeth penetrated lips, misfortunes so repelling it would have been difficult for me 
to quietly contemplate them even in the colour plates of a magazine. You may not like 
me saying it, but my visitors were gross. (TS 153) 
 
Tristan looks into a metaphoric mirror here, and while he consciously struggles to deny what 
he sees, he already guesses its validity: “Even as I gurgled and babbled about mistakes I knew 
it was not true. I was meant to be here. I belonged here. Their faces defined the territory” (TS 
154). 
When “[t]heir faces defined the territory”, then his “gross” visitors interpellate Tristan in 
this scene and situate him within a specific territory of the social structure. However, while 
social structure and the discourse of power clearly offer some explanatory value here, they do 
not suffice to express the existential crisis through which Tristan goes in this episode. If we 
want to grasp what the assigned territory means for him in terms of the value or worthiness 
he assigns to himself as human being, we have to use different categories – the ones that were 
established and used throughout this thesis. However, at this point, to ensure a consistent 
reading also in the next chapters on Tristan Smith, I have to specify the concept of 
narratisation somewhat. 
The integration of one’s person into a common moral framework, it was said, is achieved 
by a process of cooperative self-narration, by the transformation of historical time into human 
time that simultaneously integrates one’s self into a broader, human context. This 
narratisation, however, can be further sub-divided into two related aspects. One aspect is the 
integration of one’s raw experiencing into a coherent storyline. This is the ontological aspect 
of self-narration. The other aspect is the integration of the resulting entity into the grid of a 
common moral framework. This is the moral aspect of self-narration. And it is of course the 
latter process that fails in Tristan’s case above (similar to the externally narrated characters in 
My Life as a Fake). To be even more precise, through the well-intended presence of his visitors, 
he is taken out of the common moral framework provided by the theatre group of the Feu 
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Follet, and flung into the broader social context of his society. And the obvious reason why he 
cannot accept this enforced integration into the more general common moral framework is 
that his place in there would have seriously devaluing, disintegrating consequences for his 
sense of self. He would not, in this case, accept himself as valid human being. 
His consequent dissociation from the territory assigned to him by the horrible faces who 
look at him and in which he sees himself mirrored is instant and violent. “‘Fuck . . . off,’ I 
screamed. A minute later the room was empty, the door was shut, and I was alone – scared 
and shaking. All I knew was: I was not them, would not be them, would not be looked at in 
that way” (154-5). 
For the first time in his life, Tristan is confronted with a territory, a position in the moral 
framework, designated as ‘other’. For the first time, he fully understands the meaning of this 
position, and to his horror, he feels that it is somehow associated with himself. His attempt to 
flee from it results in a second spectacular climbing scene. This time he is not the Hairy Man 
climbing up a tree, but a hero climbing down “thick metal waste pipes running in a neat daisy 
chain from floor to floor, five storeys to the ground”: 
 
Watching the performance, you would not have seen the pain, but that pipe was rusty 
and sometimes rough and very, very cold. […] I did not know what floor I was on at any 
moment. My arms felt like ripped lead. My hands were numb, bleeding, but I was 
transformed. I was no longer one of the pitiable wretches I had left behind upstairs. As 
I descended, I was an actor – Mark Antony, Richard the Third, the Phantom of the Rue 
Morgue (TS 155) 
 
But this time quite a different crowd gathers on the ground to look at his public performance, 
and they will not give him his mother’s “private look of admiration”:  
 
Finally I permitted myself to look down to my audience. The ground was not more than 
twenty feet below me. Faces were tilted up towards me. I turned to them. 
The faces were all wrong. 
They were not faces looking at an actor. Nor were they looking at something as simple 
as a boy on a pipe. The faces looked at something like snot, like slime, like something 
dripping down towards them from which they wished to take their eyes and which, the 
clearer and closer it became, produced in their own eyes and lips such grotesque 
contortions that I knew – properly, fully, for the first time in my life – I was a monster. 
(TS 156) 
 
His attempt to manipulate the audience’s perception through his acting completely misfires 
and he is indeed “looked at in that way”. Wally, a member of his mother’s former theatre 
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group and the one who takes on the role of his father, is amongst the crowd: “When I fell into 
his arms he crushed me to him, as if, in holding my snotty face so forcibly against his neck, he 
could block out everything I had just learned” (TS 156). Dissociating himself from himself, the 
narrator continues to describe the same scene once more, but this time from a third person 
perspective: 
 
When he first heard this noise [a cooing noise from Wally], the boy speeded his descent, 
but then he paused, and looked down […]. 
A kind of shudder went through the crowd. It shifted its ground and emitted a little 
murmur of disgust. 
‘It’s a mutant, Maman,’ someone called. ‘It’s Phantome Drool.’ 
The boy heard it. You could see it reach him, like hot water reaching a spider in your 
sink. He shrivelled. (TS 156-7) 
 
The whole hospital scene, then, describes how Tristan meets the public gaze for the first 
time unprotected. All his violent dissociation is in vain. “I was not them, would not be them, 
would not be looked at in that way”, he exclaimed. But in the end, “[t]heir faces defined the 
territory” – and that is the faces of both, the gross visitors in the burns unit and the faces of 
the audience watching him climb. Do what he may, he is “looked at in that way” and brutally 
put into the territory designated as ‘other’, ‘monster’, ‘mutant’ – disempowered hantu. The 
effect of this positioning, of this forcibly being made what he rejects, is as violent an 
experience for Tristan as it is for the characters in My Life as a Fake. It nearly kills him. He so 
fiercely rejects this placement that he dissociates himself from himself and switches in his 
narratisation into a distanced outside perspective, changes into the third person singular 
mode. 
Back in the Feu Follet, Roxanna, Wally’s lover, dresses Tristan’s physical wounds: “It was 
shocking, but not shocking, it was just, finally, how it was – bones, skin, scars, the heart beating 
like in a baby’s chest”. But the soul is a different matter: “You could see his shame. It 
surrounded him like an aura, like Milly when she had been raped by that moron at the Shell 
station. This one was the same – he had been so brave, but he was ashamed and could not 
look anyone in the eye” (TS 158-9). 
The episode is devastating for Tristan, but “it was just, finally, how it was”. That is, the 
“orgy of denial” is over, too. This learning process may be cruel but it is also crucial. It allows 
him to escape his conceit, and that in turn kick-starts a whole sequence of decisive experiences 
that follow in quick succession. First, however, Tristan has to find to himself again, to 
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overcome his self-rejection. And that is achieved in the very next scene when Roxanna takes 
Tristan, Wally, and ‘Sparrow’ (actually Sparrowgrass Glashan, TS 25), another member of the 
former theatre group, to the Sirkus. 
At first Tristan protests and fights against being taken into the public again. But then the 
adults force a Bruder Mouse mask over his face and Wally carries him into a restroom to 
confront him with a mirror. What Tristan sees there has quite an effect on him: “He moved 
his arm. It was the Mouse’s arm. Snot dripped from his nose, but out of sight. His cheeks were 
awash with tears, but no one could see that” (TS 163). Although the narration is still kept in a 
dissociated third person perspective here, the mask transforms his outer shell enough for 
Tristan to find to himself underneath its protective cover. There is a chapter break at this point, 
and the next chapter starts with “I” again: “I did not stop shaking straight away, but it was 
warm inside the mask and my own sweet breath enveloped me. I was Bruder Mouse. All 
around me were other children dressed just the same.” Since everyone wears it, the cover of 
the mask allows Tristan to avoid being ‘othered’. It helps him into a moment of passing. But 
in his case this is a double move. He switches from the self-distance of a third person narration 
to first person narration and associates himself with himself again, but at the same time this 
means that he also associates with the crowd in which he passes: 
 
I did not like children. I was jealous of them, frightened of them, dedicated to placing 
myself in a FAR SUPERIOR CATEGORY of life, but at the Sirkus I had this in common with 
them: they too preferred to stay inside their masks, to tolerate the tight elastic, the 
improperly placed eye-holes which impeded views of the great Sirkus sky above us. 
They, like me, had their heads forever in exaggerated motion. (TS 163) 
 
Even an “us” escapes the narrator in this scene. His conceit has been blown to pieces. For the 
first time he does not feel superior to his peers anymore. He accepts that he has to hold a 
position in the social order, and that it is this that connects him with everyone else. So this 
visit at the Sirkus is truly a rite of ‘passage’ for Tristan – his initiation into the extended 
common moral framework. He realises that “they too preferred to stay inside their masks”, 
that in the social order of the framework everyone performs a role to a certain extent. What 
he still has to learn, though, is that this mask is really more than self-protection and a screen 
behind which one can seek refuge. It is also an image of completion, a projection of a unified, 
fully empowered self into the ‘other’ place of the imaginary. And this is a lesson Felicity will 
teach him. 
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7.2.3. The First Mirror Stage 
 
By running away Tristan has forced Felicity to recognize him. For the first time she truly looks 
at her son and takes him seriously. At last she realises how much he wants to be an actor, and 
decides to give him acting lessons. The narrator relates two lessons, and both are decisive. 
“You must keep on learning about being brave,” she tells him in the first session. “This is 
something you can’t learn once. You have to learn it over and over” (TS 174). And in front of 
a mirror, Felicity transforms Tristan into Puck from Shakespeare’s Midsummer Night’s Dream: 
 
I looked in the mirror and saw a creature, a fairy, something from another level of 
existence, pixie, elf, homunculus. […] She made my chest into something blue and black 
like the night sky. My scars she turned into lightning bolts. It took a long, long time. I did 
not mind. It was like being polished into life, like being a statue whose feet are washed 
with milk and yoghurt every morning. (TS 173). […] 
‘What do you see?’ […] 
I looked so wonderful, so unimaginable, so beautiful that it seemed presumptuous to 
say anything. 
‘A mutant?’ 
‘No.’ 
‘And certainly not ugly.’ […] 
She left Tristan Smith alone in the spotlight. My bladder defeated me before I was 
bored with my reflection. (TS 174-5) 
 
Tristan goes through a Lacanian mirror phase here. This is a moment when a child 
identifies with an empowered, unified ‘mirror’ image of itself and simultaneously dissociates 
from its own ‘fragmentation’. This, and that the ‘mirror’ must be understood metaphorically, 
becomes quite clear in Elizabeth Roudinesco’s explanation of the concept in the Cambridge 
Companion to Lacan: 
 
According to Lacan, who borrowed the idea from the Dutch embryologist Louis Bolk, the 
importance of the mirror stage must be linked to human prematurity at birth, which is 
demonstrated objectively by the anatomical incompleteness of the pyramidal system in 
infants and their imperfect powers of physical coordination during the early months of 
life. […] The mirror phase, occurring between the sixth and eighteenth month of life, is 
thus the time when the infant anticipates mastery of his bodily unity through 
identification with the image of a fellow being and through perceiving his own image in 
a mirror.471 
 
                                                          
471 Elizabeth Roudinesco, “The Mirror Stage: An Obliterated Archive,” Rabaté 2003, 25-34, 30. 
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Tristan goes exactly through this process. Watching himself in silence, he imagines 
completeness in an ‘other’ place and goes through an ambivalent moment of alienation and 
identification: “She left Tristan [third person, alienation] in the spotlight. My [identification] 
bladder defeated me before I was bored with my reflection”. Taken together, the cruel 
experience of fragmentation in the hospital and the identification with an image of 
empowered completeness in his mother’s mirror thus complete Tristan’s mirror phase and 
enable the development of secure personhood. 
There is one aspect of Tristan’s transition that still needs to be emphasised since it is 
important for the following discussion and was not directly mentioned in the quotation from 
Roudinesco. The being that is reflected back to Tristan and with which he identifies, this 
“something from another level of existence”, is not the Mouse and does not belong to a place 
in a neatly arranged relational system. It clearly belongs into the chaotic, undefined, and 
indefinable realm of the imaginary. His identification is image based – literally imaginary – and 
pre-linguistic: “it seemed presumptuous to say anything”. It is important, therefore, to keep 
in mind that he does not seek to transform himself here in the same sense as the compulsive 
masters of Illywhacker. 
Accompanying his father-figure Wally into the Sirkus, he wears a mask – but he does not 
identify with it. The Mouse is only a cover underneath which “[h]is cheeks were awash with 
tears, but no one could see that”. With his father, and hidden under the Mouse, he realises 
that he is part of a moral framework, that he is bound by the law of the father. Now, however, 
“being polished into life” by his mother, he identifies with something imaginary outside the 
order of signs, “something”, to repeat the quote once more, “from another level of existence”. 
“I looked so wonderful, so unimaginable, so beautiful”. The result of this learning process is 
that his experience of being situated in an abject position (as opposed to a subject position) 
in the common moral framework is complemented by a pre-linguistic, fantasmatic realisation 
of himself as an empowered person outside himself. As Sean Homer put it: “the infant’s [in 
our case: Tristan’s] realization (in both senses of the term: forming a distinct concept in the 
mind and becoming real) lies in an-other place.”472 
In Tristan’s case, however, we witness a form of protective regression. As has been said, 
he dissociates himself from his position within the moral framework and associates with the 
empowered image from the mirror. Tristan may therefore be able to take recourse to a 
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fantasmatic, empowered self-image now, but he is still not able to bear the public gaze 
without protection. Although fiercely fighting Voorstand’s cultural and political dominance 
over Efica, Felicity buys Tristan a valuable Bruder Mouse mask which he wears constantly in 
order to avoid the gaze that threatens to put him back again into a place in the moral 
framework which he so strongly rejects. 
Again, he does not identify with this mask. Even though he even tries to perfect the Mouse-
look with further embellishments, he still only uses it as a cover for different roles, such as 
Richard the Third. He does not transport himself into an already achieved future like Herbert 
Badgery, does not transform himself into the idealised being of a relational sign system, and 
engages in a hyperreal self-performance. The problem is a different one, in a way the opposite 
one, but nonetheless quite serious. 
Unable to meet the gaze without protection, and permanently keeping his cover behind 
the shelter of the mask, Tristan is in danger of losing himself in the fantasmatic: 
 
No one who watched the speech [a televised speech by Felicity] would have believed 
that she had dressed her own son in the visage of the enemy, and that the son now sat, 
not listening to a word his mother said, dreaming his own flickering dreams, peering at 
her through the half-moon slits in the back of Bruder Mouse’s eyes. (TS 180) 
 
It was easy for me to slip away to examine that subject which now interested me the 
most – my new self […] I taped cartridge paper in cylinders around my twisted legs in an 
uncomfortable approximation of the Bruder’s slick white boots. […] 
I set up in my own private dusty dark and recited bits of Shakespeare to the empty 
seats – Richard the Third – you would not have understood a word of what I said, but 
you were not there, Madam, Meneer, and your pity did not tarnish the glamour of my 
role. (TS 184) 
 
I remained alone in the kitchen dreaming vague dreams involving glittering cloaks and 
dazzling lights. (TS 185) 
 
Tristan does not control the gaze through self-mastery here. He takes the course of the 
powerless and escapes the gaze by fleeing into fantasies. But this is a problem, if it turns into 
a compulsive avoidance strategy. He wants to look “through the half-moon slits in the back of 
Bruder Mouse’s eyes” rather than to stand on the other side, out in the open, confronting the 
Mouse’s eyes and being exposed to the gaze of the moral framework. However, it is this 
exposure to the gaze in which one sees oneself through stranger’s eyes, and through which, 
therefore, “authentic reflexive monitoring” is enabled, to use Giddens’ term. The opposite of 
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compulsive mastery – Tristan’s compulsive avoidance strategy of fleeing into fantasies – is 
thus something I want to call enabling escapism. 
In order to deepen the concept and connect it with agency, I want to draw on Sigmund 
Freud’s notion of primary narcissism that, as it turns out, is also essential for Lacan’s 
conceptualisation of the mirror phase. In his essay “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (1914)473 
Freud refers back to his Totem and Taboo (1913)474 to describe a primary, infantile narcissism 
that is based on a “primitive feeling of omnipotence”,475 an “omnipotence of thought” that 
can also be found in primitive peoples: “an over-estimation of the power of their wishes and 
mental acts, the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’, a belief in the thaumaturgic force of words”.476 
According to Freud, a residual of this infantile omnipotence can even be found in grown-ups 
of modern societies and be corroborated by self-confirming experiences and the fulfilment of 
an ego ideal.477 The concept of the ego ideal is introduced by Freud in this essay, and only later 
developed further into his notion of the super-ego.478 But for the concept of enabling 
escapism, we have to stick to primary narcissism. 
For the purpose at hand, it is therefore more important to realise that Freud’s concept of 
the infantile “omnipotence of thoughts”479 clearly corresponds to Lacan and the imaginary, 
empowered self with which the child – Tristan in our case – identifies in the mirror phase. 
Roudinesco’s earlier quotation, for example, continues thus: “Henceforth, Lacan bases his idea 
of the mirror phase on the Freudian concept of primary narcissism.”480 So when Lee opposes 
the “young moi”481 or “imaginary moi identity”482 of the mirror phase to the je identity that 
Lacan, according to Lee, understands “in terms of symbolic narrative”,483 then it is clear that 
                                                          
473 The introduction by the editors (ix-xx) contributed greatly to my own understanding of Freud’s 
conceptualisation of narcissism. 
474 There, Freud states: “If children and primitive men find play and imitative representation enough for them, 
that is not a sign of their being unassuming in our sense or of their resignedly accepting their actual impotence. 
It is the easily understandable result of the paramount virtue they ascribe to their wishes, of the will that is 
associated with those wishes and of the methods by which those wishes operate” (Freud, Totem and Taboo, 84). 
475 Freud, “On Narcissism,” 98/28. 
476 Ibid., 75/5. 
477 Ibid., 98/28; 100/30. 
478 See, also e.g. Starchey’s footnote 2 in ibid., 95/25, or Freud, “The Ego and the Id,” 27. 
479 See his descriptions in Totem and Taboo, especially 83-7. According to Freud, the term was coined by one of 
his patients (the ‘Rat Man’, see The Standard Edition, vol. 10, page 233 onwards). 
480 Roudinesco, 30. See also Homer: “The mirror phase occurs roughly between the ages of six and 18 months 
and corresponds to Freud’s stage of primary narcissism” (24). 
481 Lee, 27. 
482 Ibid., 58. 
483 Ibid., 47. Lacan’s text was first published in 1956 in “[t]he first volume of La psychoanalyse” (Lee, 31). Lee 
quotes from “Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychoanalyse,” Écrits, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 
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Tristan flees from the ontologically threatening narratisation in the now into a protective but 
regressive identification with this empowered, “imaginary moi identity”. 
But there is more to fantasising and play-acting than developing and exercising 
megalomaniac fantasies into which elder children like Tristan or grown-ups may regress at 
times. A fundamental aspect of infantile role play is that it is quasi-action, reversible, without 
consequences; action not performed in earnest; that it is ‘only’ a simulation. So, when Tristan 
stands in front of the mirror “to examine that subject which now interested me the most – my 
new self”, when he loses himself in his fancies, “dreaming his own flickering dreams”, and 
when he “recited bits of Shakespeare to the empty seats” to revel in “the glamour of my role”, 
then he engages in pseudo-activity or practice. He is trying, testing, simulating himself in an 
‘as if mode’, as opposed to ‘really doing’ and forming himself like a compulsive master (like 
Herbert or Phoebe from Illywhacker). We see Tristan internalising and simulating the moral 
goods of his moral framework. He tests the shape and possible shapes of his self. 
When compulsive masters switch into the future tense in their narratisation in order to 
rewrite their now from that position, then enabled escapists like Tristan switch in their 
narratisation from the indicative into the optative mood – the mood of wishes and 
possibilities, the ‘as if mood’484 – in order to escape from their now, to avoid the gaze of the 
other, and to fantasise different positions for themselves inside the moral framework. That is 
precisely the reason why Tristan has to wear a mask for doing this. Since the hospital scene, 
he is only too aware of his actual shape, of his actual position within the moral framework. 
The mask helps him to avoid the gaze – to hide his shape especially from himself – and to 
switch into the optative mood. As has been said, in this reversible quasi-narratisation, in which 
all human beings engage at times, moral values are practised and further incorporated, 
internalised. Tristan, however, uses the optative mood to flee into megalomaniac fantasies of 
omnipotence. It is here that Felicity’s second lesson comes in, too. 
Tristan wants to do great roles: “I had expected a text from Shakespeare, Molière, Racine” 
(TS 192), but to his dismay his mother insists on the Chef of Efica – with nothing more than a 
                                                          
1966, 237-322; and “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” Écrits: A Selection, trans. 
Alan Sheridan, New York: Norton, 1977, 30-113. 
484 “Optative (adj./n.) A term sometimes used in grammatical description, to refer to a category of mood which 
expresses a desire, hope, or wish. The optative mood (‘the optative’) is chiefly known from Classical Greek. 
Optative expressions in English use the modal verbs or the subjunctive: May they get home safely, Heaven help 
us!” (“Optative,” A Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics, 6th ed., ed. David Crystal, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2008). 
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shoe and an empty paint tin as his means of expression. In this way, he is less enabled to live 
out his fantasies of greatness and forced to use his imagination to completely immerse himself 
into the role of the Chef and the shoe-tap dialogue with his mother. But the most important 
part of the session comes when the performance is over. Felicity asks Roxanna to climb into 
the ring and meet Tristan in an intense staring duel. 
 
I looked at her eyes. I concentrated. I could feel her so personally. I felt myself being 
looked at. […] 
‘Explore it,’ my mother’s voice said. 
‘It’s like a pain,’ she said. ‘Get used to it. […]’ 
I was now in the scary world of Roxanna’s eyes. It was like holding your hand in a flame. 
My ugliness was all around me. I was vile, on my own stage, in my own home. (TS 195) 
 
Through Roxanna’s eyes Tristan takes on the perspective of a stranger – of the moral 
framework that is – towards himself. In his case, this gaze threatens to place him into an 
utterly rejected territory and thus constitutes an assault to his very sense of personhood. He 
is exposed on the dissecting board of another person’s eyes as it were. His task is therefore to 
bear this attack without dissociating himself from himself as he did the first time when he met 
with that gaze. This lesson is so vital because it forces him out of his fantasmatic shapes, strips 
them off him, and confronts him, spiritually naked, with the harsh reality of the moral 
framework. It is only this exposure that can enable “authentic reflexive monitoring” in the 
end. 
 
7.2.4. Interlude 
 
The vital lesson of bearing the gaze of the other is brutally interrupted shortly after the scene 
above, and it will be continued and completed only much later in the story. From a 
narratological perspective one could say that the stage is sufficiently prepared, at this point, 
to introduce the final challenge and the villain of the piece. What causes this interruption and 
serves as the thrown down gauntlet at the very end of the first book, is the murder of Felicity. 
Tristan is confronted here with a similarly horrific scene as Molly in Illywhacker when she sees 
her dead mother hanging from a rope. In fact, it is almost the same impression he receives, 
only, perhaps, his case is even more dramatic: 
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They came and put a rope around her neck, and pushed her off. She hung and kicked 
above the sawdust ring, her own damn stage. She pissed, she shit, she bled, she died. 
[…] 
They stole her life – Manzini, the VIA, someone. It was not personal. They took her life 
from Tristan, not personal. They did not think through the consequences. They did not 
even think that when the boy found his maman, at two a.m., they were presenting him 
with a horror he would carry all his life, the picture of his mother dead and ugly, hanging 
from a bright green rope. […] 
Tristan saw his mother hanging dead inside the Feu Follet theatre. Her handbag was 
on the floor. Her eyes bulging, her jaw slack. His brain lied to him. […] 
Only the smell. Forget it. It was a smell. I cannot go to the bathroom without 
remembering my maman’s death. (TS 222-3; see also the description of these events at 
TS 303-4) 
 
We know that Tristan will eventually make good on the threat he voices here. But his instant 
reaction is that of the powerless: 
 
I could not reach her but I cut my mask off my face with a box-cutter. I could not reach 
her but I smashed Bruder Mouse with a brick. […] 
I ground the mask, pulped the wood, paint. My real face was snot, tears, drool I 
brought it into the lights of the vid camera and screamed at them. 
I did not appear on vid. Edited out. Not part of the story. (TS 223) 
 
Tristan blows his cover, he gives up the protection of the hated Mouse and confronts the 
moral framework. But he is powerless like Chubb and McCorkle in My Life as a Fake. As hantu, 
as monster, he is a ghost, invisible, and has no means to engage with the social arena on his 
own terms. “Not part of the story” stands in a very prominent place, it is the last sentence of 
the first book, and thus emphasises Tristan’s impotence. 
This helplessness in the face of the overwhelming enemy creates a strong anxiety in 
Tristan: “Everything that had allowed me to sustain my problematic existence, the illusion of 
my talent, my safety, my power, all this died with my mother. One day I was Napoleon. Next 
day I was a coward” (TS 231). With the world so brutally imposing itself upon him, escaping 
into fantasies of omnipotence – switching into the optative mood – becomes impossible, as 
does the ability to bear the gaze of the other at least temporarily. The traumatic event 
becomes “that night, that death, the single event I spend my waking hours avoiding” (TS 303). 
The powerful image of his dead mother imprints itself onto his mind and connects itself to the 
symbol of the Mouse. From now on, the Mouse is his nightmare vision – very much like Molly’s 
hereditary madness. It is the monster that lurks outside the tower. It is, for the moment, an 
enemy that is too strong for him to take on. 
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Through cutbacks in the second book the readers learn that after his mother’s death and 
after Bill Millefleur spectacularly deserts him (Book II, Chapters 23-5), Tristan is absolutely 
unable to leave the Feu Follet, the theatre building he inherited from his mother. In fact, his 
anxiety is so strong and his refusal to leave the Feu Follet so absolute that Roxanna even tries 
to kill him by poisoning. She had decided to settle down and become happy with Wally and 
now finds herself imprisoned in the theatre building. After a dramatic feud between her and 
Tristan (TS, Chapters 2-4; 392-3) during which she tells him quite frankly “‘I’ll kill you if I have 
to’” (TS 240), we read: “I never knew until later, but when I was discharged from the Mater, 
Roxanna was gone from our life” (TS 242; at 392-3 Wally implies he killed her, but actually says 
she went to jail). 
There is a gap in the narration between Books I and II. Twelve years pass between the time 
of Felicity’s murder and the time Tristan starts his journey to Voorstand with Wally and 
Jacques. The few things Tristan tells his readers of this episode are another example of his 
duplicity as narrator. The whole episode from Chapters two to four of the second book is a 
description of the lonely life of his and Wally’s after Roxanna is gone. In the end, it comes 
down to him giving his Voorstandish readers the following motivation for his travel plans: 
 
And then, just when you would think that that was that – when we were, the two of us, 
like a pair of crippled eccentrics whose wasted lives would make you shudder, whose 
existence you might learn of only when one died and the other starved to death, I 
suggested that we take this trip to Voorstand together. […] I dimly realized that this 
might be our life-line and I began to inch my way timidly forwards […]. (TS 243) 
 
But we also learn that Tristan, during this time, “was active in the January 20 Group”, a 
“[r]adical nationalist group named in commemoration of Felicity Smith’s death”. In the year 
387 EC (that is, by the Efican Calendar) – when Tristan is probably 16 years old – two members 
go to jail for the possession of firearms: “From that time on the group was thought to be 
toothless” (TS 233). So, “although the January 20 Group had the publicly declared aim of 
attacking sites of Voorstand’s installations in Efica, no one really expected anything more 
terrorizing than an essay or a letter to the Chemin Rouge Reformer” (TS 271). Also, we learn 
that Tristan gets a computer from Wally and uses it for online stock trading:  
 
my lethargy did not finally disappear until I discovered that I could use Axis 9iL [the 
computer’s name and a foreshadowing of Gabrielle Baillieux’ Mac IIx in Amnesia] to 
make money. Then my life changed overnight. […] I had a shaky start, but two years later 
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I was producing returns of between 5 and 10 per cent per month. This was from 386 to 
393 [from Tristan being about 15 to Tristan being about 22], years of the great Bull 
Market, and I was one of those so called pin-ball sorciers who brought the market 
crushing down – a Momentum Investor. (TS 232) 
 
So just how much of a lethargic, “crippled eccentric[] whose wasted [life] would make you 
shudder” is Tristan? The market comes crushing down in 393, and “two days after my twenty-
second birthday [that is, in the very year 393], you [us Voorstanders] refused me a tourist 
stempel” (TS 233). So, at the point “the market comes crushing down”, the journey to 
Voorstand seems to have been planned already, and it is finally entered upon in September 
394. Combining these facts, a pattern emerges in which Tristan actually plans and prepares 
meticulously over many years his journey to Voorstand. It was already pointed out by 
discussing the narrative situation that the extradiegetic Tristan is full of irony and actively 
misleads us, Voorstandish, readers; and again, these few details which we learn about the 
narrative gap strongly suggest ulterior motives – the very political cause the narrator so 
adamantly denies to have had in mind. 
Now, plot-wise, the gap between Books I and II, which is revealed only through dispersed 
flashbacks, occurs in exactly the place where in movies there would be a montage. The basic 
setting is developed, the antagonist, the Mouse, is introduced, and the hero has suffered his 
first defeat and needs to gather strength in order to prepare for the final battle. This is a phase 
in the narrative structure where a remarkable change in the character, a metamorphosis, 
needs to be made plausible. So, the montage is meant to demonstrate how a lot of time 
elapses with relatively little action – except for the hero gaining strength and skills; in Tristan’s 
case money, education, and experience in an armed underground organisation. Finally, at the 
end of the montage, the hero emerges, like a butterfly from its cocoon, or Tristan from his 
tower, suddenly strong enough to fight the evil. All the time, young Tristan was too powerless, 
or “toothless” as the January 20 Group is described, but now he is finally ready to emerge and 
make his impact. It is now that also his personal development continues and the last lesson 
Felicity tried to teach him is resumed and finally, at the end of the novel, completed. 
 
7.2.5. The Voyage 
 
The second book is much more of an adventure story and much less of a Bildungsroman than 
the first, and it is also full of flashbacks and sub-plots – like Jacqui’s childhood and her 
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experience in the DoS (Department of Supply, the Effican secret service). Keeping the focus 
on Tristan’s development, we have to leave out much of the story therefore. 
At the beginning of his journey, 
 
I was half dead with shame and self-consciousness. As we passed men filling their water 
tanks or loading gas cylinders, I pulled my panama hat low over my eyes. Though covered 
by clothes, by hat, I felt like a snail – de-shelled, slimy and naked in the vast and merciless 
light of day. (TS 245) 
 
Tristan is still pretty much where Felicity left him when he was staring into Roxanna’s eyes. 
Only his protective mask is gone. As the quote shows, the layers of his clothes are not sufficient 
to hide his position in the moral framework from himself. And so he feels naked on the 
dissecting board of the public gaze. Seeing himself from the external perspective of the moral 
framework, he feels like a de-shelled snail. However, after Felicity’s lesson in his late childhood 
and after twelve years of preparation, this is a pain he can, at least barely, endure. 
This is still the status quo, too, when he and his fellow travellers, being illegal immigrants, 
try to get their Prisoner of War cards, which will grant them the right to be ‘guests’ of 
Voorstand (cf TS 300). It is here that Tristan tells us: 
 
I came with nothing, not even courage. When we got to the Grand Concourse where we 
would have to stand in line to get our POW cards, I did not even want to leave the air-
kooled Blikk [a make of car]. 
That’s the sort of threat I was. I was too ashamed to face the public gaze. (TS 294) 
 
‘Blikk’ is the Dutch word for gaze. We can see here, then, that Tristan still prefers to remain in 
the back of the Mouse’s eyes – under a cover that reflects Voorstandish acceptability to the 
outside world – in order to avoid “the public gaze”. But what will help him to hide “the public 
gaze” even from himself once more, is his second Mouse act. 
When Tristan puts on the mask for a second time – this time wearing not only a mask but 
a whole Mouse costume – his disappearance becomes even more complete than inside the 
Blikk: 
 
Jacqui looked at me, but I was gone, submerged, consumed by Bruder Mouse, and she, 
who knew, intimately, what the Mouse was like beneath its nylon fur, suddenly could 
not see her wild white-eyed employer. She knew I was there, but it was like knowing 
that there is a colon, a lung, a brain beneath the human skin – you don’t respond to the 
squishy viscera but to the externals. (TS 316) 
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Initially, Tristan may put on the costume in order to earn some money, but the act is still an 
exercise in hiding: 
 
Using the Guilders the business-gjent had donated to the Simi [the dysfunctional Bruder 
Mouse robot that will become his costume], we purchased two nights at an hotel. […] 
The room was large, but gloomy, backing on to a wide balcony on which robed men with 
blue-black skin and yellow eyes – landlopers [“itinerants”] – were living. 
They were outside. […] 
I was inside, on the floor, trying to find a place where I could begin to unpick the body 
of the Simulacrum. (TS 300-1) 
 
Mirroring his time in the tower of the Feu Follet, the intimidating, gloomy world is lurking 
outside, while Tristan remains inside to prepare his cover. When he finally emerges, he is the 
enabled escapist behind the mask again. Indeed, the effect of the Mouse act he performs a 
little later for a crowd outside the hotel is so staggering and his success so spectacular – 
“Guilders fell like leaves in autumn. The crowd was like rough water and she [Jacqui, who 
accompanies Tristan] had no choice but to let herself be carried by it” (TS 318) – that he is in 
serious danger of losing himself once again in the megalomaniac fantasies of his childhood; 
that he is in danger of incarcerating himself in his cover – as he himself has to notice just 
before the grand finale: “That aside [the zip in the costume for passing water], I was 
imprisoned by the Mouse” (TS 390). 
As has been said, this role is so particularly dangerous for him, because he finds all his 
childhood fantasies about glamour realised in it: “But I was not frightened. How could I be? 
The pathetic creature who has skulked inside the Feu Follet was now the object of these 
people’s love” (TS 317). And so, shortly after this first successful Mouse act, when he meets 
the eyes of a hotel concierge without the protection of his costume, he exclaims: “I could not 
bear to see the effect of my monstrous self on one more normal face” (TS 333). Thus, despite 
the considerable injuries he received from loose wire ends inside the costume (and which are 
removed later on, see TS 331), he hides beneath its glamorous surface until the final scene of 
the novel. 
Despite several calls to take it off by Wally (TS 354-5) and Bill (TS 359), he stubbornly keeps 
it on – driving Bill into despair: “‘Tristan, I don’t know who you are in there’” (TS 359). The 
cover, it appears, is about to swallow the covered. James Bradley observes: 
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But it is Tristan’s transformation that is the most radical, and the most appalling [as 
compared to Lucinda in Oscar and Lucinda and Jack Maggs in Jack Maggs]. For it is 
Tristan, the twisted, misshapen Efican nationalist who takes up the Mouse suit, the 
ultimate emblem of the despised imperial power, and garbs himself in it. Once within, 
he is suddenly released, as never before, his new appearance making him not just 
acceptable, but actually desired, but at what cost to his own identity?485 
 
Indeed, the cost may be high. One point is very important therefore: Tristan never 
identifies with the Mouse. He is not a compulsive master like Herbert Badgery but an enabled 
escapist about to lose himself in fantasies of infantile omnipotence. The Mouse remains a role, 
a costume, a cover – a means for escape into his fantasies. He explicitly informs us that “[i]n 
place of all this cyber-junk dwelt I, yours truly, Tristan Smith”, and he describes how “[s]he 
[Jacqui] grasped my hand – not mine exactly, but the gloved hand of the limping bow-legged 
Mouse” (TS 315). Throughout the novel, when he wears the mask as a child and when he 
wears the costume as an adult, Tristan keeps clearly differentiating between ‘I’ and ‘the 
Mouse’. And that is also why he will remain able to break free again from the Mouse – which 
is decisive, as also Antje Rauwerda realises: “The costume makes the person inside the 
costume irrelevant, absent and beneath concern... until that person is revealed”.486 This 
revelation, the climax of the entire novel, also constitutes the final piece of Tristan’s bildung 
and completes Felicity’s last lesson. 
 
7.2.6. The Second Mirror Stage 
 
The finale takes place in Peggy Kram’s trothouse.487 She has already made love to Tristan 
(while he remained inside the costume) and signed the contract that would turn Saarlim into 
a Ghostdorp. Tristan, on his part, has been wearing his stuffy costume for several days on end, 
and by now, without his medicine, he is reaching a very critical state of health. At this point, it 
comes to a showdown between Wally and Tristan’s would-be assassin Wendell Deveau, who 
both die during the encounter. Tristan arrives on the scene: 
 
I was full of my own poison […] My mask was full of my own foul air. […] I turned from 
Peggy Kram and caught sight of all our images in the great mirror. What a filthy frieze it 
                                                          
485 Bradley, 665. 
486 Antje Rauwerda, “Multi-Nationality and Layers of Mouse in Peter Carey’s The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith,” 
Antipodes 20.2 (2006): 117-23, 121. 
487 “a penthouse, normally luxurious. From Dutch trots, ‘proud’” (Glossar, TS 422). 
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was – that sweet old man [Wally, who had just been shot dead by Wendell] and Bruder 
Mouse – a perverse Pietà [just like the image of his Mouse mask was linked to the image 
of his dead mother]. How I loathed the Bruder’s grinning face, those floppy ears. My 
stomach clenched and I knew I was going to be sick. (TS 410) 
 
As if he were being purged from the command that the moral framework holds over him, 
Tristan suddenly, radically, violently, dissociates from the Mouse. He is – in a very literal sense 
– going to get it out of his system. And that is – also in a very literal sense – a dangerous, 
potentially lethal procedure. Inside the Mouse head Tristan is nearly suffocating in his own 
vomit. Jacqui, finally, comes to his rescue: 
 
And then she ripped, ripped my Mouse-head apart like it was orange peel. She tore the 
head off like a prawn. 
In the mirror we all stood and stared at my true face. I turned, gagging, aching for 
breath. 
Spare me, please, the memory of Peggy Kram’s face when she saw my true nature. 
[…] 
‘It’s It,’ she cried, crossing herself in front of me. ‘It’s Marchosias. God save us. It’s the 
Hairy Man. God save us.’ […] 
‘It’s Dagon,’ screamed Peggy Kram. ‘God save us.’ […] 
‘It’s Red Saatanil,’ said Clive Baarder, and I swear he meant it. ‘God save us.’ 
‘God save us,’ hollered Peggy Kram, throwing herself on her knees before the triptych. 
(TS 411) 
 
Now, this whole finale is remarkable in several respects. After Tristan had received a voice 
patch and suddenly was able to speak, Jacqui exclaimed: “‘You could be in the Sirkus. You 
really could. You could be a star’” (TS 376). So just when the “flickering dreams” (TS 180) of 
his childhood, “involving glittering cloaks and dazzling lights” (TS 185), are finally graspable 
and within his reach – he gives them up, disgustedly throws them away. Thus, when he says 
he is “full of my own poison”, he may well be referring to these narcissistic dreams of 
empowerment, and it may be them that he is getting out of his system. 
But of course there are also the mirrors. Tristan dissociates from the reflected image of 
the Mouse when he sees the “filthy frieze”, the “perverse Pietà” “in the great mirror”. But also 
his “true nature” – the fragmented self with which he associates – is a mirror image: “In the 
mirror we all stood and stared at my true face.” This is highly significant and stands in marked 
contrast to his first acting lesson, where Felicity “polished [him] into life”, and where he went 
through a Lacanian mirror stage. There, exactly as Sean Homer describes it, he refused “to 
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accept the truth of fragmentation and alienation”488 by identifying with a unified, empowered 
being “from another level of existence” (TS 173). Here, now, he rejects the symbol of the 
Mouse and, as opposed to the first mirror phase, identifies with the fragmentation and 
distortion that the mirror reflects back to him. He acknowledges that this is his truth. Or rather, 
this is a truth he now can acknowledge and take on as his own. In the Mater Hospital, as a 
child, he looked at “missing faces, cleft palates, conditions where teeth penetrated lips, 
misfortunes so repelling it would have been difficult for me to quietly contemplate them even 
in the colour plates of a magazine”, and “[a]ll I knew was: I was not them, would not be them, 
would not be looked at in that way”. Now, however, what he finds in this reflection is “my 
true face”. 
This acceptance stage is almost like a reversed version of the Lacanian mirror stage. Also 
here we have a moment of simultaneous alienation and identification. Tristan is alienated 
from the inhuman law of the Mouse, his position within the common moral framework, and 
identifies with his fragmented body – in this way regaining control over it. The mirror is looking 
back at him, as it were, and – for the first time in his life it seems – he is able to hold that gaze, 
the gaze of the ‘other’, the Mouse, Voorstand’s elite, his lover Peggy Kram. Bearing it, being 
able to endure it without succumbing, means he is set free to act on his own terms. He does 
not need to hide behind a mask or inside a costume anymore. This does not mean that with 
emerging from the Mouse and gagging for air, that with this second birth in which Jacqui 
“ripped my Mouse-head apart like it was orange peel”, the first mirror phase, in which it was 
Felicity who “polished [him] into life”, were somehow overcome; it only means that now he 
does not flee anymore into fantasies of glamorous completion, that now his escapism is over. 
However, this accepting of one’s own fragmented shape – one’s ‘true’ or ‘objective’ self 
as reflected back to oneself, one’s self seen as if from an outside perspective – never comes 
easy. And in Tristan’s case, there is quite a lot to accept. As a child, when his delusion about 
his own superiority was lifted, he suddenly realised the authority of the moral framework to 
which he was exposed, and where that moral framework put him: “I knew – properly, fully, 
for the first time in my life – I was a monster” (TS 156). In order to save his sense of personhood 
– the sense of his humanness, his sense of being a subject rather than an abject – he left his 
now, hid his shape from himself behind a mask and switched from a narratisation in the 
indicative mood into a narratisation in the optative ‘as if’ mood. This escape was necessary, in 
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a certain sense, because his place in the common moral framework was uninhabitable. 
Bradley is correct, therefore, when he points out that “Tristan is trapped not only by his 
deformities, but by the social perceptions of them.”489 One only needs to add that the social 
perception of his deformities strongly informs his own perception of them. 
Incidentally, this is a point that also ties in with discussions in disability studies – a field of 
scholarship that has not been applied to the text so far.490 Tom Shakespeare, for example, 
observes that “[t]he experience of disability as a negative identity arises out of a process of 
socialisation, or in the context of social relations, in which impairment is the sole focus of 
analysis.”491 The acceptance of a focus which “social relations” put on us may be achieved in 
different ways, but Shakespeare argues that 
 
none are psychologically or socially healthy or progressive. They all involve an element 
of denial or failure to come to terms: they all involve a significant element of external 
definition, of accepting external disempowering agendas.492 
 
So, by implication, if Tristan does not hide himself from himself anymore, then he must have 
found another way to deal with these social perceptions – especially his own perception – of 
himself. And that is exactly what the acceptance stage entails when it is tied to the 
simultaneous rejection of the Mouse. 
If the Mouse costume reflects Voorstand acceptability to the outside, then with the total 
dissociation from that symbol, he rejects the extended moral framework to which he had been 
exposed from the episode in the Mater Hospital onwards and that puts him into an abject 
position. That is, while he accepts that a certain value system, a common moral framework, 
would make him non-human, he does not accept that value system anymore. Put into a simple 
formula: in order to survive the acknowledgement of his particular fragmentation, he must 
                                                          
489 Bradley, 664. 
490 The only text I could find discussing Tristan Smith from a disability perspective is Gillian Fulcher’s review, 
“Carey’s ‘Unusual’ Novel Exposes Politics of Disability,” Eureka Street 18.6 (2008): n.pag. Also she says that 
“[n]either Australian nor British reviewers of The Unusual Life, which was published in 1994, appeared to 
ponder these matters [the representation of disability in Tristan Smith]”. According to her, “[i]n using disability 
to expose corporate oppressions, and in mocking the language and principles which emanate from 
government, the academy and people with disabilities, The Unusual Life becomes a book that offends what 
Frank Moorhouse calls Official Culture”. In other words, she celebrates Peter Carey as subversive anti-
establishment writer. 
491 Tom Shakespeare, “Disability, Identity and Difference,” Exploring the Divide: Illness and Disability, eds. Colin 
Barnes and Geof Mercer, Leeds: The Disability P, 1996, 94-113, 100. For a critical discussion of the so called ‘social 
model’ that is opposed to the so called ‘medical model’ in disability studies, see Tom Shakespeare, Disability 
Right and Wrongs, London: Routledge, 2006. 
492 Shakespeare, “Disability, Identity and Difference,” 100. 
7. Tristan Smith 
256 
 
reject a social norm that would deny him, in that case, his humanity. While earlier we found 
him saying “imagine my gratitude when the Captain […] looked at me as if I were human” (TS 
245, my emphasis) and witnessed him talking of his “monstrous self” (TS 333), now, while 
fleeing through Voorstand, “surrounded by animus, taunted by the dangling effigy of the Hairy 
Man at wayside shrines, I was more alive than ever in my life before” (TS 414). It seems that 
now he is able to uphold his own humanity to himself – that despite accepting his 
monstrousness he is also, paradoxically, more secure than ever in his subjecthood. 
However, this last quotation also points towards a problem. One can see in the description 
how Tristan is surrounded by opposition. What is more, the discussion of My Life as a Fake 
clearly showed that a person can come undone if the social arena withholds authenticity in 
such a way. And yet, the quote makes also quite clear that, finally, Tristan is secure in his 
humanness, in his subject position within a common moral framework. Which leaves us with 
the question how this is possible. 
It is the company of Bill and Jacqui that is the key to answering this question. By extension 
it is the company of the Feu Follet ensemble, Wally most of all, that helps to solve the puzzle. 
Right from his birth when the doctors want to kill him and Felicity fights for his life, Tristan is 
never alone. He always has support. He is exactly not a Nietzschean Übermensch who finally 
freed himself from the herd mentality – the limitations of a common moral framework – to 
stand alone. It is a very similar gesture of humbleness to that of Gabrielle Baillieux, therefore, 
that saves him in the end. “[Y]ou cannot be a solo artist and release asylum seekers from their 
corporate jails”, she says in Amnesia. “I was, always, in every single action of my life, spoon-
fed by others.”493 Accordingly, in Tristan’s acceptance stage, when he is surrounded by 
animosity on all sides, it is Bill and Jacqui who offer him the possibility of an alternative moral 
framework and who lend him, fragmented as he is, validity: “A twilight comradeship 
developed between the three of us, a friendship marked by great intimacy, small kindnesses. 
It was a tender plant that I, at that time, did not expect to live into whatever night might lie 
ahead” (TS 413-4). We must assume that it survived. For, he closes the narration of his 
“Unusual Life” with the following Shandy-esque statement: “At that time, although I did not 
know it, my unusual life was really just beginning” (TS 414). 
The acceptance stage thus constitutes a confrontation with the now. It connects the 
optative mood with the indicative again, and constitutes an informed personalisation of the 
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moral framework. Tristan, being a sadder and a wiser man, knows he holds an abject position 
within the extended common moral framework. It is this acknowledgement, too, that sets him 
apart from Illywhacker’s Phoebe “surrounded by her menagerie” of Annette and Horace as 
she is. But he does not identify with that position anymore because the “twilight comradeship” 
constitutes a smaller, personalised, framework that affirms his subjecthood to him. Thus, he 
personalises the moral aspect of his narratisation by restricting it to the “twilight 
comradeship” and so manages to integrate the radically marginalising narration of the 
extended common moral framework, of which he is still fully aware, into his own narratisation 
and to accept the resulting shape of his self. This, then, is how Tristan, as extradiegetic 
narrator, can address his readers from a secure, autonomous subject position. Ultimately, the 
acceptance stage entails the acceptance of one’s limitations, of one’s fragmentation, without 
dehumanising oneself. The acceptance stage is thus also always dependent on acceptance of 
one’s limited self by others. 
In passing we note the Freudian theme that is played out here. Tristan flees with Jacqui – 
his nurse – a mother figure whom he, at first, sexually desires, who, metaphorically, gave birth 
to him when she ripped the Mouse head apart, and who helped him into self-identification. 
And he flees with Bill, a father figure whom he had to conquer (force him into committing to 
his son) in order to find an acceptable position within an informed but personalised moral 
framework. We may understand, therefore, the significance of him saying “so although I had 
begun the journey [the escape through Voorstand] in the front seat [of their car], I soon sought 
out the back” (TS 414). Him giving up his claims to Jacqui and leaving her to his father implies 
that on the last page of the novel, he also manages to resolve his Oedipus complex. 
I want to conclude this chapter with one last observation: When Tristan holds the gaze as 
he does in his acceptance stage, he also forces it to recognise him. And this point is even 
overdetermined in the novel. For as has been indicated, at the novel’s conclusion Tristan 
makes also Bill, his biological father, truly commit to him for the first time. So he forces his 
father and the law of the father to take notice of him. He will not let himself be cast out 
anymore. With the dramatic revelation at the end of his Mouse act, he makes it impossible to 
be “edited out”. As narrator, many years after the narrated events took place (32 to be 
precise494), he is “part of the story” – and it begins exactly like Herbert’s self-constitution in 
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Illywhcker: “My name is Tristan Smith” (TS 5). “At ten years old I believed books would be 
written about me” (TS 70) – at 55 he is writing one himself. And so, at the end of the second 
book, just like at the end of the first book, Tristan shows his “true face”, his “true nature” to 
the public (inside the narration in Peggy Kram’s trothouse), and to his readers (on the level of 
the narrative frame). But this time he is heard. 
However, just how he manages to force himself into recognition; what it is that makes his 
Mouse act so successful; this is a question that is still open and will be discussed now, in the 
following chapter. 
 
7.3. Tristan’s Subversiveness: “Bodies […] out of Control” 
 
In the last chapter Tristan’s personal development was traced in detail. It could be shown that 
Tristan Smith is, at least also, the story of the bildung of its eponymous character. In order to 
employ the powers that are within him, he has to go through a development that culminates 
in his acceptance stage. Ultimately, he has to find an alternative, personalised moral 
framework in which he is accepted as valid human being and that therefore allows him to 
accept his fragmentation, too; a moral framework, in other words, that does not hantu him 
and puts him into a valued subject position in which he is able to unfold his potential, allows 
him to strive towards his hypergood. 
However, a major impression that sticks after reading the novel is that Tristan, grotesquely 
impaired and orphaned as he is after his mother’s death and after Bill deserted him, somehow 
manages to disturb the prevailing powers: “Tristan subverts the power balance. Like Mercy 
[Jack Maggs], Tristan realizes that the narrative can be interrupted”, as Larsson remarks.495 
Over and above his personal development, his actions have an impact, and unfolding his 
potential means, in his case, that he significantly changes the world he lives in. His case seems 
to be a paragon of agency. To quote Peter Pierce once more: “The resourceful resistance of 
individuals to institutions which attempt to control them is epitomised by the disruption that 
Tristan causes in Efica.”496 It is therefore obvious to ask how Tristan does this, how he manages 
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496 Pierce, 149. He might be mixing up Voorstand and Efica here. 
7. Tristan Smith 
259 
 
to be the decisive grain in the gearbox that brings the whole clockwork to a standstill – or at 
least makes it tick out a different pace. 
The answer to this question will lead along a somewhat circumstantial route. First, I will 
treat the established postcolonial readings of Tristan Smith. As has been said, these readings 
are fully valid and also helpful for the approach presented here. Especially Bill Ashcroft’s 
application of the Baudrillardian concepts of simulation and hyperreality are very elucidating 
– even though there are predictable points where my own view differs from his. I will then try 
to show that not only Peggy Kram’s Ghostdorps can be grasped as hyperreal simulations, but 
also Felicity’s Feu Follet. The central struggle of the novel is thus not between the true, 
indigenous culture of Efica and the simulated, artificial culture of Voorstand, but between 
hyperreal simulation and an ungovernable external reality more generally. Being true to my 
approach, I try to tie back this struggle to the character level again in the last part of this 
chapter. For, ‘simulation’ can mean two things – as we know since the introduction of enabling 
escapism: hyperreal self-simulation (like many characters in Illywhacker) and simulation of 
possible selves in the optative mood (like Tristan). Only after this discussion of the characters 
around Tristan – especially the discussion of Jacqui Lorraine – one can satisfactorily answer 
the question of what it is that makes Tristan and his friends – we now know how decisive they 
are – successful as agents. 
 
7.3.1. Postcolonial Approaches and External Reality 
 
To a certain extent, the postcolonial approaches the novel is of course inviting, are very helpful 
and may serve as a good starting point also for a discussion of agency. Carrie Dawson, for 
example, combines Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Judith Butler to describe Tristan’s feat in 
the Mouse costume as a “menacing form of colonial mimicry”497 that works in the “slippage 
between discursive command and its appropriated effect”.498 Like Mickey Mouse, Bruder 
Mouse is a seemingly non-threatening sign of everything good, funny, and entertaining. Since 
it is spread worldwide by a giant entertainment industry, it functions as “discursive command” 
that the neo-coloniser imposes on the entire world. Tristan, the Efican steals this symbol of 
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Voorstand, he appropriates it and takes it on for himself. In this way, he enters “processes of 
signification” to change them. According to Dawson, Tristan’s interruption is successful, or is 
an interruption at all, because with his act he blurs decisive boundaries. With the help of the 
Mouse costume he, the model Efican, the ideally disfigured ‘other’, assumes a dominant, 
Voorstandish subject position, which makes him both, complicit and subversive at the same 
time. The subsequent disruption, however, occurs only when the appropriation becomes 
apparent and the mirrored ‘otherness’ of the Mouse, the “alterity of the master or model”,499 
is revealed and reflected back to the cultural elite of Voorstand. That is, to employ Bhabha’s 
term, in front of the Voorstanders Tristan makes a total farce of the Mouse with which they 
still identify. Thus, when his mask comes off, he generates a double effect. In the moment 
when “we all stood and stared at my true face”, Tristan goes through his acceptance stage. 
But simultaneously, “when she saw my true nature”, Peggy Kram and the other bystanders of 
the Voorstand elite are confronted with the “alterity of the master or model”, with their own 
otherness, the weirdness of the Mouse, the weirdness of the symbol with which they identify. 
Bill Ashcroft argues in a very similar way to Dawson when he says that 
 
[t]he simulation of identity, the seizure of self-representation for the postcolonial 
subject, is to control the gaze by controlling the theatre of representation. […] But one 
powerful consequence of his simulation of Bruder Mouse in Saarlim is that by invading 
the discourse of Voorstand myth he controls the gaze: he becomes Bruder Mouse.500 
 
Like Dawson, Ashcroft speaks of appropriation, of “invading the discourse of Voorstand myth” 
through “[t]he simulation of identity” by taking on the Mouse costume. It is important that by 
‘controlling the gaze’ Ashcroft does not mean Tristan became the Mouse in the sense of 
identifying with, and thus being swallowed up by, the sign (I use ‘sign’ and ‘symbol’ 
interchangeably here): 
 
But he [Tristan] is never fazed by the separation between illusion and reality – he never 
believes he is Bruder Mouse. There may not be an “absolute level of the real,” but his 
interpolation of the dominant culture is always mediated by a sense of the difference 
between illusion and reality. […] The disruptive invasion of Tristan’s performance of the 
Mouse keeps in sight Bhabha’s concept of the “menace of mimicry.” By dressing up as 
Bruder Mouse, he gets the attention he is longing for, but he never succumbs to the 
simulacrum.501 
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While Ashcroft keeps his focus firmly on the subversive simulation itself and the power it 
lends Tristan, Dawson, as we could see, goes one step further to include also the revelation at 
the end, the exposure of the otherness of the master. However, it is Ashcroft’s argument 
about simulation that investigates more fully the mechanics of Tristan’s appropriation. And 
since it is these mechanics which are important for agency, we will have to stick with his 
interpretation for a while. 
By saying Tristan “becomes Bruder Mouse”, Ashcroft means Tristan becomes Bruder 
Mouse for the Voorstanders. And that really is the case. It is astonishing how enthusiastically 
they buy his act. When Tristan is inside the costume for the first time, he and Jacqui encounter 
the ‘deskmajoor’ (concierge) of their hotel, who immediately gives 50 Guilders to the Mouse: 
“So the deskmajoor was a fan. He bowed to the Mouse, in the middle of the foyer. It was 
ludicrous from an Efican perspective – the respect. No Efican would act like that to anyone” 
(TS 316). This is the point Ashcroft is interested in. In order to explain the effect of the Mouse 
act, he refers to Baudrillard’s concept of hyperreality and shows how well it is suited to 
describe Voorstand and its capital Saarlim. Of course, Baudrillard has been referred to already, 
but since Ashcroft neatly sums up the main points in as far as they are relevant for Saarlim, 
and since hyperreality is so important for Tristan Smith, it is worthwhile to quote Ashcroft at 
some length here: 
 
All this makes the novel appear to be a flamboyant excursion into Baudrillard’s theory 
of the precession of simulacra. Baudrillard’s thesis is that ‘postmodern’ culture is a world 
of signs that have broken away from any ‘reality’. Simulacra – copies without an original 
– are not just ‘pretending’, they produce the same symptoms, signs and images as the 
real and they become the determinant of our perception of reality.502 
 
For Baudrillard, the breakdown of the boundary between simulacrum and reality creates 
a world of hyperreality in which the distinctions between the real and unreal are blurred, 
and because the simulacra ultimately have no referents, the social begins to ‘implode’. 
This process of social entropy leads to the collapse of all boundaries between meaning; 
and the collapse of the social distinction between classes, political parties, cultural 
forms, the media and the real. We see such a situation in the crazed mind of Peggy Kram 
and her dystopic postmodern Saarlim city.503 
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So, what is ‘wrong’ with the deskmajoor in the scene above, and with most of the people 
inhabiting Saarlim, is that they inhabit a hyperreal world in which the reality principle is gone, 
in which the signs have taken over and extinguished the referents. It is a Disneyworld in which 
Bruder Mouse is as real as anything else because the people have lost an external, non-
manmade reality and thus have ceased distinguishing between simulation and nature. 
So far, the presented argument is very elucidating. However, as it stands, it fully depends 
on the differentiation between reality and hyperreality, or between an external, independent 
reality and simulation. And that is something Ashcroft tries to avoid, as it goes fully against 
Bhaba’s concept of mimicry. In “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse”, 
Bhabha writes: 
 
As Lacan reminds us, mimicry is like camouflage […] a form of resemblance, that differs 
from or defends presence by displaying it in part, metonymically. Its threat, I would add, 
comes from the prodigious and strategic production of conflictual, fantastic, 
discriminatory ‘identity effects’ in the play of a power that is elusive because it hides no 
essence, no ‘itself’.504 
 
What Bhabha says here is that mimicry is to copy something obliquely – the same, almost. 
Slight imperfections or alterations produce an effect of difference between copy and model 
which result in an effect of identity. But the identity is an effect – an effect that comes about 
through the very act of copying. There is no essence therefore, no true identity, only the effect 
of difference (one is tempted to repeat the biology examples from Chapter 4.8.). 
Accordingly, also quoting from “Of Mimicry and Man”, Ashcroft, Griffith, and Tiffin write: 
“The menace of mimicry does not lie in its concealment of some real identity behind its mask, 
but comes from its ‘double vision which in disclosing the ambivalence of colonial discourse 
also disrupts its authority’ (88).”505 When one retraces this concept, one finds, of course, that 
it mimics Derrida’s notion of mimicry in turn, which he develops in his discussion of Mallarmé’s 
Mimique, where he minutely retraces the history of that text and shows that each version can 
always be said to refer to yet earlier ones, and where he makes the point that the text repeats 
only repetitions and represents no underlying ‘truth’ beyond itself: 
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We are faced then with mimicry imitating nothing; faced, so to speak, with a double that 
doubles no simple, a double that nothing anticipates, nothing at least that is not itself 
already double. There is no simple reference. It is in this that the mime’s operation does 
allude, but alludes to nothing, alludes without breaking the mirror, without reaching 
beyond the looking-glass.506 
 
Very much in line with this notion of “mimicry imitating nothing” or at least mimicry not 
concealing “some real identity behind its mask”, Ashcroft takes Baudrillard to task for his 
dependence on an “absolute level of the real” and notes: “The problem with Baudrillard’s view 
is the implicit assumption that there is some transcendental real not affected by the processes 
of signification (i.e. by ‘simulation’).”507 
But obviously this move gets Ashcroft (and by implication also Derrida and Bhabha) into 
the old problem that has been described several times now. Also here it is easy enough to 
spot. Earlier, in Chapter 7.2., we saw that there seems to be a real Tristan indeed behind the 
mask of the Mouse; and above, Ashcroft himself wrote that Tristan “is never fazed by the 
separation between illusion and reality” and that “his interpolation of the dominant culture is 
always mediated by a sense of the difference between illusion and reality” – which clearly 
shows how his own argument depends on what he takes great efforts to reject. 
Alluding to Bhabha’s “identity effects” that are achieved by resembling but only 
resembling the model (and inappropriately so, which is how the double vision is produced that 
exposes the model’s own alterity), Ashcroft may write that Tristan’s “separation between 
illusion and reality” is in itself only a cultural production: 
 
Cultural identity, around which an entire history of colonial struggle has revolved, in 
discourses of place, history, language, art and aesthetics, is a field of simulacra. That is 
to say, cultural identity is always a field of performance specifically directed at the 
performance of cultural difference. […] But the issue is not one of pretence. Simulation 
opens up the importance to the postcolonial society of taking hold of the signs of self-
representation, of interpolating the dominant field of representation as a mode of 
resistance.508 
 
But of course we are turning in circles here. The bluntest way of putting it, is probably by 
asking: If there is no “transcendental real” then what exactly is the dominated culture’s 
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problem? What would be ‘wrong’ about hyperreality (such as Saarlim’s)? And why would we 
even need such a term? What could it possibly signify? 
And back to the discussion of Tristan Smith, what ‘self’ should the Eficans represent with 
“the signs of self-representation”, if there is no such thing, if there is only signs and no 
“transcendental real”? Indeed, if there is no “transcendental real”, then what is the basis for 
the claim that in postcolonial societies “the issue [of simulation] is not one of pretence”? The 
whole concept of hyperreality would lose its explanatory power if there were no “absolute 
level of the real” and only “mimicry imitating nothing”. 
But for our purpose it is more to the point to observe that what Ashcroft cannot explain in 
this way is why Voorstand’s, the oppressor’s, cultural simulation should be ‘worse’ than 
Efica’s, why “Saarlim, centre of a culture built on myth and self-delusion, is a social world that 
operates entirely on pretence and insincerity”,509 while “the indigenous Efican theatre”510 is 
apparently not. 
 
7.3.2. Cultural Simulation: Ghostdorps and Ghost Lights 
 
I did not describe the contradictions in Ashcroft’s argumentation to find fault with his 
approach, but because these contradictions directly point to a central theme of the novel. A 
theme, however, that first needs to be developed further. Thus, even if we follow Ashcroft, 
we still need to distinguish between two forms of simulation: 
 
In fact, the book situates itself at the juncture of the postmodern and the postcolonial 
in presenting two dimensions of simulation, a postmodern field of simulacra in which all 
meaning implodes and about which nothing can be done; and a postcolonial field of 
representation in which simulation and performativity become the strategies of cultural 
struggle.511 
 
It is the ‘bad’, hyperreal or, as Ashcroft says, ‘postmodern’ form of simulation that will get us 
to the heart of the problem, and to the heart of the novel, too. 
The prime example of this bad simulation are Peggy Kram’s Ghostdorps. They really are 
the eerie places their name would indicate (literally ‘ghost villages’): “In each one of her 
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Ghostdorps she had tried to create an ideal world – a model – where the actor inhabitants 
lived in accordance with the values of the Settlers Free. ‘They ploughed, they tilled, hulled, 
they shucked, they ground, etc.’” (TS 402). These Ghostdorps are exactly like the cages Hissao 
built in Illywhacker, where he displayed a hyperreal idealisation of Australia for tourists, like 
the town in “American Dreams”, or like the open museum at Cruesot which Baudrillard uses 
as an example in Simulacra and Simulation. As Ashcraft notes (without making the connection 
to Illywhacker):  
 
Peggy, who owns the historical theme parks called Ghostdorps, thinks she alone knows 
what the Great Historical Past was like, because history is her business (406). This 
rehearses FoucauIt’s linkage of truth and power. But it also supports Baudrillard’s 
contention that capital has always dominated at the level of the symbolic [Baudrillard 
himself would perhaps prefer the term ‘semiotic order’ here]. […] Historical theme parks 
such as the Ghostdorps are a neat demonstration of the way in which capital achieves 
dominance within the symbolic order by packaging culture.512 
 
Like the Sirkus, the Ghostdorps constitute a “material transcription of all values”,513 and 
this commodification and exploitation of Voorstandish myths and beliefs that once belonged 
to a symbolic order in the Baudrillardian sense of the term (see Chapter 6.4.1.) produces an 
“all out advertising effect” in which “politics” and in fact every form of external moral values 
dissolve.514 Myths, the codification of once external values, the symbolic anchoring points of 
moral frameworks, are thus bereft of their meaning and turned into commodities. In this way, 
Voorstand’s cultural hegemony and imperialism simultaneously turns into cultural simulation 
in the Baudrillardian sense. There is no contradiction but a correlation, then, between 
Voorstand’s cultural imperialism and its simultaneous cultural vulnerability. It is therefore no 
wonder that the ‘proud’ Voorstanders are “at sea, as it were” and do not “know anymore, for 
an important range of questions, what the significance of things was for them”, exactly in the 
way Charles Taylor describes it. This being at sea with regard to the significance of things is 
the reason why they so easily believe Tristan’s Mouse act. Hassall notes accordingly: 
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There are, however, unmistakable signs that the evil empire is disintegrating, and is 
open to subversion by rebellious colonials. […] Tristan uses the mythology and the 
technology of the Sirkus with exquisite appropriateness to expose and humiliate the 
decaying culture of Voorstand.515  
 
And this, now, brings us to the Efican side of ‘bad’, hyperreal or ‘postmodern’ simulation. 
However, since this point is far less obvious – in fact, it has, as yet, not been noticed in any 
critical source on which I drew – we will have to take a wider sweep again. 
What allows Tristan “to expose and humiliate” Voorstand’s culture in the way it has been 
described above, is – according to Ashcroft – his Efican heritage: “The simple difference is that 
he [Tristan] comes from a different culture”.516 That is, because he is an Efican, he can see 
through the insincerity and self-delusion of Voorstandish simulation. Tristan himself stated 
above that the way the Voorstanders behave towards the Mouse “was ludicrous from an 
Efican perspective”. Bradley, too, points out: “Once outside their own lands, Carey’s 
characters are made aware not just of the limitations of their own culture, but of its 
possibilities, of its importance to their own lives.”517 
However, these observations by Ashcroft and Bradley stand in marked contrast to the 
descriptions of Efica’s dominated culture one finds in the novel. Indeed, back home in Efica, 
things seemed to look quite differently: 
 
‘Did we even begin to define a national identity? […] No one can even tell me what an 
Efican national identity might be. We’re northern hemisphere people who have been 
abandoned in the south. All we know is what we’re not. […] But what are we? We’re just 
sort of “here”.’ (TS 117) 
 
Thus Felicity expresses her “pain of unbelonging” in similar terms as Leah Goldstein did in 
Illywhacker. And Tristan agrees. Quoting his pamphlet for the January 20 Group, he writes: 
“Our greatest defence is our culture, and the brutal truth is – we have none” (TS 231). 
Apparently, that is what makes Efica, on its part, so vulnerable to Voorstand’s cultural 
domination: 
 
if Tristan Smith is, in one sense, a rhetorical gesture of cultural terrorism contesting the 
hegemony of the Disney/Hollywood circus over the global entertainment industry, it 
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also exposes the readiness of the culturally oppressed to cooperate in their own 
imprisonment by an alien culture […].518 
 
Also on the extradiegetic level Tristan seems to confirm this estimation by Hassall when he 
relates: 
 
Thus I lived fatherless through that shameful period of Efica’s history as armies of our 
conscripts were raised to fight Voorstand’s war in Burma and Nepal [the reference to 
Australia and Vietnam is obvious]. I saw the great Efican health-care system weakened 
and demolished at the insistence of Voorstand’s bankers. I saw the Sirkus Domes spread 
across our little islands and the Bruders appear to spread their stories, your stories, not 
ours, in every corner of my nation’s life. (TS 311) 
 
However, things are not as clear cut as this may make appear. The narrator may talk of 
Voorstand’s cultural hegemony and the Eficans’ lack of culture, but he also talks of a certain 
Sirkus attraction, which, for the Efficans, is the greatest attraction of all. When he, as a boy 
and still living in Efica, visits the Sirkus for the first time, he already knows what to look out 
for: 
 
[W]e would have to tolerate, for a while, the chorus girls […] Not that we did not think 
every each one of them to be beautiful, but because none of them was Irma, and by 
their very existence on the stage they distracted our attention from their queen. […] She 
alone, of foreign performers, dared recite our own stories on the stage. It was the mark 
of the skill of your Sirkus managers to everywhere adapt the show to what was local. 
We did not know there was no Irma in any of the Saarlim Sirkuses. (TS 167) 
 
So, while the Bruders “spread their stories […] in every corner of my nation’s life”, Irma, the 
actual “queen” of the ‘Efican Sirkus’ – and we have to call it thus – recites “our own stories on 
the stage”. Additionally, we learn in a footnote that “the Voorstandish Spookganger Drool” is 
“the Efican Phantome Drool”, which “results in such fracturing of the character that Phantome 
Drool has lost all historical and mythic connection to the Deuce and the Hairy Man” (TS 339-
40). If we, moreover, take into consideration the completely different habit of perception that 
the Eficans bring to the Sirkus, we may come to different conclusions than the cultural cringe 
that had just been referred to would indicate: 
 
But when we Eficans watch the Voorstand Sirkus we do not watch like you. We watch 
with our mouths open, oohing and aahing and applauding just as you do, but we watch 
                                                          
518 Hassall, “Power Play,” 141. 
7. Tristan Smith 
268 
 
like Eficans, identifying with the lost, the fallen, the abandoned. When a performer falls, 
c’est moi, c’est moi  
Our heroes are the lost, the drowned, the injured [one may think of Ned Kelly or 
Waltzing Matilda here], a habit of mind that makes our epic poetry emotionally repellent 
to you, but let me tell you, Meneer, Madam, if you are ever sick whilst visiting Efica you 
will quickly appreciate the point of view. (TS 136) 
 
If we take all this into consideration, we may wonder whether it is really the case that Efica 
has no culture and that “[t]he Sirkus, so deeply grounded in the moral foundations of the Great 
Historical Past [of Voorstand], has gained a popularity that threatens to undermine the 
indigenous Efican theatre just as it has enveloped Efican culture”.519 
The passages above show that the Voorstandish Sirkus does not envelop Efican culture but 
is rather thoroughly transformed once it touches Efican soil – and the concept of mimicry itself 
would predict as much.520 Moreover, if the Sirkus is incorporated, assimilated, turned into 
something Efican in the way it is, maybe then Efican culture does not need to be saved at all. 
And that, finally, brings us to the ‘bad’ simulation on the Efican side of the coin. 
The reference to the “indigenous Efican theatre” by Ashcroft is quite remarkable. For, the 
apparently endangered “indigenous Efican theatre” is not undermined at all, but, in fact, has 
never existed as such. When Bill dates Felicity, he takes her not to the theatre, but to the circus 
– spelled that way because the circus, as opposed to Felicity’s theatre, indeed does refer to 
an Efican tradition. This is how Tristan narrates these romantic outings: 
 
She was twenty-eight, knew nothing about real circus, but she had had such guts, such 
style. […] He took her out into the cantons to the petites tentes. She did not see the 
meanness of the circus, the lying proprietors, the stinking caravans, the brutal beatings 
Bill had suffered. She saw instead the discipline, the lack of affectation, the highly critical 
audiences who could compare a given performance with others from a hundred years 
before. Seeking to invent an Efican national style in drama, she began then to 
incorporate circus skills into her shows. (TS 40-1) 
 
Felicity, the Voorstandish woman deeply in love, romanticises about an Efican circus she does 
not understand. She uses it “to invent an Efican national style in drama”. That does not sound 
like an “indigenous Efican theatre” at all. Hassall has a point, therefore, when he writes: 
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Felicity Smith, the founder of the Feu Follet, which champions a supposedly native Efican 
theatre against the all-pervasive Voorstand Sirkus, is herself a native of Voorstand. And 
the theatre she champions so fervently does not derive from indigenous Efican culture, 
but from the imported theatre of Efica’s European colonisers. The Feu Follet plays 
Shakespeare and Moliere, Ibsen and Chekhov, albeit it in modern, ‘deconstructed’ 
versions. It does not play Louis Nowra and David Williamson, or their Efican equivalents, 
and we are told that there are none. 
In one sense, then, the conflict is not between colonising and colonised narratives or 
forms of entertainment, but between traditional ‘high’ culture on one hand [the Feu 
Follet], and folk-derived and technology-enhanced mass culture on the other [the 
Sirkus], both of which are ‘foreign’ to Efica.521 
 
Later in the first book, in the scene that leads to Bill breaking up with Felicity, a very telling 
argument ensues in which he confronts her with the futility of her efforts: 
 
[Bill says:] ‘A tour like this. What’s it for? If there’s an election tomorrow…’ 
‘There’s one on January 22…’ 
‘All right. If there’s an election next month, what have you affected?’ […] I feel like I’ve 
been in a theme park, acting out some heroic role, and now it’s time to go home and…’ 
‘Have I become provincial? […] I always thought I’d know if I was becoming second-
rate.’ […] 
‘I’ve fooled myself,’ he said. ‘It’s like some kids’ game. I got too excited and let myself 
believe it was real.’ (TS 93-4) 
 
This fight is quite remarkable. Bill confronts Felicity with the fact that she is achieving 
nothing for her political cause. Felicity’s reaction, however, is to worry that she might have 
become “provincial” and “second-rate”. She fully confirms Hassall’s estimation in other words. 
It seems she is only concerned about being a first-rate avant-garde artist, and the ‘cause’ is 
only a means to that end. However, in the end, after the fight and after Bill left her, she does 
‘get real’. She discards the entire Feu Follet project and enters politics – which threatens to be 
far more successful, and far more serious in its consequences. As Tristan says himself at the 
very beginning of his narration: 
 
it is hard to see how the Feu Follet Collective was a threat to anyone […]. When, at the 
end of her life, my maman found a way to really threaten the status quo it was not 
through the theatre but in the dirty old fairground of baby-kissing politics. In comparison 
the notorious Feu Follet was toothless. (TS 6-7) 
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But there is a second point of note. Bill describes the Feu Follet as a “theme park”. That is 
exactly the term Ashcroft used to describe Peggy’s Ghostdorps. In fact, when “[w]hat this poor 
theatre saw itself doing was inventing the culture of its people” (TS 50), and when Felicity tells 
Bill, who deliberates whether he should become a Sirkus artist in Saarlim: “‘It’s your life, but 
if you want to know what I think – you’re an Efican actor. You belong here, with us. We have 
important work to do. We have a whole damn country to invent’” (TS 53), when we consider 
this attempt to personally invent and establish the truly Efican culture for the Eficans, then 
she appears to be almost as patronising as Peggy Kram herself. Already at the beginning of the 
novel, the narrator quite explicitly likens Efica to a child of Felicity’s: “her feelings for the 
Eficans, […] were protective and critical, admiring and impatient. […] she betrayed her foreign 
birth in the way in which her ambitions for each of us, the country and the child [Tristan], were 
not humble” (TS 9). And later, when she discards the Feu Follet again, we read: “It [the Feu 
Follet] was hers in her secret heart, and not because it was her money that had purchased it, 
but because she made it, dreamed it, spun it out of herself” (TS 108-9). “Peggy, who owns the 
historical theme parks called Ghostdorps, thinks she alone knows what the Great Historical 
Past was like”, Ashcroft said above. One might add: ‘And Felicity, who owns the political theme 
park called Feu Follet, thinks she alone knows what the True Efican Theatre should be like’. 
Feu Follet is a French word. It means will o’ the wisp or ghost light, something that leads you 
off the track in a swamp at night. It is, in other words, already by its very name something 
similar to the Voorstandish Ghostdorp. No commentator to whom I referred mentioned that, 
but it surely cannot be a mere coincidence. 
 
7.3.3. Confronting Simulations: Tristan and Peggy 
 
Now we are finally ready to tackle the central theme of Tristan Smith that surfaced when 
Ashcroft tried to dispose of Baudrillard’s “transcendental real” while still holding on to 
Tristan’s “separation between illusion and reality” – as a consequence differentiating between 
‘bad’ postmodern or hyperreal simulation and ‘good’ postcolonial simulation. 
Contrary to Ashcroft’s claim, the struggle in Tristan Smith is not between an indigenous 
Efican culture and an artificial Voorstand culture. When one considers that both, the 
Ghostdrops and the Feu Follet, are hyperreal simulations, then the central theme seems to be 
a struggle between hyperreal simulation and an external, non-manmade reality in general. In 
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fact, Tristan’s case shows that the struggle is not only between hyperreal simulation and 
external reality, but between simulation and external reality. That is, also according to the 
present argument there are two different forms of simulation – only both bear the potential 
to be destructive. When Tristan wears masks to hide from the reality of his abject position and 
to flee into optative self-simulations, then this simulation is not so much hyperreal as hyporeal 
– a simulation that is not more real than reality but less than real or even non-real, 
fantasmatic. Both forms of simulations are relevant for Tristan Smith, and both forms are 
confronted in the novel by an unyielding now that keeps disrupting them. 
In Tristan’s own case, for instance, hyperreal simulation is never a problem. The physical 
reality of his body is so indomitable and so omnipresent that he cannot become a compulsive 
master easily. Whatever vision he develops, it first has to be adjusted to his physical 
circumstances. His impairment, in turn, becomes a completely normal aspect of his life – a 
point that has often been emphasised in the field of disability studies, too. Nick Watson, for 
example, presents many statements that reveal how impairment becomes such an integral 
part of the lives of many disabled people that it completely recedes into the background: 
“Throughout their lives, these particular informants had created a biography that 
incorporated their impairment into their sense of identity in such a way as to normalise the 
impairment.”522 Watson concludes that 
 
[b]eing disabled, for many of these informants, is not about celebrating difference or 
diversity, pride in their identity is not formed through the individuals labelling 
themselves as different, as disabled, but it is about defining disability in their own terms, 
under their own terms of reference.523 
 
One may say that this is what Tristan’s acceptance stage entails. But even before that 
stage, his physical impairment is an aspect of reality that he never has any trouble to accept – 
just like the informants in Watson’s study. This becomes clearly evident in the following scene 
in which he practices for his Hairy Man act: 
 
And although I said, and will say again, that I was not aware of my monstrosity, the 
opposite was also true: I knew exactly why I could not be an actor, and I was equally 
determined to become one. […] 
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To hell with that [his physical limitations]. I would make my Hairy Man a mute, 
something scary that jumps at you from the dark. I would base him on a spider. […] 
In short, I could not do a character that walked. 
My biceps were not large, but the pale blue-ish skin covered healthy muscle and I knew 
that muscle could be made to grow. My Hairy Man could climb and drop free-falling out 
of the dark sky. […] 
But when, at six o’clock that night, my father finally entered the theatre, he saw the 
Hairy Man, spotlit precisely, hanging from the ladder on the back wall of the theatre, 
right up near the lighting rig. (TS 70-2) 
 
Tristan’s physicality simply has to be accommodated – and so it is. He cannot do a Hairy 
Man that walks. This is a fact he has never a problem to acknowledge. But neither does that 
keep him from trying to unfold his potential. In short: exactly because of his physical 
circumstances, Tristan always personalises his visions, always ties them back to his now. It is 
this very process of personalisation that we witness when he says: “To hell with that. I would 
make my Hairy Man a mute, something scary that jumps at you from the dark. I would base 
him on a spider.” As has been said, and as has been demonstrated now, for him it is not the 
ontological aspect of narratisation that is the problem. What is problematic in his case is the 
moral aspect, his position within the common moral framework. 
Peggy Kram, by contrast, forcefully brings the ontological aspect into play. That is, this 
“attractive thirty-year-old woman” (TS 399), “this woman, whose wealth and power were 
envied everywhere” (TS 402) does not have a problem with her position within the moral 
framework, but with the traumatising events of her past:  
 
So many terrible things had happened to her in her short life. She had witnessed her 
handsome husband’s brains splatter against the front-row celebrities on opening night. 
She lost two babies in the home that caught alight while she was at the theatre. Other 
things, you may or may not know about, more things than should have happened to 
anyone, had happened to this woman, whose wealth and power were envied 
everywhere. (TS 401-2) 
 
It is this ontologically threatening experience that flings her into visions of safety. Just like 
Herbert in Illywhacker she tries to reinvent her arché, her origin and past, by positioning 
herself in the blissful future of her vision: 
 
‘I tell you, this is what the Great Historical Past was like.’ […] ‘When the Saints walked 
Voorstand, that is how it was, just like it is in the Ghostdorps. We were decent people 
then.’ […] ‘We did not have all these codicils and revisions to the old laws. We ate beans 
and rice and raagbol pudding. We did not rape and murder. We did not thieve. We were 
better then.’ (TS 406) 
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It is this future vision of the past that she tries to make real in her desperate effort to control 
reality and regain ontological security: 
 
‘A Ghostdorp is a safer environment for women and children.’ […] ‘Look out there,’ she 
said, nodding her head towards the grey and humid sky. ‘You are looking out on a 
corrupt and decaying city and you have lost the ability to believe in a future.’ […] ‘[…] 
God damn, I am sick of being afraid,’ she said. ‘I am sick that something bad will happen 
after dark. I’m tired of being afraid of sicko men with knives and poisons.’ […] ‘I’m going 
to give the citizens of Saarlim exactly what they need. Clean streets. Well-dressed 
people.’ […] ‘I’ll let all the decent folk go about their business.’ […] ‘[…] I can run a clean 
Ghostdorp and I can run this city. I can have the parks safe all night long. I can have the 
streets tidy and neat. The grass in the park will be cut. It is so very simple. People will 
come from all over the world once again. We will be a great nation once again.’ (TS 406-
8) 
 
One can clearly see Hissao’s Australian Museum in this vision. Clive Baarder even exclaims: 
“‘Stop it, Peg. You’re frightening me. You can’t ask the bhurgers to be like actors in your 
Ghostdorp. No one will let you. I won’t let you’” (TS 408). He implores Peggy to acknowledge 
the reality principle: 
 
‘A mouse is a little thing,’ he said at last. […] ‘You know that, Peggy, in real life.’ (TS 405)  
 
‘Just the same: this [Tristan in his costume] is not a mouse, Peg.’ […] ‘We know that, 
don’t we? A real mouse is not like this little gjent.’ (TS 406)  
 
‘This is not a mouse.’ Clive Baarder was shouting now, […]. He was standing up, gripping 
the long table like he wished to tip it over. ‘A mouse is four inches long.’ (TS 407) 
 
But of course in a city where Mouse robots – “simulacra” they are called in the novel – walk 
through the streets and where the deskmajoor and the crowds celebrate the spectacle of 
Tristan with money donations, this appeal to ‘real mice’ appears naive. The reality principle is 
gone. “‘‘You think you can reduce everything to DNA, but you can’t’”, is what Peggy replies 
(TS 406). “‘You see the stitching on his suit. Hooray. I see it too. Is that the point? We see the 
gold paint on the Saint’s crown. So what? The point is not the paint. The point is, we’ve lost 
our values’” (TS 407). 
Peggy is longing for a time when “[t]he Sirkus was not just an entertainment” (406). But of 
course, as Sirkus producers, she and Clive greatly contributed to the very profanation she 
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laments. In America Baudrillard talks of “the perfect simulacrum – that of the immanence and 
material transcription of all values”.524 It is just such a materialisation of the imagined, virtuous 
past that Peggy, the compulsive mistress, tries to achieve. Ordering him to keep his identity 
to himself, she wills Tristan to be the Mouse: “‘Don’t tell me,’ she said. ‘Tell you what?’ ‘Don’t 
tell me anything, OK?’ […] ‘No Tristan here,’ murmured Peggy Kram” (TS 400). Seeking moral 
values that are binding, external, she tries to let them take on material form in her bedroom 
and in the Ghostdorps. Thus she is caught in a truly Promethean paradox: she tries to force 
down on earth the moral values she is seeking, but precisely because she is forcing them, they 
cannot fulfil their function of lending her orientation. As soon as the values materialise and 
take on concrete form in the Surkuses and Ghostdorps, they turn out to be only womanmade 
consumer goods – just entertainment, as she says. In the end, she is producing the same 
“market-driven”, womanmade values that were discussed in Chapter 6. 
But the novel has a twist. For, all this – and that is the point – takes place before Tristan 
takes off the mask, before he confronts Peggy Kram with the “alterity of the master or model”, 
as Dawson put it. In the moment he takes off his mask, Peggy’s world turns out of control once 
again, defeats her willpower. Thus Tristan may really constitute an ‘event’ in the Baudrillardian 
sense of the term and disrupt the hyperreality of Voorstand – but in a different way than most 
critics would have it. In Peggy’s Deposition to the Bhurgercourt, added at the very end of the 
novel, we read: “It came to me disguised as one of God’s Creatures. Its true nature was 
monstrous, like the Hairy Man, […]. For a brief time, to my great shame, I fell under its spell. 
When I saw its true nature, I asked it, what have we done to you that you should bear us such 
enmity? It had no reason” (TS 414, the original is in italics). Voorstand still seems to be “a 
culture built on myth and self-delusion”. And yet, after Tristan’s revelation, this myth seems 
to be strangely alive and adaptable; and yet, Peggy “fell under its [Tristan’s] spell” only “[f]or 
a brief time”. Is Saarlim actually ever turned into a Ghostdorp? In the novel, we only read that 
Tristan is charged with having disguised as the Mouse “with the express purpose” to do so (TS 
401). If Tristan really disrupts the hyperreal simulation of a model society and really confronts 
Peggy with the “alterity of the model”, one has to assume she never followed through on a 
plan that the Hairy Man himself whispered in her ear. She might never have built an emporium 
like Hissao therefore. One might even argue that Tristan’s interruption revives the profaned 
Voorstand myth. He adds a new, unforeseen character to it. While in the Sirkus the old myths 
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were a product for entertainment and easy consummation, Peggy’s Deposition makes clear 
that they may have been charged again with some sincerity and regained some explanatory 
value. 
With Baudrillard in mind, one might even be justified in saying that the symbolic order (in 
the Baudrillardian sense of the term) is reinstalled, that symbolic exchange with a reality that 
is perceived as external and not self-produced is once more established. As opposed to 
Baudrillard’s The Symbolic Exchange and Death and more in line with his The Consumer Society 
it is not Tristan’s self-sacrifice and symbolic death – this is precisely what can be avoided – but 
the irruption of the ‘event’ that breaks the stranglehold of hyperreality. To apply Baudrillard 
directly to Tristan Smith: “We shall await the violent irruptions and sudden disintegrations 
which will come, just as unforeseeably and as certainly as [Tristan Smith], to wreck this white 
Mass.”525 
Even if this last argument about the renewed symbolic exchange might be stretching the 
interpretation somewhat, the point remains that two forms of simulation are confronted with 
an external reality in Tristan Smith. Again one can see the double function of the great finale 
here. While Tristan’s hyporeal simulation inside the cover of his Mouse costume is demolished 
by his “true nature” as reflected back to him from the mirror, Peggy’s hyperreal simulation is 
confronted with the event caused by Tristan. That Tristan switches from the optative back into 
the indicative mood has been shown. Whether Peggy switches from the future tense to the 
present tense is debatable. 
 
7.3.4. Not Escaping the Now: Felicity 
 
I claim that the struggle between simulation and external reality is central in Tristan Smith. 
And this claim is supported by the fact that Tristan and Peggy are not the only characters 
engaged in it. There are also Felicity and Jacqui. Because especially Jacqui’s development 
comprises both forms of simulation and is therefore ideally suited to conclude this chapter, I 
will start with Felicity. 
Peggy’s and Felicity’s attempts to fix – both, in the sense of repairing and in the sense of 
immobilising – the value systems of Voorstand and Efica with their ‘ghost villages’ and ‘ghost 
lights’ respectively are endeavours to control and dominate interaction with an independent 
                                                          
525 Baudrillard, The Consumer Society, 196. 
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reality. But as opposed to Peggy, Felicity is not traumatised by her past. In this respect, she is 
rather like Phoebe in Illywhacker. As has been shown, also Felicity’s visions, just like Phoebe’s, 
circle around the idea of being first-rate, of standing out from the crowd. But other than 
Phoebe, Felicity is confronted with a son who is perhaps even more stubborn than Charles and 
simply will not let her abandon him. From the very start, Tristan puts things out of control for 
her. Felicity is acting in a full rehearsal of the Scottish Play when her waters break. And in the 
following, on her way to the hospital (she walks there, and she walks there alone), the vision 
she had formed about this event is so persistently interrupted by raw experience that her self-
narration is constantly thrown back into the realities of the now. It is worthwhile to quote the 
scene at some length here: 
 
When she came down the brick ramp in Gazette Street, things started happening faster 
than she had expected. Oxytocin entered her bloodstream like a ten-ton truck and all 
the pretty soft striped muscles of her womb turned hostile, contracting on me like they 
planned to crush my bones. […] As she crossed the Boulevard des Indiennes to the river 
she already felt distinctly uncomfortable, as if she were holding back a pumpkin, and yet 
she would not abandon her plan, i.e. to walk quietly, by herself, along the river to the 
Mater Hospital. She had long ago decided on this and she was a woman who always 
carried out her plans. […] No one watching her walk along the grey sandy path beside 
the river bed would have guessed at what her body was experiencing. She was an actress 
of the most physical type, and for the first half of her journey her walk was a triumph of 
will. […] The last thing – the book [she is carrying with her] – is a good example of the 
sort of thing that irritated people […]. They sensed in her this expectation of herself, that 
she could, for Christ’s sake, read Stanislavsky while she had a baby. 
She had a rude shock coming to her. […] 
No one from the Feu Follet saw her walk […]. Had they done so, they might have been 
tempted to see it as evidence of her will, even her pride, her belief that she could walk 
while a lesser woman would be in an ambulance calling for the anaesthetic, […] [S]he 
had imagined this moment, this walk beside the river, for too long to abandon it. 
As the great slick machine of Sirkus rose before her, her muscles came crushing down 
upon my brain box. Her mouth gaped. […] She got the base of her back against the tree 
and propped her legs. […]. When the contraction was done, she limped […]. The road 
crews […] danced around the woman who was, by now, almost staggering through them. 
(TS 7-11) 
 
Throughout this long, introductory scene, descriptions of Tristan’s drastically physical 
environment are put in neat juxtaposition to Felicity’s willpower. Unlike Phoebe or Herbert, 
she cannot be the sky therefore. She tries to put her vision into practice, to create her world. 
But her body – or rather Tristan inside it – resists. It is this resistance that forcefully ties her 
vision back to the now and keeps her connected with the ontological aspect of her 
narratisation. Luckily so, for, as has been shown so often now, agency cannot mean 
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omnipotence and must always be connected with an intended but not fully predetermined 
outcome if it is not to turn into hyperreal self-simulation. Only when interaction with an 
independent, external world is maintained in such a way, one’s actions have implications for 
oneself in turn, and one remains “existentially involved”. Thus Felicity is saved from de-
essentialisation and kept from becoming a compulsive mistress by the stubborn insistence of 
her body and Tristan himself. 
For Felicity and her lover Vincent, Tristan is an idea – a product of their will and their 
imagination. They ‘intend’ him: 
 
If she had conceived me with Bill, it was Vincent she had discussed me with most often. 
Bill was only twenty-two, but Vincent wanted the role. 
My maman wanted me too, but after Lear, after Mother Courage, after the tour to Nez 
Noir. She scheduled me, rescheduled. She named me Tristan in the summer of 366 [that 
is five years before he is born], even as she postponed me. I was Tristan before my egg 
was hit, Tristan before they knew if I was a boy or a girl. 
The moment I was conceived, I was Vincent’s little liefling [darling]. He treasured me, 
the idea of me, just as he might a folk painting […]. (TS 28) 
 
But bursting into this pleasant dreaming with all his physicality, Tristan Smith – the actual 
outcome of their intention – forces them back into realty and the now-time of their self-
narration. After seeing Felicity presenting the real Tristan to the audience, Vincent is 
shattered: “I did not come back on stage, but for Vincent the aesthete, who felt he had 
invented me, it was a kind of hell. He was left alone with his thoughts and theories in the dark 
– a two-hour production with no interval” (TS 32). Indeed, there is no interval when “thoughts 
and theories” meet with the unrelenting brutality of an independent external reality – when 
action is not pure self-expression (as is the case in a fully dependent, manmade world), but 
has real consequences. 
This particular version of the struggle between fantasies or visions and reality runs through 
the entire novel. Whenever Tristan is mentioned, his stark corporality is in the forefront, while 
whenever Felicity is mentioned, it is in connection with the determination of her extraordinary 
willpower, her intention which is guided by her ideal of being first-rate and which is expressed 
in her visions. 
Tristan is trouble. He makes trouble. He is never ‘as planned’. For his survival that is 
absolutely necessary. We already saw above that once Felicity is back home with her new-
born son, “she lost her nerve” – just like Vincent. It is interesting to note in this respect that, 
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despite naming him five years before he is born, Felicity is completely unprepared. Tristan was 
a lifestyle choice that was not really meant to have a significant effect on those who made the 
choice. But in Tristan Smith and through Tristan Smith the significance feature – the fact that 
the agents are themselves concerned and implied by their actions – is firmly kept in place. One 
may differentiate between ‘choice’ and ‘decision’ therefore. A consumer ‘chooses’ between 
options that are provisional, non-binding, reversible and, in principle, predictable. A choice is 
a consumer’s self-expression. An agent, however, has to ‘decide’. Such a decision will elicit an 
intended but not completely foreseeable response from the system and thus fundamentally 
imply the one who decides in turn. Felicity thought she had chosen a fittingly extravagant 
lifestyle, but has to realise that she really made a decision that resulted in non-negotiable 
consequences. As it turns out, she has to live with it. 
After her dramatic flight from the hospital we read: “She had no plan. […] She had no 
tissues, no bandocks [diapers], nothing but a bottle of eau mineral for herself to drink” (TS 
20). When one reads through the description of her room in that scene, one finds absolutely 
nothing one could use for taking care of babies – something, for example, like a nursery or at 
least a changing table. “‘Do you know about babies, Wally?’”, she helplessly asks the 50-year-
old ex-con. She was on stage when her waters broke and she was back on stage again the very 
next night, presenting her newly born accessory to a shocked audience. “[B]y the time I had 
survived another eight weeks,” Tristan relates, “the Feu Follet was in rehearsal for a very 
athletic production of The Caucasian Chalk Circle” (TS 55). Not surprisingly, Felicity’s milk dries 
up – a change that eight-week-old Tristan does not agree with: “I became irritable, devious, 
needy, capable of blazing fits of rage. It was at this stage, an hour before curtain of the dress 
rehearsal, that my maman telephoned Vincent” (TS 56). In the end – and after five years of 
planning – also Vincent, just like Felicity, will find himself too busy to take care of a child 
(impaired or not). It is Wally, the ex-con who has no idea himself, who will have to do the job: 
 
He placed two delicate fillets on a pale blue plate – and I know, Madam, a ten-week-old 
child does not eat fish, but Wally did not know. I was his first. […] So when, at last, he 
offered me the meal he had so lovingly prepared, I rejected it. […] I wanted Vincent. I 
wanted my bottle. Wally gave me a cup. I had never seen a cup. I knocked it over. Wally 
yelled at me. I cried. And that is how it was always to be with us – Wally was the one 
who made the rules and was angry, the one who cooked breakfast and lunch and yelled 
at me when I didn’t eat it. (TS 61) 
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From the very beginning Tristan has no choice but to make himself heard with all the might 
he can muster. For, in no way whatsoever are Tristan’s parents – except Wally – prepared to 
accept the actual consequences of their actions, to direct their life towards the new 
responsibility of raising their child. 
When Tristan puts his life on the line by climbing a tree in order to demonstrate that he 
can perform the role of the Hairy Man – another one of his many drastically physical scenes – 
it is amazing how completely his mother misreads her son, even as his motifs are spelled out 
to her by Bill – in an almost eerie feat of empathy on his part: 
 
‘He was not bird-nesting,’ he said. 
‘Sweets, he brought me eggs.’ 
‘It was the Hairy Man. It was his action.’ He turned on his side and raised himself on 
his elbow. ‘He was showing you his action. He was showing you he had the guts to 
perform his action. He did not plan the eggs. He made them the character’s aim.’ 
She smiled. ‘You’re turning this into a story about you.’ […] 
‘All I’m suggesting,’ he said, ‘is that it would not be peculiar if that was what it was. We 
gave him a role and then we took it away from him.’ (TS 78-9) 
 
For Felicity, narcissist (in the everyday sense of the word) and self-absorbed as she appears 
here, Tristan is a fancy idea just like the Feu Follet, which she “made […], dreamed […], spun 
[…] out of herself”. But in the end, Tristan will win over her. When he runs away, we find her 
contemplating – for the first time – the physical realities of her son and what they mean for 
him: 
 
She understood exactly. She knew she had betrayed him […] in so many complex ways, 
not least by carelessly allowing him to fall in love with the theatre. 
He could not be an actor. […] 
He did not have the [vocal] instrument. No matter how he exercised, there was so little 
muscle tissue to develop, and although she was intensely, continually, moved by his 
courage – […] – courage was not the same as ability. 
[…] Her son could never do it. […] 
‘He’s not in hospital,’ she said to Vincent […]. ‘I know he’s not.’ […] ‘He’s back at the 
theatre,’ she said. ‘He frightens me.’ (TS 152-3) 
 
Despite everything, she will give him the two vital acting lessons, as we know. But the 
decisive point here is that Tristan forces Felicity to recognise him and take him seriously. For 
the first time, she clearly and explicitly acknowledges the limits of her self-simulation, that her 
actions are not pure self-expression but mutually transformative interaction with real 
consequences for herself and others. As has been said, this is the difference between 
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Illywhacker’s Phoebe, who will remain self-conceited to the end, and Felicity, who is forced to 
‘get real’ by Tristan and Bill – which means that she is kept from fully implementing and thus 
living inside of her own visions. In the end, the ontological aspect of her narratisiation is too 
self-imposing as to be ignored or dominated, the interplay between the ontological and the 
moral aspect of her narratisastion is thus forcefully kept intact. 
 
7.3.5. Jacqui: From Self-Realisation to Escapism and Back to the Now 
 
Jacqui Lorraine will be the last character being discussed here. Her development is particularly 
elucidating, since it comprises both, visionary self-transformation and escapist fantasies. But 
eventually, also she will return to the now of her immediate living conditions in order to “face 
whatever might be waiting for her” – just like Honey Barbara from Bliss. 
Throughout her childhood, Jacqui Lorraine is treated to a spectacular Christmas 
simulation. Her father Jesse and his friend Oliver Odettes would drive at Christmas Eve “to the 
peak of Mount Cootreksea, 10,000 feet and 200 miles from the palm trees of Chemin Rouge, 
and there they would spend two hours sipping wine, admiring the light, and shovelling snow 
into the truck”. This snow is then duly spread over the Lorraines’ “pocket-handkerchief size 
lawn at the front of Jacqui’s house” (TS 323) at the next morning – and Peter Carey takes care 
to include papayas and banana trees in that scene. Oliver wears “very short shorts” and is “as 
ugly as a drag queen”, while Jacqui’s mother, Rene, has “tanned arms folded across her 
breasts” and Jesse would “tuck the tartan rug around his shining shapely brown legs”. Despite 
despising “so ridiculous a spectacle”, Rene helps it along by playing 30 seconds of sleigh bells 
from a tape recorder, before Jesse takes seat in a “ridiculously small chrome and vinyl chair” 
(TS 324) on the snowy lawn and reads European (if we count Russia to Europe) stories about 
snow: passages from Tess of the d’Urbervilles, Anna Karenina, and Jane Eyre. This spectacle is 
always also enjoyed by the neighbours, who crowd on the other side of the hedge: “They did 
not miss God in their lives, but they were Eficans, and their history had given them another 
kind of nagging loss which the cold white snow temporarily eased” (TS 325). 
Once again Carey’s readers are treated to the cultural cringe here, to the pain of 
unbelonging, to a European culture utterly out of place with its traditions and customs. For 
Jacqui, however, this means that she goes through a very similar process as David Joy in Bliss. 
She dissociates from her now, and associates with the future vision of adventure, introduced 
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to her by her father: “He had photographs of himself, a young good-looking man in a red shirt 
standing on a road in China, in a blizzard in Voorstand, in a restaurant in Paris, on the wharf in 
Marseille” (TS 325). When making this connection to David Joy it is important to keep one 
thing in mind, however. Jacqui’s vision is linked to her father himself, his generous, life-
affirming attitude. Even while slowly dying “he had more life in him than her [Rene, Jacqui’s 
mother]” (TS 327). This is important, for it means that as opposed to David or Phoebe, who 
says she wants to “do something”, “something unusual”, something she cannot plan for and 
who wants to invent herself, Jacqui has a definite, real-life role model in her father. She does 
not want to ‘invent’ herself in the same sense therefore. Her vision is not based on dissociation 
from her past and her parents but the acknowledgment of them and the association with her 
father. Her vision is not, therefore, a form of suppression and denial. 
By grappling with her attitude towards her parents and negotiating their moral goods, 
Jacqui may try to create herself, to take her life out of the hands of nature and into her own, 
but she never fully de-essentialises and cuts her connection to her arché: 
 
Do children decide how they are going to grow? Jacqui always believed she had decided, 
that she had stood on the veranda of her home and made the choice. (TS 322) 
 
[O]n Christmas Day [in the year 380, when Jacqui, being as old as Tristan, is nine] she 
decided she would be like her father. She looked like her mother, but she would be like 
the big man, the bear with his tobacco smell – not a man, she never wanted to be a man 
– but not fearful or mean or angry or small-minded. (TS 325) 
 
What Jacqui does not realise, however, is that her very ambition and determination 
connect her more to her mother than to her father. Jesse simply accepts his situation of old 
age and unemployment, while her mother, Rene, has to work hard to make a living: “He had 
a doctorate from the Sorbonne but he was unemployable. And although his bride never 
thought this was his fault she was, just the same, irritated by his lack of guilt. ‘What do you 
want me to do?’ he said. ‘I will enjoy my life. I have always enjoyed my life’” (TS 326). In her 
very endeavour to emulate her father, Jacqui does not share in her father’s attitude at all. Her 
burning ambition leads her from a prize-winning PhD thesis – which she must have completed 
at least three years before she was 23526 – to the Efican secret service, DoS (the Department 
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“[o]nce she got me, […] this twenty-three-year-old young woman was fraudulently misrepresenting my activities 
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of Supply), where she holds a position as “POLIT analyst” (TS 268). However, at this point her 
self-forming drive meets with certain realities that are beyond her control. Trying to emulate 
her father, working as an analyst is not what she really wants – even if it is an analysing job 
with the secret service. It is an adventurous job in Operations for which she really longs, and 
which she simply cannot get as a woman, no matter how hard she tries. As we shall see now, 
her entire story invites reflections from a gender studies perspective, too – one that cannot 
be elaborated here, however. 
From her desk she has to observe “the unmarked cars of the operatives as they waited at 
the security gate to be admitted to the building” and craves to be one of them: 
 
She never saw an operative on the third floor [where she works], never met one inside 
the building. They drove in and out of the security gate with their tanned male arms 
resting on their open windows. They hung around in the basement wearing shirtsleeves 
and shoulder holsters. They told jokes and threw medicine balls at each other. She knew 
this because she managed, through Daphne Loukakis, to get asked to the drinking 
parties at the Printemps. 
In Analysis the operatives were thought to be barbarians. […] But they were not half-
hearted, or meek. They were alive. They took risks. 
You had to discount a lot of things they thought […] but at the core they were the real 
thing. That was her opinion. They did not live as if they were in rehearsal. They lived like 
this was it. (TS 269) 
 
When we see this description, we get the image of a young girl romanticising about a very 
brutal environment, just as Felicity did when she went to the circus with Bill and “did not see 
the meanness of the circus, the lying proprietors, the stinking caravans, the brutal beatings 
Bill had suffered”. The quote above states: “You had to discount a lot of things they thought”, 
but it seems you had to discount, too, a lot of things they did. Jacqui has a short-lived affair 
with the operative Wendell Deveau (the one who took Tristan to the Mater Hospital when 
Tristan ran away as a child, and the one who will assassinate Wally): 
 
He was not an old man, no more than thirty, and he was still handsome, but he had 
already been through the fire-bombing of Blue’s headquarters [the political party for 
which Vincent works] and he was now balding and pale and overweight as though 
bloated with the gas of secrets he could not release. (TS 270) 
 
                                                          
to her computer” (TS 271). We must assume that she had been applying for three years before she finally got 
Tristan, and we must assume that she had written her thesis even before that. 
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These ‘real men’ Jacqui admires, might not be quite so admirable in reality then. When 
she turns herself into one of them in order to get a job as Tristan’s nurse, in order to get a job 
as operative spying on a member of the boring, toothless January 20 Group, then she takes 
on a costume. Thus, ironically, the “real thing” is not only a product of her fantasy, but also a 
role she starts to play. 
“I was a low-level security risk”, Tristan reports, “a boring, tedious report job. […]. I was so 
unattractive a job that others might just let her have me” (TS 270). At this point Jacqui’s path 
towards self-realisation takes a turn. In order to get the job, she has to transform herself into 
a man as Wendell explains: “The mark [Tristan] won’t hire a woman. He falls in love” (TS 270). 
Consequently, Jacqui changes her looks, practices to move like a man and in the end succeeds: 
“Jacqui got me because I was low-status work – demeaning, disgusting, safe” (TS 271). 
We witness how Jacqui, as a woman, finds herself in a position within the common moral 
framework that does not allow her to strive for her moral goods, and how she starts to play 
roles in order to escape this situation. But right away Jacqui is in the danger of losing herself 
in these optative simulations. “Once she got me, she changed what I was. I was safe, she made 
me unsafe. I was inactive, she made me active. […] She was as discreet and complete as any 
butler [in the role of Tristan’s nurse], but at the same time this twenty-three-year-old young 
woman was fraudulently misrepresenting my activities to her computer” (TS 271). The quote 
shows how she builds up her own fantasy world. But she is not a child anymore who tries out 
different roles and simulates possible selves. She is a grown-up, and in her case the game 
threatens to have serious, non-reversible consequences. 
Very early, on her journey with Tristan and Wally, there is a scene that clearly 
demonstrates how the outside world intrudes on her play. In many respects, Jacqui’s walk 
through the Burro Plasse tunnel, which connects the nation of Zeelung (the similarities with 
Mexico are difficult to overlook) with Voorstand, parallels Felicity’s walk to the Mater Hospital. 
It is an intensely physical, if somewhat clichéd, description of a powerful will and the betrayal 
of the – interestingly once again female – body: 
 
No matter what lies he [Jacques] had told to get here, no matter what long strands of 
life led him to this point, no matter that it had seemed […] as if this voyage was nothing 
less than his destiny, now his body was traitor to his will. […] To be a man was like driving 
a huge and complicated machine on manual systems, so even something as simple as 
urinating involved planning and subterfuge, asking for a place to shit so you could squat 
in private. Wally and Tristan, Aziz, the farmer – we would pee just about anywhere. We 
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had no sense of privacy and would wave our penises and splash our sour, luxuriant urine 
against the blue rock walls, flap our foreskins, squeeze them dry. But Jacqui [note the 
change of name] thought of urine and its disposal like a desert traveller rationing a 
supply of water. (TS 267-8) 
 
Jacqui – for the first time in the novel called by this, female, name – has no access to the 
exclusive club of “we” to which all the others – even the farmer, even deformed Tristan – 
belong on grounds of their being able to pass urine standing. Notably, however, and perhaps 
to Peter Carey’s defence, the funny yet cliché scene of Jacqui’s squatting down in the shadow 
of the tunnel (TS 276) does exactly not lead to her discovery. Aziz finds her out before (TS 275), 
and her company does not find her out at all, allowing the narrative voice to switch back to 
her male name, Jacques, again after the incident. The act, thought to be of prime symbolic 
importance, turns out to be completely insignificant. Still, what we find here is one more “body 
[…] out of control” – to use Susan Wendell’s expression527 – a body that simply will not be fully 
mastered and determined by intention. 
The difference between Felicity and Jacqui, when they try to win over their bodies during 
their respective walks, is that Felicity performs her self while Jacqui consciously play-acts a 
role. They identify with what they do on different levels: self-forming vision (Felicity) and 
fantasmatic simulation (Jacqui). When Jacqui embarked upon her career and entered the DoS, 
she formed and transformed herself according to her vision of adventure. But once she 
realises she cannot, not in reality, progress from there because she is a woman and women 
will not be admitted into operations, she puts on a costume, invents lies, and increasingly 
escapes into fantasies, a parallel world, narrated in the optative mood, in which Tristan is a 
dangerous terrorist and she a successful secret agent: 
 
It never occurred to me that I might be her man, her invention, […] this slight, attractive 
woman with size five shoes had made me into a terrorist. […] I was the centre of her 
fiction. […] 
I had no idea of the risk my sleeping nurse had taken to make this trip, the cynical lies 
she had told to get there, or the looming consequences she had successfully obliterated 
from her consciousness. (TS 288-9) 
 
                                                          
527 “As long as the goal is to control the body, there is great potential in all healing practices for blaming the 
victims, and for discarding or ignoring all those whose bodies are out of control, including people who are 
terminally ill, disabled, chronically ill, fat, or addicted.” Susan Wendell, The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical 
Reflections on Disability, New York: Routledge, 1996, 98. 
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Just like Tristan, when he, as a child, put on the Mouse costume to play Richard the Third 
(TS 184), she puts on a man costume to play secret agent. And just like Tristan she runs into 
the dangers of enabling escapism. Accordingly, the lies she uses to enter her parallel world are 
different from Herbert’s in Illywhacker. His lies “delivered value in whatever way it was 
required” (IL 24), he kindles other people’s desire. Jacqui, however, kindles her own desire 
(the Freud of “On Narcissism” would say she is trapped in ego-libido): “She had not meant me 
harm. She had not meant me anything. She wanted something for herself and I was a member 
of a proscribed group [the “toothless” January 20 Group]” (TS 288). She never believes she is 
a man, and she never believes she may uncover the secrets of the Zawba’a – the terrorist 
group to which she fraudulently links Tristan. Very consciously, she plays a role – a role she 
desires, but a role she knows she does not really hold. ‘Flight’ thus means denial. She blocks 
out the uncomfortable external world she knows is actually out there. She play-acts at being 
a secret agent and is amazed and thrilled like a child by her success. 
From the very beginning of the operation it is all a game for her: “They [the DoS] coaxed 
her, cradled her, pushed her. They had her doing crunches and push-ups. They gave her 
intensive weapons training, then halted it when they found her attempting Sirkus tricks with 
her fifteen-shot semi-automatic Glock” (TS 289). Also later, when already in Voorstand, she 
revels in the excitement of her adventure: 
 
She leaned into the air with her chest as if it were a shield […] hiding the riches the 
Misdaad Boys [members of a gang, ‘misdeed boys’] could not have imagined she 
possessed: the Water Sirkus, the Baan, the dinner with Bill Millefleur, Peggy Kram, the 
doorman, the gondel, the champagne glass she had carried in the elevator; and she 
wished only that someone from home – she imagined Oliver Odettes in his demi-bottes 
– had been there to witness her entry into such glamorous society. 
[…] She would have been wise to be nervous, but she thought what other small-town 
gens have thought since time began: Here I am. (TS 367-8) 
 
Jacqui has switched her self-narration almost completely into the optative mood. In the 
alternative world into which she thus escapes, she can be Jacqui and Jacques at the same time, 
she can be a secret agent and Tristan a terrorist, and they can still be friends. The whole 
adventure can be thrilling, dangerous, and benign all at once. In this fantasmatic alternative 
world there are no contradictions and especially no actual consequences. However, in the 
non-alternative world, the one we cannot chose, the one we cannot escape in the end, her 
lying is performative – it does provoke replies from the external system. Jacqui, who has 
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“successfully obliterated from her consciousness” “the looming consequences”, has a rude 
awakening coming to her – like a child that has done something silly. 
It is Wendell Deveau himself, who comes from Efica to burst the bubble of her dreams: 
 
‘Your’re a fucking child,’ he whispered. 
[…] So, she thought, the game is up. (TS 372) 
 
‘You don’t involve the Voorstanders like this and not have a result. Now I’m here, we’re 
going to have a result.’ 
Jacqui felt ill. ‘What are you going to do?’ 
‘What are you going to do?’ he mimicked her. ‘I’m going to have to kill Tristan fucking 
Smith before the Efican Department [of the VIA] finds out the real story.’ 
Jacqui began to cry. 
Wendell looked at her, shaking his head. 
[…] ‘Your fax came true. You made the poor little fuck a terrorist.’ (TS 374) 
 
In the end, as we know by now, Wally kills Wendell, and Wally will be shot dead by him 
during the fight. This is the reality that will not let itself be blocked out forever. It hits and it 
hits hard: the “looming consequences” Jacqui blocked out are the deaths of her former lover, 
Wendell, and Wally, “that sweet old man”. However, she also manages to save Tristan’s life in 
the end and to flee with him and Bill through Voorstand. Eventually, then, she does lead the 
adventurous life she had always dreamed of – but not in a way she could possibly have 
foreseen and only after she has stripped her roles and returned to a narratisation in the 
indicative mood. That the outcome of her actions was intended but not fully predetermined 
is somewhat of an understatement, then, but it is clear that it is this mutually transformative 
interaction between herself and the independent, external world that allows her to 
successfully make use of her inner sources, her potential – although her path, like Leah 
Goldstein’s, is full of contradictions and bitter mistakes. As has been said, agency is a case of 
trial and error. 
When we ask again now, what it is that makes Tristan – and we now add Jacqui – 
successfully disruptive, then, yes, menacing mimicry, appropriation, subversive resignification 
is part of the answer. However, acceptance is also part of the answer. The controlling and 
escaping characters of Tristan Smith are successful precisely because they are not successful 
enough in escaping from or in re-forming themselves. The two walks by Felicity and Jacqui can 
be cited as representative examples of how the actors in Tristan Smith – as opposed to those 
in Illywhacker – are permanently confronted with an unrelenting, external reality from which 
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they cannot fully escape and which they cannot fully control. For the characters in Tristan 
Smith, action is therefore always interaction and not pure self-expression. Accordingly, the 
answer from an independent, external reality grounds them, flings them back into the world, 
and makes their actions meaningful in the sense that they feel “existentially involved”. 
Like Jacqui, the Voorstanders “did not think through the consequences” of their brutal 
actions in Efica. The answer, however, comes in form of Tristan Smith. Once his mask comes 
off, his act turns into an event that is utterly beyond the control or understanding of the 
Saarlim elite around Peggy Kram – the commanding evidence of a reality outside their 
hyperreal constructions. It is him – in all his grotesque, incomprehensible and imposing 
physicality – who provides the response from an independent, external reality that refuses to 
be completely dominated and controlled, and thus changes their world in turn. 
 
7.4. The Radical’s Conceit: Peter Carey’s Political Activists 
 
At this point, by way of concluding the chapter, it is time to look into Peter Carey’s theme of 
the radicals’ conceit more generally in order to connect The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith with 
Peter Carey’s complete oeuvre. Political activists that they are, Ned Kelly, Che’s parents – 
Susan Selkirk and Dave Rubbo – or Gabrielle Baillieux, naturally seek publicity, just like Felicity 
and Tristan Smith. However, in Peter Carey’s writing this appeal to an audience is very often 
revealed to be an act of self-staging and self-expression rather than commitment to a cause. 
When Bill asks Felicity what she has affected with her avant-garde theatre and tells her: “I feel 
like I’ve been in a theme park, acting out some heroic role, and now it’s time to go home”, she 
only replies “‘Have I become provincial? […] I always thought I’d know if I was becoming second-
rate.’”. 
Ned Kelly’s case is very elucidating in this respect. He says, he is “plotting what revenge I 
would take upon them higher ups who so oppressed us all”, but this fight against “them higher 
ups” is not political at all. It is, in fact, very personal: “I come to elevate him [Mr Gill, editor of 
the Jerilderie Gazette] to a higher calling. HE WOULD PRINT THE TRUTH THEN MY MOTHER WOULD BE 
RELEASED FROM GAOL”. Just like Chubb and McCorkle in My Life as a Fake, his actual concern is 
his position within the common moral framework: “I wished only to be a citizen I had tried to 
speak but the mongrels stole my tongue when I asked for justice they give me none.”528 Riding 
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alone through the bush he even has an important insight: “I finally seen the truth. The bush 
protected no one. It had been men who protected Harry and it were a man who betrayed him 
in the end.”529 He realises that it was the people’s support that was responsible for Harry 
Power’s success – and still the idea to make his struggle a political struggle does not even enter 
his head. His conclusion is only that loyalty has a price tag to it and that therefore he must rob 
a bank: 
 
Harry were not captured because the traps suddenly learned his trails and hideouts he 
were arrested when he put a lower price on his freedom than the government were 
prepared to pay. The sad truth is the poor people’s love is cupboard love and all it took 
was £500 for the police to be led directly to his secret door.530 
 
Ned Kelly seeks a national audience but only to tell his story, not to mobilise them. He 
fights for himself, not for the people. The signs of escapism and primary narcissism – fantasies 
of infantile omnipotence – are all present. To quote the passages from Chapter 3 again: “But 
they cannot catch me Mary they can’t even find their way along the public highway”;531 “the 
police was actors in a drama writ by me”;532 “The Commissioner thought he were the servant 
of Her Majesty the Queen but he were my puppet on a string […] they never imagined they 
would be captives in a drama devised by me”.533 Finally, he builds himself an iron armour – a 
costume like Tristan’s and Jacqui’s – behind which he feels invincible: 
 
What is it he [Joe Byrne] asked and turned it upside down. 
It is the pattern for the ironclad man. 
Who is he asks Joe. 
He is you said I he is a warrior he cannot die.534 
 
Ned never reaches an acceptance stage like Tristan; never manages to personalise his moral 
framework in the “twilight comradeship” of his mates and Mary, and to flee with them to 
California. 
When he thus simply cannot accept his position within the common moral framework as 
a murderer and coward (while still being accepted and validated by his close relations and 
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making his case from the safety of California), then he perfectly fits Charles Taylor’s 
description of honour ethic (see Chapter 4.9.). In the end, Ned Kelly sacrifices his and his 
mates’ lives for his sense of personhood, in a similar manner as Christopher Chubb. 
Che’s parents’ case is different. Also for them the political cause is a personal matter: 
“Susan Selkirk […] could still issue commands like the revolution was a family business. For the 
Movement! Please.”535 But when they turn themselves into media images, they are not 
enabled escapists. They are hyperreal self-simulators, or “subjects of consumption”. If we 
remember, Che knows his parents only from the media: “Cameron gave him a full-page picture 
of his father from Life. Cameron read him the caption. Beyond your command. His dad was 
cool looking, with wild fair hair. He held his fingers in a V.”536 Che’s ‘real’ father has 
disappeared into a staged reality behind television screens and magazines. It is exactly as 
Baudrillard describes it. Che’s father is 
 
absorbed into the order of signifiers of social status, etc. He is not reflected in that order, 
but absorbed and abolished. The subject of consumption is the order of signs. […], the 
involvement of the subject is no longer, at any event, that of an ‘alienated’ essence […]. 
The situation is rather like that of the child kissing his image in the mirror before going 
to bed.537 
 
A consumer woman (or man) who chooses her selves to put them on display for everyone’s 
admiration does not actively engage in a mutually transformative exchange that would 
“existentially involve” her. For that reason, the Movement does not “existentially involve” its 
members either. It is a lifestyle choice like everything else in their affluent world. Except for 
its increasing violence, it is a theme park just like Felicity’s Feu Follet. Accordingly, Susan’s 
death by accidentally blowing herself up is not symbolic in the Baudrillardian sense, it is just 
ridiculous. 
As wealthy members of the upper-class, there is indeed something auto-aggressive in the 
whole posture of the Movement’s members – a suppressed conflict with their family 
background. This severing of one’s origins is a theme in Carey’s writing with which we are well 
acquainted by now. Accordingly, one might argue that Che’s parents have too little of what 
Ned Kelly has too much. They engage in a Movement but have nothing to fight against, except 
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their own affluence. They have no moral values that are non-chosen and binding. Avoiding 
their now like Phoebe, they create themselves and have nothing to involve them existentially 
anymore. 
Moreover, when action is self-expression in such a way, then it is not even meant to have 
consequences. Che, who is more burdensome than the usual accessory and cannot even be 
returned like other consumer goods, is thus as much a nuisance for his parents as Charles and 
Sonia are a nuisance for Phoebe, and as Tristan is a nuisance for Felicity (initially). Accordingly, 
Honey Barbara’s assessment of the Joy Family also applies to Susan and Rubbo: There are 
“pleasures so everyday that these people would never see anything in them but tiredness, 
prepetition, discomfort, and no originality at all”. With Che they reject the very thing that 
might have given them some responsibility and meaning in their lives. And they reject him for 
the hyperreal theme park of the Movement, the very thing that precludes interaction with an 
external reality. 
The result of the Illywhacker discussion can now be elaborated, however. Some 
protagonists, like Che’s parents, suppress or avoid an ontological aspect of their self-narration 
by living in and for their visions, while others, like Ned Kelly, cannot integrate decisive moral 
aspects into a coherent self-narration, hide inside costumes and fantasise themselves into 
alternative shapes. Sometimes one would have to adapt and personalise one’s vision, and 
sometimes one would have to adapt or personalise one’s moral framework. In both cases, 
however, one would have to adjust one’s ambitions to one’s actual living conditions rather 
than the other way round – even though, from a theoretical perspective, agency would entail 
both (see also the case of Jack McGrath). In both cases, the conceited radicals use ‘the cause’ 
as a means for self-staging and self-expression – as a mirror for self-reflection, a self-reflection 
either in the future tense or in the optative mood. 
In order not to de-essentialise, these characters would have to confront the now. In Honey 
Barbara’s words, they would have to “face whatever might be waiting for [them] at home”. 
Rootedness, staying connected with one’s arché is thus what makes Carey’s rebels successful, 
if they are. 
The Hups in “The Chance” forego glamour and beauty. They neither fantasise alternative 
personas for themselves, nor do they transmogrify themselves in accordance with a vision. 
They lose The Chance on purpose and thus are freed to engage with the world. Paradoxically, 
one has to get over oneself in order to interact with the world in a mutually transformative 
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process and in so doing to unfold one’s potential. Nowhere is this expressed more clearly than 
in Amnesia. To quote the crucial note of humbleness again: 
 
To Mr Felix Moore, posing as a radical, it read […]. This woman [Gabrielle] is a human 
being and it will be your honour to celebrate her real life without hysteria. […] 
All you need is to be humble, the note continued. If you can manage this we, her 
friends, have the ability to publish you digitally around the world. We are legion. Ten 
million readers are now within your reach.538 
 
Gabrielle has another person tell her story, and she addresses her global audience in this 
way not because she wants it to admire her but in order to mobilise it. What she, Tristan and 
Carla (“The Chance”) all realise – and what Ned, Che’s parents and Felicity all do not realise – 
is that you have to be a part of the world in order to change it. Again it is Gabrielle who 
expresses this insight most clearly when she says: “But you cannot be a solo artist and release 
asylum seekers from their corporate jails. I was, always, in every single action of my life, spoon-
fed by others.”539 In Carey’s fictive universe this is what makes rebels successful. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
In this last chapter I will quickly retrace the course of the thesis and then present the findings 
of the three extended readings (Chapters 5, 6, 7) in a slightly new arrangement – emphasising 
two findings that have permanently suggested themselves but never quite entered the focus 
of attention. First, I will draw the connection between bildung and agency, presenting the 
novels from the perspective of the characters’ development. Then, I will draw out the link 
between storytelling and agency, referring to Carey’s oeuvre more generally. A final paragraph 
on agency shall conclude the thesis. 
 
For nearly 30 years, scholarship on Peter Carey has repeated itself in describing how the 
author reinvented Australian history and challenged the distinction between fact and fiction 
through postmodern and postcolonial writing techniques. Accordingly, this thesis set out to 
view Carey’s works from a new angle, namely agency. The main effort was to get away from 
analyses of the texts’ political and artistic potential towards a more character-oriented 
approach of close readings. In order to discuss the three dominant ‘agency themes’ in Carey’s 
writing – the contest for voice, the self-destructive dreaming of many of his characters, and 
Carey’s political rebels – it was therefore necessary to find a conception of agency with which 
it was possible to investigate plots and characters again. 
The problem with such a concept of agency was that I had to work it out first. It had to be 
based on the standard sociological account of agency, designated with the term ‘agency game’ 
in reference to Wittgenstein, as well as on the philosophical tradition. In particular, it had to 
include notions of free will and external moral values that are strongly contested (to put it 
mildly) in the prevailing academic climate in the humanities. Accordingly, the theoretical 
foundation – and that entails justification – of the agency concept applied here took up a lot 
of space. However, the resulting concept of intrinsic sources that have to be deployed within 
a common moral framework did yield completely new, and I hope also interesting, insights 
into Carey’s works in the end. 
One of these insights, and a striking one at that, is that all the novels under discussion can 
also be grasped as novels of development – quite in contrast to Lever’s claim that “recent 
Australian literary fiction has less concern with narrative, and more interest in the 
performance of language, often depending for its interest on the establishment of an 
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energetic voice (witness the novels of Astley, Mathers, Ireland, Foster, Carey).”540 Lever is 
right, of course, about the energetic voice. But in Carey’s case at least this does not entail a 
wholesale renunciation of traditional features of narration. Not that we would have, in most 
of Carey’s novels, classic, linear plot structures that are developed in a mimetic mode of 
narration – again, here Lever is right – but Carey’s energetic voices do talk of individual, clearly 
discernible characters that try to undergo a development – even if this turns out to be a futile 
struggle. 
 
Bildung 
 
Already the process of essentialisation – of discovering one’s potential by using it within a 
moral framework that is provided by one’s immediate social surroundings – indicates 
development, bildung. Analysing Peter Carey’s novels in terms of agency is therefore also 
always an investigation of the characters’ development. 
One could argue that bildung is exactly McCorkle’s problem in My Life as a Fake. He is the 
most thorough fake of all the characters presented in this thesis. Like Frankenstein’s monster, 
he has no childhood. He never develops. He is ready-made – created. Accordingly, he accuses 
Chubb, the postmodern Prometheus: “when I hold this child [Tina, whom he abducts in this 
scene], I feel the weight of everything you stole from me. This I had not expected, but now I 
know exactly what I want from you. What is that? This is a childhood, he said” (MF 155-6). 
From the very start of his existence, McCorkle violently tries to craft the origin he does not 
have. In this he is very much like all the other compulsive masters of our novels. “I have made 
myself a whole man, almost” (MF 155), he declares before stealing the baby. Just like Herbert 
in Illywhacker, he is condemned to always be whole, almost. Forever, he must continue the 
paradoxical struggle to create his origin. This plight is matched, of course, by Chubb. Also he 
is hantued, also he is forced into an existence he rejects. When he is put, like McCorkle before 
him, into an abject position within the common moral framework, then his own past, his own 
origin is denied him, wiped out and replaced by another. His bildung is perverted, negated, 
and replaced. As was shown in the discussion of the novel – he would rather die for the sake 
of his origin than continue being a being he rejects being. 
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The one character in My Life as a Fake whose development is described in some detail is 
Sarah Wode-Douglass herself. Her case makes particularly clear, therefore, how agency is 
linked to bildung. She discovers – and does not decide or chose – that “my life had been 
shaped by my misunderstanding of John Slater”. But this does not damage her hypergood, the 
mysterious beauty of true art. And so, even though the path she took within her common 
moral framework was based on a misconception, “I was not unhappy with the shape itself” 
(MF 136). The final attack on her very hypergood, however, constitutes an invalidation of her 
entire development. The process of her bildung comes to a halt and she comes undone. At 
that point, she finds herself in a very similar predicament as Jack McGrath when he asks 
Herbert Badgery: “If kindness is not the point, what point is there?” (IL 127). If the truth of art 
is not the point, then there is no point for Sarah’s life. That is, too, why she turns into an 
Ancient Mariner herself. Driven, she keeps stumbling through the maze of Chubb’s narration, 
for she must either solve the conundrum of the hoax or else confront the bottomless pit that 
threatens to swallow up her very sense of personhood. 
Different from McCorkle, Illywhacker’s Herbert Badgey does have a childhood. It is, 
however, a very troubled one. Quite early on, therefore, he tries to take control and redo his 
origin in order to bury the trauma of his early years underneath the double vision of home. 
But the vicious and paradoxical cycle of self-production, of going forward in order to create 
one’s starting point, turns him into a hyperreal simulation of a self, a fake in a slightly different 
sense than the hantus of My Life as a Fake; a fake that might be described, with reference to 
Baudrillard and Nietzsche, as hyperhuman. What makes Herbert’s vision viscous, then, is that 
it is a means for him to flee from the here and now into an utterly self-defined and self-
determined future. And when I say he ‘flees’, I mean that he actually positions himself into 
this self-defined future – as has been said, this is a future-based form of self-narration, not a 
future-oriented one. From this self-defined position, he then tries to obliterate and prevent 
his traumatic past from ever emerging. The vision, to say it in other words again, is a constantly 
maintained effort to suppress and deny his own history: “I spent my ten years in Rankin Downs 
with one real aim, i.e., that I would end up with a place in this rotten lonely world. I invested 
an entire decade so that I would not end my life hiding amongst cabbages in the Eastern 
Markets” (IL 461). 
That such self-simulation is a trap, is the very realisation that strikes Leah Goldstein when 
she cries out: “I am a fraud […] I am a fake, a fake, a fake. I cannot be anything” (IL 244). What 
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comes to the fore here is the difference between bildung and building. Herbert constructs or 
builds a new self. But always the obliterated past lurks underneath the newly built self, ready 
to break to the fore. The control-seeking behaviour thus becomes a vicious compulsion, a 
permanently maintained effort to avoid or disregard the now, connected as it seems to be 
with one’s abandoned history. 
Bildung on the other hand means staying connected with one’s arché, means to develop 
oneself from a position in the present tense or now rather than to acquire a new self from the 
future. It means to acknowledge and stay connected in the now with the determinism of one’s 
past in order to have some orientation for approaching the indeterminism of the future. When 
Leah “had woven [kindness] into something new and personal” (IL 302), then she does just 
that. She personalises her vision which means that she acknowledges her present situation 
and her past, and adjusts her vision accordingly. Thus, when one applies the question of 
agency to Leah – is she using the sign (the vision) to unfold her true potential, or is the sign 
(the vision) already enslaving her to unleash its potential truth? – then the answer is, in her 
case, that she adapts the vision to her potential rather than adapting herself to the demands 
of the vision. 
Paradoxically, then, one needs to give up some control in order to escape self-enslavement 
– though not all of it as Jack McGrath’s case clearly demonstrates: “He had never planned 
anything. He had trusted his life and let it carry him along never expecting it to mislead him. 
He could not acknowledge that it had” (IL 75). In order to avoid becoming a fake one needs to 
acknowledge one’s arché, but in order to make use of one’s potential one also needs a telos. 
For the preservation of one’s authenticity, these must stay connected. Herbert and Phoebe, 
however, sever the connection from their past for the sake of their visions, while Phoebe’s 
father, Jack, leaves his potential untouched and eventually loses sight of it by stumbling telos-
less along as he does. 
This interplay between telos and arché that we find in Illywhacker reveals a very 
problematic aspect of bildung, and thus agency as it is conceptualised here. Namely that 
bildung is visible only ex post facto. Also Herbert’s growing expertise in lying, for example, his 
increasing proficiency in manipulating and controlling his fellow characters, is a process of 
bildung. The differentiation between bildung and building, between development within a 
moral framework and self-creation, may be quite difficult to maintain therefore. Leah and the 
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curvy path she takes clearly demonstrate this point. Whether we bilden ourselves or build our 
selves is not always easy to determine while we are at it. 
Tristan Smith, finally, adds one more aspect to the problem of bildung. As opposed to most 
characters in Illywhacker he does not try to cut loose from his origins. It appears that the 
physical make-up of his body is even helpful, here, to keep him rooted in the now. Indeed, his 
body is so well and truly out of control, his physicality so self-imposing, that it never even 
occurs to him to deny it. Far from being a source of ontological insecurity, it permanently 
confronts him with physical necessities that tie him back to the present tense. As a matter of 
course, for example, he adjusts the role of the Hairy Man to his physical circumstances when 
he bases his act on a spider – thus personalising his vision: “To hell with that. I would make 
my Hairy Man a mute, something scary that jumps at you from the dark. I would base him on 
a spider” (TS 70-1). Precisely because of his body, the ontological aspect of narratisation never 
poses a problem for him. His bildung is troubled for a different reason, however, that is also 
connected to his body. In his case bildung is threatened because of the position in which he is 
placed inside the common moral framework. 
When he wakes up in the burns unit of the Mater Hospital and is greeted by “missing faces, 
cleft palates, conditions where teeth penetrated lips, misfortunes so repelling it would have 
been difficult for me to quietly contemplate them even in the colour plates of a magazine” (TS 
153), he realises: “I was meant to be here. I belonged here. Their faces defined the territory” 
(TS 154). This is a territory, however, that withholds authenticity, or full humanity, from him 
and thus incapacitates the deployment of his inner sources. Just like Chubb and McCorkle, he 
is declared a “mutant” (e.g. TS 157) and “edited out” (TS 223). Accordingly, when he puts on 
the Mouse costume to play Richard the Third in order to escape into “the glamour of my role” 
(TS 184) and when he “remained alone in the kitchen dreaming vague dreams involving 
glittering cloaks and dazzling lights” (TS 185), then he does not seek to escape his body but his 
current position inside the common moral framework. Tristan flees into alternative, optative 
roles in which he is not an abject but a subject eliciting other people’s admiration. Later, in 
Voorstand, and inside the Mouse costume he actually comes dangerously close to having 
these fantasies fulfilled: “The pathetic creature who has skulked inside the Feu Follet was now 
the object of these people’s love” (TS 317). The decisive difference to the compulsive masters 
is that he is still actively committed to his origin. Tristan still fully identifies here with his past, 
with “[t]he pathetic creature who has skulked inside the Feu Follet”. Only now, by hiding inside 
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a costume, he manages to disguise this creature and make his act the centre of people’s love 
and admiration. This is dangerous because it induces him to exchange his self for the desired 
role. “I could not bear to see the effect of my monstrous self on one more normal face” (TS 
333), he exclaims and almost too late realises how completely “I was imprisoned by the 
Mouse” (TS 390). Only in his acceptance stage does Tristan finally manage to accept the 
monstrousness with which the common moral framework regards him, without himself 
sharing in this dehumanising perception. The “twilight comradeship” with Jacqui and Bill (TS 
413) provides him with an alternative moral framework that confirms his humanness. Thus, at 
the end of his bildung, Tristan knows and accepts how he is perceived by most, he is a sadder 
and a wiser man, but he is ready to “face whatever might be waiting for [him]”541 in the 
“unusual life” that “was really just beginning” (TS 414). 
Applying the agency concept that was developed in Chapter 4 to the three novels and its 
main characters yields a first result, then. When we consider the struggles of Bob McCorkle 
and Christopher Chubb, Herbert Badgery and Leah Goldstein, and finally Tristan Smith, then 
their origin, their arché, is always at issue. It seems that through the persistent concern for 
origins Carey’s texts ask in how far bildung is still possible in the Western world. By no means 
do the texts reject bildung as an obsolete concept, therefore. Perhaps one could even go as 
far as saying that either Carey’s characters manage to develop, to bilden or they fail. Indeed, 
if we remember Pordzik’s opinion regarding Carey’s short story “The Chance”, namely that 
“the reader is offered the view of a new quality in individuals aiming to overcome their 
adherence to fixed notions of identity, solidity and permanence”,542 while in The Unusual Life 
of Tristan Smith he discovered a “positive value to ambiguity and elusiveness”, thus 
“precluding permanent solutions” and “ruling out a condition of being that claims an 
autonomous (national and/or cultural) identity for itself”;543 and if we further remember Brian 
Edwards writing about Illywhacker that “Carey’s representation, in Badgery, of the author as 
bricoleur exemplifies the play in postmodernist construction by featuring positive possibilities 
that are in collusion against totalities”,544 then we now see that they describe nothing else 
than plain old bildung. The escape from the trap is usually dependent on a change in the 
characters – here Pordzik and Brian Edwards are completely right – but this change in the 
                                                          
541 Carey, Bliss, 287. 
542 Pordzik, 289. 
543 Ibid., 296. 
544 Edwards, “Deceptive Constructions,” 156. 
8. Conclusion 
298 
 
characters can perfectly well be described as a development, their bildung in other words. The 
question, moreover, that the rhetoric of change for change’s sake cannot answer, but that a 
focus on bildung and agency can answer readily, is when change is productive and when it is 
destructive. 
As has been shown, the point is that always when the characters change or fail to do so, 
authenticity still matters, and matters centrally. From the outset of this thesis I said that a 
perspective on agency would investigate how authenticity is meaningfully constructed and 
not rejected as an essentialist mistake. After discussing the three novels in detail and also 
briefly engaging with all the others so far written by Peter Carey (except Chemistry of Tears) I 
maintain this assertion. Authenticity and fakery are decisive factors that decide whether the 
process of narratisation is successful or self-destructive. 
 
Narratisation and Fakery in Carey’s Fiction 
 
Almost all of Carey’s major characters are storytellers, many of them compulsively driven. 
They unfold their potential within a common moral framework that is shaped by its moral 
goods. Storytelling – the joint narratisiation of their selves – is how they position themselves 
and are positioned by others in this common moral framework – while at the same time, of 
course, each narratisation process influences the framework of which it becomes a part. 
Fakery and authenticity, now, may have various meanings in Carey’s novels but they are 
always modes of narration. That is, to be more precise, fakery is always a form of de-
essentialising (self)narration – it is narratisation gone wrong. So, if the deployment of one’s 
inner sources within a common moral framework is a process of essentialisation in which one 
discovers one’s potential by unfolding it, then the trouble with fakery is that it sabotages 
exactly this process. In My Life as a Fake, Chubb and McCorkle turn into fakes when their 
voices are ignored by the social arena. In Illywhacker, a fake is someone who de-essentialises 
in order to become the sky and have limitless opportunities of self-construction. A fake thus 
trades its “doggy smell”, its authenticity, for a self-chosen and in the end self-destroying prison 
“in the midst of a sign”. In Tristan Smith, finally, the characters engage in an “orgy of denial” 
that needs to be overcome; they flee or reconstruct a reality which they have trouble 
acknowledging. But in all cases, fakery is an attempt to disrupt narratisation, to disconnect it 
from the now, or to take the narratisation process out of the characters’ hands. This 
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observation can now be broadened and applied to Carey’s works in general. Peter Carey’s 
rivals who engage in a contest for voice, his compulsive masters who are mislead by the allure 
of fanciful visions, and his conceited political rebels – they are all struggling with authenticity 
and narratisation. 
As has just been said, in My Life as a Fake, a fake is someone who is hantued, someone 
who is made into a demon or a ghost, and that is someone from whom authenticity is withheld 
– a dehumanising predicament that also Carey’s Ned Kelly expresses well when he says: “I 
wished only to be a citizen I had tried to speak but the mongrels stole my tongue.”545 These 
speechless fakes are no part of the human community. Indeed, at some point or other, all the 
main characters of My Life as a Fake find themselves in the same position as Echion, Ned Kelly, 
or Jack Maggs – that is, they find themselves in a story that is authored by someone else, and 
find themselves to be characters that are alien to themselves. It is this that makes them ‘fakes’. 
Finding themselves in ‘wrong’ positions within their common moral frameworks, they cease 
being what they are and are made what they reject. They are literally outcasts: hantus, ghosts, 
or monsters – otherworldly or ‘underworldly’ beings without a voice in the social arena. The 
contest for voice that is so prevalent in Carey’s writing right from his short story “Concerning 
the Greek Tyrant” is a struggle for self assertion, then – a struggle for being in command over 
the narratisation process of one’s own identity, in the end a struggle for authenticity. 
Earlier, Mathews was quoted as saying: “Since voice is inescapably linked to power, the 
act of speaking holds a place of inherent privilege and authority for which the reader must 
account”546 – which is true of Carey’s writing in a different sense than Mathews intended it. It 
is true of course that whoever gets drawn into another person’s story and becomes another 
person’s character, will suffer for it. But the insight one gains from an agency perspective is 
not that voice is a source and exertion of privilege, but that voice is simply necessary to assert 
one’s independent existence, one’s worthiness as a human being, one’s dignity, one’s 
subjecthood – qualities bestowed or withheld by the moral framework and the social arena in 
which one finds oneself situated. 
The second grand theme of agency – compulsive masters being entrapped by their own 
visions – contains compulsive storytelling in a different way. The theme of self-destructive 
dreams and ambitions that strongly informs Carey’s early works from “American Dreams” up 
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to The Tax Inspector is not based on competing voices, but a voice compulsively directed at 
self-construction and self-control. Here a fake is not someone who is hantued by others, but 
someone who severs their connection to their arché, who positions himself or herself into a 
future form of being, who, so to say, switches in their narratisation into the future tense to 
block out their now. So the townspeople in “American Dreams” do not care for their town, 
“because we all have dreams of the big city, of wealth, of modern houses, of big motor 
cars”,547 and so Bettina Joy teaches her son “the meanness, the insignificance of the town he 
lived in, the smallness of his life and thus, in her own perverse way, showed him the beauty 
of the world or, at least, the beauty of Other Places”,548 and so, too, Annette Davidson teaches 
Phoebe McGrath about the “Bohemian life in Paris” (IL 37) so that Phoebe seeks “a place 
where there were other problems than the price of wheat or wool, or whether the waterside 
workers would be engaged in Yarra Street or Corio Quay”; in short, she “began to imagine a 
place in the world where she might not only belong but also be admired” (IL 6). By shifting 
their identities into the future of their visions, these compulsive masters take their lives into 
their own hands and for this reason, too, incapacitate mutually transformative interaction 
with an external reality. Like Benny Catchprice, these characters “cannot be what [they 
are]”.549 In some cases the characters devalue and disregard their now, in others they 
suppress and deny it. In all cases however, they do not accept it. Instead of making decisions 
that connect the determinism of the past with the indeterminism of the future, instead of 
essentialising in a process of narratisation and making a story out of their lives, they choose a 
vision and try to transmogrify themselves in accordance with it (see Chapter 7.3.4. for the 
differentiation between choice and decision). In this way they turn themselves into lifestyle 
choices. These characters, to say it in Baudrillard’s words, are “absorbed into the order of 
signifiers of social status, etc. [They are] not reflected in that order, but absorbed and 
abolished. The subject of consumption is the order of signs.”550 The compulsive masters thus 
cease being existentially involved, they literally de-essentialise. In Carey’s works this is 
invariably depicted as a negative process that more often than not ends in violent death – the 
final aspiration, the ultimate absorption and abolishment of the subject. 
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Carey’s political activists, finally, are trapped in their “radical’s conceit” of being “different, 
but superior”, a compulsive form of denial and self-staging. These rebellious storytellers are 
obsessively staging themselves like Felicity Smith in The Unusual Life of Tristan Smith, Ned 
Kelly in True History of the Kelly Gang, or Che’s parents in His Illegal Self. While compulsive 
masters like Felicity Smith or Susan Selkirk and David Rubbo try to cut loose from their origin 
(Voorstand, the wealthy family background), to invent themselves anew and thus run into the 
danger of being “absorbed into [and abolished in] the order of signifiers”, conceited rebels 
like Ned or young Tristan cannot live with their position within the common moral framework. 
In their case it is a moral aspect that cannot be integrated into a coherent narrative and thus 
sabotages their sense of authenticity. They therefore also disengage from the now. But other 
than the compulsive masters, these disempowered characters flee into an optative ‘as if’ 
mood of narration. Their compulsive storytelling is driven by primary narcissism and theatrical 
role play. Like Tristan or Jaqui, they know that they are playing, but in an enabling form of 
escapism they “successfully obliterate” (TS 289) from their consciousness the dire 
consequences of their actions in the now. 
What makes Carey’s political rebels successful, if they are, is that they get over a theatrical 
self-staging in which the political cause would only be a means for self-expression. A 
glamorous vision of their own self that would be achieved in a Genetic Lottery is exactly what 
the Hups in “The Chance” reject. Likewise Gabrielle Baillieux never succumbs to the media 
image of hers. Unlike Phoebe McGrath and Felicity Smith, her ultimate goal is not to be first 
rate, but to change the world. As opposed to them, she rejects being “a solo artist”. And as 
opposed to Ned Kelly, she does not believe in her own superiority and wants to fight alone 
against “them higher ups who so oppressed us all”, but rather tries to wake the masses to join 
the cause. She manages to become an omnipresent media image while still staying connected 
to her roots. “This woman [Gabrielle] is a human being and it will be your honour to celebrate 
her real life without hysteria”, as her followers instruct Felix Moore. “All you need is to be 
humble”.551 It is this that enables her to successfully confront the now and alter it. 
 
In the end we can conclude: As a theoretical tool for productive literary analysis, agency is not 
an impersonal force inherent in social structures, nor is it a social structure that continues 
itself through its members. Agency is a capacity inherent in agents. It is an inner source, a 
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potential of individuals. This potential, however, is fundamentally dependent on social 
structure for its realisation. Further, agency is connected with an intended but not 
predetermined outcome. In a fully deterministic world or a world that is so chaotic as to 
dissolve any connection between intention and outcome, the external system is so 
independent that it precludes human intervention. In a world, however, that is entirely 
manmade, the external system is so dependent on human creation that it turns into self-
expression and thus also precludes interaction. Accordingly, agency is tied to both, acceptance 
and self-efficacy. It is situated between adaptation (transforming oneself according to one’s 
circumstances) and construction (transforming one’s circumstances according to one’s 
needs). Agency thus means to accept reality without fleeing into fantasies so that one may 
adapt, but not accepting one’s situation and adapting to it as completely as Illywhacker’s Jack 
McGrath. Agency therefore also means to take control and change reality, but not as 
thoroughly as all the compulsive masters of Carey’s fiction. 
Accordingly, when discussing agency in novels, the question is not really whether the 
protagonist is active or remains passive, whether the individual can assert itself or is exposed 
to the unconquerable forces of fate. The question is rather under which circumstances agents 
can make use of their powers or are prevented from doing so, and how they make use of 
them. In Carey’s fiction, the most prominent characters whose appeal seems to be successful 
so that they manage to uphold their authenticity and also escape de-essentialisation are Carla 
in “The Chance”, Honey Barbara, Lucinda Leplastrier, Leah Goldstein (qualified), Tristan Smith, 
Jack Maggs, Parrot, and Gabrielle Baillieux. However, most of these characters who 
successfully manage to deploy their inner sources and to defend their authenticity manage 
just barely and need to go through a difficult development in order to achieve this. Carey’s 
texts seem to react, here, to the individualist liberalism of postmodern Western societies. 
Accordingly, the greatest obstacles to a successful bildung in Carey’s work are either social 
factors such as childhood traumata or the oppression of women, or – first and foremost – 
hubris: Promethean-like arrogance and selfishness. These are the flaws – from Bettina and 
David Joy in Bliss or Phoebe McGrath in Illywhacker over the young Felicity Smith in Tristan 
Smith up to Ned Kelly in True History of the Kelly Gang or Susan Selkirk and David Rubbo in His 
Illegal Self – that are most unforgivable in Carey’s fictional universe. 
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10. Appendix 
 
During all my research I have found not one article, chapter or monograph that would 
systematically contextualise Carey’s work historically and biographically – or at least not 
thoroughly, pace Andreas Gaile and Bruce Woodcock. This appendix is meant to lay at least 
part of the foundation for such readings in the future. 
Like any writer, Peter Carey is a child of his time, a child of his place, and a child of his 
parents. National, international and personal developments combined to produce his 
writing, and in order to appreciate his texts from a biographical perspective it is necessary 
to have at least a rough understanding of these different backgrounds. The 1970s, for 
example, mark a period of momentous shifts in the Australian cultural and especially 
literary landscape. It is during this period that Peter Carey emerges as an author. This 
makes his early publishing history very interesting and significant. But the 1970s do not 
only provide the ‘outside’, the publishing frame, for his first books, also the ‘inside’ of his 
novels and stories, the content, is marked by this turbulent period. The political and social 
issues of the 1970s can be found in his earliest short stories and remain relevant right up 
to Amnesia (2014). The conditions for Carey’s first book publications, the cultural shifts of 
the 1970s, will therefore lead the way into these discussions while his personal upheavals 
will conclude this appendix. 
 
10.1. Publishing Carey: The Emergence of an Author 
 
That Peter Carey is a product of the Australian 1970s is not a venturing claim when one 
considers that it was the 1970s when his first books appeared, the short story collections The 
Fat Man in History in 1974 and War Crimes in 1979. But in Australian literary history this period 
is highly significant. It is indeed a key period. To oversimplify matters a bit: white Australian 
literature was characterised by nationalist realism straight until that time. There are, of 
course, some forerunners and path breakers as Bruce Woodcock makes clear. In the 1950s 
and 1960s “Patrick White’s mythic modernism had been followed by the emergence of writers 
like C.J. Koch and Randolph Stow as a late Modernist ‘spiritual’ tradition”.552 Delys Bird points 
out further that “[Thomas] Keneally and David Ireland bridge the gap between the established 
                                                          
552 Bruce Woodcock, Peter Carey, rev. ed., Manchester: Manchester UP, 2003, 6. 
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writing of the 1960s and 1970s and the avant-garde fiction of the later 1970s [to which Peter 
Carey belongs]”.553 But Bruce Woodcock goes on to stress: 
 
Nevertheless, despite [the late modernist tradition of Koch and Stow] and despite 
diversely experimental work from writers like Hal Porter or Dal Stivens, the dominant 
perception of Australian writing during the 1960s was of a literature devoted principally 
to a nationalistic tradition stemming back to the ‘barren anecdotal realism of local 
literature’ found in the tradition of Henry Lawson’s bush stories.554 
 
“By the mid-1970s, though”, says Susan Lever, “a new generation of writers was evident. […] 
Their influences were not British or Australian, but the European, American and South 
American experimenters”, such as Gabriel García Márquez or Jorge Luis Borges.555 Right 
among these new, experimental writers we find Peter Carey. 
There is another factor to substantiate the narrative of a ‘barren’ Australian literature 
production prior to the 1970s, namely that “a mature literary system” was something that had 
“scarcely existed in the immediate post-war decade” in Australia, as David Carter explains. By 
‘mature literary system’ he means a well-developed literary infrastructure: 
 
A mature literary system is marked by dense institutions that are relatively stable, and 
professional participants. It has publishing houses and imprints in high, middle and 
popular registers; diverse bookselling and book promotion venues; a variety of journals 
of criticism and review in print and other media; scholarly infrastructure; professional 
associations; professional careers for writers and cultural intermediaries (literary 
agents, editors, critics); substantial state and private investment or subsidy; a significant 
domestic audience; and significant international traffic in books, rights and personnel.556 
 
According to Carter, all these academic, economic, and public institutions only developed 
during the 1960s and 1970s: “the institutions of Australian literature were remarkably 
underdeveloped until the last quarter of the 20th century”.557 The 1970s thus were indeed “an 
                                                          
553 Delys Bird, “New Narrations: Contemporary Fiction,” The Cambridge Companion to Australian Literature, ed. 
Elizabeth Webby, Cambride: Cambridge UP, 2000, 183-207, 187. 
554 Woodcock, 6. The quote is from Murray Bail qtd. in Ken Gelder and Paul Salzman, The New Diversity: Australian 
Fiction 1970-88, Melbourne: McPhee Gribble, 1989, 15. Cf. also Andreas Gaile, Introduction, xx. 
555 Susan Lever, “The Challenge of the Novel: Australian Fiction since 1950,” The Cambridge History of Australian 
Literature, ed. Peter Pierce, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009, 498-516, 506. 
556 David Carter, “Publishing, Patronage and Cultural Politics: Institutional Changes in the Field of Australian 
Literature from 1950,” Pierce 2009, 360-90, 361. 
557 Carter, ibid. 
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opportune moment to be writing the kind of fiction Carey was interested in” as Woodcock 
observes.558 
Woodcock appears to be the only Peter Carey scholar to devote two entire pages to the 
context of Australian literary history in which the author emerged.559 But this context is 
decisive for Carey’s early career. The simultaneous emergence of a mature literary system and 
Peter Carey as an author goes hand in hand, in Australia, with the local effects of international 
politics. Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War, the subscription, the widespread anti-
Vietnam protests and, finally, the election of the Gough Whitlam government in 1972 where 
hugely important factors for establishing a new literary infrastructure that could be used by 
young, rebellious authors – somewhere among them Peter Carey. 
Bird writes about the period: 
 
Ironically, while Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War brought it into the 
international political arena, it also generated one of the few periods of national division 
in Australian history. That social upheaval was matched by what has been claimed as an 
absolute shift in Australian literary historiography, […]. This self-styled new writing 
emerged from the climate of the anti-war movement, sharing its consciousness of 
radical change. A journal, Tabloid Story, was established in Sydney by Frank Moorhouse, 
Carmel Kelly and Michael Wilding in 1972 to publish the new fiction.560 
 
Hardly an Australian literary history fails to underscore, in this respect, the importance of the 
establishment of the Australia Council for the Arts: 
 
[T]he Literature Board of the Australia Council [was] established by the Whitlam Labor 
Government in 1973 and given statutory authority in 1975. […] It is impossible to 
untangle the influence of Literature Board funding from other developments – the 
growth of new publishers, the formation of the Australian Society of Authors, the 
expansion of university teaching, a generational shift in terms of higher levels of 
education, or the arrival of cheaper offset printing which allowed new entrants into the 
publishing game. But that it did make a difference seems clear.561 
 
Woodcock mentions most of these points and further stresses the role of the 
University of Queensland Press (UQP), which adopted a policy to support young writers, 
as also Carter confirms: 
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UQP, which had been protected from earlier takeovers, developed significant new 
fiction and poetry lists [Paperback Poets series launched in 1970, and Paperback Prose 
series launched in 1972]. All were biased towards new writers in what might be seen as 
an age of the ‘new’ – the new poetry (New Poetry magazine began in 1971), the new 
theatre, the new journalism, the New Wave in cinema and the New Left.562 
 
During this decisive period in Australian literary history, the manager of UQP was Frank 
Thompson. He recounts: 
 
The protests against the Vietnam War were reaching their peak in 1970, a turbulent year 
for Australian universities. Students were finding a new, more creative voice which was 
not always well received in the hitherto sleepy groves of academe. The University of 
Queensland had, perhaps, awakened a bit sooner than most with the appointment of a 
relatively young and dynamic vice-chancellor, Zelman Cowan, and it had the added zest 
of confronting a deeply conservative state government committed to censorship and 
the elimination of dissent.563 
 
Thompson goes on to relate that 1970 was “the banner year for our poetry publishing […] 
when we published the original Paperback Poets titles”. And: “Following the success of 
Paperback Poets we turned to Paperback Prose in 1972”,564 which in turn is significant for 
Peter Carey, as his first published book, the short story collection The Fat Man in History (1974) 
was part of this newly established Paperback Prose list of UQP. 
UQP may have been “confronting a deeply conservative state government”, but the new 
federal government in Canberra was a different matter, and it came into power in the same 
year that Paperback Prose was launched. In fact, UQP received funding from the new Labour 
government for its prose series. As Woodcock states: “Craig Munro was commissioned to 
launch [UQP’s new Paperback Prose fiction list], backed by a Literature Board subsidy, and his 
first three titles were books by David Malouf, Rodney Hall and Peter Carey.” 565 It is not clear 
which titles Woodcock has in mind. Thompson, at least, writes: “Our first two titles in the new 
Paperback Prose series published in 1972 were […] Michael Wilding’s [short story collection] 
Aspects of the Dying Process [Paperback Prose series no. 1] and Rodney Hall’s The Ship on the 
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Coin [Paperback Prose series no. 2].”566 The third title of UQP’s Paperback Prose series was 
most likely David Richard’s short story collection Peanuts in Penang (1973), while Carey’s The 
Fat Man in History was only the seventh volume of the series.567 Malouf’s first published prose 
book, Johnno: A Novel, appeared only in 1975. Being “our first fiction title published initially 
only as a hardback”, as Thompson remembers, it was definitely not amongst the first three 
titles of Paperback Prose, either.568 
But be that as it may, the interesting point is that Peter Carey’s first books were indeed 
published with the help of government subsidies. “Back in 1981”, writes Kathy Keele, “the 
Australia Council’s Literature Board gave the University of Queensland a grant to publish 
a book. It was a darkly comic novel called Bliss, by someone called Peter Carey”.569 Cath 
McLean, Louise Poland, and Jacinta van den Berg are even vaguer in their report for the 
Literature Board of the Australia Council, but they confirm the indirect funding of Peter 
Carey by the Australian government: 
 
Former UQP publisher Craig Munro remembers receiving Literature Board subsidies in 
the 1970s and 1980s for assistance with the publication of first books by now very 
successful and well-known Australian authors including David Malouf, Peter Carey, 
Nicholas Jose, Murray Bail and Kate Grenville.570 
 
Stuart Glover even claims that “Munro, if anyone can, can take the credit for discovering 
Carey”571 although Carey himself emphasises the importance of Tabloid Story’s Michael 
Wilding in bringing his short stories to Munro’s attention.572 Wilding confirms this: 
 
But when Craig Munro phoned me to say UQP had a spare subsidy or spare slot or spare 
something for another title in the Paperback Prose list and did I have any ideas, I sent 
up the collection [of unpublishable short stories]. It contained stories by Moorhouse, 
Vicki Viidikas, myself and Peter Carey, who had written ‘Life and Death on South Side 
Pavilion’ [sic] especially for the volume, or so he said. Craig, too, decided against the 
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anthology but leapt on the Peter Carey stories with acuity and avidity and ended up 
securing a volume of them for the series [The Fat Man in History, Paperback Prose series 
no. 7]. At that stage Carey was unknown. Moorhouse and I had been publishing his early 
work in Tabloid Story (where Craig first read him) and I’d been publishing him in Jon 
Silkin’s UK journal Stand, for which I was Australian editor.573 
 
Tabloid Story, which was launched – just like Paperback Prose – in 1972, published many 
young writers and also printed several of Peter Carey’s short stories before they appeared in 
his collections.574 What Wilding’s account shows is that despite continuing conservative 
sentiments in the general public, it had become possible to publish at least some of the new 
young voices (Peter Carey in this instance) and publish them through official channels, using a 
university press and receiving government funding. In this context it is noteworthy, too, that 
Carey was quick to leave his humble origins behind. Albert Moran reports: 
 
Although the University of Queensland Press had been Peter Carey’s first publisher, UQP 
lost Carey. When Carey had an international reputation, UQP had to assiduously court 
the author. Laurie Muller who had taken over from Frank Thompson as general manager 
of the Press in 1983 explained how UQP decided to go to this author on bended knee [in 
order to buy back Illywhacker (1985) from UK’s Faber].575 
 
All this evidence about the launch of Peter Carey’s career seems to deconstruct a popular 
myth. The government sponsoring, the fact that Carey was first published by an Australian 
university press, and his immediate departure for a more advantageous UK publisher stand in 
marked contrast to the rebelliousness that he tries to construct for himself. “[T]o some extent, 
he [Peter Carey] relishes the cavalier image of literary insurgent afforded by his ‘outsider’ 
position”, writes Woodcock.576 Hardly a scholar fails to mention that Carey quit university 
after his first year and that “[i]ronically, it was through working in advertising that he received 
his education in literature and writing”577 – even though Carey went to Geelong Grammar 
School, one of the finest institutions of the country which Nicholas Wroe describes as “the 
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exclusive Geelong Grammar, popularly known as the Eton of Australia. Both Rupert 
Murdoch and Kerry Packer went there, as did Prince Charles some years after Carey had 
left”.578 
It is quite understandable that Carey sees himself in the position of someone who battled 
against small-minded Australian officialdom. Twice, in 1965 and in 1970, he had been rejected 
the Stanford writing scholarship (which means he must have applied), he had written five 
novels (Contacts [1964-1965]; Starts Here, Ends Here [1965-1967]; The Futility Machine [1966-
1967]; Wog [1969]; Adventures aboard the Marie Celeste [1971]579) and a short story 
collection (Slides for a Magic Lantern [1967]580) which had all been turned down (Carey 
withdrew Adventures aboard the Marie Celeste himself581), before finally the political climate 
changed and Munro published The Fat Man in History with the help of the new Australian 
government. 
But while Carey indeed faced considerable rejection on his way to fame, it had always 
been the authorities to whom he had applied. Tabloid Story, for example, was not really a 
small avant-garde magazine but rather “was a supplement to existing mass-marked 
publications containing short fiction” and “[b]etween 1973-84, [...] received $ 41 155 in 
subsidy from the Australia Council” as Phillip Edmonds points out.582 Considering all this 
evidence, it becomes clear just how much Peter Carey’s early publications depended on 
the political and cultural shifts of the 1970s and how much he profited from official, albeit 
mostly indirect, support. It appears that the Australia Council for the Arts in particular was 
very helpful and had a definite, if indirect, influence on Carey’s emergence as an author. 
 
10.2. Peter Carey and the New Nationalism 
 
Peter Carey’s appeal to Australian authorities also makes him part of a new nationalist 
movement. Despite all the rebelliousness that the new, experimental authors of the 1970s 
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claimed for themselves, the aim was still – and quite officially so – to establish an indigenous, 
Australian literary culture. As Bennett observes: 
 
The Literature Board of the Australia Council, established by the Whitlam Labor 
government in 1973 to replace Australia’s oldest arts assistance body, the 
Commonwealth Literary Fund (CLF) (1908-73), contributed greatly to the development 
of an indigenous literary culture through its programs of assistance to individual writers, 
to publishers and literary magazines and to the promotion of Australian literature, 
nationally and internationally.583 
 
When we consider that the Commonwealth of Australia was founded in 1901, we may 
understand what it meant that the CLF, which had been operating from 1908 onwards, was 
replaced by the Literature Board of the Australia Council in 1973. The early 1970s indeed mark 
“an absolute shift in Australian literary historiography”. A new politics, a new cultural politics, 
had emerged in the wake of a new Australian self-perception. Bird illustrates: 
 
In the I970s, the publication of a number of critical works on the Australian novel 
signalled the beginnings of an institutionalised literary critical tradition in Australia, 
coinciding with a perception that Australian fiction had a history and a place in a larger 
world literature.584 
 
While signs for change had been evident, remarks Bennett, “it was not until the Whitlam Labor 
government of 1972-75 that Australia’s winds of change blew strongly with a new cultural 
nationalism”.585 Gaile may therefore write that “the then literary avant-garde [the 
experimental writers of the 1970s] rebelled against the restrictions of the formulaic bush tales 
[from writes such as Henry Lawson, Joseph Furphy, and ‘Banjo’ Paterson]”, and add that 
“Peter Carey was at the forefront of this movement of opposition against the ‘“well rounded 
tale” and the bush-realist “nationalist” tradition in Australian fiction’”.586 But this government-
subsidised ‘rebellion’ constitutes a paradox similar to those Carey so often describes in his 
own fiction. Exactly because Carey rebels against the old nationalist realism and mercilessly 
exposes Australia’s “symptomatic acquiescence to US-style cocacolonization”,587 he is himself 
part of a new nationalist movement. To understand this fully, one should perhaps first 
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investigate the old nationalism first, revolving the ‘cultural cringe’, the ‘Legend’ and ‘ANZAC’ 
as it does, before coming to the new nationalism of which Carey is a part. 
As we could see, especially in the chapter on Illywhacker, Carey manages well to express 
a certain ‘cultural cringe’ in some of his works that also many of his academic critics seem to 
feel. For European or northern American readers, it might be difficult to empathise with the 
“cringe direct”, as Arthur Angell Phillips calls it (see below), but the opening of David Malouf’s 
famous Remembering Babylon (1993) provides a useful description. It is “the middle of the 
nineteenth century” and three children, a boy and two girls, play outside under the 
blistering sun of Queensland: 
 
the paddock, all clay-packed stones and ant trails, was a forest in Russia – they were 
hunters on the track of wolves. The boy had elaborated this scrap of make-believe out 
of a story in the fourth grade Reader; he was lost in it. […] But the girls […] were bored. 
They had no experience of snow, and wolves did not interest them.588 
 
The cringe, however, is not just an inferiority complex towards a European and 
especially British culture that Australians imbibe from their earliest childhood days with 
the ‘classics’ they read in school (think of Shakespeare, Defoe, Richardson, Fielding, 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, Austen – the ‘real’ literature seems to come from England), with 
fairy tales and Christmas traditions that sport pine trees, wolves, nightingales, snow, and 
medieval castles (none of which are natural to Australia); it is also a certain bitterness at a 
pervading conservatism and hostility against the fine arts that many artists and 
intellectuals seem to perceive in Australian society. Robert Ross, for example, quotes Peter 
Carey describing himself as: “growing up in ‘a society where,’ he [Peter Carey] says, ‘artists 
were not only not valued but, often despised’”.589 
Coining the term ‘cultural cringe’, Arthur Angell Phillips sums up these two aspects 
when he writes, in his influential 1950 article of the same title, that the “Australian Cultural 
Cringe” appears “either as the Cringe Direct, or as the Cringe Inverted, in the attitude of 
the Blatant Blatherskite, the God’s-Own-Country and I’m-a-better-man-than-you-are 
Australian Bore”.590 He laments: “The Australian writer cannot cease to be English even if 
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he wants to. The nightingale does not sing under Australian skies; but he [sic] still sings in the 
literate Australian mind.” But then he concludes: “The most important development of the 
last twenty years in Australian writing has been the progress made in the art of being unself-
consciously ourselves.”591 
During the 1970s, this old nationalism, expressed here by Phillips, in which Australian 
literature endeavoured to be “unself-consciously ourselves”, was duly replaced by a new form 
of nationalism that could be described as deconstructivist and postcolonial: a literature that 
was very ‘self-consciously ourselves’. In the Cambridge History of Australian Literature David 
Carter describes “the stirring of new developments beyond what could now appear as an 
established orthodoxy” which culminated “[i]n the academic sphere in the Association for the 
Study of Australian Literature [that] was formed in 1977”: 
 
Central to this was a complex ‘new nationalism’ (the term is appropriate here): critical 
of the ‘old nationalism’ for its nostalgia, racism and sexism, but also anti-imperialist 
(American or British), hence predisposed to new versions of nationalism focused on 
contemporary Australian culture. If there were nationalist traditions to be rejected there 
were others to be reclaimed, […]. Despite radical differences in their politics and poetics, 
writers such as Peter Carey, Malouf [and many others] could all be seen to represent a 
newly autonomous, original and self-originating culture no longer defined by its colonial 
inheritance.592 
 
Susan Lever concurs with this observation from Carter and Bennett’s earlier claim that from 
the Whitlam government onwards “Australia’s winds of change blew strongly with a new 
cultural nationalism”. She writes: 
 
While these writers [young writers emerging over the mid 1970s, such as Peter Carey 
and David Malouf] could be read as experimenters, most were also assertively white 
Australian men, sensitive to the cultural power of Britain and America. Many of their 
works explicitly resist British and American influence. Moorhouse’s The Americans Baby 
(1972), Foster’s Moonlite (1981) and Carey’s Bliss (1981) all tried to come to terms with 
the insidious dominance of American and British culture within Australia. As a 
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generation, these artists expressed a need to find a national voice – different to the 
nationalism of an earlier generation, but nationalist nevertheless.593 
 
Of course, this holds true not only for Carey’s Bliss. In as far as a new, unoriginally original, 
truly fabulated Australia is concerned, more or less all of Carey’s novels take part in and thus 
contribute to this ‘new nationalism’ – with the exception, perhaps, of The Chemistry of Tears 
(2012), the one novel that does not seem to deal with Australia: Australian politics of the 
1970s, Australian art, or Australian history. 
Indeed, ten years earlier, in the Oxford Literary History of Australia, Lever writes the 
following about the young innovators of Carey’s generation: 
 
Surprisingly, for all their postmodern playfulness, few of these novels brought any 
rigorous criticism to bear on contemporary Australian society. Most expressed the 
tolerant liberal philosophy of the urban middle class deploring (and often simplifying) 
the contradictory history of Australian settlement. A celebratory, if not populist, 
nationalism emerged despite the postmodern layering of texts. Whatever its dark 
history, Australia was, it seemed, a fine place to live in 1988. Peter Carey’s career 
provides a particularly interesting example of a writer whose experimental techniques 
convey a rather conventional moral and political vision. 
 
In Oscar and Lucinda, she goes on, “Carey rewrites the work of Edmund Gosse, Thomas Hardy, 
Anthony Trollope and George Eliot into an Australian context, openly manipulating his 
characters for effect”.594 Lever wrote these words in 1998, before the publication of My Life 
as a Fake (2003) or, indeed, His Illegal Self (2008) and A Long Way from Home (2018). But even 
Carey’s A Long Way from Home is more concerned with Australia’s racist past (the 1950s in 
this case) than the issues of its present day. And there would certainly be enough to write 
about, if we think, for example, of the ‘intervention’ in the Northern Territory. Effectively, 
Lever denounces Carey’s (and David Malouf’s) postmodernist style as fashion and criticises its 
political emptiness. 
The celebration of Peter Carey, mainly by white intellectuals, as postcolonial re-
inventor of Australian history is, in this respect, the Australian Legend all over again. But 
in order to understand this claim, it might first be necessary again to explain the term 
‘Legend’ in a little more detail. There are at least two layers to this Legend and it is easy 
for the non-Australian to become confused. First and foremost, the Legend refers to an 
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Australian auto-stereotype of a national character. It contains mateship, or, in Baron Alder’s 
words, “artless decency”. He explains: “The working-class attitudes of the convicts […], the 
plebeian self-consciousness of the native-born […] and the fabled rebellious spirit of the Irish 
immigrants, all went ‘up the country’ and coalesced in the ideal of the bushman.”595 The 
second layer concerns the foundation of this consciously anti-English bush ideal, namely the 
supposed foundation of Australian culture by white bush poets in the 1890s – which is why 
the Australian Legend is sometimes referred to as the Legend of the 1890s or Legend of the 
Nineties.596 Both layers are often attributed to Russel Ward’s highly influential historical study 
The Australian Legend (1958). As Graham Huggan informs us, the heyday of the Legend 
appears to have been from the 1930s to the 1960s: 
 
The Legend, although still periodically reinvented, now stands at something of a 
crossroads; it is increasingly seen as the limited product of an equally limited number of 
middle-class writers and intellectuals during the period roughly from the 1930s to the 
1960s, who shared a somewhat inflationary sense of the justice of the national cause. 
The Legend's alleged radicalism has been exposed, as have its pretensions to 
egalitarianism. The modern consensus view is that it overprivileges white-settler 
experience by excluding Aborigines; male experience by marginalizing women; rural 
experience by ignoring the city. […] In literary terms, the Legend has also been in steady 
decline since the late 1960s, although it continues to circulate widely in certain areas of 
popular culture (Martin 1998). Some of the writers associated with it, notably Joseph 
Furphy, are no longer widely read if read at all, while others such as Banjo Paterson and 
Henry Lawson, although enduringly popular, are no longer read unproblematically as 
matey stalwarts for the radical-nationalist cause.597 
 
In its postcolonial guise, the new nationalism is diverse, urban, intellectual, and decidedly 
less heroic. Very consciously it tries to sidestep the pitfalls of sexism, racism and parochialism. 
It is, as Lever said above, “different to the nationalism of an earlier generation, but nationalist 
nevertheless”. Therefore, one might perhaps refer to it as The Legend 2.0. 
That Patrick White won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1973 may, in this light, be the 
international recognition of a new Australian self-perception as much as a catalyst for its 
establishment. Indeed, the new nationalism that emerged in the 1970s was the very opposite 
of the old isolationist attitudes but was rather the expression of a new self-confidence that 
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originated from perceiving oneself, finally, as fully-fledged part of the Western world 
community. 
A very decisive factor for Australians seeing themselves as fully accepted members of the 
team of the West was the Vietnam War. In fact, Vietnam can be considered a new ANZAC 
myth in this context. ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) refers to the ill-fated 
“campaign of Gallipoli in the Great War”, which, as Rudolf Bader and Anja Schwarz write, 
“represents a milestone in the development of the relationship of the ANZAC […] troops 
and their emerging young nations with the imperial seat of power in Britain”.598 They 
include a text excerpt from Gavin Souter’s Lion and Kangaroo: Australia 1901-1919, the 
Rise of a Nation (1976) in their anthology in which he explains: “The performance of 
Australians in the world arena, in unison with but clearly distinct from British troops, was 
seen as a rite of passage which confirmed national confidence and incorporated Australia 
into a community even larger than the Empire.”599 “Through his [sic] heroism”, Elizabeth 
Webby confirms in her Cambridge Companion to Australian Literature, “Australia was seen 
to have finally joined the company of nations as an equal, and fully erased the birth stains 
of Botany Bay and Van Diemen’s Land [that is, of Australia as a penal colony]”.600 I do not 
want to suggest that Australians celebrate Vietnam as they (or some of them) do ANZAC 
day (25th of April), but that everyone seems to agree that “Australia’s involvement in the 
Vietnam War brought it into the international political arena”, as Bird stated above. It 
seems, then, that the Legend 2.0 comes together with a new and improved ANZAC 2.0. 
The Vietnam War and its importance for literary production had been mentioned several 
times above, and the following statements by Bennett may illustrate my point further: 
 
The Vietnam War […] provides a convenient introductory locus for considering ways in 
which literature and history have been intertwined in this period.601 
 
The most important social and cultural consequence in Australia of the Vietnam War 
was the development of a counter-culture in the late 1960s and 1970s. […] A spirit of 
generational protest had been brewing in pre-Vietnam issues such as censorship and 
the death penalty but ramified during and after the war in Vietnam into issues such as 
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sexual politics, Aboriginal rights and movements to conserve the natural 
environment.602 
 
This new, self-confident membership in the team of the Western Bloc brought home 
‘international’ literary tastes, too. “During the 1970s and 1980s”, writes Bennett, “the 
always ambivalent relationship with the new cultural master, the USA, strengthened 
discernibly” – that is, after the successful overthrow of the Whitlam government. 
According to him, it were these strengthened international ties also with “countries of Asia 
and the Pacific, especially in the late 1980s and 1990s” that made Australia “a testing ground 
for intellectual movements, including feminism, post-colonialism and post-modernism”.603 
Carter describes these intellectual developments as “textual politics” that take on a very 
specific meaning and revolve around very specific and very acute issues in the Australian 
context: 
 
Although psychoanalytical and semiotic theory made an impact, the force of post-
structuralism was localised predominantly as a form of ‘textual politics’ around the 
categories of gender, race and nation (nationalism became even more problematic). If 
gender was the key revisionary concept for the first wave [of ‘theory dominated’ literary 
criticism], race and ethnicity have now become radically central in work on migrant-
settler, Asian-Australian, postcolonial and, above all, Indigenous-non-Indigenous 
relations. In these equations literature can scarcely be contained within ‘literary 
studies’; and literary studies will not be limited to ‘literature’.604 
 
While Bird greets the local impact of ‘international’ – that is, specifically ‘Western’ – theory 
with enthusiasm,605 Lever describes the exact same developments much more critically: 
 
A series of political interest groups has emerged since the 1960s which at various times 
has demanded attention for the voices of, for example, women, migrants, Aborigines, 
gay men or lesbian women. And these different voices have often found the techniques 
of postmodernism—fragmentation, pastiche, self-conscious irony—to be the most 
appropriate expressions of the incoherence of contemporary life.606 
 
Lever even feels “a little daunted”, she says, by the prospect of providing an overview of 
Australian literature from 1965 to 1995.607 
                                                          
602 Ibid., 241. 
603 Ibid., 239-40. 
604 Carter, 386-7. 
605 Bird, 197. 
606 Lever, “Fiction: Innovation and Ideology,” 310-11. 
607 Ibid., 311. 
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Whether scholars regard the arrival of Western theory in Australia with reservation or 
enthusiasm, its influence is undeniable. And paradoxically it is precisely the emerging self-
confident internationalism in which the new nationalism of the 1970s finds its expression. 
Peter Carey in particular is a child of his time. His oeuvre very much reflects the respective 
discourses that were prevalent at the time of writing: the counter culture issues of the 1960s 
and 1970s find their way into his first novel, Bliss; his early historical re-fabulations such as 
Illywhacker and Oscar and Lucinda – the latter just in time to appear in the year of the 
controversial celebrations of the Bicentennial in 1988 – got him directly involved in the so-
called Australian ‘history wars’; and his often vicious depiction of Australia’s dependence 
first on England then on the USA led him from Illywhacker to The Unusual Life of Tristan 
Smith and on to the engagement with global surveillance and its disclosure by the likes of 
Julian Assange and Edward Snowden in Amnesia. 
If Peter Carey’s literary debut is not part of the counter culture itself, it is definitely a 
direct outcome of it. All of the counter culture issues listed above by Bennett – “sexual 
politics, Aboriginal rights and movements to conserve the natural environment” – also 
surface in his early writing. Prominently so, of course, in his debut novel, Bliss (1981; later 
revisited in His Illegal Self, 2008). The turbulent events of the 1970s, revolving around the 
overthrow of the Whitlam government, appear in his later work – thinly veiled in The 
Unusual Life of Tristan Smith (1994) and overtly in Amnesia (2014). But especially the early 
novels Bliss (1981) and The Tax Inspector (1991) (and later again the story of Doris 
‘Baillieux’, Gabrielle’s grandmother in Amnesia) mercilessly expose the bigoted, 
“restrictive ‘suburban values’ [of Australia]”608 that the Australian counter culture rose up 
against, while Illywhacker (1985) and Oscar and Lucinda (1988) rewrite the Australian past 
and try at least occasionally to integrate also an Aboriginal perspective. 
Also in the context of the contemporary political climate in Australia, postcolonial 
writing and criticism very often have a decidedly political touch to them. When Gaile starts 
his dissertation thesis with accounts of the so-called ‘history wars’ in Australia, or Rollo 
Hesketh, in 2013, tries to defend Phillips’ nationalism of the 1950s,609 then this is indicative 
of a still raving cultural uncertainty in Australia that forcefully brings up the same old 
                                                          
608 Bennett, 242. 
609 Rollo Hesketh, “A.A. Phillips and the ‘Cultural Cringe’: Creating an ‘Australian Tradition’,” Meanjin 72.3 (2013): 
92-103. 
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question again and again: What is Australianness? In a European settler colony that 
completely ignored the already existing inhabitants and their cultures, a settler colony that 
cleared the land of human habitation with its infamous terra nullius lie, in a settler colony 
that stands out by not signing any formal treaty – however unfair and one-sided – with the 
indigenous people of the land, that to this day does not designate specific rights to 
Aborigines in its constitution,610 in a settler colony, moreover, that desperately tries to 
disregard the fact that it is not European at all but as much Asian as European, in such a 
suppression-laden society, this is indeed a question of traumatic proportions. It comes in many 
guises: What is Australian literature? When did it start? How should we represent Australian 
history? What is glorious, what inglorious about the past? What in fact is the ‘Australian’ past 
and who should be telling it?611 
The urgency and importance of such questions can readily be seen, when we consider such 
issues as the stolen generations, the ethnic riots in Cronulla in 2005, or the highly controversial 
‘intervention’ in the Northern Territories that started in 2007 – even before Kevin Rudd 
announced his ‘big sorry’ on 13 February 2008 – and is still going on at the time of writing, in 
2016. The so-called ‘intervention’ may convey something of the still prevailing, paternalistic 
attitude of many white Australians, especially those in power. I will not go into the furious 
debates that are waged around this programme, but just point out that it is a federal 
government initiative that made it necessary to suspend the Racial Discrimination Act and the 
Aboriginal Land Rights Act of the Northern Territory,612 and that is seen by some – not least 
                                                          
610 “Simply, there have been no frameworks built into the Australian Constitution to entrench an Indigenous 
position in civil society, to assist culturally different others to participate or to protect Indigenous rights” (Victor 
Hart, Lester Thompson, and Terry Stedman, “The Indigenous Experience of Australian Civil Society: Making Sense 
of Historic and Contemporary Institutions,” Social Alternatives 27.1 (2008): 52-7, 52.). Hart, Lester, and Stedman 
go on to quote ex Prime Minister Gough Whitlam: “The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia was 
flawed from the beginning by its references to the Aborigines of Australia. The Federation itself was founded on 
the assumption that the Aborigines would, quite literally, disappear. The two mentions they received in the 
Constitution were both negative” (Gough Whitlam, “Dragging the Chain: 1897-1997,” The Second Vincent Lingiari 
Memorial Lecture, Northern Territory University, Friday 29 Aug. 1997, n. pag, web, 19. Nov. 2014, 
<http://www.kooriweb.org/foley/essays/whitlam.html>, qtd. in Hart, Lester, and Stedman, 53). John William 
Tate elucidates what Whitlam might mean by ‘negative’: “Prior to its repeal by referendum in 1967, s. 127 of the 
Australian Constitution stated: ‘In reckoning the numbers of people of the [Australian] Commonwealth, or of a 
State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted’” (“John Howard’s ‘Nation’: 
Multiculturalism, Citizenship, and Identity,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 55.1 (2009): 97-120, 101, 
note 9). One may argue that this had been at least a form of recognition – albeit a racist one trying to reject the 
Aboriginal ‘other’ in an attempt to maintain the delusion of a white Australian ‘nation’. 
611 A lot of these issues are discussed in Huggan’s Australian Literature. See especially Chapter 2 “Beginning 
Again,” 35-70. 
612 Irene Watson, “In the Northern Territory Intervention: What is Saved or Rescued and at What Cost?” Cultural 
Studies Review 15.2 (2009): 45-60, 58, note 28. See also: Rebecca Stringer, “A Nightmare of the Neocolonial Kind: 
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the UN Special Rapporteur James Anaya613 – as a clear violation of the Aborigines’ human 
rights. Not only the millions of Asian immigrants, then, but also Aboriginal peoples themselves 
– and that is truly ironic – are kept outside many versions of ‘Australianness’.614 No wonder 
many Australians feel a “pain of unbelonging”.615 By 2016 the inappropriateness of the Legend 
of the 1890s – the myth of the foundation of Australian culture by white men such as Furphy, 
Lawson, Paterson, and, perhaps, Ned Kelly (especially his Jerilderie Letter) – has become so 
obvious, the magnitude of suppression necessary in order to maintain this illusion so 
enormous, that the question, ‘What is Australianness’, turns into a violent outcry that 
threatens to split the country. 
In this light, Peter Carey’s rewriting becomes political, even though both, his novels and 
the postcolonial readings by academics, are firmly situated within a Western intellectual 
context that still – precisely through its attempted deconstruction of origins – is preoccupied 
with installing Western foundations for ‘Australia’. 
 
10.3. Biographical Notes on Peter Carey’s Writing 
 
As has been said earlier, in order to contextualise Carey’s work fully, a few aspects of his 
personal history are very important. So we turn from the socio-political upheavals of the 
Australian 1970s to Carey’s individual upheavals. Famously, he states in “A Letter to Our Son”: 
                                                          
Politics of Suffering in Howard’s Northern Territory Intervention,” Borderlands e-journal, 19 Nov. 2007, web, 19 
Nov. 2014. <http://www.ntne.ws/#/article/500f70fac5b261906c000480>; J. C. Altman, “The Howard 
Government’s Northern Territory Intervention: Are Neo-Paternalism and Indigenous Development Compatible?” 
Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research 16 (2007): 1-19. 
613 James Anaya, “Observations on the Northern Territory Emergency Response in Australia,” Report by the 
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James 
Anaya, United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Fifteenth Session, Agenda Item 3, Appendix B 
25-41. Anaya sees “several problematic aspects from an indigenous human rights standpoint” and points out the 
“deep implications [of the Northern Territory Emergency Response] for a range of fundamental human rights, 
especially the right to non-discrimination” (25). See especially point III, “Incompatibility with the International 
Human Rights Standards” (28-33). 
614 Cf. Mary O’Dowd, “Place, Identity and Nationhood: The Northern Territory Intervention as the Final Act of a 
Dying Nation,” Continuum 23.6 (2009): 803-25. 
615 For the concept of unbelonging, see Sheila Collingwood-Whittick, Introduction, The Pain of Unbelonging: 
Alienation and Idenitity in Australian Literature, ed. Sheila Collingwood-Whittick, Pref. Germaine Greer, 
Cross/Cultures 91, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007, xiii-xliii. The expression “pain of unbelonging”, Collingwood-
Whittick explains, goes back to an interview by Germaine Greer (xiv). It is important to acknowledge the quite 
different and perhaps much more severe pain of unbelonging suffered by indigenous peoples. Collingwood-
Whittick concludes: “Notwithstanding the asymmetrical, not to say antagonistic positions they occupy in the still-
dichotomous space of the ex-colony, both the indigenous and the non-indigenous peoples continue to suffer 
today from the psychic repercussions of geographical and cultural deracination to which colonialism inexorably 
exposes all those whose lives it touches” (xl). 
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“I recognize that I have made a whole career out of making my anxieties get up and walk 
around, not only in my own mind, but in the minds of readers.”616 And in a 2006 interview 
with the Paris Review’s Radhika Jones, he adds: “No one could have guessed that the 
experience [of being sent to a boarding school at eleven years of age] would finally produce 
an endless string of orphan characters in my books. […] [I]t took me ages to figure that out.”617 
As these two quotes indicate, a few biographical points are particularly germane for 
contextualising Carey’s writing. The most extensive and most recent, though unfortunately 
sometimes flawed, chronology of Peter Carey’s life can be found in Mary Ellen Snodgrass’ 
Literary Companion (2010), and the following notes draw heavily, though definitely not 
exclusively, on her work.618 
Carey was born on 7 May 1943 and grew up in Bacchus Marsh, “a working-class rural 
town of 4,000 located 33 miles west of Melbourne”.619 His parents managed a garage and 
General Motors dealership, a point that is important, for example, in Illywhacker, The Tax 
Inspector or A Long Way from Home. From 1954 to 1960 he was a boarder at Geelong 
Grammar School, and in 1961 he enrolled at Monash University, Melbourne, studying 
organic chemistry and zoology. Here, at the age of 18, he met Leigh Weetman, two years his 
senior and his future wife (they married on 7 November 1964). “A year before”, Carey reports, 
“I had been at a boys’ boarding school. Now I was free, smoking cigarettes, having sex”.620 A 
few months into the relationship, Leigh got pregnant. And that is where the fun ended. 
Abortion was still illegal in Australia at the time and Carey relates how a pharmacist 
refused to sell him a drug for an abortion, even threatening to call the police621 – a scene that 
he would later rework for his novel, Illywhacker.622 In a dramatic episode, and with the help 
of Carey’s zoology professor and Leigh’s mother, the couple finally managed to illegally abort 
the foetus three months into pregnancy. But in 1970 the nightmare of the abortion resurfaced 
with a vengeance. That year, the couple had a stillborn daughter. “[W]e did not know”, writes 
Carey in his harrowing account of the events, “that the fifty pounds the strawberry-blonde 
                                                          
616 Peter Carey, “A Letter to Our Son,” Collected Stories, London: Faber and Faber, 1995, 338-53, 342. 
617 Radhika Jones, “Peter Carey, The Art of Fiction No. 188,” The Paris Review 177 (2006): n.pag. 
618 Mary Ellen Snodgrass, Peter Carey: A Literary Companion, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010. 
619 Snodgrass, 5. 
620 Peter Carey, “A Small Memorial. To the Children the Author Tried to Forget,” New Yorker 25 Sept. 1995: 54, 
59-63, 54. 
621 Carey, “A Small Memorial,” 60. 
622 See Horace Dunlop’s unsuccessful attempt to get abortion medicine for Phoebe in Book I, Chapter 68, 
especially the invalid receipt he receives from Bernstein and the scene at the pharmacist’s (Carey, Illywhacker, 
155-60, especially 157-8). 
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woman counted so carefully [at the abortion clinic] had also procured an ‘incompetent 
cervix’, which was why the next pregnancy repeated itself like a sequence from ‘Last Year 
at Marienbad’”. Indeed, the ordeal did go on. “Like all nightmares”, writes Carey, “the 
repetition was not exact. This time there were twins, and when the labor was over they 
were alive. […] To the nurse, I said, ‘Will they be all right?’ ‘Oh, no,’ she said. ‘Oh, no’”.623 
The twins, a boy and a girl, died shortly after their birth. 
The ordeal of an illegal abortion and the nightmares of anxiety, guilt, and death connected 
with it, find their way into many of Carey’s works, from the short story “Peeling” (1972624) 
to traumatic episodes in Illywhacker (1985) and Jack Maggs (1997);625 while in Amnesia 
(2014) Doris ‘Baillieux’ is confronted with the inhumane conservatism concerning 
extramarital pregnancy in wartime Australia.626 
In 1961, not long after the illegal abortion, Carey used a serious car accident as excuse, 
as he said,627 to leave university and began working for an advertising agency. From 1967 
to 1970 he travelled in Europe and temporarily lived in London, in 1973 he separated from 
Leigh Weetman, and, according to Wroe, “he began to live with the painter Margot 
Hutcheson” from 1974 onwards.628 He moved with her into a hippie community in Yandina 
(paradoxically “returning for five days a month to Sydney to work at Grey Advertising”), 
where they lived from 1977629 till 1980. But mainly he stayed in advertising during this 
period. In 1980 he even moved to Sydney to establish his own advertising agency with Bani 
McSpedden and sold his share only in 1989 when he moved to New York with his second 
wife Alison Summers and their first son, Sam (he met her in 1984 while working on a script 
for the rock musical Illusions). By then, however, Carey was already a well-established 
author and had won the Booker Prize for Oscar and Lucinda (1988). 
                                                          
623 Ibid., 63. 
624 Before appearing in The Fat Man in History, “Peeling” was first published in Meanjin 31.1 (1972): 38-45 (see 
Gaile, Fabulating Beauty, 353). 
625 See Phoebe’s ordeal during the unsuccessful abortion of Charles in Illywhacker (Chapters 69, 71); Jack Maggs’ 
impression of the forcefully aborted son of Sophina Smith’s and his (204-5, 238-41) and the fatal abortion of 
eighteen-year-old Elizabeth Warriner’s and Tobias Oates’ (her brother-in-law) child (313-6, 325-6) in Jack Maggs. 
626 See especially Amnesia, 95-9. 
627 See Woodcock, 3; Woodcock refers to Candida Baker, “Peter Carey,” Yacker: Australian Writers Talk About 
Their Work, ed. Candida Baker, Sydney: Picador, 1986, 54-77, 71. 
628 Wroe, n.pag. 
629 I refer here to Woodcock 7; Hassal, Dancing on Hot Macadam, xv; Huggan, Peter Carey, viii; and explicitly not 
to Snodgrass, who puts Carey’s move to Yandina at the year 1976 (Snodgrass, 13). 
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Obviously Carey used his experience in Yandina in Bliss (1981) and His Illegal Self (2008) 
and perhaps also for some episodes in Amnesia (2014), but also a lot of his family background 
– the experience in advertising, his parents’ car dealership, small-town life in Bacchus Marsh 
– went into his stories and novels, perhaps most thoroughly into Illywhacker, and A Long Way 
from Home where he also uses a lot of background from his grandparents – such as aviation, 
showmanship, nostalgia for England – if we are to believe Snodgrass’ account on these 
details.630 
                                                          
630 She writes about Carey’s paternal grandfather: “In addition to owning a stable and operating a taxi in Port 
Melbourne, R. G. held Australia’s first commercial flying permit, delivered the nation’s first airmail, and owned 
the island’s first airfield. He piloted a Bleriot XI monoplane from Adelaide to Gawler on November 23, 1917. The 
plane survives on display in the Powerhouse Museum in Sydney.” And of Carey’s maternal grandfather she says: 
“his paternal grandfather [sic. She means ‘maternal’, however.], John Thomas Warriner, a teacher from 
Camperdown, thought of England as ‘home,’ a sentiment shared with Lucinda Leplastrier, a co-protagonist of 
Carey’s neo-Victorian novel Oscar and Lucinda (1988, 168, 194) and the title figure in Jack Maggs (1997)” 
(Snodgrass, 5). Why she leaves out Herbert Badgery’s father in Illywhacker in this list is not clear. 
